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1 CONTEXTS OF EDUCATION THROUGHOUT THE LIFE 
COURSE – EDUCATIONAL CAREER PATTERNS IN 
SWEDEN, GERMANY AND THE US. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: Life Courses, Education and Life Chances 
Compared to former societal and economic orders, in advanced industrial societies 
life chances are strongly determined by education. Scholars with an interest in social 
inequality and intergenerational social mobility have recognized this circumstance 
and the debate about intergenerational inequality has been extended by a large body 
of research on educational inequality. 
At the same time, life course researchers have sought to understand how 
biographical patterns change in societies with steadily increasing opportunities. There 
is evidence for an increasing variation in the sequence and order of important life 
events and life phases of young people in economically highly developed societies 
(e.g. Shanahan, 2000). Individual consequences of this process can be manifold and 
depend on which periods of the life course and which areas of the biography are 
involved. Further, on the societal level consequences for social inequality can be 
expected, in particular if life courses diversify during formative periods with a key 
role for status attainment. Youth and young adulthood are important periods for the 
placement in the social order. Not last due to the fact that education still falls into 
these earlier parts of the life course. At the same time as individual life courses 
aggregate to outcomes on the societal level, society and its institutions shape 
individual life courses (Buchmann, 1989; Mayer and Müller, 1986). Social 
institutions, structural conditions and incentives as well as social conventions and 
norms determine how individuals will eventually live their life. 
Within this interplay of individual life courses and societal institutions, the 
transition from the education system to the labor market is a central step for the 
1 .  In troduct ion  
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biography of young people. Several studies show a de-standardization this area life 
too. The pattern of initial education and then a single entry event into the labor market 
does not characterize anymore the school-to-work transition of many young people 
(Brückner and Mayer, 2005; Buchmann, 1989). Other authors show that it depends on 
the country context in how far educational careers are intertwined with the labor 
market entry (Jacob and Weiss, 2010a). Furthermore, there the standardization of 
educational career patterns and their mixing with other activities is coupled in several 
context with ascriptive variables, such as social origin (Jacob and Weiss, 2010b for 
Germany) or race (Coleman, 1984 for the US). Much more frequently, the school to 
work transition is studied as a single event, or with a focus on the labor market career. 
Here, international comparisons weigh out by far the comparisons over time and 
reveal strong differences of in the standardization of life courses and the smoothness 
of a transition (Gangl, 2002; Kalter and Kogan, 2002; Kerckhoff, 2000; Kim and 
Kim, 2003; Kogan and Müller, 2003; Kogan, Noelke and Gebel, 2011; Kogan and 
Unt, 2008; Kurz et al., 2008; Leuze, 2010; Müller and Gangl, 2003a; Ryan, 2001; 
Saar, Unt and Kogan, 2008; Scherer, 2005; Shavit and Müller, 1998; Wolbers, 2007). 
These studies identify typical features of the transition process in the different 
societies and connected them with the structural conditions of the labor market and 
the education system. Empirically, this literature focuses on the integration into the 
labor market. Studies incorporating other life domains – e.g. family formation during 
the early career or further schooling – are less frequent (cf. Scherer, 2001 for an 
excpetion). 
In parallel to the de-standardization of life courses, the tertiary education 
system expanded throughout the last four decades in all industrial societies. Higher 
education systems are confronted with a strongly increasing number of students 
(Arum, Gamoran and Shavit, 2007). This has consequences for life course research as 
well as for research on inequality: Firstly, the postsecondary education system, and in 
particular tertiary education, has gained power for structuring life courses and 
working careers. And secondly, this goes along with an increasing role of higher 
education institutions for the assignment of social positions. As a consequence, the 
attention of the scientific debate on intergenerational inequality shifted partly into the 
postsecondary part of education, what is mirrored in a large number of studies 
showing social origin differences in higher education attainment (Astin and Oseguera, 
2004; Davies and Guppy, 1997; Mayer, Müller and Pollak, 2007; Müller and Pollak, 
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2007; Reimer and Pollak, 2005; Schindler and Lörz, 2011; Schindler and Reimer, 
2011; Shavit et al., 2007). The increasing number of highly educated individuals goes 
along with the expectation of a devaluation of higher education for the labor market 
status. Even though these expectations have not been confirmed by recent research, 
e.g. for Germany (Klein, 2011), the contribution of the higher education system to the 
continuously high intergenerational stability of social position has increased. Thus, 
studying characteristics of the higher education system and its interplay with other 
institutions such as the secondary education system and the labor market has gained a 
larger role in research on inequality. 
One transition, which is a crucial aspect of de-standardized educational 
careers, is the return from the labor market back to school. Research on inequality 
often still assumes that education follows a straight route and studies this process 
mostly independent from the developments in other life domains. Human capital 
models of educational participation, for example, do not consider this possibility. 
From their viewpoint a re-enrollment would only occur if capital markets for credit 
constraints fail or human capital depreciates fast (Marcus, 1986). Empirically, an 
increasing number of country studies testify that the single transition-model is often 
not correct. Several authors find for the US context that interruptions within the 
educational career and delayed entry (or re-entry) are frequent (Adelman, 2006; Arum 
and Hout, 1998; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Light, 1996; Light, 1998; Maralani, 
2011; Marcus, 1986; Oettinger, 1993; Roksa et al., 2007; Taniguchi and Kaufman, 
2007). Studying the de-standardization of the life course, Buchmann finds for the US 
already in the 1980´s an increase in the share of interrupted educational careers 
(Buchmann, 1989). Arum and Hout (1998) link the issue of educational career 
patterns to specific educational institutions and connect the diversification of 
education with the diversification of individual life courses. Empirically, social origin 
effects have been observed also for late education within other education systems 
such as the US (e.g. Goldrick-Rab, 2006; Goldrick-Rab and Han, 2011; Roksa, 2011). 
Outside this heavily US-centered body of research on college transitions, less is 
known about the link between such non-traditional education patterns and social 
origin, in particular not with regard to systematic country differences. Past studies on 
the German context observed that different specific types of deviations from the 
norm-educational career are more common among lower social origin students on 
specific sections of the educational career (on the participation in the so-called '2. 
1 .  In troduct ion  
17 
 
Bildungsweg' e.g. Henz, 1997; for multiple postsecondary degrees e.g. Jacob, 2004; 
for the secondary school system in comparison to the Netherlands Jacob and Tieben, 
2009), but also in a more comprehensive view (Hillmert and Jacob, 2010; Jacob and 
Weiss, 2010b). 
 
 
This volume aims at integrating research on educational inequality by social origin 
further with the life course perspective. I will go beyond previous studies in several 
aspects by studying patterns of and transitions within postsecondary educational 
careers. Two central research questions are being discussed: 
First, I will study social inequality in educational career patterns. The target 
sample consists of all those young adults who qualify for higher education. Specific 
attention will be given to the decision to re-enroll in the education system, which is a 
core component of many non-standard educational careers. In order to evaluate the 
role of structural conditions, I compare three country cases: Germany, the US and 
Sweden. 
Second, I will investigate the effects of non-traditional educational career 
patterns on a successful labor market entry. This second step makes a relevant 
addition to the first step for evaluating the contribution of educational careers to 
intergenerational persistence of social status. 
 
 
The comparative study follows a tradition of life course research with a focus on 
structural conditions, set by the state, as framework for individual life courses (Mayer 
and Müller, 1986). Recent reforms in the European higher education sector strengthen 
the relevance of a comparative study, in particular with regard to the developments in 
Germany. The call for more upward permeability of the higher education system for 
disadvantaged groups has been one motivation for the so-called Bologna reforms. Not 
only is the tradition of long study programs given up and the educational career is 
broken down into several steps by the Bachelor-Master system. A central part of this 
reform also aimed at widening access for non-traditional students and at creating 
opportunities for more individualistic educational careers (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, 2012, p. 31; Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive 
1 .  In troduct ion  
18 
 
Agency Eurydice, 2012)
1
. In sum, these changes bring the German postsecondary 
education sector much closer to the model of the Anglo-Saxon and the Nordic 
countries, which is a major motivation for my selection of comparison cases. 
 
 
Throughout the volume, several seemingly vague or unusual terms have to be used; in 
many cases for consistency with the literature. Some will be clarified within the next 
chapters and in section 1 within the short discussion of my methodological approach. 
Some other clarifications should be made beforehand. Firstly, a large body of research 
investigates the role of education in the life course, but mostly with regard to training 
or less formal education. The role of these forms of skill formation have gained much 
attention within the sociological and economic literature both with regard to 
inequalities in access and the effects on later career mobility. For this volume, when I 
refer to education, I mean ‘schooling’ throughout. Instead of training courses for 
specific job tasks, I am interested in attainment of education outside companies, or as 
the NLSY79-questionnaire asked about in my American sample: ‘being enrolled in 
regular school’. 
Secondly, the type of education I am studying is postsecondary education, 
which is in some few cases limited to higher education. Postsecondary education 
comprises both higher education and other forms of education beyond secondary 
school. For the US, the differentiation is less important because most scholars simply 
refer to ‘college’. In European contexts a number of educational alternatives exist for 
those who are qualified to enter higher education, e.g. vocational (apprenticeship) 
training in Germany. I will subsume all of them under the label of ‘postsecondary 
education’. My sample is limited to those young adults who are entitled to enter 
higher education. Thus, postsecondary schooling collects all types of regular schools 
these individuals could visit. 
Thirdly, as soon as life courses are involved, the terms standardization, 
patterns, sequencing or individualization are frequently used within the literature 
(Brückner and Mayer, 2005). The central concern with regard to educational careers 
throughout this volume is de-institutionalization and de-standardization at the same 
                                                 
1
 See for example the newsletter of the project on quality management of the university president 
conference (Projekt Qualitätsmanagement der Hochschulrektorenkonferenz) in January 2009, p. 12, 
with the article ‘Stifterverband fordert Öffnung der Hochschulen für Berufstätige’. 
1 .  In troduct ion  
19 
 
time. To recapitulate this, the following definitions given by Brückner and Mayer 
(Brückner and Mayer, 2005, p. 32) are helpful: 
 
‘The institutionalization of life courses refers to the process by which normative, legal or 
organizational rules define the social and temporal organization of human lifes. It can refer to 
stages or states in lives which can be formally decreed like marriage, education and retirement. 
It can also refer to transitions like leaving school, entry into and exits from labor contracts, or 
ages of pension entitlements.’ … ‘Conversely, de-institutionalization would then mean that 
states, stages, events, and transitions, which at earlier times were clearly differentiated, are 
being re-integrated or fused’. 
 
‘The standardization of life courses refers to processes by which specific states or events and 
the sequences in which they occur become more universal for given populations or that their 
timing becomes more uniform.’ … ‘Conversely, de-standadization would mean that life states, 
events and their sequences can become experiences which either characterize an increasingly 
smaller part of a population or occur at more dispersed ages and with more dispersed 
durations.’ 
 
‘Differentiation refers to the process of where the number of distinct states or stages across the 
life time increases’. 
 
‘… the term individualization (Beck, 1986; Junge, 2002; Schimank, 2002; Wohlrab-Sahr, 
1992) is frequently invoked to refer to many of the changes mentioned above. It is a more 
interpretative concept according to change which individuals are assumed to gain greater 
control over their lives, thus pursuing a wider variety of life designs and life trajectories.’ 
 
Comparing these definitions with the motivation for my study as outlined above helps 
to substantiate the research question on the institutional level. The process I am 
expecting for the German context, which already advanced much further in Sweden 
and the US, is de-institutionalization. Flexibility for non-traditional careers or 
openness are terms I am often using when referring to the degree of 
institutionalization of education systems. The consequence I am expecting on the 
individual level is de-standardization. In cases I use terms such as ‘diversity in 
patterns’ or ‘individualization’, these refer to the degree of standardization of life 
courses throughout a population. However, I am not only concerned with the overall 
stage of de-standardization of societies, but also with individual deviations from 
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national standards. Deviating cases from the nationally institutionalized framework 
with regard to education will often be termed non-traditional students.  
The main two dimensions of institutionalization of education system I will 
compare are openness of the higher education system and flexibility. Openness (as 
opposite to restrictive or selective) broadly refers to the question how selectively and 
irreversibly the education system defines access to higher education. Open systems 
would be characterized by a few barriers regarding nominal eligibility to higher 
education, which are permeable compared to other systems. Flexibility means the 
institutional set or rules defining whether students individually decide about their 
curricula, class schedules and educational career trajectories. To exemplify, policies 
which facilitate credit transfer between colleges, allow part-time studies, stop-outs for 
a longer time or distance studies would increase flexibility. Generally, in contrast to 
openness, flexibility can apply even if a system is selective. Flexibility does increase 
openness by removing barriers for re-entrants, but openness is a much broader 
concept capturing more than the mere institutional design of the higher education 
system. In principle, they are two different theoretical dimensions. Empirically 
however, they are often coupled. Whether the two characteristics are systematically 
linked our not would be another question for institutionalist researchers, but 
empirically they often are. A systematic link between them seems highly plausible. 
Therefore, I may sometimes lump the two dimensions together as systems, even 
though I am aware that the concrete institutions accounting for each of them are 
different ones. To distinguish is, however, important when thinking about policy 
implications. The counterfactual for increasing openness includes removing 
selectivity from the secondary education system and in consequence shifting decisions 
about educational decisions into later ages. Increasing flexibility on the other hand 
would only mean to make the higher education system more open for students with 
other obligations, but who already qualified for higher education. Selectivity of the 
secondary education system can remain as it is. 
 
This exercise in nominal definitions refers in particular to section 2 and 
chapter 3.4, where measures are defined more technically. But also all other sections 
are affected. The definitions I have given here limit the framework out of which the 
phenomena I investigate throughout the book, which all can be subsumed under these 
terms. 
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The book is partitioned into six sections. The remainder of this section 
introduces into the fundamentals of my international comparison: the reasoning for a 
small N comparative case study, the case selection and the institutional setup of the 
comparison countries as well as some first descriptive facts on them. Within this 
section, I will also shortly familiarize with the datasets I am analyzing and how I 
define and measure social origin. Section 2 describes the typical structures of 
educational careers in the three country contexts and compares their degree of de-
standardization. Following that, section 3 contains four chapters on inequality 
throughout postsecondary educational careers. Then, the last two sections engage into 
a micro-centered approach. The question why these micro studies follow a country 
comparison and not vice versa might appear somewhat unusual. Choosing this 
structure has its major reason in the small number of comparative studies on the main 
research questions. In order to be able to improve structural explanations, the relevant 
micro-processes that can inform macro-level comparisons had to be picked yet. 
Completing a first macro comparison results into questions about micro-level 
processes. Then, studying these questions more carefully can inform future 
institutional research. Beyond understanding social inequality in later educational 
transitions, the aim of the individual centered chapters is to eventually contribute to 
more informed studies on the institutional level in the future. In chapter 4.3 I take a 
first start by comparing Sweden and the US with regard to a more specific research 
question on costs and parental class positions as deterrents for re-enrollment into 
postsecondary education. Finally, in section 5 I ask about the consequences of de-
standardized educational careers for the labor market entry after completing 
education, my second research question. Section 6 closes with a short conclusion and 
discusses policy implications. 
In the remaining part of section 1, I will introduce into the backgrounds of this 
comparison, including the case selection and a description of the country contexts. 
Further, I will present the datasets used throughout the empirical chapters. 
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1.2 Institutional Structures and Individual Life Courses: 
Approaches to Research on the Individual and the Societal 
Level and their Linkage 
The question how states and institutions shape living conditions and social realities is 
central to sociological research. States intervene into and structure life courses to a 
large degree, even though these macro structures can be easily overlooked since they 
are constant over comparatively large groups of people and historic periods. However, 
theorizing on institutional conditions followed very different approaches being rooted 
in very different traditions. Therefore, I will discuss some methodological of my 
research first before I come to more specific aspects of the research question and my 
strategies for answering it. 
This volume addresses different questions on two different types of ‘units of 
analysis’. Individuals and their life courses on the one hand, institutional settings on 
the level of societies on the other hand. On the individual level, data from large-scale 
survey studies are the basic source of information for my research. I use quantitative 
statistical analyses to draw conclusions about individuals in each of the countries. The 
methodology on the societal level on the other hand is a comparative qualitative case 
study of three societies. Since the debate about methodological approaches of 
comparative research in the social sciences is a controversial one, I will briefly 
discuss the standpoints in the literature and further spend some space to justify my 
choice of a qualitative design. 
 
1.2.1 Societal and Institutional Structures as Conditions for Life Courses: 
Regimes, Variables and Cases 
The aim of comparative research in the social sciences is to use real world 
institutional differences between countries for learning about the impact of institutions 
on various outcomes. So far, this seems to be the shared basic consensus of all 
participants in the debate about how comparative research should be done 
‘appropriately’. Beyond that, however, the dispute on the question how to handle the 
complex situation of few and very complex units of analyses is discussed 
controversially. These complex units – of which only few exist – are contingent in 
their historical development and by far not independent from each other (cf. 
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Ebbinghaus, 2005). This seems a difficult starting point for ‘business as usual’ of 
quantitative sociologists – or maybe even for any research? What outweighs these 
worries in my opinion is that learning about institutional conditions and their 
influences on individuals has strong potential on contributing to sociological 
explanations of inequalities. And furthermore, if it succeeds it has the potential to 
develop information which can inform political debates. While e.g. explanations 
referring to human biology or natural contexts often are important – but their causes 
are unavoidable – the design of institutional structures in most cases dates back to 
political decisions. Reforms, e.g. of the healthcare insurance, pension system, labor 
market regulations or the education system are policy decisions. The impact of ash of 
volcanoes on air traffic or of sun on Texas and Australia might have as far reaching 
implications for life courses, but cannot be changed by policy makers or any other 
human beings. By contrast, the subjects of comparative research in the social sciences 
are subject to action, and not only reaction, of policy makers. 
 
1.2.1.1 Comparative Research Beyond Description 
Out of the tradition of historical comparative research – which has emphasized the 
uniqueness of cases – the strand of comparative research in sociology has compared 
country cases in detail. As Scheuch (1990) has put it, in studies emphasizing the 
historic context and unrevealing systematic institutional links, context is ‘treated as a 
real thing’ (Scheuch, 1990, p. 31). However, the motivation of comparative studies in 
the social sciences was not to describe the uniqueness of cases per se, but rather to use 
the generalizable characteristics of them for building and improving social science 
theories. Przeworski and Teune suggest to consequently following research strategies 
that are suitable to serve this aim: 
 
‘…explanation in comparative research is possible if and only if particular social systems 
observed in time and space are not viewed as finite conjunctions of constituent elements, but 
rather as residua of theoretical variables. General lawlike sentences can be utilized for 
explanatory purposes. Only if the classes of social events are viewed as generalizable beyond 
the limits of any particular historical social system can general lawlike sentences be used for 
explanation. Therefore the role of comparative research in the process of theory-building and 
theory-testing consists of replacing proper names of social systems by the relevant variables’ 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p. 30). 
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When following this suggestion in a consequent way, comparative research will find 
itself in a contradictory situation. On one side, there is the aim of reducing and 
generalizing information to create systematic and abstract theoretical knowledge. On 
the other side, empirical research can only base its inference on few repetitions of 
differences and regularities between a small set of cases only. The fierce debate 
accompanying all efforts to realize empirical comparative research thus comes at little 
surprise. The core of the debate in different social sciences refers to the ‘small N 
problem’ – i.e. the small number of cases that differs on a large number of variables. 
As for any non-experimental observational study, causal interpretations of the results 
are subject to a number of fallacies. I will not discuss these problems here again in 
length, as there is a large number of contributions doing this already (King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994; Lieberson, 1985; Lieberson, 1994). 
 
1.2.1.2 The Number of Cases: Why not as Many as Possible? 
Two methodological approaches are proposed to tackle this problem. One camp of 
scholars proposes macro-quantitative studies as the solution. They use statistical 
techniques and compare as a many countries as possible to handle the problem of too 
many confounding variables by statistical control. In Scheuch’s terms, their approach 
is to treat ‘context as a set of variables’ (Scheuch, 1990, p. 31). Such studies became a 
very popular variant of comparative research. With the availability of more and more 
– mainly European – comparative data sets, this approach has experienced a boom. In 
contrast, proponents of the case approach criticize the use of statistical simplifications 
and the treatment of large numbers of countries as samples for several reasons. Many 
scholars have attempted to structure the discussion and describe the problems arising 
from the frequent use of this approach, often in their own terminology. For this 
chapter, I will review only a small part of this literature, which refers to the problem 
of missing information in the reduction by statistical models. Within the context of 
institutionalist life course analysis, Mayer (2009) divided the different research 
traditions into the ‘variable approach’ and the small N ‘case approach’. Macro-
quantitative studies of the variable approach-type build statistical models for isolating 
single variables. This raises at first the question, whether a sometimes more or less 
thoughtful statistical control of other variables would do this job properly. If enough 
proper measures for all relevant variables are available for enough country cases, this 
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strategy might work – in theory. In practice, it is likely that quite a number of macro-
quantitative studies would benefit from a deeper knowledge of the single country 
cases to improve model building. 
Comparative case studies can thus be justified as a helpful source of 
information for later statistical model building. But should the purpose of qualitative 
comparative case studies be reduced to an inductive, premature form of the ‘true 
science of macro-quantitative comparison’? As Kittel has noted in his discussion of 
fallacies of the macro-quantitative approach, careful and deep comparison has been a 
major method of many classical sociologists (Kittel, 2006). The reason could lie in the 
circumstance that entire social processes or ‘systems’ and their path dependent 
development (Ebbinghaus, 2005) can hardly be pinned down to a single variable and 
are easily overlooked when reducing country characteristics to variables (Brady, 
Collier and Seawright, 2004; Stinchcombe, 1968). A good example is the theoretical 
distinction between the logics of internal and occupational labor markets and their 
interplay with the educational system. This established explanation for many 
phenomena of youth labor markets in different societies was developed in several 
small N studies (Kerckhoff, 1995; Marsden, 1999; Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre, 
1986; Müller and Shavit, 1998a). Similarly, comparative studies (e.g. Gangl, 2004) 
could contribute much to an understanding of how institutional arrangements within 
countries influence individual life course patterns. The fruitful impact of these 
examples on sociological knowledge shows that it can be worthwhile to engage in 
such effort and discuss each country in more detail than simply modeling their 
characteristics in regression models. The explanations developed in a cumulative 
debate of such studies are well established, even though could never be tested 
applying more rigorous, quantitative methods. Moreover, path dependencies 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005) might be overlooked, which may or may not be seen as additional 
problem. The problem of path dependency is in principle solvable in quantitative 
studies, if unite roots are modeled e.g. using fixed effects models (given the 
researcher knows about the problem, of course). Therefore, I see the major divide in 
the question how detailed information on single cases is needed, against the need for 
as many cases as possible to establish causal relationships. 
Beyond historical contingency and the difficulty of capturing systematic 
complex interrelations of institutions, other problems have been brought up against 
macro-quantitative studies. One is the impossibility of random sampling. Deliberative 
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sampling of countries based on theoretical hypotheses seems unavoidable, given the 
small number of industrial nations that exists. 
What is to be admitted by proponents of the qualitative approach is the 
awareness of great difficulties to prove causal relationships in one single empirical 
study. Evaluating theoretical arguments against such kind of empirical evidence can 
only be done with much caution and should be embedded into a longer process of 
scientific discussion. Bueno de Mesquita describes this process of cumulative 
establishment of explanations and evaluating theories using comparative case studies 
as ‘the first principle of wing walking’ (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003). He suggests 
exposing theories to a ‘storm’ of strong scientific knowledge that could best serve as 
falsification of them following the basic suggestions of Popper (1963). The researcher 
who proposes theories on the other hand ‘should not abandon one theory for another 
until the new theory proves to be the better tool for explaining the events of interest’ 
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2003, p. 81). Sticking to these principles in a scientific debate 
leads to the continuous improvement of knowledge based on falsifications. But only 
careful checks, replications and the cumulative outcome of many empirical studies 
will slowly build up good explanations. A crucial step for finding empirical evidence 
with the potential of falsifying theories is the selection of strong cases, which also 
vary in theoretical relevant aspects. I therefore discuss the selection of the three 
country cases analyzed below under 1.3. 
This principle, however, implies that more cases with testable implication for 
a theory are always better than less and is thus in principle also in line with the 
variable approach. Detailed information on single cases might be needed too – but the 
more cases, the better. The fasten up the cumulative collection of more cases can 
indeed not be criticized on the basis of all those argument in favor of small N studies, 
if the complexity of single cases can be captured good enough. In the field of social 
stratification, cooperative comparative case studies have been used to compromise 
between detailed information of small N on the one side and the strength of large N 
designs in ruling out spuriousness on the other side (Arum, Gamoran and Shavit, 
2007). Each country is described in its own article or book chapter written by a 
country expert. The single chapters are written in a way that offers a good basis for 
the comparison. The comparison itself then summarizes the findings of the country 
chapter. These studies are able to present all cases in a sufficiently detailed way and at 
the same time use the practically maximal possible number of cases. In many nearby 
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areas of research similar to my research question, studies have yielded great insights 
on macro-level differences. For example on the transition from education to work 
(Müller and Gangl, 2003b; Shavit and Müller, 1998), inequality in educational 
achievement (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993) or inequality in the access to higher 
education (Shavit et al., 2007). Even though combining the strength of both 
approaches is an appealing strategy, I cannot follow this model for the comparative 
research within this volume. First and most trivial, dissertations cannot be authored by 
a large number of country experts whose findings are then summarized by the 
candidate. Second, I presume that the theoretical complexity of the research question 
on the micro-level also requires a more intense discussion about the micro-level 
mechanisms than one chapter per country. As the number of comparative studies on 
late educational participation is still very small, sound theoretical explanations have 
yet to be developed. Furthermore, two institutional areas and their interplay are 
relevant: the labor market as well as the educational system. Against this background, 
a detailed investigation of each of the country cases seems necessary instead of a 
strong simplification to single variables that are necessary for macro-quantitative 
comparisons. Third, any approach addressing the question of inequality throughout 
educational careers in adulthood that requires a larger quantity of countries or even 
repeated measurements over time for these countries could fail due to data 
unavailability. The fact that longitudinal data with detailed life histories is required 
limits the choice of country cases considerably. I will therefore focus on a comparison 
of three country cases with a long tradition of small-N comparisons, but less with 
regard to non-traditional educational careers, Germany, Sweden and the US. Although 
I cannot reject that more countries would be better – compromising on the depth of 
the country studies seems to be the more problematic alternative. 
 
1.2.1.3 Abstract Regimes or Concrete Institutions? 
Another methodological and theoretical problem is the question on how explicit 
single institutional differences should be addressed or how much entire systems can 
be treated as ‘regime types’. The latter may be a way of overcoming the problem of 
independent variables. Many examples of sociological work can be found that 
theoretically justifies the ‘lumping’ of states to regime types. Originally, these types 
fulfill exactly the purpose of describing entire systems of institutional regulations. The 
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clusters are justified by theoretical arguments how different institutional settings 
interact and develop in path dependencies arriving at stable higher-level system. The 
resulting regime typologies ought to be informative on many areas of social life and 
living conditions. At present, most prominent are probably Esping-Andersen´s 
‘Worlds of Welfare States’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and the ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’-typology (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice, 2001 with particular 
reference to education; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The aim of these studies is to find a 
‘higher dimension’ or regime behind institutional settings, shaping the conditions 
under which individuals live. The appealing feature of these approaches is that it 
enables to simplify and create labels for the complex institutional systems for 
comparative research. 
The high complexity of institutional settings is a strong challenge to 
comparative research and theoretically informed simplifications are therefore a 
welcome escape from the multitude of legal regulations, institutional settings and 
historical contexts for many researchers. Thus, the resulting regime types may inspire 
later studies on very different issues to ignore the full institutional setting and 
compare countries on the basis of regime types only. If intended or not, the ‘regime-
typologists’ have prepared the grounds for macro-quantitative comparisons by 
providing a variable that promises to capture the mechanisms and processes in a 
society under a simple label. Therefore, I argue that making the adaption of existing 
country clusters the theoretical backbone of new studies goes along with the danger of 
deviating from the origins of theorizing in concrete and real institutions. In the most 
simplified form the clusters are often nothing more but variables which are hard to 
capture in their intensity, in the timing of their development and in the way they can 
influence individual behavior. The practice of simplifying packages of institutions to 
regime types has provoked other critiques (Mayer, 2005). A broad categorization and 
labeling of regime types may lead to a problematic loss of information for the 
researcher and thus bare the potential of losing explanatory grid. At least three 
arguments guided me in not following this research tradition, and even ignoring their 
work to some degree. 
First, the labels of welfare state regimes or another grouping of countries may 
be too broad and general for distinguishing all relevant aspects and specific domains 
of the life course. States differ in many relevant institutional aspects, even when 
grouped into the same welfare state category (Mayer, 2005, p. 35f.). For individual 
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behavior, details can often be very powerful. For educational systems, this statement 
is at least as true as for other domains of the life course. To exemplify, Denmark 
shares many feature of the vocational training system with Germany, while Sweden 
emphasizes on general education and flexibility in the educational career throughout 
adulthood, and thus resembles many features that are known to be characteristic for 
the US system. In terms of Esping-Andersen’s worlds of welfare states, Sweden and 
Denmark would be analyzed as equivalent examples for the Nordic social democratic 
welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Second, partly as a result of the heterogeneity within the country clusters, 
Mayer argues that the comparison of individual states offers more opportunities for 
tracing specific life course domains to their adjacent policy domain (cf. Mayer, 2005). 
Explanations for educational career differences would first to be looked for in the set-
up of the educational system, and not the healthcare system. Such a focused view, he 
argues, enables to build macro-theoretical hypotheses that are informed by the micro 
level. Individual behavior can be directly tied to relevant policies. The advantage is 
that the choice of a reasonable sub-set of policy fields shrinks the gap that theories 
have to fill between exogenous institutions and individual life course outcomes. Thus, 
concrete institutions suit better for developing arguments based on methodological 
individualism
2
. More precise theoretical statements can be developed than under the 
broad framework of welfare state clusters. To some degree, the breakdown to specific 
institutional sub-systems seems as one would give up the idea of analyzing entire 
country-systems and move – at least somewhat – towards the variable approach. But 
this is not necessarily the case. Although the reduction to specific areas of institutional 
set-ups might ignore some contextual information, it still allows for more than the 
analysis of ‘variables’ without regarding any (historic national) context. 
Finally, a third advantage of more concrete hypotheses is their value for policy 
analyses and policy evaluation. As difficult as it is to establish causal relationships by 
doing comparative research, if this succeeds the causal link should be understood as 
good as possible. And it should be as useful as possible for evaluating future policies. 
This does not mean that direct policy evaluation should be the main aim of 
comparative research. But policy informative theory building can nevertheless be seen 
                                                 
2
 For the discussion on the benefits of building theory simultaneously on the micro and the macro-level 
see the contributions of Coleman (1990); or Esser (1999, , Ch.28). For a discussion of the purpose and 
limits of restricting theory-building to methodological individualism see Stinchcombe (1968). 
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as something useful, and nothing would be less explicit than knowing that a certain 
circumstance is as it is just because the country in which it occurs belongs to a cluster. 
Specific institutional areas, such as the educational system, the labor market or the 
system of unemployment protection and benefits, are not only more likely to explain 
properly, the practical value of theories on these systems is also greater. 
Following the arguments documented above, a small N comparative case 
study without the aim of creating ‘big’ regimes is the model I will follow. Having 
made this choice, I can now go on discussing the selection of cases. For such a small-
N study, deliberative case selection – instead of random sampling – is a central and 
crucial step (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Ebbinghaus, 2005). Previous research and 
theory should inform the selection of cases as much as possible – but also practical 
and methodological issues have to be regarded. The following section discusses the 
case selection. I will underpin case selection with theoretical arguments in places, but 
won’t develop my hypotheses for the comparative study in their full scope. This will 
be left for later chapters. 
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1.3 Case Selection: Educational Systems and Labor Markets – the 
Potential of a West-German, Swedish and US-American 
Comparison 
 
 
 
In the following I will briefly discuss the selection of the three country cases. An 
extensive discussion of case selection would normally require first a presentation of 
all theoretical hypotheses in detail. Up to this chapter, this has only been done in a 
rather crude way. The reason is that the broad research question on inequality in 
discontinuous educational careers is broken down to more concrete sub-questions that 
I discuss in their own chapters. Thus, it seems to make the single chapters easier to 
read if the theoretical hypotheses are derived in each chapter. For elucidating the case 
selection, I will therefore refer to rather global aspects of the education system and the 
labor market, affecting all different steps of educational careers. 
Most central institutions are the secondary and the postsecondary education 
systems. The secondary education system regulates access to higher education. The 
postsecondary education system is the actual institutional environment of individual 
educational choices. Furthermore, educational policies by the state accompanying the 
education system set-up itself - such as student aid or specific rules introduced by the 
government for non-traditional students - are to be considered. Beyond that, my 
macro-level arguments are also based on differences in the labor market. In short, this 
seems important as the labor market is the major alternative to schooling for young 
adults. It may well matter for educational decisions ‘what could be gained on the 
labor market by attending education’ (Becker, 1964). For non-traditional, later 
students the labor market also defines what is lost by giving up work and re-enroll. 
Therefore, labor markets and the higher education system were the focal institutions 
when selecting the comparison cases, apart from practical considerations such as the 
availability of previous national research and the accessibility of longitudinal datasets. 
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1.3.1 Germany´s Recent Development in the Education System and Future 
Policies as a Starting Point 
One of the motivations to engage in a country comparison is the recent development 
in the German education system implying a gradual assimilation to the Anglo-
American and Scandinavian education systems. I will thus start discussing the 
selection of country cases from these developments in Germany. I will limit the 
comparison to West Germany, since East German education and labor market careers 
were still strongly affected by the historically unique situation of the post-socialist 
transformation. Traditionally, the German educational system is a rather strictly 
institutionalized and inflexible one, even for postsecondary education. Access was 
very restricted by prior educational achievement, options for non-traditional students 
were scarce (Schuetze and Slowey, 2002; Teichler and Wolter, 2004). In the last 
years, reforms stimulated by the European Union and the German government, have 
changed the system with the aim of becoming more flexible and open for non-
traditional students. Until the Bologna reforms, Germany’s higher education system 
was a parallel-stratified system with two major tiers (cf. chapter 1.4). In the early 
2000´s, this has started to change and new, sequential elements of stratification were 
introduced. Yet, a before-after comparison of entire educational careers of German 
students is impossible due to the slow implementation of the reforms and the long 
life-course period to be observed. International comparisons of the earlier years of 
reorganization to other education systems are more feasible. 
Two countries that have de-institutionalized their higher education sector and 
introduced such flexible arrangements in higher education much earlier are Sweden 
and the United States. First, the sequentially stratified education system – that 
Germany has implemented later – has existed there for a long time already. And 
second, restrictions in access to higher education are rather loose. With regard to 
policies fostering educational career flexibility, both countries are far ahead in the 
direction that Germany seems to go. In the 1970’s Sweden made reforms similar to 
the ones as Germany is undergoing now, but in an even more rigorous way (see 
chapter 1.4 for description of all three higher education systems). As will be shown in 
later chapters, there is now a high amount of adult learners in the tertiary sector. By 
international comparison, Sweden fares on the top of the distribution of the different 
indicators of adults participation in formal schooling (e.g. Róbert, 2012). Sweden thus 
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qualifies as a comparison case for the old German system, as it offers a prospective 
view on the effects of the reforms that Germany has just started. It fundamentally 
differs though in central aspects, e.g. the generous Swedish student support. 
The United States have an even longer tradition for flexible arrangements in 
higher education. Driven by the growth of the community colleges, tertiary education 
targets a much broader group of students, including a large number of mature students 
(cf. chapter 1.4 of this volume). The recognition of previous courses in other colleges 
is as common as part time studies. Thus stop-outs, switching between colleges and 
combining college with work are easy to realize. 
With regard to the secondary education system, both comparison cases have in 
common that lower educational institutions are, compared to Germany, much less 
rigid and consequent filters for eligibility to higher education. access to higher 
education is comparatively open. The gatekeeping-function of schools is not very 
rigid compared to Germany. Germany´s recent reforms for higher education studies 
without general education certificate (e.g. Buhr et al., 2008; Hanft and Brinkmann, 
2013) as well as the large increase of students who are admitted via vocational tracks 
in secondary school (Schindler, 2012) show that countries also assimilate in this 
respect. 
All in all, the American as well as the Swedish systems is very flexible 
compared to the German case. Therefore, they qualify for a comparison with 
Germany in order to inform expectations about possible consequences of the present 
German reforms. Justification of the choice of these comparison cases is further 
strengthened by the fact that, apart from educational flexibility, other relevant 
institutions such as student support or labor market regulation differ between these 
two countries. 
The triple Germany, the US and Sweden is a frequently studied set of cases 
within comparative research. Previous research has mainly highlighted system 
differences and rarely pointed out similarities between any of the three. Many studies 
have used the three cases as ideal types for institutional settings. Quite a number of 
these studies have found that each of the three cases frames life courses in its own 
way throughout different sub-systems of the welfare state. Mayer (2005) as well as 
DiPrete (2002) summarize comparisons on the national institutional configurations 
and their effects on life courses and inequality. Table 1.3.1 is an excerpt of Mayer´s 
table 2.5 (Mayer, 2005, pp. 34-35) including those institutions that are of particular 
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importance for educational career patterns. The single institutions and their effects 
both on the trajectories of postsecondary education as well as on inequality in 
education need to be discussed in more detail in the theoretical sections of the 
respective chapters. It is evident from table 1.3.1, that the similarity of Sweden and 
the United States in the flexibility of postsecondary education is by no means 
transferable to other policy fields
3
. 
 
Table 1.3.1: Comparing institutional settings and life-course outcomes (Mayer, 2005)
.
 
life course institutions United States Germany Sweden 
schooling low stratification, low 
standardization, general 
education 
highly stratified, high 
standardization 
low stratification, high 
standardization 
vocational training marginalized vocational 
school, on-the-job 
training 
apprentice/vocational 
school, dual system, 
highly standardized, 
employer/ 
union coordinated 
vocational school (upper 
secondary), 
unstandardized, 
uncoordinated 
school-to-work linkages loose linkages, personal 
networks 
tight linkages, 
apprenticeships, 
employment offices 
loose linkages, labor 
exchange 
firm-based institutions weak internal labor 
markets, high 
occupational welfare 
strong internal labor 
markets, medium 
occupational welfare 
weak internal labor 
markets, low 
occupational welfare 
active labor market 
policy 
low (medium) training/ 
employment subsidies 
high vocational 
(re)training; low skill 
public employment 
labor market regulation deregulated, weak job 
protection 
highly regulated, work 
conditions and benefits, 
strong job protection 
medium regulation, work 
conditions and benefits, 
weak job protection 
family policies: family 
allowance, childcare, 
parental leave 
income replacement direct cash transfer-
entitled income 
replacement; long job 
protection 
direct cash transfer to 
child; strong public 
provision of childcare; 
long/generous income 
replacement and job 
protection 
Source: Mayer, 2005; pp.34-35. 
 
 
 
1.3.2 Labor Market Regulation 
Table 1.3.1 already identifies differences in labor market policies and identifies 
differences between Sweden and the US, but also between Sweden and Germany. I 
argue, however, that the Swedish system was closer to the German one in the 1990´s 
                                                 
3
 Regarding school-to-work linkages it should be noted that the table refers to lower qualifications. For 
higher education, the linkages are certainly weaker in Germany and more alike those in other contexts 
(cf. Kim and Kim, 2003 for a comparison of the German system to the UK). So far, not much research 
has dealt with the question in how far the German higher education system has similar particularities 
by international comparison as the secondary vocational education system. 
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when most of the educational career I will study took place. Therefore, table 1.3.2 
compares labor market policies again referring to the relevant historical period. Two 
summary-measures capture several characteristics of the labor market affecting 
individual life courses. The employment protection legislation defines how stable jobs 
can be expected to be once they are entered. The flexible US system is mirrored in 
educational careers with more frequent interruptions, more frequent transitions 
between occupations, but also less severe average scaring effects for temporal labor 
market dropouts and a generally easier access to jobs for labor market outsiders 
(DiPrete and McManus, 1996; Gangl, 2004; Kappelhoff and Teckenberg, 1987; 
Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). These features of the US labor market might be 
important for young adults who re-enroll into postsecondary education, since they 
define what is given up by leaving the labor market for re-enrollment. In the flexible 
employment regimes, the opportunity costs for giving up a job position can be 
expected to be lower. The unemployment protection on the other hand consists of 
measures to ameliorate hardships when unemployment occurs. This again can affect 
individuals in several ways when deciding about belated enrollment. If unemployment 
protection e.g. is high, it might be easier to risk re-enrollment since the time for job 
search after leaving the school will be funded. Generally, both unemployment 
protection and employment protection legislation describe the ‘strictness’ of 
governmental intervention into the labor market. The higher the value, the more 
regulated the market. 
Table 1.3.2 shows the results from comparative research characterizing the 
‘employment protection legislation’ as well as the ‘unemployment protection’. To put 
the numbers into context, other countries are included as well. All values refer to the 
relevant period, the 1990´s. In this period, the strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) as well as unemployment protection is rather similar in Germany 
and Sweden, while the US has a very low score (OECD, 2004a). With regard to labor 
market intervention, Sweden and Germany are on a very similar level, while the US 
stands out with the most market-liberal system. This illustrates the welcomed 
difference between the US and Sweden. Thus, the comparison between the inflexible 
German education system and flexible other education systems can be done towards 
two different labor market contexts. Even though the German and the Swedish 
systems are not identical in the entire structure of the labor market – in particular for 
entrants (Erikson and Jonsson, 1998a; Müller, Steinmann and Ell, 1998) –the 
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differences in the labor market of the two cases being compared to Germany 
strengthen the comparison of the education systems. 
 
Table 1.3.2: Labor market protection legislation and unemployment protection legislation 
in selected countries. 
 (West-) 
Germany 
US UK Sweden Denmark Norway 
mean of EPL-index 
1995-1999 (OECD, 
2004b) 
2,8 0,2 0,8 2,8 1,6 2,4 
unemployment 
protection (Estevez-
Abe, Iversen and 
Soskice, 2001)  
0,77 0,10 0,11 0,63 0,91 0,64 
 
 
 
1.3.3 Sweden, Germany and the United States: Three Institutional Settings for 
International Comparative Research 
Taken together, the three countries qualify well for a comparative study on the 
differentiation of educational careers and its consequences for inequality. Other 
countries could have chosen as well, as their education systems are equally open. 
However, for Denmark and Norway the availability of micro data has turned out to be 
far more difficult than for Sweden. Furthermore, the labor market intervention in 
Denmark differs more strongly from Germany than in Sweden. On the other hand, a 
comparison with Denmark might be a fruitful extension in the future since it has a 
vocational education system which is similar to the German one
4
. Labor market 
intervention also rules out the case of the U.K., which differs less from Sweden than 
the US. The question is then rather whether to choose either the US or the U.K. The 
US is more consequent and has a longer tradition of flexibility in the education 
system, which makes it a more distinct case. Moreover, the postsecondary education 
system in the U.K. differs between Scotland on the one side and England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland on the other side (Eurydice, 2000b). This circumstance would 
introduce additional complexity for comparison. 
Finally, the availability of previous research and of good longitudinal micro-
data is a strong argument for my choice of country cases. Comparative case studies on 
inequality or life course research often compare these three cases, compare couples 
                                                 
4
 See for example the Eurypedia-web archive: 
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/eurypedia_en.php (access date March 24, 2013). 
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out of this triple, or at least contain the three cases as a sub-set of a larger group of 
comparison countries. DiPrete summarizes the situation of research concerning these 
three cases as follows: 
 
‘While gaps in our knowledge about life course mobility in these countries still exist, the 
available evidence from an increasingly extensive research literature produces a comparative 
picture that, as I will argue, meets the test of reasonableness for both parsimony and 
plausibility.’ (DiPrete, 2002, p. 279) 
 
Indeed, as the overviews of DiPrete (2002) and Mayer (2005) show, there exist 
already a large number of studies for these countries with regard to life courses and 
various aspects of social inequality. However, postsecondary educational careers and 
their relation to a standardization of life courses are not studied much within this 
literature (see Brückner and Mayer, 2005 for one of the few exceptions of a Germany-
U.S. comparison). Given the similarities of this sub-system in Sweden and the US and 
the extreme position that West-Germany took for a very long time, this is surprising. 
Extending previous research into this direction, I argue, can thus be a part which is yet 
missing in the picture. 
Having justified my case selection, I will now explicate all of the three cases 
in more detail. The following chapter 1.4 will describe the education system and the 
labor markets of Sweden, Germany and the US one by one. This serves as background 
information for the subsequent development and testing of macro-hypothesis. Readers 
being familiar with the three education system might thus easily skip this section. 
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1.4 The Education Systems of Germany, the US and Sweden: 
Setup, Transitions to Higher Education and Inequality 
 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes background information on the three country contexts 
Sweden, the US and Germany focusing the education system and the labor market. By 
contrast to the previous chapter, this one will summarize facts in more detail instead 
of analytical discussion. These institutional areas will then later be the core 
explanation when developing hypotheses for the country differences. The descriptions 
stress the differences on the dimensions of stratification, standardization, the openness 
for non-traditional students and the coordination mechanism which have theoretical 
significance for the discussions in section 2 and 3. The time frame I refer to are the 
1990’s and early 2000’s. I further give a first descriptive overview over the 
phenomenon of interrupt and delayed education and inequality by social origin in this 
context. This serves as an illustration that there exists variance on the macro-level also 
on the dependent variable, while a more careful description of educational careers is 
needed to capture the relevant country characteristics properly and will follow from 
section two onwards. Readers who are familiar with the three systems could skip this 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
1.4.1 Germany 
The formal requirement for entering tertiary education in Germany is the Abitur-
degree or a vocationally oriented Fach-Abitur/Fachhochschulreife-degree obtained at 
the end of upper secondary school. Tracking in secondary school is rather rigid, and 
not all tracks directly lead to a qualification for higher education. The only direct 
track towards higher education entry certificates is the Gymnasium. Due to the early 
pre-selection of students, only a minority qualifies for higher education at the end of 
secondary school. Those students visiting the lower tiers of secondary school, 
Hauptschule and Realschule, have different possibilities, e.g. becoming eligible to the 
lower tier Fachhochschule or the full higher education system through vocational 
education. 
The German higher education system is commonly classified as a ‘binary 
stratified’ system (Goedegebuure et al., 1996; Teichler, 1993) as it is (mostly) a two-
tier system with universities and lower tertiary institutions (Fachhochschulen). The 
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Fachhochschule or so-called ‘University of Applied Sciences’ offers vocationally 
oriented tertiary education. This lower tier of the system was expanded in the 1970s 
and is limited to a narrow range of fields such as engineering, business and 
administration of social services (Huisman, 2003). Universities engage into research 
and teaching in all academic fields, offering courses in many more fields of study, 
including the ‘traditional’ professions such as law or medicine. There has been a clear 
difference in status between these two types of institution (Teichler, 1993). Almost all 
tracks are terminal, granting degrees of varying occupational specificity. Entering a 
certain track therefore implies the decision to obtain a certain terminal degree. 
Returning to the educational system thereafter means obtaining more than one 
terminal degree – usually with no (or only minor) credit transfer to the new program. 
As a consequence, Germany counts as a typical case of parallel stratification in higher 
education. 
Study programs are organized in a similar way in both tiers, although the 
completion of a degree at the Fachhochschule takes slightly less time than the 
standard duration of university studies (eight instead of nine or ten semesters). Hence, 
in both institutions at least four to five years have to be spent studying before 
obtaining a degree. As a result, a decision for tertiary education represents a major 
investment. 
State coordination and intervention in higher education in Germany is 
comparatively strong. The federal states are responsible for providing higher 
education and control the budgets of higher education institutions. They also accredit 
programs of study, are involved in the hiring of professors, and determine the salaries 
of university employees (Mayer, 2003). This leads to high degrees of standardization 
in study programs. Although the content, number, and type of final exams are 
regulated by each university separately, universities are considered to be more or less 
equal in quality, and there is no particular hierarchy among universities. During the 
1990´s there were no tuition fees for public institutions of higher education. These 
have been introduced in the early 2000´s and will be abolished again by most states 
within 2013. Universities are the most prestigious institutions with the highest returns 
in the labor market (Müller, Brauns and Steinmann, 2002). 
A postsecondary alternative to studies in higher education studies is vocational 
education in schools or (more common) through apprenticeship training. 
Apprenticeships consist of in-company training, complemented by part-time 
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vocational schooling which usually lasts 2 to 3 years. Entering the labor market with 
only upper secondary education is uncommon. However, many young adults who are 
qualified to enter higher education choose this option (Jacob, 2004). Between 2000 
and 2008, approximately a quarter of all students who were qualified to enter higher 
education enrolled in vocational training half a year after leaving secondary school 
(Heine and Quast, 2009). It seems that many upper secondary school-graduates 
perceive apprenticeships not as second best choices. Empirically, it could be shown 
that this alternative is often used by young adults with lower educational background 
(Becker and Hecken, 2009b). However, for many young adults completion of an 
apprenticeship is not the end of their educational career. A part of the graduates from 
vocational training who are eligible to higher education enroll into the tertiary level 
education. Heine and Quast (2009) report for the years between 2000 and 2008 
numbers between 15 and 20 percent of those young adults qualified for higher 
education aiming for both a vocational and a higher education degree. Others choose 
spontaneously to re-enroll after completing vocational training.  
Most importantly, the higher education system was not very open for non-
traditional students who enter later. Part-time studies or shorter programs were 
uncommon and flexibility in curricula and class-schedules was limited. Long study 
programs without opportunities to interrupt imply a long term commitment and are 
thus less attractive for potential older students who are already established in the labor 
market. 
 
1.4.1.1 Recent reforms 
With the aim of harmonizing higher education in Europe, the Bologna reforms have 
changed the organization of studies in Germany fundamentally. Almost all study 
programs were affected. At their core, the Bologna reforms impose a new structure 
with a sequential Bachelor- and Master-degree program, but there are far more 
aspects of this development. Most importantly, one aim which is much less discussed 
was to foster the role of higher education for lifelong learning. In the European Union 
report on the implementation of the reform, entire chapter six reports on this matter 
(Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency Eurydice, 2012). In particular 
in section 6.4. being entitled ‘Promoting flexible delivery of higher education 
programmes’, the efforts towards flexibility of higher education institutions for all 
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countries are summarized. Germany has done comparatively little yet, in particular 
the provision of part time studies is much less common than in other European 
countries. However, German representatives state the aim of developing into this 
direction is explicitly: 
 
‘Germany indicates that even if there is no formal part-time status, higher education 
institutions have autonomy to offer part-time studies and several Länder have adopted legal 
regulations covering this type of study (Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency 
Eurydice, 2012, p. 136).’ 
 
Similarly, the proportion of students who interrupt their educational career between 
the secondary and tertiary education is still rather low. The percentage of students in 
tertiary education who are 30 or more years old is with 14 percent among the lowest 
in Western Europe. By comparison, Sweden reaches already a share of over 35 
percent. In another aspect of flexibilization – the recognition of prior learning for 
access to and as credits in higher education – Germany is now already classified as 
one of the leading countries. Even though the development seems to be slow, 
institutional changes suggest that Germany is moving towards a more flexible system 
for adult learners. The recognition of prior learning has been introduced legally in 
2002, and by 2012 all German states have institutionalized rules for access of students 
without formal qualification to enroll in higher education (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, 2012, p. 31). Further, in the same report to the European 
Commission, the federal government urges states and higher education institutions to 
improve the possibility to combine studies with other areas of life. Mentioned are 
childcare and work. From the federal government, a studentship for upward social 
mobility (‘Aufstiegsstipendium’) for adults with completed lower vocational degree 
has already been introduced. These and many other measures show that policy makers 
are making serious attempts to offer more flexibility in higher education careers and 
open the system to a broader group of potential students. As a consequence, the 
German postsecondary education system offers more and more features that are 
common in the most flexible countries such as the US and Sweden. 
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Figure 1.4.1: The educational system of Germany. 
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Figure 1.4.2: Social origin and participation in higher education in Germany: the GLHS 
  sample. 
 
 
Note: Class of origin categories are explained in chapter 1.5 
Data source GLHS64/71, own calculations. 
Not weighted. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4.2 shows how the sample of the (West-)German Life History Studies 64 and 
71 (GLHS) moves through the education system. The set-up abstracts much from the 
educational system itself as depicted in figure 1.4.1 in order to enable later 
qualified for higher education: 
Abitur or Fachhochschulreife 
% of sample:    39.1 
  of service class children:  65.3 
  of intermediate class children:  38.3 
  of working class children:   20.2 
direct path 
 
% of all higher ed.:  54.7 
  of service class:  60.1 
  of intermediate class: 52.3 
  of working class:   43.8 
N   446 
Indirect path 
 
% of all higher ed.:   45.3 
  of service class:  39.9 
  of intermediate class:  47.7 
  of working class:   56.3 
N   446 
higher ed degree 
 
% of all direct: 74.6 
    
N  244 
no degree 
 
% of all direct: 25.4 
  
N  244 
higher ed degree 
 
% of all indirect: 55.4 
    
N  202 
no degree 
 
% of all indirect: 44.6 
    
N  202 
enter higher educ. (incl. incomplete) 
 
% of all ‘qualified’:  65.5 
  of service class:  75.4 
  of intermediate class: 60.1 
  of working class:  54.4 
N   812 
no higher education 
 
% of all ‘qualified’:  34.5 
  of service class:  24.6 
  of intermediate class:  39.9 
  of working class:   45.6 
N   812 
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comparisons to other systems. Both the overall transition rates and the rates by class 
of origin are reported. The numbers document the elitist nature of qualification for 
higher education in Germany: on average only 39 percent of the sample achieves at 
least eligibility to the lower tier higher education. While about 65 of the upper classes 
(service classes) arrive there, only 20 percent of the working classes realize this. 
Further inequality adds up on that at the transition into higher education. The indirect 
pathway is not even so uncommon and almost half of all young adults who eventually 
enroll, among the working class children even 56 percent, arrive there via a detour. 
These detours mainly consist of ‘double qualifications’, i.e. the completion of both 
vocational (apprenticeship-) training and higher education, which cannot be seen in 
figure 1.4.2. 
The last row the completion rates of higher education, broken down by the 
educational career pattern. Three out of four students with a direct educational career 
track eventually achieve a degree, while the respective share among those who 
interrupted is only about two out of four. 
 
1.4.2 United States 
In the US, graduation from high school or passing the GED exam provides formal 
entitlement to enroll in higher education. In contrast to Germany, the majority of 
students take this hurdle. While the American system of higher education is often 
classified as ‘diversified’ in terms of stratification (Goedegebuure et al., 1996), the 
institutional setting is mainly twofold. The upper tier are research universities (or full 
four year colleges) as the first tier, with selective admission procedures offering 
classes in liberal arts and scientific education, and granting Bachelor, Master, and 
doctoral degrees (Lucas, 2006; Thelin, 2004). Within this system, studies are 
structured into an undergraduate and a graduate period. The second tier consists of 
community colleges or two-year colleges, providing rather open access and offering 
transfer classes of two years leading to ‘Associates of Arts’ degrees (A.A.) for 
continuation in higher education or terminal vocational education. In community 
colleges, transfer classes and terminal courses channel the students to different final 
levels of education. By offering specific credit requirements and high class-time 
flexibility in their programs – and therefore the possibility of temporary drop-out – 
community colleges often cater for part-time students and older students returning to 
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education (Arum and Hout, 1998; Brint and Karabel, 1989; Cohen and Brawer, 1996; 
Grubb, 2006; Roksa et al., 2007). In contrast to Germany, study programs in both 
universities and community colleges are sequentially stratified, i.e. a transfer into 
another program after a certain time is expected. The possibility of entering the labor 
market at these thresholds within the higher education career or continuing with one’s 
studies implies flexibility in the planning of educational careers. The decision for or 
against participation in tertiary education is broken down into several smaller 
decisions at different stages in the life course. 
Further, the American system of higher education can be described as market-
coordinated, as intervention in matters of higher education by the government is very 
limited, and universities compete for students e.g. by offering an environment of 
selective admission and/or reputation, or by offering flexible study schedules. State 
intervention concentrates on support for students, predominantly by loans. The state 
does not play an active role in shaping the institutions of higher education (Roksa et 
al., 2007). Degrees are not very standardized, e.g. (community) colleges sometimes 
offer very specialized degrees in contrast to the very broad liberal arts degrees. 
Comparing the two education systems (see Table 1 for a summary) reveals 
that the American system offers more opportunities for the interruption of educational 
careers than the German system. In section 2.5 I derive some more specific 
hypotheses on the national differences. 
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Figure 1.4.3: The education system of the United States. 
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Figure 1.4.4: Social origin and participation in higher education in the United States: the 
NLSY79 sample. 
 
 
Note: Class of origin categories are explained in chapter 1.5 
Data source NLSY79, only cross sectional samples, own calculations. 
Not weighted. 
 
 
 
The US system is less selective in the minimum entry criterion for higher education 
which is achieving a high school diploma or GED than the German one. Nevertheless, 
qualified for higher education: 
high school degree or GED 
% of sample:    88.3 
  of service class children:  93.7 
  of intermediate class children:  88.8 
  of working class children:   72.9 
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  of service class:  59.0 
  of intermediate class: 43.3 
  of working class:   41.7 
N   1380 
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% of all higher ed.:  54.7 
  of service class:  60.1 
  of intermediate class: 52.3 
  of working class:   43.8 
N   446 
 
indirect path (work-gap) 
 
% of all higher ed.:   50.8 
  of service class:  41.0 
  of intermediate class:  56.7 
  of working class:   58.3 
N   1380indirect 
indirect path 
 
% of all higher ed.:   45.3 
  of service class:  39.9 
  of intermediate class:  47.7 
  of working class:   56.3 
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enter higher educ. (incl. incomplete) 
 
% of all ‘qualified’:  64.2 
  of service class:  81.2 
  of intermediate class: 63.3 
  of working class:  47.4 
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no higher education 
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highe  ed degree 
 
% of all direct: 65.7 
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  intermediate:  59.7 
  working:  39.8 
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N   
no degree 
 
% of all direct: 34.3 
  service:   20.0 
  intermediate:  40.3 
  working:  60.2 
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higher ed degree 
 
% of all indirect: 29.5 
  service:  42.5 
  intermediate 24.0 
  working  22.4 
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no degree 
 
% of all indirect: 70.5 
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1 .  Ins t i tu t ional  Condi t ions:  Overvi ew  
48 
 
educational inequality already exists in this step of comparatively weak pre-selection. 
In the second step asking whether any entry into higher education occurs, inequality is 
quite high. Entering higher education is operationalized as being enrolled for at least 
three months continuously in a two- or four-year college until age 32, which explains 
the high overall coverage rate. While only 47 percent of lower class children 
participate in higher education, 81 percent of the service class children can enroll. 
About half of the sample takes some indirect way; the other half has a rather straight 
educational career. The number of ‘standard students’ seems very low compared to 
the findings of other authors (e.g. Adelman, Daniel and Berkovits, 2003; Adelman, 
1999; Adelman, 2004; Adelman, 2006). Note however, that drop-outs with a single 
spell who enter before having worked for six months in a full time job are included in 
the continuous group. As in the case of Germany, this inconsistency shows that the 
structure of educational careers is more complex and needs a more thorough 
description which will follow in section 2. What can already be spotted in the simple 
description in figure 1.4.4 is that there exists inequality by social origin in the 
question if students follow a straight pattern or take a detour. In particular the most 
privileged classes (service classes) have a high share of direct educational career 
patterns. 
In the last row of figure 1.4.4 the completion rates are reported. First, in 
accordance with previous evidence (Kempner and Kinnick, 1990), it shows that direct 
pathways through the system more often lead to a degree. Second, completion 
constitutes another important dimension of inequality in the US. Within both groups – 
interrupting and non-interrupting higher education students – the share of completions 
among the service classes doubles that of the working classes. 
 
1.4.3 Sweden 
The Swedish education system has undergone several reforms during the second half 
of the 20
th
 century, some of them with the explicit purpose to promote equity and 
enable flexibility between different tracks and sectors of it. At the same time, an 
increase of postsecondary choices and an expansion of university education (Erikson 
and Jonsson, 1996b) took place. In the 1990´s, a series of reforms followed which 
promoted competition between schools and assigned private institutions stronger roles 
than they had before (Björklund et al., 2005). 
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For simplification, schooling over the life course in Sweden can be 
categorized into three broad phases (Halldén, 2008). Since the 1970´s, all students in 
Sweden have to complete a nine year comprehensive compulsory school 
(Grundskola). Following this, students choose between different alternatives of upper 
secondary school programs (Gymnasieskola) and after completion enter the third 
cycle, the tertiary education system provided by universities (universitet) and 
university colleges (högskola). Almost all students transfer to upper secondary school, 
but most of the programs were vocationally oriented, especially before the 1990´s, i.e. 
at the time when the majority of the sample I analyze passed the system. The large 
majority of vocational programs are school based; apprenticeship training plays a 
minor role. Program duration is now generally three years, but used to be two years 
until the 1990´s for the less demanding vocational tracks. The programs either lead 
into the labor market or into continuing studies in higher education. 
Defining the group of young adults who are eligible to higher education in 
Sweden is extremely difficult (cf. Jonsson and Erikson, 2007). As a general 
requirement, students need to complete at least two years at an upper secondary 
school and this has to encompass at least two years of studies in Swedish and English 
(Swedish Ministry of Education and Science, 1993). The grade point average 
achieved in upper secondary education is a central criterion for admission to higher 
education, but there are other criterions such as scores in national university tests, age 
and work experience (Halldén, 2008). The latter is certainly a central institutional 
characteristic of the Swedish system with regard to non-traditional students and 
‘patchwork-careers’ in education. In 1970 the rule was introduced that everyone with 
gainful employment of at least five years (later: four years) or an age of at least 25 
years was eligible to enter higher education, although a quota limited the number of 
admissions through this track. Hence, every Swedish pupil will become theoretically 
eligible to higher education at some point in the life course. However, this is only 
nominal eligibility and strong hurdles might apply in practice, since universities are 
free to introduce a numerus clausus and there is a quota for places being filled 
according to the 25/4-rule. 
Higher education in Sweden is organized in three tiers (Jonsson and Erikson, 
2007). The lower vocationally oriented tertiary track (Högskola) lasts normally less 
than three years; the higher tertiary track providing scientific training in a diverse 
range of fields of study (Universitet) and offering B.A. and M.A. degrees; an finally 
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the occupational oriented professional university programs ‘with longer study times of 
4-7 years, such as law, medicine, business administration, and civil engineering’ 
(Jonsson and Erikson, 2007, p. 123). The majority of the programs are sequentially 
stratified into B.A. and M.A. degrees and the Högskola offers even shorter programs. 
The main line in parallel stratification divides the institutions into two tiers: the 
Universitet as the upper tier and the Högskola as the lower tier. The Swedish 
government coordinates higher education centrally and a very large majority of 
universities and university colleges are public. The government also introduces the 
rector, the head of the institutions. There is on the other hand some freedom for 
universities to offer study programs according to local needs or enable students to 
follow their individual study program if required. 
Different features of the Swedish postsecondary education system make it a 
comparatively welcoming environment for adult learners. The expansion of 
postsecondary education has also led to geographical diversification in particular of 
the university colleges into the different counties. ‘Since 1998 each county in Sweden 
has at least one university or university college’ (European Commission, 2013). In 
combination with the availability of distance studies, this reduces costs and removes 
difficulties in particular for less mobile adult students. In 1993, the share of distance 
students cover was 8.4 percent of all students, which increased rapidly thereafter 
(European Commission, 2013). A grant system offers support to the majority of the 
students in higher education while there are no tax benefits for parents (European 
Commission, 2011). The generally strong focus on adult learning is also mirrored in 
programs outside the postsecondary education system. Also secondary education is 
widely available for adults. Local municipalities are responsible to provide adult 
education with curricular standards which are defined under the komvux (kommunal 
vuxenutbildning) framework. 
1 .  Ins t i tu t ional  Condi t ions:  Overvi ew  
51 
 
Figure 1.4.5: The Swedish education system. 
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Figure 1.4.6: Social origin and participation in higher education in Sweden: the LNU 
sample. 
 
Note: Class of origin categories are explained in chapter 1.5 
Data source NLSY79, own calculations. 
Not weighted. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4.6 shows some basic facts on the educational careers of Swedish young 
adults in the sample I will analyze later. Eligibility (here not defined as all nominally 
eligible persons, defined according to Erikson and Jonsson, 2007, which captures 
those individuals who can enter ‘easily’) is reached by less than half of the cohorts 
qualified for higher education: (def. 
according to Erikson and Jonsson, 2007) 
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which I included in the analysis sample. Inequality in direct achievement of entrance 
qualification for higher education is high; the share among working class children is 
half the share of children from the upper classes (service classes). Taking only those 
students directly qualifying, more than half of them enter higher education, with again 
a remarkable underrepresentation of the lower class students. Even among the directly 
qualified higher education students only about 40 percent have un-interrupted 
educational careers, with again more direct careers among the upper class students. 
This result points towards a high relevance of interruptions and later studies in 
Sweden. Full degrees are, however, more often achieved among those students who 
interrupt. Note that this representation is somewhat misleading in the way that there 
are shorter programs which do not offer full higher education degrees (university 
colleges), but their shorter duration offers lower chances for interrupting ones 
educational career. It is therefore not quite correct to talk about completion, which 
would require further examination. 
The descriptions of the education systems of the three countries serve as 
background for the coming chapters. I have not highlighted so far, how institutional 
structures I have described above may shape social realities in the three societies. The 
aim was rather to summarize some empirical facts to prepare the ground for such a 
comparison. Beyond, the simple analyses in the figures summarizing how different 
social origins groups move through the education system highlight the relevance of 
studying higher education beyond access. There are not only pronounced differences 
in access opportunities to higher education and in access itself, but also in the pattern 
of the educational career (interrupted or straight) and in the completion rates. In the 
following, I discuss the former in detail and in comparative perspective between the 
three countries. After describing the microdata-sources and the central independent 
variable on the micro-level, social origin, I continue in section 2 by comparing the 
time patterns of postsecondary educational careers between the three countries. 
Understanding the institutionalization of educational careers by different systems 
seems to be a pre-condition for developing hypotheses on differences in inequality in 
educational career patterns thereafter. 
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1.5 Data Sources 
 
 
 
 
Below I introduce the datasets I analyzed for the empirical sections 2 to 5. I will also 
shortly discuss some of the strength and weaknesses and give some reasoning why I 
chose to analyze the respective dataset. 
 
 
 
 
All analyses within this volume are based on secondary data analyses of data other 
researchers have collected. Thus, the datasets were not produced with the aim of best 
fulfilling the requirements for studying educational careers from a life course 
perspective. Nevertheless, I was able to use three datasets which I consider suitable as 
the core datasets for the majority of the analyses: the Swedish LNU, the German 
GLHS and the American NLSY79. These datasets had to fulfill at least three basic 
features: first, they needed to capture the life course in a longitudinal way including 
detailed information on educational and occupational careers. Second, social origin as 
the key dimension of social inequality must be measured sufficiently detailed. And 
third, they had to have the potential to allow at least a basic comparison between 
countries on the central concepts. Beyond these three main datasets I have used other 
data from Germany to extend my analysis in a number of details or back up my 
findings with larger data sources. On the coming pages I introduce all of the data 
sources and briefly discuss their strengths and weaknesses with regard to my research 
question. 
 
1.5.1 The German Life History Study (GLHS) 
The main dataset used for most analyses on Germany will be the German Life History 
Study (GLHS). This retrospective study contains information about the educational 
and labor-force status on a monthly basis (Max Planck Institut für Bildungsforschung, 
2004; Mayer, 2006). I draw on nationally representative samples from the birth 
cohorts 1964 and 1971. Both cohorts were interviewed in 1998, and those born in 
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1971 were also interviewed in a second wave in 2004. For this cohort, I use cases with 
valid observations in both waves only. 
This dataset has several advantages for the purpose of studying 
postsecondary careers. First and foremost, it has been collected with the aim of 
providing a database for research on inequality from a life course perspective. Central 
concepts I am referring to, such as social origin, school attendance or occupational 
careers are therefore all included in the data. Furthermore, the data quality is high, as 
several indicators show. A response rate of 66 percent (Mayer, 2006, p. 31) might be 
seen as low by international comparison, but stands out as a high result compared to 
other German studies. During collection of the GLHS data, much research has been 
invested in the modes of data collection, such as methods for improving 
autobiographical memory. The collected data files were edited thoroughly by the 
research group at the Max Planck Institute, using a multitude of information and 
examining each case on internal consistency. Even telephone inquiries with the 
respondent or tape records from the interview were used if the respondent had agreed 
in recording. 
As to any data source, several limitations apply to this data set as well. The 
retrospective nature of the survey did not allow asking for ‘soft facts’ such as opinions 
or aspirations which are often not remembered correctly. For my research, this mainly 
implies a lack of measures for scholastic performance beyond the GPA from the 
school-leaving certificate. Another drawback is the small sample size of individuals 
being qualified for higher education. Hence, for several sub-analyses within the 
context of Germany, I used alternative datasets or added other data to the GLHS. 
 
1.5.2 The Study ‘Arbeit und Leben im Wandel‘ (ALWA) 
The ‘alwa’-dataset (Antoni et al., 2010) follows a similar design as the GLHS and 
comprises retrospectively collected life course information of about 10,404 
respondents. Interviews took place in the years 2007 and 2008 and cover a broad 
range of birth cohorts. In order to ensure comparability, I limited the dataset by 
selecting the cohorts born between 1960 and 1974. 
The response rate in the computer assisted telephone interviews amounts 
about 46 percent of those target persons from whom a phone number could be found 
(24 percent among the total target population). The vast majority of the interviews 
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were conducted in German language, with some exceptions for migrants for whom 
the interviews were completed in Turkish or Russian. The data-structure and much of 
the information included is similar to the GLHS, but for a larger number of cases. 
However, the suitability for my research is limited by a number of weaknesses. The 
most important disadvantage compared to the GLHS is the less detailed information 
about social origins. While the GLHS has information on both occupation and 
education of the parents in great detail, information on parental occupation is rather 
basic in the case of ALWA. Furthermore, information on the educational career is 
somewhat less detailed in places. Therefore, I analyze the dataset only for section 2 on 
educational career patterns, but not for section 3 on inequality in educational career 
patterns and transitions. 
 
1.5.3 The National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) 
For the US, I select sub-samples from the NLSY79 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008) 
which vary somewhat over the chapters. The NLSY79 is a cohort panel study 
representative for the US population containing 12,686 cases at its start-up in 1979. 
At that time, the respondents were between 14 and 22 years old. They were 
interviewed annually (from 1994 biannually) about a broad range of topics involving 
detailed information about educational attainment. Labor force status and the number 
of hours worked are available in weekly arrays. 
The response rate for the initial interview in the sub-samples I selected was 
90 percent of all people designated for interviewing. From then on, annual response 
rates continued to be high. In 1994, when the study moved from annual to biannual 
interviews, the response rate was still 89 percent of all respondents who completed an 
interview in 1979. In 2006, at the time of the last interview which I will use within 
this volume, the rate had dropped to 76 percent. Interviews were mostly conducted 
face-to-face, with a small minority of telephone interviews upon the explicit desire of 
the respondent or the interviewer or for the reason that the respondent lived in a very 
remote area. 
As I am interested in a cross-section of the American population, I have not 
used the sub-sample targeting specific populations (racial-, military- and poor-white 
sub-samples) in any chapter. Furthermore, I have restricted samples to the later 
cohorts in order to capture the entire educational career and because the IQ-testing 
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was conducted before completing high school. This reduces the sample sizes in some 
cases considerably to a remaining sample which is still large by comparison to the 
German and Swedish samples. In addition to the sample size, the NLSY79 has several 
strengths also compared with the datasets I use for the other countries. Social origins 
are measured in the same detailed way as in the LNU and the GLHS. For scholastic 
performance a direct cognitive test (IQ-test) is available in addition to other variables 
such as tracking in high school or the experience of being expelled from school. 
Further interesting concepts such as occupational aspirations were included into the 
survey. On the downside, the information on school marks in the transcript surveys 
has a large share of missing values and could not be used and the fact that the NLSY 
is a panel study introduces additional missing cases due to panel attrition. 
 
1.5.4 The LNU (Levnadsnivåundersökningarna): Swedish Level of Living 
Survey  
The LNU applies a mixed approach between panel and retrospective life history 
design. Respondents were asked about their full work and educational biography, and 
were also re-interviewed in decennial waves. This decennial panel data with 
retrospective life history information has been collected by the Swedish Institute for 
Social Research (Bygren, Gähler and Nermo, 2004). 
The dataset has been conducted as well as the GLHS for the purpose of 
inequality research, but covers a broader range of topics. The response rates are high 
compared to the German datasets. In the 1990 and 2000 waves which I have used, 79 
and 77 percent of the targeted sample took part in the study. Most respondents (84 
percent) were interviewed personally face-to-face by Statistics Sweden (Statistiska 
Centralbyrån). In all other cases, telephone interviews were used (Gähler, 2004). 
The LNU has similar strengths and weaknesses as the GLHS. On the positive 
side, it enables to reconstruct entire education- and work-careers and offers detailed 
information on social origins including parental occupation. The main drawbacks are 
a somewhat small sample size of higher education students and the scarce information 
on scholastic performance. 
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1.5.5 The HIS Panel Study of Young Adults Qualified for Higher Education in 
Germany 
In chapter 4.1, I analyze the 1999 HIS Panel Study of young adults qualified for 
higher education (Durrer and Heine, 2001) which is a mail survey in two panel waves. 
The first of these was conducted six months after the young adults left secondary 
school and the second wave three years later. The study covers educational career 
intentions in the first wave. In the second wave, retrospective information about the 
actual pattern of the educational and labor market career is collected. Parental 
educational achievement is measured, as well as a rich set of variables describing the 
previous educational achievement of the respondents, e.g. type of secondary 
schooling, school-leaving certificate and grades (GPA). The great advantage of this 
dataset with regard to the research question of chapter 4.1 is that the intentions for the 
future educational career are asked in the survey. Furthermore, a sufficiently large 
number of cases were available via remote access to the HIS-institute for analyzing 
smaller sub-groups (7,374 respondents who completed a questionnaire for both 
survey-waves). 
The data has, however, several limitations urging me to use them only for the 
specific question of chapter 4.1 and not for any of the other analysis. The 
documentation, in particular with regard to response rates, is scarce and the rate can 
therefore be expected to be low. The questionnaires were long and asked a large 
number of attitudes on a rather small space of paper, and the item-nonresponse is high 
– due to the given methodology. The operationalization of parental social class is only 
possible in a strongly simplified form and not comparable to the other datasets. Right 
censoring occurs already five years after completing upper secondary school, and the 
coding of the data does not even allow to fully reconstructing life histories for this 
period. Even though these limitations are severe and one can doubt in particular about 
the descriptive findings from it, the dataset was the only possibility to scrutinize 
educational intentions and I therefore analyzed them for this specific extension of 
theoretical significance. 
 
1.5.6 The HIS Panel Study of Graduates from Higher Education in Germany 
In chapter 5.3, I analyze the graduate surveys of the HIS (Hochschul-Informations-
System). Several cohorts of graduates from higher education in Germany are surveyed 
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six months after graduation and in a second panel wave five years thereafter. 
However, only two cohorts are available as scientific use file, the graduate cohorts of 
1997 (Fabian, 2006; Fabian and Minks, 2006) and of 2001 (Schramm and Beck, 
2010) which I used as pooled sample. The usable sample consists of 8,105 graduates. 
The data was collected as a self-report mail survey at random sample of graduates 
from a large number of German universities. According to HIS, the dataset qualifies 
to make representative inference on the German graduate population (Schramm and 
Beck, 2010). 
Certainly, doubts can be raised about self-reported mail surveys with low 
response rates and no interviewer control over the response process. Furthermore, the 
documentation of the response rates misleadingly reports the percentage of interviews 
among all graduates of the cohort, but not of the number of graduates who had 
received a questionnaire. For the later cohort, the documentation is better and a 
response rate of roundabout 30 percent in the first wave and 75 percent of first-wave 
respondents in the second wave is documented. Nevertheless, the data quality raises 
doubts which led me to refrain largely from descriptive analyses based on these 
samples. Furthermore, I have used them only for the sub-questions where no other 
data source with sufficient sample size could be found. 
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2 PATTERNS OF POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL 
CAREERS IN THREE SOCIETIES – THE INDIVIDUAL 
PROCESS OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN 
DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses how individual educational biographies are shaped by 
institutions. I compare Sweden, Germany and the US from the perspective of looking 
back over careers that led to a certain outcome. I.e. I ask in how far students in 
different countries diversify into different educational career patterns, given they 
achieve higher education. With the usual perspective on pronounced differences in 
their welfare state systems, the US and Sweden resemble certain characteristics that 
lead to a similar flexibility in educational career patterns – even though central 
aspects of financing and labor market institutions differ. Germany stands out as a 
rather inflexible system, with much pre-sorting of higher education students which 
leads to much more ordered and institutionalized educational careers. This also 
implies the consequence that educational decisions are hard to revise and determine 
later achievement to a large degree. The macro conditions of these country differences 
are discussed theoretically. In order to illustrate these processes, the chapter applies a 
descriptive sequence analysis approach. 
 
The following publication is a previous version of this chapter: 
Jacob, Marita, and Felix Weiss (2010): From higher education to work patterns of 
labor market entry in Germany and the US. Higher Education, 60, issue 5, p. 529-542. 
This chapter extends this work by an application of a wider range of methods and the 
inclusion of Sweden as an additional case. Further, replications for the German results 
with a new dataset (ALWA-data) are now included as well for several analyses. 
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2.1 The Transition from School to Work for those Eligible to 
Higher Education 
 
 
 
In many industrialized western countries we observe prolonged transitions from 
school to work which are characterized by longer participation in education, times of 
early work experience during school and times in which employment is the major 
activity. Both activities, being in education and being employed, may overlap or the 
decision to leave education might be revised by leaving the current job and returning 
to school. Intertwined educational careers and labor market entries pose several 
substantial and theoretical challenges for research: on the one hand, the results of 
comparative research usually have to rely on very broad definitions of labor market 
entry. On the other hand, returning to the educational system after some working 
experience might decrease or increase social inequalities, depending on the social 
composition of those who decide to prolong and complement their education. In this 
chapter I focus on the first of these two questions. I.e. I aim at describing labor market 
entry patterns in more detail to elaborate further on country differences and 
differences in the standardization of these patterns due to specific institutional 
conditions of both, the system of postsecondary education and the labor market. 
Previous comparative studies of the transition from school to work have 
shown that transition patterns differ across countries due to different (secondary) 
educational systems, labor market structures and their relation (Kerckhoff, 2000; 
Leuze, 2010; Müller and Gangl, 2003a; Scherer, 2001; Shavit and Müller, 1998; 
Wolbers, 2007). However, these comparisons rely on a rough definition of labor 
market entry, often neglecting the complexity of leaving education and entering work. 
Studies for single countries, in particular the US, have highlighted that school and 
work careers in young adulthood are far more complex than the ‘single transition’ 
definition presumes due to individualized patterns of higher education attendance 
(Adelman, Daniel and Berkovits, 2003; Adelman, 1999; Adelman, 2004; Adelman, 
2006; Bradburn and Carroll, 2002; Carroll, 1989; Choy and Maw, 1995; DesJardins, 
Ahlburg and McCall, 2002; Horn and Carroll, 1998; O'Donnell and Chapman, 2006). 
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Whereas a lot of comparative research exists on the overall patterns of the transition 
from school to work in different institutional settings, only a few studies have gone 
into details e.g. by examining specific transitions from employment back to (full-
time) education (cf. Brzinsky-Fay, 2007). Further, by mainly focusing on secondary 
and postsecondary vocational education, the specificities of higher education could 
not be elaborated. Although recently some comparative studies concentrating on 
participation and returns to tertiary education have been published (Allen and Van der 
Velden, 2007; Arum, Gamoran and Shavit, 2007; Kim and Kim, 2003; Triventi, 2011; 
Triventi, 2013; Triventi, forthcoming), these have not taken into account the complex 
processes within educational careers at this stage of the life course, i.e. interruptions 
to gain some work experience and re-entry into higher education to continue with 
one’s studies. 
This chapter describes transition patterns of students qualified to enter higher 
education and their ways through the higher education system if they enter. It extends 
the school-to-work perspective by a broader observation period up to age 34 
encompassing learning in young adulthood within this important part of the life 
course. The main interest lies on the sequential order of education and work 
experience and the extent of the deviation from ordered and nationally 
institutionalized life course sequences that can be clearly separated into a phase of 
completed education and subsequently entering work. Furthermore, to describe the 
influence of the institutional setting of an educational system on the integration into 
the labor market, I compare three countries: Germany, the US and Sweden. These 
three countries differ in central aspects of the system of tertiary education, which 
constitutes differences in the institutionalization of individual educational choices and 
life course patterns. Whereas in Germany higher education is mainly stratified into 
two parallel tracks and into different fields of study leading to one level of final 
graduation, the American and the Swedish systems of higher education are stratified 
more diverse and but especially are sequentially stratified in addition, with more 
flexibility between different tracks and for non-traditional students. Hence, the 
institutionalization of education as an important part of young adults’ life courses is 
low in this sub-system. The education systems provide flexibility of individualism in 
life course pattern, both in Sweden and in the US, which fall otherwise into quite 
different clusters ‘national life course regimes’ (Mayer, 2005, p.34/p.45). Not 
scrutinizing intertwined processes of different life course domains I focus on the 
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sphere of education instead. The general regime types might be most appropriate as a 
heuristic for describing such holistic patterns. However, a deeper view into one sphere 
might be able to uncover differences between the concrete structures better and in 
sum, together with other results of small scope, challenge the regime typology 
approach. 
In order to illustrate the institutionalization of educational careers in 
comparison, a method is needed that somewhat abstracts from the country specific 
educational institutions. I will suggest a number of different solutions for the 
description of complex sequences representing life course patterns within a specific 
domain using a range of different indicators for institutionalization and 
individualization of life courses. 
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section I elaborate the 
theoretical background of the research question and discuss the relevant 
characteristics of the three systems of tertiary education (for a general overview over 
the systems see chapter 1.4). Against this background, I derive hypotheses on the 
patterns of educational careers and labor market entry in the three countries. After 
discussing the datasets used and the operationalization of the central concepts I 
present the results and the conclusions of the analysis. 
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2.2 Diverse Transition Patterns from (Higher) Education to the 
Labor Market as a Phase of Transition in the Biography 
 
 
 
Previous research has found evidence for de-standardization and de-
institutionalization of life courses in highly industrialized societies (e.g. Buchmann, 
1989; Shanahan, 2000 for an overview). In this context 
 
‘…de-institutionalization would (…) mean that states, stages, events and transitions, which at 
earlier times were clearly differentiated, are being reintegrated or fused’ (Brückner and Mayer, 
2005, p. 32). 
 
One striking example of this trend of growing diversity in life courses is the transition 
from school to work, for example due to prolonged participation in education, phases 
of unemployment or jobs with precarious contract conditions (e.g. Brzinsky-Fay, 
2007; Buchholz and Kurz, 2005; Hillmert and Jacob, 2004). The results of several 
studies suggest that the transition from school to work is less an ordered, 
institutionalized sequence of leaving school and entering work but a phase of different 
activities that overlap and last throughout adolescence and young adulthood. As a 
consequence of a ‘spreading’ of education throughout adulthood arrayed with and 
paralleled by work, labor market entry as an ‘event’ can often not be determined 
precisely (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Light, 1998). The two analytically defined events 
‘leaving school’ and ‘starting a job’ are often empirically not clearly identified. One 
may rather speak about the first (or last) time of leaving school and the first job after 
leaving school - which might not actually be the last. Returning to school and re-
entering work might occur. Hence, entering the labor market is a ‘murky event’ 
posing problems for comparative research that has to grapple with the operational 
definition of the first ‘real’ or first ‘stable’ job. Having said this, comparative research 
nevertheless succeeded in identifying typical national transition patterns: for example, 
in Germany the transition from school to work appears on average to be rather smooth 
in terms of lower youth unemployment and less job mobility in early working careers 
than in most other European countries (e.g. Müller, Steinmann and Ell, 1998; Scherer, 
2005). In the US in contrast, the transition from school to work can generally be 
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characterized as a period of floundering. There is a much longer testing and trial 
period in the early working career that can be characterized by initially low-level 
and/or low-paid jobs, then progressing over the initial years in the labor market and 
often high rates of job mobility or transitions back to school (Arum and Hout, 1998; 
Coleman, 1984; Roksa, 2011; Rosenbaum, 1999). The rare results for Sweden have 
revealed a similar pattern: defining the ‘real first job’ is extremely hard, as transitions 
back and forth between the education system and the labor market occur frequently 
(Halldén and Hällsten, 2007). However, these results are driven by the majority of 
youth. In particular in Germany, the many ‘smooth’ transitions via apprenticeships 
cover up the patterns of other transitions. Since postsecondary and higher education in 
Germany is still expanding, knowing about the transition processes into and out of 
that sub-system gets more and more important. 
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2.3 Structures of the Educational System and Labor Market 
Linkages 
 
 
 
Young adults who completed the full secondary education and have the highest 
schooling certificate available in their country have many options regarding their 
educational career. In principle, returning to (full-time) education after having gained 
some work experience or interrupting an ongoing education or training course for 
work is possible at any time. However, the feasibility of entering and returning to the 
education system depends on both the options and the incentives for additional 
schooling or for remaining in the labor market without more education. To assess the 
provisions and regulations by educational systems and labor markets that determine 
these individual life course decisions, a comparative design is needed. As outlined in 
chapter 1.2, this analysis as well as the rest of this book will therefore be engaged 
with comparative research on US, Sweden and Germany. 
Several general characteristics of tertiary education as well as flexibility of 
the labor market need to be described for each of the three cases. I will further 
develop hypotheses on the country differences of patterns of educational careers and 
labor market integration of high school graduates in the three comparison countries. 
 
2.3.1 Mode of Stratification 
‘Parallel stratification’ implies a differentiation of educational outcomes by the type 
of educational program which is chosen out of different parallel educational tracks. 
Besides parallel stratification, educational systems can be ‘sequentially stratified’, e.g. 
into undergraduate and postgraduate studies, or they can comprise both of them. In a 
classification of higher education systems, Goedegebuure et al. (1993) call systems 
that comprise both, prestige differences between universities in parallel tracks and a 
sequential organization of educational decisions, diversified systems. The US higher 
education system is an ideal example for a strongly diversified educational system. 
Systems which are mainly divided into two tracks with different prestige are called 
binary systems in their classification. A typical example is the German higher 
education system (before the Bologna reform). As a third category, they refer to 
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formally unified systems which intentionally reduce status differences by central 
coordination. Sweden has sometimes been placed into this category (Bauer, 1996). 
With reforms of the higher education system in 1977 the vocational tracks of higher 
education (university colleges) were strengthened and made up a rapidly increasing 
share of the postsecondary education system. Even though these institutions may 
formally be less clearly distinguishable from the research universities – as e.g. the 
German Fachhochschule – in their vocational orientation and the shorter programs, 
they play a similar role. Other authors have thus described the Swedish system as one 
that has developed into a binary system after the 1970´s (Jonsson and Erikson, 2007). 
Parallel and sequential stratification are important system characteristics for 
educational decision making, since their absence or presence changes the 
consequences, frequency and time of decisions. Under the condition of parallel 
stratification, decisions about educational achievement become ‘one and all’ 
decisions. If a system is parallel stratified and mobility between tracks is impossible, 
the choice of a track almost perfectly predicts the final educational level. Under 
sequential stratification, the decision is broken down into steps. Young adults in this 
system will be faced with smaller but more decisions that are made at different points 
in time. Hence, as a first hypothesis, I assume that a higher percentage of young adults 
in systems with sequential stratification split their educational career into several 
periods of education, intermitted by other activities. 
 
2.3.2 Openness of Educational Systems to Non-Traditional Students 
Beyond their basic set-up, education systems differ in their openness to older, non-
traditional students. Several policies can foster the late participation in postsecondary 
education. Higher education institutions can promote flexibility for students who want 
to re-enter higher education and enable them to combine and arrange education with 
other life domains (Schuetze and Slowey, 2000). Practically, such flexibility mirrors 
in less strict regulations, e.g. concerning the number of credits per semester and the 
schedule of classes or the availability of distance studies. For many young adults, low 
formal entry requirements are important as well. It goes without saying that in 
systems were the entrance into the educational system is nearly impossible for non-
traditional students that even motivated and able young adults will refrain from 
enrollment. On the micro-level such policies can reduce students’ costs of entry and 
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changes their behavioral patterns. In some cases - e.g. the one of the Swedish 25/5- or 
25/4-rule - policies even remove institutional restrictions completely. Apart from the 
education system, states can promote access opportunities for non-traditional students 
by accompanying educational policies with the provision of other institutional support 
such as studentships. As a second hypothesis, I thus expect that systems which are 
open for non-traditional students and reduce the costs of late entry lead to more 
diverse patterns of educational attendance. 
For this analysis, I ignore the question on the ‘true’ aim of these policies. 
They could be implemented in order to promote equality of opportunities, but also to 
satisfy the demand by certain interest groups in the elites, so that the equality of 
opportunity argument is simply used as justification. The latter could be the case e.g. 
to reduce the cost of unemployed in times of economic downturns by offering 
enrollment in the hope that the skills acquired by re-entrants guarantee a more 
productive workforce once the economy reprises. For my central question, whether 
and how different institutional settings structure the individual educational biography, 
the true motives of politicians are less relevant. But more should be said about the 
stability of these institutions once introduced, and also about the question why certain 
institutions may specialize to cater the needs of non-traditional students. In the 
following paragraphs, I argue that this institutional characteristic will develop, expand 
and remain in systems where educational institutions compete for students according 
to market rules. 
 
2.3.3 Private/Public Mode of Finance and Centralized Control over Higher 
Education Institutions 
Once introduced, I hypothesize, the characteristics of different tertiary educational 
systems are highly dependent on the mechanisms of coordination and finance of 
higher education. These are either tightly controlled by the state or the free market 
(Shavit et al., 2007). On the one hand, the mechanisms differ in the extent to which 
centralized control is operative with regard to the development of the institution and 
the curriculum. On the other hand, they also differ in the degree to which institutions 
are free to develop their own profile by catering for consumer demands with specific 
educational programs. In privately funded market systems colleges have to attract 
students in order to survive financially. Different suppliers on the market will make 
differentiated offers specializing on certain clients. Higher education institutions must 
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offer study programs that meet the demands of students. The strongest example for a 
market driven system are the United States. Universities are free in the policy they 
pursue, but also highly dependent on private funding. 
In centrally coordinated and state financed systems on the other hand, the 
state plans the curricula and also finances education. In many state financed systems, 
including Germany and Sweden, higher education is free or at least subsidized to a 
much higher degree as for example in the US. In a comprehensive comparative study, 
Shavit et al. (2007) compare these system characteristics and examine their relation 
with social inequality. The authors find privately financed systems to be more diverse 
and to have higher attendance rates in higher education, but also to show higher social 
inequality within higher education. The core difference between these two types of 
systems is the main supplier of higher education, i.e. the agent deciding about the 
offers of higher education. In private systems, the decision about the set-up of the 
higher education system evolves from a market dynamic. I assume that actors follow 
the principle of profit maximization. In countries with centrally coordinated higher 
education systems on the other hand, the set-up of the institutions is a political 
decision which does not necessarily follow the rule of profit maximization. However, 
there might be market-like competition if the institutions’ fortune (in getting public 
funding) depends on the number of students it can attract. These systems must thus to 
some degree be grouped into the market-coordinated systems. 
On the side of suppliers of higher education, we can expect that market-
coordinated systems force them to offer study programs which are able to attract fee-
paying enrollees. Whether they can survive depends on whether there are enough 
people willing to pay for enrollment in their programs. The competition for such 
‘customers’ should motivate colleges to cater their needs best. If this fails for the 
majority of potential students, they can focus on certain niches. While high prestige 
universities will try to attract as talented students as possible in order to maintain their 
status, lower prestige institutions are under the pressure of finding enough students at 
all. As these institutions cannot attract students with excellent records, they have to 
offer other advantages. Such aspects can be open access and easy-to-pass entrance 
requirements and low tuition fees. More importantly in this context, it could also be a 
way to cater the demand for non-traditional students, e.g. by flexible class schedules 
enabling non-traditional students to combine their studies with work and family. 
Hence, especially lower tier institutions should be motivated to follow a strategy of 
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‘openness and flexibility’ and attract young adults who are willing to reenter the 
educational system. This leads me to the expectation that market systems allow more 
diversification in the timing and patterns of educational careers than state-coordinated 
systems. 
When education is financed by the state, the question of a flexible 
organization of studies enabling non-traditional students to enroll becomes a political 
issue. Colleges can be opened to non-traditional students, e.g. to promote greater 
equality of opportunities over the life course. But there is no system-inherent 
mechanism which would cause this. It rather depends on the policy makers and which 
aims they pursue with education. Therefore, a general claim on the coordinating 
mechanisms of the education system is much more difficult to make than for countries 
where private funding plays a pivotal role for the financing of higher education. 
Consequentially, the strong link between non-traditional students and lower prestige 
institutions will not necessarily evolve. 
As opportunities for flexible educational careers in the market-coordinated 
framework will only be created upon demand, we can directly expect more 
diversification in the educational career patterns in systems offering many 
opportunities for non-traditional students. This effect is fostered by the fact that 
students can anticipate re-entries a long time before they actually enter the educational 
systems (see e.g. chapter 4.1 of this volume for evidence that entire sequences of 
education are often planned ahead). 
Gaps can be triggered by students’ inability to pay for the costs of education. 
They can then leave the educational system with the aim to return whenever they were 
able to amass enough savings to ‘cover the next round of college’. When higher 
education is costly, not only stop-outs/drop-outs can cause diversification of 
postsecondary education career patterns. Indeed, a number of studies suggest that high 
work-load or the financial situation can account for drop-outs (for literature reviews 
see Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005; Riggert et al., 2006). Involuntary drop-outs are 
likely candidates for re-enrollment once they have gathered enough savings. This 
pattern then results in interruptions instead of totally drop-outs. But high working 
hours during college in systems with high costs for higher education could also lead to 
other deviations, such as delayed graduation or also permanent drop-outs (Weiss and 
Roksa, 2012). 
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Summing up, we can expect that opportunities for late entries into higher 
education will evolve in market-coordinated systems, but can as well be created in 
state-coordinated systems if politically wanted. The US can certainly be seen as the 
most typical market-coordinated system. The Swedish system is state regulated and 
publicly financed, but has a ‘soft market component’ in that the institutions have 
discretion on many aspects of their educational programs. At the same time, many 
obvious policy efforts have been made to invite older students. The German system is 
the most centralized one. Against this background, I will now discuss hypotheses 
about the patterns of educational careers in the three comparison countries. 
 
2.3.4 The Institutional Background: the Institutionalization of Educational 
Careers by the Higher Education System in Germany, the US and 
Sweden 
The German higher education system contrasts strongly with the US system in many 
respects. Until recently, there was almost no sequential stratification and the system 
was only parallel stratified into two main tracks with clear prestige differences. 
Financing and organization of higher education in Germany are duties of the federal 
states that also tightly control the universities and second tier Fachhochschulen 
(Mayer, 2003). There are almost no specific arrangements in favor of non-traditional 
students and studies last generally four to five years (see above under 2.3.2). 
Selectivity of secondary education is strong. Higher education can only be entered 
with an Abitur- or Fachhochschulreife-degree, while the latter only grants access to 
the lower tier Fachhochschulen.  
The US higher education system is a sequentially stratified system which is 
at the same time diverse. It opens many opportunities for flexibility in higher 
education. The sequential stratification manifests in the Bachelor-/Master-structure of 
degrees and the two year colleges with transfer-classes which enable to continue at 
regular colleges. But these three ‘institutionalized steps’ between different programs 
are by far not the only opportunity to interrupt postsecondary education in the US. 
Many colleges follow a laissez-faire policy with regard to stop-outs and late (re-) 
entries. 
Compared to European countries, the financing of higher education in the US 
depends to a large extent on private sources. The system is diversified and institutions 
are rather independent in their curriculum and in the admission of students. As 
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discussed above, in such an environment I expect that colleges with lower prestige 
specialize on those groups who cannot make it for several reasons to the more 
prestigious institutions. E.g. Community colleges are ‘specialized’ on the group of 
students not able to enter a full university after high school. This comprises poor 
students, students with lower academic abilities but also older students who want to 
study late or refresh their education and have to combine their studies with other areas 
of life such as family and work (Cohen and Brawer, 1996). For the system of higher 
education in the US, the community colleges are of quantitative importance after their 
constant expansion throughout the last century. In the mid 1990´s, about half of all 
college freshmen where enrolled in community colleges. 
Thus, community colleges as the lower tier institutions in the market-
coordinated US system of higher education indeed behave in the predicted way: they 
seek for clients among those not aspiring higher prestige-colleges for any reason. 
While this explanation searches the reason for the openness of community colleges in 
the structural set-up of the system, authors explaining the American higher education 
system from a historical perspective have argued that the purpose of community 
colleges is ‘empowerment’ of disadvantaged groups and non-traditional students 
(Cohen and Brawer, 1996; Thelin, 2004). As far as the establishment of the colleges is 
concerned, this might be the case. For the persistence and expansion of the systems, I 
suggest the consideration of client seeking as an alternative explanation. Several 
observations support this hypothesis at least for the US context, where education is 
often seen as a private good for individual social mobility (Labaree, 1997) and the 
costs for college education has skyrocketed over the last decades (Archibald and 
Feldmann, 2010). Here, I will not discuss this in more detail and neither test which of 
these explanations reflects the specific situation in the US or Sweden best. However, 
it should be kept in mind that even if the initial aim was empowerment, only those 
institutions who could find enough students are able to survive. 
On the other hand, it must be admitted that the process of opening the system 
for non-traditional students was in all three cases accompanied by a strong rhetoric on 
the creation of equal opportunities – e.g. for students who were disadvantaged in their 
early educational career. The German system has picked up on that trend later than 
the US and the Swedish systems, as a part of the adaption of the Bologna reforms (cf. 
Chapter 1.4.1). As the first move towards this direction, the US opened colleges with 
the passing of the GI Bill of Rights in 1944 to create opportunities for soldiers 
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returning home from war. This decision has changed American colleges. Besides 
many minorities and working class students also students of older age and with war 
experience entered the system (Kaestle, 1993; Stulberg and Chen, 2011). Sweden has 
made a similar move with the educational reforms in the 1970s. With reforms mainly 
in the secondary school system that were accomplished in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Swedish social democratic government made far reaching educational reforms with 
the explicit aim of decreasing inequality in opportunities (Erikson and Jonsson, 
1996b; Halldén, 2008). Erikson and Jonsson further describe the development of the 
tertiary system as follows: 
 
‘Tertiary education was reformed in an Education Act from 1977. Short-term tertiary 
education, mostly vocational, expanded, and training colleges for nurses and comprehensive 
school teachers were paced under the auspices of the extended university organization …. . 
Traditional university courses in faculties of Arts and Social Sciences were furthermore 
‘vocationalized’ (not necessarily by a change in contents). Admission rules were changed, so 
that work-life experience could now be included as a merit for university studies. Tertiary 
education was decentralized, in order to diminish regional barriers. All in all, the 1977 reform 
aimed at making university studies less exclusive, and at facilitating the transition to 
postsecondary education.’ (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996b, p. 72) 
 
This illustrates that opening the system for non-traditional students was an integral 
part of an educational reform aimed at the provision of opportunities leading to 
equalization in intergeneration inequality. The astonishing similarities to the US 
system are well summarized in the directly following paragraph: 
 
‘In sum, one might say that the school system in Sweden was changed from a fairly traditional 
European system – with early selection, parallel school forms, several selection points, and 
small, exclusive secondary and tertiary levels – to a system reminiscent of the American one, 
with mass education at secondary level. However, it has maintained, or even strengthened the 
focus on vocational schooling …., and the tertiary sector has not been permitted to expand to 
meet the demand for university education.’ (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996b, pp. 72-73) 
 
Most importantly, however, the Swedish reforms as well attempted to use the opening 
of the higher education system to non-traditional students to create opportunities for 
certain groups. This was even more pronounced than it might be salient in the 
summary of Erikson and Jonsson. One central aspect of the reform to equalize access 
to higher education was the introduction of the 25/5-rule in 1969 (later 25/4-rule). 
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According to this rule, all young adults of at least 25 years of age or with five or more 
years of work experience are in principle eligible to higher education, at least to a 
certain part of the system (Eurydice, 2000a; Werler and Claesson, 2007). Over time, 
and in particular with further reforms of the higher education system in 1993, this 
right has been extended to the entire population (Eurydice, 2000a; Werler and 
Claesson, 2007). Non-traditional students are further offered a large number of 
opportunities to combine studies with other areas of their life, for example through 
part-time or distant study programs. 
To sum up, the Swedish system is financed by the state and all public 
institutions are free of charge. Higher education is coordinated to a high degree by the 
state. However, Swedish higher universities and högskolan are much more open 
towards non-traditional students than other state-coordinated higher education 
systems such as Germany. Costs of higher education are low, students receive 
financial support from the state which is not means tested. In line with the general 
openness for non-traditional students, selectivity into the group which is eligible for 
higher education is low. In Sweden, higher education is – as well as in the US – set up 
in a sequentially ordered Bachelor-/Master system. 
The appeal that open and flexible education systems seems to have to 
politicians is illustrated by the outlets of many multinational bodies urging more 
countries to follow the examples of the US and Sweden (Education Audiovisual and 
Culture Executive Agency Eurydice, 2012; Organization for economic cooperation 
and development (OECD), 1996; Organization for economic cooperation and 
development (OECD), 2004). For a long time Germany´s education did not allow 
changing tracks from an early phase of the educational career on (Blossfeld, 1990). 
For higher education, policies of permeability of tracks and shorter cycles could be 
observed in Germany only lately in the course of the Bologna reforms which were, as 
policy maker argue, among other aims a strategy for equalizing educational 
opportunities (see chapter 1.4). 
 
2.3.5 Labor Market Flexibility 
Regarding the core dimensions of labor-market structures I assume that labor market 
flexibility is an important core institutional characteristic. The available routes into 
employment will set the possibilities for labor-market entrants to get a suitable job – 
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with or without completed education. Labor market job protection, as opposed to 
flexibility, further defines individually perceived probabilities of losing the present 
job and of being able to get a new job after returning to school. In flexible labor 
markets, employment protection typically is low which allows employers to fire 
easily, i.e. in a flexible labor market the division between insiders and outsiders of the 
labor force is less strict (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). Flexibility both offers 
incentives to re-enter education in the case of an unsuccessful or unsatisfactory first 
job and reduces the cost of giving up a job. In sum, I will discuss three reasons why 
transitions from higher education to work are less ordered in flexible labor markets. 
- First, a higher turnover-rate of workers in the labor market facilitates early 
exits from the educational system justly due to the number of vacancies. 
Attractive jobs will divert students away from education more often than in 
labor markets where entrants face high disadvantages in comparison to 
insiders. As previous research has shown, flexible labor markets do indeed 
manage to integrate school leavers faster than more regulated systems 
(Wolbers 2007). 
- Second, once a position is reached in a flexible labor market, the value of 
holding this position is smaller than in inflexible labor markets. As job safety 
is lower in flexible labor markets, the chance of losing a job is higher (to be 
said in real world language: one could be fired soon anyhow). Thus, the 
opportunity costs for leaving the labor market – or at least reducing working 
hours – are higher in inflexible labor markets. 
- Third, re-entry into the labor market after a second period in the education 
system is easier. Lock-in effects in the educational system can be expected to 
be shorter, which again reduce the costs and the risk of re-entering the 
education system. 
Besides labor market regulation, a counteracting force to flexibility is the 
occupational structuring of labor markets (Kerckhoff, 1995; Marsden, 1999; Maurice, 
Sellier and Silvestre, 1982; Müller and Wolbers, 2003). Occupationally structured 
labor markets typically go along with educational systems that provide highly 
occupational specific skills. Educational degrees can be directly or at least closely 
assigned to occupations. In systems with an internal labor market logic the education 
system provides more general skills. Careers and job assignments are organized 
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within companies
5
. In less occupational structured labor markets, entering the labor 
market is usually easier and depends less on the formal educational credential (De 
Vreyer et al., 2000; van der Velden and Wolbers, 2003). Research on whether these 
system differences matter as much for graduates from higher education as for 
secondary or non-tertiary postsecondary education is rare or even seems absent. Other 
system characteristics such as the degree of expansion are assumed to have a stronger 
effect on the labor market integration of higher education graduates (Kim and Kim, 
2003). However, opportunities to enter the labor market with or without vocational 
degree define the set of alternatives to choose from, even for those young adults who 
eventually enroll in higher education. If there is no chance to enter the labor market 
without vocational education, the group of re-enrolling students is naturally reduced 
to those who have already completed a vocational program and entered the labor 
market on that basis. Above and beyond, college drop-outs should thus be 
discouraged by a labor market with high occupational closure. Thus, the requirement 
of vocational (or alternatively higher) educated to enter the labor market makes the 
decision about education once again a one-and-only decision. Frequent transitions 
between the labor market and the education system are difficult. The logical 
consequence is the hypothesis that the number of deviations from the direct way to 
higher education will be reduced, but those individuals who are off the standard track 
will have to go an even longer detour through an initial phase of vocational education. 
For the three labor markets compared here, the US are the prime example of 
a flexible labor market. In comparison to both Sweden in the 1980´s and 1990´s and 
Germany, employment security is lower and job changes occur more often. Chapter 
1.3 has compared the labor market flexibility situation between different countries in 
the discussion of the case selection and confirmed this: according to the OECD 
employment protection legislation index and other criteria, the US are not only by far 
the most flexible system within the three countries studied in this book, but also 
among a larger group of countries including e.g. the UK. This index ranges from 0 
(least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions). If we compare the exemplary values for 
1990, Germany range with a value of 3.17 and Sweden with a value of 3.49 on a 
similar level, while the US are clearly below that with a value of 0.17. 
                                                 
5
 For discussion of the theoretical mechanism behind this connection of labor markets and educational 
systems see Marsden (1999) or Müller and Gangl (2003a).  
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With regard to the occupation-education linkage, the German system is 
usually classified as a typical case for an occupational labor market, while the US 
system is prototypical for an internal labor market system (Shavit and Müller, 1998). 
Sweden stands somewhere in between. Vocational education is available, but taught 
in schools and less often attended as in Germany (Erikson and Jonsson, 1998a). 
Against this background, I expect that the US labor market is the context 
which eases unstandardized, individualized patterns of educational careers most, 
while Sweden and German should be similar in this respect. 
 
2.3.6 Summary of Hypotheses 
Comparing the three education systems, strong differences in the patterns of 
postsecondary educational careers can be expected. The main hypothesis is in short 
that sequential stratification of higher education, openness of the educational system 
for older students, a more flexible and not occupationally structured labor markets 
will give students more options and incentives to interrupt education, gain work 
experience and/or (re-)enroll later. And both of these individual actions, interrupting 
and enrolling late, will then account for less standardized and more individualized 
educational career patterns in these societies. 
Two types of careers will be distinguished: those leading to a degree and 
those never completed, i.e. drop-out careers. Due to sequential stratification - 
conditional on being in one of these groups - the openness of higher education 
institutions for non-traditional students and the lower selectivity in eligibility to 
higher education, I expect to find greater variability in educational career patterns in 
the US and Sweden than in Germany. The high costs in the US system, its sequential 
stratification and the wide availability of educational opportunities for older students 
as well as the low requirements for entering higher education, lead to expect that the 
variation of educational career patterns is greatest in the US. Sweden´s education 
system has many things in common with the US system, but the financing differs and 
the market pressure on colleges to get as many students as possible may be somewhat 
lower. Regarding the labor market, the US is the most flexible case as well. Sweden 
stands closer to Germany in this regard, but has a weaker occupational labor market 
structure. In Germany, education is very structured and the institutional corset is hard 
to break through. Only at high cost, especially in terms of time, can educational 
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careers be individualized. Therefore, the prospected fewer deviating cases in Germany 
should go along with a stronger deviation from the norm of following the 
institutionally prescribed track. 
Given the similarities between the Swedish and the US education system in 
the structural set-up, the question will be if the marketization of education and the 
labor market structures will make the difference, or if the two countries arrive at a 
similar institutionalization of educational biographies. Since the main interest of this 
chapter is the overall difference between countries, I will ignore the hypothesis on the 
within-country differentiation of the education system. 
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2.4 Data and Methodological Approach: How to Describe 
Variability in Life Course Patterns? 
 
 
 
2.4.1 Data 
For this analysis, I use four datasets (see chapter 1.5): 
- for Germany the (West-)German Life History Study (GLHS) (Max Planck 
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 2004) and in addition for the West-German 
part of the study ‘Working and learning in a changing world’ (alwa, Arbeit 
und Leben im Wandel) conducted by the Institute of Employment Research 
(Antoni et al., 2010) is used. Of the total of 2543 cases of the GLHS, I omit 
1769 who did not take exams qualifying them for tertiary education (Abitur or 
Fachhochschulreife) for most analyses. The remaining sample contains 774 
cases. The alwa dataset contains 1861 respondents with full information on the 
variables I use and who are qualified to enter higher education and are born in 
the time between 1960 and 1974. 
- For the US I analyze the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79, U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). I selected respondents of the 
birth cohorts born between 1960 and 1964 only, with complete information 
until age 34. For most analyses I refer only to cases that have attained either a 
high-school degree or GED. These criteria apply to a sub-sample of 2045 for 
my empirical analyses. 
- For Sweden I use the Swedish Level of Living Surveys 1990 and 2000 
(Levnadsnivåundersökningarna). For the Swedish context it is very difficult to 
define those young adults who are qualified to enter higher education. For this 
chapter I follow the approach suggested by Erikson and Jonsson (2007). For a 
more detailed discussion of eligibility for higher education in Sweden see 
chapter 1.4.3, where I describe the structure of the education system and 
chapter 3.2 discussing inequalities throughout different educational thresholds 
in the life course. After selecting the relevant cohorts (born between 1955 and 
1970, but reduced older cohorts when necessary for balancing life course 
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spans) and limiting the sample to students qualified for higher education, I 
have an analysis sample of 744 cases. 
All of the mentioned datasets qualify for such a comparative study by providing 
high quality data about life courses of specific cohorts (see chapter 1.5). 
 
2.4.2 Excursus: Describing the Patterns of Educational Careers as Categorical 
Sequences 
Variation in educational career patterns has many different aspects. Capturing all 
relevant differences between sequences requires reporting several different aspects, 
leading to a confusingly high number of empirical results. On the other hand, 
calculating only one composite measure representing many characteristics at once – 
such as measures of sequence complexity – one might overlook particularities of 
certain transitions or sections in the life course. Within this trade-off between 
‘concreteness’ and ‘generality’, a compromise has to balance the need of abstraction 
and simplification for comparative research with the need for a detailed description of 
the complex reality within each context. A somewhat closer look may yield additional 
insights compared to a composite measure combining many different aspects of 
complexity. In the following, I will give a brief overview on possible methodological 
approaches and discuss their application on a comparison of educational career 
patterns and complex school-to-work transitions. Since sequence analyses are not 
(yet) standard tools of social research, I will also discuss measures I do not use and 
eventually substantiate the methodological choice I have made. This short excursus 
into the topic of description and comparison of sequences will also lay the ground for 
other chapters following later in this volume. 
 
2.4.2.1 Transitions from School to Work as a Multi-State Process 
One approach for comparing processes between groups is to define ‘key events’ and 
compare the rates of their occurrence. At least two events are useful to characterize 
for the school-to-work transition: the beginning of that process, i.e. ‘first exit from 
full-time education’ and the end of the transition from school to work, i.e. the ‘first 
job after the last time enrolled in education’. The second event is always as late as the 
first; it is later if there is an intervening period involving any other activity (neither 
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school nor work)
6
. In order to characterize educational careers and intertwined labor-
force experience, the first and last entry into full-time work are useful to delineate and 
describe the duration of this process. A useful graphical summary of these events are 
survivor curves for the two events ‘first’ and ‘last transition from education to work’ 
starting at the time of leaving general upper-secondary education (Coleman, 1984). 
They show the probability of remaining in the group that has not (yet) experienced an 
event. Hence, survivor curves include also the cases that have not experienced the 
event until the interview but may do so in the future. Such curves represent quite well 
the variability of education and labor market sequences on the group- or context-level. 
To arrive at a more comprehensive measure – also including events in 
between the first and the last transition from education to the labor market – one could 
simply extend the idea above and count the number of transitions from school to 
work. Also, the number of periods in education without any interruption or the 
number of transitions into and out of the educational system can help to better 
understand the way in which educational careers are structured in a given society. 
Further, for those cases that do have multiple transitions, we would expect the age of 
re-entry to be higher (that is, in Sweden and the US higher than in Germany). So far, 
the description has centered on events – and thus more or less ignores the dimension 
of timing. The way timing influences the event-centered characterization of sequences 
is limited to the definition of events – by criteria as e.g. the minimum time spend in 
the labor force before the change between schooling and working is counted as ‘labor 
market entry’. 
Overcoming this shortcoming needs more, additional information. Combined 
with the events outlined above one would ask about the activities between the two 
transitions into the labor market. Was the time between the two events spent in 
education, the labor market or other activities? The share of time individuals spend in 
the labor market can give useful insights. 
Under the headline of sequence analyses, more systematic methods for the 
analysis of complete educational careers have been suggested. These methods allow a 
much more parsimonious description of educational careers. This comes at the cost of 
a more global assessment of different educational careers and leads to values that are 
sometimes hard to interpret. Indeed, in many occasions much simpler measures might 
                                                 
6
 Alternatively the labor market entry can be regarded in a similar way, comparing the ‘first entry into 
the labor market’ and the ‘last entry into the labor market’. 
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be preferable. Several approaches to the description of categorical sequences and a 
measurement of their complexity have been proposed. A more comprehensive 
discussion of methodological options is found in a recent working paper of Aisenbrey 
and Fasang (2009). Also, the reference manual of the TraMineR software (Gabadinho 
et al., 2008) gives a statistical summary in addition to a manual for practical sequence 
analysis using the free software package ‘R’. In the following, I introduce two 
possible sequence analytical strategies. First, methods describing the complexity of 
educational career patterns as such and second, methods comparing the sequence of 
each individual with a theoretically defined ‘comparison sequence’, the sequence we 
would find if the ideal and direct road through the educational system is taken. 
 
2.4.2.2 Sequence Complexity and Sequence Turbulence 
Similar to counting the number of transitions from school to work, as suggested 
above, one can describe one aspect of sequence complexity by counting the number of 
transitions between distinct states occurring in a sequence, i.e. the number of 
transitions from school to work or back plus one. This measure appeals with 
simplicity, but still cannot capture any differentiation in the duration of the states. 
However, we often want to qualify sequence as being more complex which follow 
transition pattern where the transitions distribute equally over the sequence. The 
following two sequences illustrate this problem: 
 
Sequence 1:  work-school-w-s-w-w-w-w-w-w-w-w 
Sequence 2:  work-w-school-s-s-w-w-s-s-s-w-w 
 
Both sequences are of equal length and contain an equal number of transitions, but the 
educational career of sequence 2 can intuitively be described as being more ‘complex’ 
or less ‘stable’, since it is harder to predict a certain activity at any point in time. In a 
more extreme example, a 100 months long sequence with five different states in the 
first five months and then no change between month five and month 100 should 
ideally be characterized as being less complex than a sequence with the same number 
of transitions occurring with a distance of approximately twenty months. This can be 
solved by reference to a measure for the variation of the length of the different 
‘activities’ or ‘states’. Differences in the distribution over time can be characterized 
by the longitudinal entropy h (also Shannon-entropy): 
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with a being the number of different states that are principally possible (i.e. 
in sequence analysis terminology: the size of the alphabet) and πi being the proportion 
of time in the total sequence in which the state occurs. However, now the number of 
transitions between states is ignored. This is particularly problematic in the case of 
educational careers, as I only distinguish between two states and the qualification of 
many different states is not the problem. In this case, the entropy h is completely 
predictable from the amount of time a person attended education (as share of the total 
time of the observation period). Thus, the two representations of ‘event occurrence’ 
and ‘timing’ closely correspond to the very simple approach presented above. 
A more condensed measure should now be able to combine the two 
elements. Several different suggestions have been made to tackle this problem. None 
of them has yet neither been justified by a theoretical argument nor proven to be the 
most useful tool in practice. A rather direct combination of the two measures is the 
complexity index suggested by Gabadinho et al.(2010) 
  
 
 
where denotes the theoretical maximally possible entropy (which is log 
a), the length of the distinctive state sequence (all transitions between states in 
the sequence + 1) and the total length of the sequence. The sequence complexity 
index can take values between 0 (no complexity, consists of only one state) and 1 
(maximal possible complexity is reached). It closely corresponds to Pearson´s 
correlation coefficient r. 
An alternative measure is the sequence turbulence – which is in recent 
publication also called sequence complexity – suggested by Elzinga (2006). This 
measure is much more computational intensive. In this framework, each of the 
sequences is divided into different sub-sequences. Sub-sequences are sequence 
patterns describing parts of the sequence, e.g. the educational career. Consider for 
example a sequence of w-s-w; then w-s is a possible sub-sequence. The criterion for 
complexity of a career is the logarithm to the basis 2 of the number of distinct sub-
sequences. The complete educational career is divided into all possible sub-sequences 
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that are contained in it. The more transitions between activities occur, the more sub-
sequences can be found. Beyond that, this measure also captures the number of 
transitions between two identical activities. If identical activities are ‘located’ closer 
to each other in the career, this reduces the number of possible sub-sequences and 
hence can be used as an alternative representation for the distribution. It is defined as 
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where ϕ(x) denotes the number of sub-sequences in a sequence and s2t the variance of 
the time spent in the distinct states consecutively. The measure itself has been revised 
somewhat by the author in the meantime (Elzinga, 2010). The logarithm is chosen as 
a more preferable scale based on a solely practical argument: the size of the numbers 
produced by the number of sub-sequences would be extremely large (Elzinga, 2010). 
None of the measures is justified by a strong theoretical justification. It 
should however be noted that in many cases Elzinga´s sequence turbulence leads to 
higher values for very complex sequences. That means the existing complexity is 
highlighted (or, as one could also say: overstated) more strongly. In tendency, the 
measures of Elzinga and Gabadinho et al. arrive at similar results. However, often not 
even the observations in the dataset are ranked to the same positions. The complexity 
index is certainly more straightforward and much simpler to calculate. Further, some 
procedures in the calculation of Elzinga´s turbulence approach are justified by 
computational convenience rather than on theoretical grounds. Eventually, both 
measures have the same aim: they describe certain characteristics of single sequences. 
They make different judgments on the importance of either time variability or event 
occurrence. The more important problem is that they sometimes reveal smallest 
values for life courses considered as ‘odd outliers’ by social theory. A small value 
thus corresponds not always with a ‘usual’ or ‘smooth’ transition. For example, a 
person being in education forever has the least complex sequence, as well as someone 
who never had any education. In the case of education careers, there exist norms in 
educational systems for the educational career pathways – and a measure for complex 
educational careers should ideally mirror the congruence of a career pattern with this 
norm. Obviously, this norm includes changing states and a specific value for the 
entropy that is greater than zero. In general though, a rather low number of sub-
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sequences would be the consequence of moving through the system in that way. Thus, 
Elzinga’s sequence complexity seems somewhat more valid for the purpose of a 
comparative description of educational careers. However, ideally we would want to 
represent the measure for the deviance from the system-imposed, direct educational 
career – being smallest for complete accordance and largest for complete non-
conformity with it. Instead of a description of the educational career itself, I suggest to 
characterize the variability in educational careers based on a comparison to the 
‘standard sequence’ of the respective education system. This straight career will be 
termed ‘reference sequence’ or ‘standard pathway’. As should become clear now, the 
other methods described above do not qualify for comparative research, since the 
different standard pathways through the education systems lead per se to different 
complexity of all educational careers in the different country contexts. This is the case 
for both measures discussed so far. Therefore, I will now turn to alternative tools. 
 
2.4.2.3 Sequence Distances and the Operationalization of Sequence Deviance 
As commonly used, sequence analysis starts out by calculating distances between all 
sequences to each other and builds clusters of different trajectories of e.g. life courses 
or careers. The same representations for distances between all sequences with each 
other can also be used to derive distances to a theoretically chosen reference 
sequence. The educational career that could be seen as a ’straight road’ to higher 
education in a respective society is a meaningful reference sequence for my question. 
While a great difference from many educational careers can be a good thing if most 
educational careers are complex, the difference from a quick and straight way to 
higher education tells how far a given student deviates from the most efficient way to 
a degree. For the given three educational systems, we can define three reference 
sequences that can be assumed to be something like a ‘royal road’ to higher education 
between the age of 18 and 32: 
- Germany: after the graduation from Abitur with 19 years of age, five years of 
studies would lead to a Diplom degree. Hence, the ideal way to higher 
education would be to finish everything after the first six years of our 
observation-window and then transfer to ‘non-studying’. 
- United States: after graduation from high-school (in most cases with age 18), a 
Bachelors degree can be achieved ideally in the first four years. Hence, the 
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first academic degree can be reached earlier than in Germany. The ideal 
sequence would be to study for the first four years of our observation-window 
and then stop. Master studies therefore will be marked as non-studying, 
because otherwise students studying for a Master degree would be 
characterized as more distant from the ‘direct way to higher education’. 
- Sweden: after graduation from Gymnasieskolan, higher education degrees 
could be achieved approximately four years later. Hence, we take a sequence 
template of studies in the first five years of our observation-window, then 
work. 
Again, a number of measures have been proposed for defining distances between 
sequences. As in the case of sequence complexity, there are hardly any theoretical 
arguments that would ease the choice between them. The application-context does not 
suggest preferring one of them either. Therefore, I chose applying the optimal 
matching procedure as a simple and fairly well established measure to define 
distances between all educational careers and the aforementioned reference sequence 
(Abbott and Tsay, 2000). Here, the sequences are evaluated as more distant, the more 
‘indel’-procedures (insertion and deletion-procedures) are required in order to convert 
the pattern of the educational career into the reference sequence. For example, to 
convert the sequence 
 
w-s-w 
 
into the sequence 
 
w-w-s 
 
we would insert one w to convert into 
 
w-w-s-w 
 
and then need one more deletion to arrive at 
 
w-w-s. 
 
The total ‘cost’ of the conversion would be two: one insertion and one deletion. The 
approach requires defining costs for insertions, deletions or substitutions of elements 
in a sequence. In the example above, I have just assumed that the cost for each 
insertion and each deletion is one. In principle, for each different transition from one 
into another state a specific insertion and deletion cost can be defined. Sometimes, it 
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is suggested to derive these costs from the actual transition rates between states in the 
dataset. However, since the estimation of indel-costs by estimation from the given 
transition rate can lead to very problematic assumptions and any other indel-cost 
choice is arbitrary (Elzinga, 2003), I decided to fix the costs for insertion and deletion 
procedures at the value 1 and for substitutions at 2. It can be shown that in this case, 
the optimal matching logic is identical with the sequence comparison based on the 
longest common sub-sequence between two sequences. 
In several occasions, substitution costs might be dependent on time and vary 
over the life course (Lesnard, 2006). When comparing educational careers to ideal 
sequences of educational careers, it can be argued that time indeed matters for the 
distances between sequences. The ideal educational career consists for each country 
of an initial phase of studies and at a certain point in time a single transition into 
work. In many cases, it might be hard to define a very clear transition point and a 
variation of few months would in reality not be a deviation with all its consequences. 
Therefore, a preferable approach could be a procedure assuming an increase in the 
substitution costs with the time elapsed since the typical transition point from school 
to work. Transitions near to the typical transition point would then have a smaller 
substitution cost, and those lying further apart are harder to substitute and hence 
contribute more to our measure of ‘complexity’ of educational careers. The weight for 
a given time elapsed then opens another opportunity for an arbitrary choice. For the 
following analyses I have compared all results with a set of different solutions for 
defining indel-costs according to the distance from the expected time-point of the 
transition from school to work. E.g. by weighting the indel-costs with the log- or 
square-root of the number of months they deviate from the expected transition month 
in the reference sequence. Even though this was a time consuming attempt, I will not 
report the results for several reasons. First, this procedure has not led to any 
meaningful difference in the results. Second, and more importantly, the expected 
transition points vary between the countries. As a consequence, the distance that 
theoretically would be possible thus varies between different countries as well. A 
solution that produces meaningful results for country comparative research has thus to 
be left for further research. Albeit the extensive discussion, within this chapter I will 
only report the results from a sequence comparison based on the optimal matching 
algorithm comparing each sequence to the reference sequence.  
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2.5 Results 
 
 
 
In the following, I will present several descriptive results on the diversification of 
educational career patterns. The first approach defines two analytical events: the first 
entry into the labor market for at least six consecutive months and the last observed 
transition into the labor market within the time of the life course that is observed in 
the data – until age 34. Figure 2.5.1 shows these survivor curves for the three 
societies. These curves show the estimated (conditional) percentage of young adults 
who have not left education yet for the first time (left curve) resp. who have not left 
education yet for good (second curve). For example at the age of ~22 in Germany, 50 
percent of all young adults qualified to enroll in university have left the education 
system for the first time whereas in the US and Sweden this has occurred for almost 
75 percent at the age of 20. Five years later, at age 25 in the US almost two thirds (64 
percent) have left the educational system permanently. 
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Figure 2.5.1: Survivor curves of first and last transition from school to work in the US, 
Sweden and Germany. 
 
Note: for each country context, the left curve depicts the first and the right curve the final transition 
from school to work. 
Data source: GLHS 64/71, NLSY79, alwa and LNU; own calculations. 
 
 
 
Thus both first and last exit from education in Germany are in general later than in the 
US or Sweden. Sweden even has a slightly higher rate of late transitions and a higher 
distance between the first and the last transition, but the pattern overall matches the 
US pattern almost perfectly
7
. 
For all three countries, the curve for the first exit is rather steep, which means 
that many cohort members leave the educational system at the same time. However, 
the line showing the last exit from the educational system before the age of 34 is 
steeper for Germany than the one for US students. This indicates that the age at final 
entry into the labor market is less standardized in the US and Sweden than in 
Germany. In these more flexible countries there are more very early exits, but there 
are also more very late transitions and it is hard to determine a typical age for leaving 
                                                 
7
 Note that confidence intervals for the survivor curves can be calculated but were left out of the graph 
for aesthetic reasons. Sweden and the US are not significantly different when the 95 percent confidence 
intervals are used as criterion. 
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the educational system. Sweden even has the lowest slope, showing that this transition 
occurs most ‘individualized’ among young adults in this context. The slope of both 
curves is steepest in Germany, and transitions occur in general later than in the US. 
The largest difference between the first and the last transition from school to work is 
found for Sweden. Swedish young adults start their working career early, but 
apparently re-enter education more often than in Germany and even the US. This 
pattern also appears when comparing the average time-gap between the first and the 
last entry into the labor market, which is reported in table 2.5.1. On average the 
longest time between these events exists in Sweden compared to Germany and the 
US, and it varies most between individuals. Again the US stands closer to Sweden
8
 
than to Germany. Hence, in Germany on average the entry into the labor market has 
more the character of an ‘event’ than a ‘phase’ in the biography. 
In first row of table 2.5.1, the gap between the first and ‘final’ entry into the 
labor market is reported for all cases. The results confirm what we already saw in the 
plot: in Germany, the disparity between differently defined transitions to the labor 
market is the smallest, while it is the highest for Sweden. But clearly, the question 
arises in how far this is a result of 
a. the share of those students who enter any postsecondary education at 
all and 
b. the share of students who do indeed enter postsecondary education 
more than one time. 
In order to refine this picture, I report several characteristics of those cases with 
multiple transitions into the labor market in the second row of table 2.5.1. First, the 
age of re-entry into education shows that those students who enter the labor market 
more than once are on average oldest when they return to the educational system in 
Germany. This is a counterintuitive result at the first view. It is less surprising though 
if we take into account that there are in general less students in Germany who go that 
way. For those who are re-entrants when enrolling into the universities, there are 
several reasons why they are on average even more mature than students in flexible 
systems of higher education. One reason is the longer phase in upper secondary 
school and the compulsory military or civil service. Until very recent reforms, 
                                                 
8
 The data is censored after the age of 34 in order to compare it to the German data. If I did not censor 
at that age, it would become even clearer that more Swedish adults return to higher education very late 
in comparison with Americans. 
2 .  Pat tern s  o f  Educat ional  Careers  
91 
 
schooling which qualifies for higher education lasted in Germany at least thirteen 
years. Further, most German men in the examined cohorts were drafted for military or 
civil service, which lasted at least one year. Another reason is the fact that the first 
entry into the labor market is virtually impossible without obtaining vocational 
education, which lasts normally two to three years. 
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Table 2.5.1: Higher education careers: several aspects of variability between individuals. 
mean (std. dev.) Germany: GLHS Germany: ALWA USA: NLSY Sweden: LNU 
 
all cases entering the labor market until age 34 
 
    
gap between first and last transition from school to work (in 
months) 
30.5 (43.6) 23.4 (40.9) 39.2 (60.4) 38.14 (63.7) 
     
 
cases with multiple transitions only 
 
    
age of re-entry to education 24.1 (3.1) 24.1 (3.3) 22.2 (3.9) 23.6 (3.5) 
gap between first and last labor market entry (in months) 71.0 (39.5) 75.4 (44.8) 84.6 (52.3) 92.7 (52.6) 
labor force experience (in months) before last labor market 
entry  
26.4 (26.8)  26.7 (27.3) 59.5 (45.2) 59.8 (48.9) 
 
N (not censored) 
 
671 
 
1658 
 
1950 
 
766 
N (multiple transitions) 289 685 925 233 
N(all cases) 774 1861 2045 744 
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Figure 2.5.2: Distributions of time spent in education throughout the twenties. 
 
 
Cases qualified to enter higher education  Cases with higher education degree 
Germany 
  
   
US 
  
   
Sweden 
  
 18  32 18  32 
 age age 
   
  in education  not in education 
Data source: GLHS 64/71, NLSY79, alwa and LNU; own calculations. 
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The next two rows in table 2.5.1 confirm that Germans do not spend the time by 
which they delay entry into higher education in the labor market but in other 
activities. Those who do delay still have on average a shorter gap between their 
transitions from school to work, and they collect significantly less labor market 
experience before their ‘final’ graduation compared to both flexible systems, Sweden 
and the US. Again, we see that for Germans the entry into the labor market can be 
more clearly defined as an event, while Swedish and American young adults start 
earlier collecting more work experience before entering the labor market the last time. 
On the one hand, we can see that more late entries into postsecondary 
education occur in Sweden and the US, while young Germans follow a more ordered 
educational career. This picture is however a bit too simple for comparing the 
situation in the three countries. Figure 2.5.2 changes the perspective and looks at the 
distribution of educational attendance between the age of 18 and 32. This shows that 
the respective group of young adults who are qualified for higher education spend a 
very different amount of time in the educational system in the three societies. The 
black space in each graph is the share of young adults in education at a given age. 
What we can easily see in the left column is that German young adults are clearly the 
ones who spend on average the longest period of time in higher education. In order to 
illustrate that this is not only the case because the attainment of the qualification for 
higher education is much more selective in Germany, I also plot the same distribution 
for those students who achieve a degree in higher education in the right column. Here 
we can see the difference of attendance in postsecondary education: in the early years, 
the share of students in education is high in all countries. However, in the US many 
students move on more quickly into the labor market. The longest, most intense 
participation in education can be seen in Germany. In the late twenties however, the 
distributions in the three countries become similar. 
So, on the one hand Germans spend more time in education, on the other 
hand there are more late entries into education in the flexible countries. This suggests 
that educational participation in Germany is mainly very standardized due to its long 
duration, while the shorter programs in the flexible countries allow collecting work 
experience before re-entry. The result seems to reveal a less standardized educational 
career and with more, but also shorter episodes in education, even in the Swedish 
education system with its low costs for education and more regulated labor market 
compared to the US. 
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In order to include more aspects of the educational sequence pattern, I now 
refer to the results of the sequence analytical method discussed under 2.4.2.3: each 
sequence is compared to the ‘straight way’ to the first possible higher education 
degree using an optimal matching procedure. That means I count the number of 
insertions and deletions of monthly observations in order to transfer each of the 
sequences into this template sequence which represents the ‘smoothest way to a 
degree’. The results are summarized in figure 2.5.3. 
For the sample of young adults who are eligible to enter higher education the 
German sample contains more careers which are close to the straight pathway to 
higher education. Among those eligible to higher education, the median-deviation is 
the same in Sweden and Germany, the Swedish sample however has more ‘outliers’ at 
the right end of the distribution, i.e. educational careers being very far from the fastest 
track than any of the other two countries have. There are many more young adults 
with great distances to a straight educational career than in the other societies. 
Combined with the descriptive statistics from chapter 1.4, a likely reason for the 
strong deviations in the US is the high rate of drop-outs being excluded in the figure 
on the right. Moreover, qualifying for higher education is less selective in the US, 
especially when compared to the situation in Germany. Therefore, the typical patterns 
of studying will be better captured by referring to those respondents who successfully 
completed higher education only. Now, the US sample has rather low distances to the 
direct pathway, which are on the level of the findings for Germany. Sweden has the 
most students with indirect educational career patterns achieving a degree. The 
highest number of students being very close to the direct track is found for Germany. 
Germany´s students however also often deviate and the median does not differ from 
the US. The US even has the lowest share of graduates with very high values on the 
distance measure. The strong difference for the US according to non-completion or 
completion of higher education confirms findings from previous research, showing 
that non-traditional students have extremely low chances for completion (Roksa and 
Velez, 2012). 
In sum, deviations are present in all three societies. In Sweden, non-
traditional students succeed in higher education and complete degrees, while in the 
US those with completed degrees have mostly very direct pathways through the 
educational system. German young adults have often very small values on the 
distance measure, but also some cases with rather high values. The latter might be 
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attributed to the long phases of studies and the high number of young adults 
completing a vocational degree before enrolling in higher education. 
Figure 2.5.4 visualizes the individual patterns of higher education attendance 
for those who eventually graduate. Each life course is depicted with a line being black 
when the individual was enrolled in postsecondary education and being grey when the 
individual was not enrolled. All life courses are sorted according to their distance to 
the national standard sequence, i.e. the institutional ‘prescribed’ way to graduation. 
The figure illustrates the shorter cycles of studies in the US, with frequent 
interruptions and short stays in the education system, even for those who complete 
higher education. For Sweden, it is much more difficult to spot any systematic 
difference to the other two countries. Noticeable is the low number of direct, 
uninterrupted careers at the bottom of the graph. Thus, even among students who 
complete higher education in Sweden, those who interrupt are almost the norm. 
2 .  Pat tern s  o f  Educat ional  Careers  
97 
 
Figure 2.5.3: Optimal matching distances to direct degree completion. 
 Cases qualified to enter higher education  Cases with higher education degree 
Germany  
  
 Median: 68 IQR.: 64 N: 732 Median: 58 IQR.: 66  N: 464 
USA 
  
 Median: 121 IQR.: 65 3324 Median: 51 IQR.: 45 N: 666 
Sweden 
  
 Median: 66 IQR.: 51 N:462 Median: 92 IQR.: 59 N:138 
           kernel density estimates 
Data source: GLHS 64/71, NLSY79, alwa and LNU; own calculations. Note on NLSY79 sample: the 
information needed for this analysis was available for all birth cohorts. The sample therefore deviates 
from the previous analysis for which the oldest birth cohorts have been dropped. 
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Figure 2.5.4: Individual pathways to higher education degrees in Germany, the US and Sweden. 
Germany USA Sweden 
   
   
  in education  not in education 
   
Data source: GLHS 64/71, NLSY79, alwa and LNU; own calculations. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The results of this chapter show that the patterns of postsecondary educational careers 
are often diversified within societies, and often divert from a normative institutional 
expectation for straight educational careers. Beyond, however, educational careers 
and the entry process into the labor force differ strongly between societies. In 
Germany, were higher education is rather exclusive, higher education careers often 
follow a straight pattern of studies directly after qualifying for enrollment. In contrast, 
in the US both the qualification is less exclusive as in Germany and the drop-out rate 
of those entering higher education is higher. At the same time, many young adults use 
their eligibility to enter higher education only temporary, enroll later, accept stop-outs 
from higher education or drop out permanently. Thus, the educational domain 
accounts for de-standardization and de-institutionalization of the life courses of young 
Americans. Incompatibility with the model of a direct degree achievement is also 
common in the Swedish context. The share of permanent drop-outs, however, is to a 
lower degree coupled with non-standard routes into colleges (cf. figure 1.4.6). While 
non-standard educational careers are in Sweden as common as in the US, students 
who deviate from the traditional pattern of educational attendance are much more 
likely to achieve a full university degree. This finding points towards a more 
successful integration of students with work experience into the education system in 
Sweden than in the US. 
Overall, in accordance with my first two hypotheses, the two education 
systems with sequential stratification and openness to older and less flexible students 
have a lower standardization of educational career patterns. The hypotheses that 
market coordination stabilizes the systems as diversified and as open to non-
traditional students cannot be tested with the present analysis, since I only refer to 
life-history data from few cohorts. To test this hypothesis on the development of the 
openness of education systems over time, one would need a time series of cohort 
datasets. My hypothesis is then that the openness develops fastest in societies in 
which cohorts entering the postsecondary education system decrease in size. When 
cohorts become smaller and the number of traditional, regular students decreases, 
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client-seeking educational institutions will have stronger pressure to win other 
students. Moreover, as long as the demand for high-skilled employees remains stable, 
employers will have to recruit more and more among late entrants or upgrade the 
skills of their present employees, since the supply of regular high skilled graduates 
decreases. However, this endeavor has to be left for future research. 
The German system imposes the longest programs on students for achieving 
credentials with any worth on the labor market. This is coupled with long and rather 
continuous attachment to the education system. In comparison to Sweden and the US, 
even students with interruptions spend most of their time in education, either in higher 
education or in other postsecondary alternatives. Schooling in years, and thus the cost 
for schooling but potentially also the skill benefits, is longest in Germany. In Sweden 
and in the US on the other hand, labor force experience before the last observed 
transition from education to the labor market is much more common. Postsecondary 
educational careers therefore are not only less individualized in Germany, they are 
also more dominated by education. This is, however, not true for those students who 
achieve higher education degrees at least on the Bachelor-level. For them, studying is 
the main activity in Sweden and the US as well as in Germany (cf. figure 2.5.2). 
Apparently, the additional students the US and the Swedish system can include are in 
general not ‘full higher education’-students, comparable with the German university 
students. Some of them rather compare to vocational training students. The special 
feature of the Swedish system is therefore less that educational careers follow less 
often the national standard pattern, but that even later students manage to complete 
intensive and long study programs. This finding is worth discussing against the 
hypothesis that fee-paying systems lead to less standardized educational careers with 
more gaps. The Swedish students enrolling late often still manage to study long and 
complete degrees, while this is uncommon in the US. This could indeed be connected 
to the much higher costs for higher education in the American system. Other reasons 
would then account for the higher number of later entrants into the Swedish school 
system, such as the greater flexibility for non-traditional students or the stronger 
support for students in general. By comparison, the US-students who often have ‘on 
and off’-educational attendance have higher incentives for education. In the North 
American context a job does not only guarantee earnings, but also helps to avoid 
further tuition and other costs of education. However, this conclusion has to be seen 
as a preliminary one against the background of the much earlier family formation in 
2 .  Pat tern s  o f  Educat ional  Careers  
101 
 
the US which could introduce additional difficulties for young Americans to pursue 
their educational expectations. 
Finally, the labor market seems to play a much smaller role than I expected 
in the hypotheses derived at the outset of the chapter. Educational career patterns of 
young Swedes have many more similarities with the US system than with the German 
system. While many characteristics of the Swedish labor market are more similar to 
the German labor market than to the US, the typical patterns of educational careers 
seem to be governed much more by the educational system. My hypothesis that in 
particular non-regulated, flexible labor markets will increase deviations from the 
standard sequence of educational careers would then have to be refuted. 
Against this background, an obvious follow-up question to sociologists is in 
how far educational inequality is involved. This comprises educational inequality in 
each of the transitions within educational careers, and in the overall patterns resulting 
from these decisions. Especially the inequality in later enrollment, after the first labor 
market entry, is of interest since it is necessary to evaluate whether flexibilization of 
the education system can indeed contribute to social equity in the higher education 
system. The next chapter will tackle several facets of this question, comparing again 
the US, Sweden and Germany. 
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3 SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN EDUCATIONAL CAREER 
PATTERNS IN CONTEXT – CLASS EFFECTS ON 
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATIONAL CAREERS IN SWEDEN, 
GERMANY AND THE US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section links the findings of section 2 to educational inequality. Asking what the 
implications of diversified educational careers for different educational systems are, I 
discuss in 3.1 some theoretical extensions to section 2 and a number of empirical 
findings. Comparative analyses in chapter 3.2 differ from section 2 by focusing first 
on inequality in single transitions within the educational career. I will present 
multivariate analyses with the aim of a more depth description of each society. A 
similar type of analyses as in section 2 will follow later in chapter 3.4 discussing the 
potential of social origin differences in educational career transitions for social origin 
differences in the overall educational career pattern. I will show how social origin 
differences between countries found in chapter 3.2 relate to the timing dimension of 
educational inequality. In chapter 3.3 I discuss in how far the results of 3.2 could be 
driven by different selective processes in the different countries. 
 
 
 
 
The previous section has documented that postsecondary educational transitions are 
embedded into life courses differently depending on institutional structures. As a 
strong and direct link to educational policies and institutions seems to exist, an 
obvious follow up question is how these differences relate to educational inequality. 
Under the label of lifelong learning, policy makers often celebrate late entries into 
postsecondary education as opportunities for individuals who were previously 
disadvantaged in their educational career (Education Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency Eurydice, 2012; McLendon, Jones and Rosin; Óhidy, 2009, Ch. 1; 
Organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD), 1996; 
Organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD), 2004; Wolter, 
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2010). Fuelled by the hope that earlier disadvantaged young adults can use second 
chance education to compensate for earlier disadvantages, proponents of school re-
entry opportunities hope that widening the access for non-traditional students will 
reduce social origin differences in education. Wolter et al. even speak about a ‘global 
policy consensus (John Field cit. in Wolter, Wiesner and Koepernik, 2010)’ with 
regard to the necessity for lifelong learning. It was a core aim of the recent reform of 
the Bologna system to open the education system for older, non-traditional learners 
(Education Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency Eurydice, 2012; Wolter, 
2010). The overwhelmingly positive evaluation of the provision of the blurry life-long 
learning concept has been summarized by Schütze and Slowey (2000) and led them to 
the somewhat ironic conclusion: ‘In making sweeping claims for lifelong learning in 
terms of providing the solution to a range of economic and social problems, the 
concept has become something of a ‘New Jerusalem’ (Rubenson and Schuetze).’ 
(Schuetze and Slowey, 2000, p. 10). 
More differentiated views are expressed in the scientific debates around life-
long learning in postsecondary education. Several scenarios can counteract the 
expectation of equalization and thus challenge the claim that societies with more adult 
education are per se the more equal ones. Although adult education can reduce 
inequality, it may also increase it (Weedon and Riddell, 2012). Previous studies found 
evidence that, indeed, inequalities school entry throughout adulthood by social origin 
exist and lead to a continuous disadvantage of children from the lower classes (e.g. 
Elman and O'Rand, 2004; Elman and O'Rand, 2007; Goldrick-Rab, 2006; Jacob and 
Weiss, 2011). Since adults who participate in life-long learning in formal schools 
often already had more education before, this phenomenon is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘Matthew effect in education’ – following Merton´s description of the ‘Matthew 
effect in science’ (Merton, 1968). Taking the Matthew-effect hypothesis serious, one 
has to expect that the creation of additional opportunities for lifelong education would 
first help those who are already well-educated and from advantaged backgrounds. 
While it is not difficult to find one of the two hypotheses published in policy reports 
of scientific work, there are by far not as many studies which discuss the two 
positions against each other on the basis of empirical evidence. In this section, I will 
present several different pieces of empirical evidence which can contribute to such a 
debate. 
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Along with other changes in the education system, several countries have 
expanded higher education. An extension of opportunities for older students has been 
part of the expansion of the tertiary education system as a whole. Educational 
expansion implies that higher education became less exclusive. Students of 
educational stratification have connected educational expansion with the development 
of inequality. When more students achieve higher education, the relative position of 
the highly educated will be less of a privilege. This process has been studied for a 
multitude of countries in the last years and concluded that expansion contributed to 
inclusion of previously disadvantaged groups (Shavit et al., 2007). Then, however, the 
question arises whether there are new dimensions of social stratification within higher 
education through which inequality can persist. The link between expansion and new 
differentiation is even claimed to be a general pattern in the work of Lucas (2001; 
2009) on effectively maintained inequality (EMI). In brief, his expectation is that 
socioeconomically advantaged groups always secure their advantages in educational 
outcomes. Whenever possible, they do so in a quantitative way, i.e. they manage to 
get more education for their children. Beyond, they also strive to get ‘better’ 
education and achieve a qualitative advantage, a demand that is served by system 
differentiation. Examples for such qualitative differences in the US are that better 
schools are often located in richer neighborhoods, or the sorting into different tracks 
within American high schools. Whenever quantitative differentiation is no longer 
possible because a certain educational level becomes universal, qualitative 
differentiation ‘steps in’ and leads to new inequalities. This framework was influential 
for subsequent studies of educational inequality. At the same time, many studies not 
explicitly referring to EMI have shown inequalities in time patterns of educational 
attendance and stressed their importance for educational inequality in certain contexts, 
in particular in the US (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Coleman, 1984; Goldrick-Rab, 
2006; Light, 1996; Milesi, 2010; Roksa, 2011; Roksa and Velez, 2010). This 
differentiation into different time patterns of attendance in education can be seen as 
qualitative differentiation as expected by the EMI hypothesis. While achieving the 
same ‘amount’ of education, disadvantaged students would have to go the long and 
winding road, with several consequences. Examples are later degree achievement and 
therefore lower lifetime returns to education or a higher probability for situations in 
which education interferes with other life course events, such as family formation or 
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the necessity to make ones’ own living (see section 5 on consequences of interrupted 
education). 
Different scenarios for an increase or decrease of inequality are possible 
when access to adult education is widened. All of the aspects around the question of 
inequality in the transitions within educational careers and educational career patterns 
will be discussed in the next chapters. 
- First – what best represents the Matthew-effect – stronger or continuously 
high levels of inequality by social origin in the entry into education 
throughout adulthood. In this case, educational inequalities would increase 
over the life courses of cohorts. The degree of inequality in ‘belated’ 
education in the three countries will be subject of chapter 3.2. This chapter 
will also contextualize inequality in re-entry with the educational 
inequality at earlier transitions. 
- Second, effects of social origin throughout adulthood being persistent but 
lower than origin difference in earlier transitions. In this case, inequality 
still exists and adds up to the given inequality in earlier transitions. This 
scenario is not very different from the first one. On the one hand because 
inequality is still increased throughout adulthood. On the other hand 
because the initial degree of inequality can influence the magnitude of 
later inequality via the selection effect which will be discussed in chapter 
3.3 below. 
- Third, inequality can be wiped out and social origin differences be no 
longer existent, or lower classes even catch up to some degree on earlier 
disadvantages. In this case, overall inequality in the final educational 
attainment is reduced. However, a new dimension of inequality is 
introduced. The way of how a certain level of postsecondary education is 
achieved is now differentiated into more or less direct educational careers. 
In how far earlier inequalities are indeed reduced depends now on a 
number of factors which will be discussed in the following chapters. The 
latter pattern with a higher number of lower-class children arriving at their 
degree through detours can even exist if upper-class children are the ones 
who re-enroll more often – depending on the degree of initial inequality. 
This will be illustrated and discussed in more detail in chapter 3.4. 
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3.0.1 Defining Social Origin 
Social origins can be understood in various ways and generally refers to the social 
standing of parents. I will define social origins as the class of parents according to 
their occupational position. Referring to the term ‘class’ as a central concept, I rely on 
a definition which is often made in large scale quantitative studies of social mobility 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). This approach refers to the actual occupational 
positions of the parents and not to subjective judgments of class membership. Parental 
occupations are mapped into different class positions which represent different 
employment relations and go along with a stable representation of the economic 
position in a society (Goldthorpe, 2000).  
In practice these so-called EGP- (Erikson, Golthorpe, Portocarero-) classes 
are generated using information on the occupation of the parents, measure in usual 
occupational classifications such as the ISCO (International Labor Organization), the 
KldB (Germany) or Census Occupational Classification (United States). Each 
occupation is then mapped to a class position, in some occasion using additional 
information such as whether the worker had a supervisory position. Different authors 
develop coding routines for the mapping of occupational groups to classes 
(Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996; Rose and Harrison, 2007). For most of the chapters 
following from here on I will use simplified versions of the class scheme and collapse 
several categories. For the present section, only three broad categories remain: the 
service classes, the intermediate classes and the working classes. Table 3.0.1 shows 
how the original full version is simplified into this three-class scheme. For those 
young adults whose parents both had an occupation, I assign the higher class position 
out of both parents, i.e. I follow the strategy to include the mother’s position that 
Erikson has called `dominance approach’ (Erikson, 1984). 
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Table 3.0.1: EGP Class scheme and simplified version. 
Full EGP Class Scheme Categories Simplified Class Version 
I Professionals and managers, higher grade Service (1) 
II  Professionals and managers, lower grade; technicians, 
higher grade 
Service (1) 
IIIa Routine non-manual employees, higher grade Intermediate (2) 
IIIb Routine non-manual employees, lower grade Skilled Working (3) 
IVabc Small employers and self-employed workers Assigned to other classes 
according to occupation 
V Technicians, lower-grade supervisors of manual 
 workers 
Intermediate (2) 
VI Skilled manual workers Skilled Working (3) 
VIIa/b Non-skilled manual workers Unskilled Working (3) 
 
 
 
The stability of class positions and the usefulness of the concept for 
intergenerational mobility research has been shown by a long tradition of mobility 
research. Validation studies have further shown that the classes reflect to the 
theoretical background which presumed to be micro-mechanism of stratification. is 
indeed captured in the empirical operationalization, such as the EGP or the closely 
related ESEC class schema (e.g. Bihagen, Nermo and Erikson, 2010; Wirth et al., 
2010). 
In accordance with the EGP schema I will refer to ‘service class’ instead of 
‘upper class’ when talking about the most privileged class positions. In places I also 
use the terms interchangeably. When using the term ‘lower classes’ I mean non-
service classes, i.e. intermediate and working classes. 
 
3.0.2 Observing Social Inequality in Educational Careers: Two Perspectives 
A conceptual clarification that is needed before a theoretical discussion on the 
emergence of social inequality is the assumption about the timing of decision-making 
for postsecondary education. I ignored this question – which refers to the individual or 
‘micro’-level – throughout chapter 2 and focused on the macro-level structures there. 
For the question of how educational inequalities develop under certain institutional 
structures, some more conceptual clarification of the decision making on the micro-
level seems necessary. The development of social origin effects at different stages of 
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the educational career has recently got remarkable attention among sociologists. Most 
of these studies chose single, isolated transitions in the educational system and 
compare the impact of social origin over a large set of societies. Others have extended 
this view and have taken a life-course perspective by comparing inequality along the 
life course over different transitions (Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993; Breen and Jonsson, 
2000; Hillmert and Jacob, 2005; Hillmert and Jacob, 2010; Jacob and Tieben, 2009; 
Mare, 1980). For each of these transitions, a ‘risk set’ of individuals being potentially 
subject to make a certain transition is observed. For studying late adult education, the 
number of transitions throughout the educational career has to be extended. Leaving 
the education system therefore is not anymore the final step in the educational career, 
but defines the set of potential re-entrants. Then, the re-entry into education is another 
transition with its own potential for social inequality (‘transition perspective’). Behind 
this idea, one would assume something like an ad hoc decision to revise earlier 
educational decisions and return to school. This assumption of myopia of respondents 
has also provoked critical response: are we indeed modeling (ad-hoc) re-enrollments 
or intended delays? To be able to build hypothesis on the re-entry behavior this 
question is important to consider. That ‘the logit model of grade transitions implicitly 
assumes myopia on the part of agents’ (Cameron and Heckman, 1998, p. 263) is one 
of the central critiques of Cameron and Heckman against using continuation rate 
models for studying inequality in educational careers. However, given that the young 
adults who re-enroll indeed try to enter the labor market first, myopia might also 
apply, and most likely will apply to at least a share of the graduates. This chapter 
assumes that the decision to leave the education system and re-enter, are both ad hoc 
decisions and independent from the earlier plans – and that the selection mechanisms 
are introduced by the education systems and thus technically produce a part of the 
results we are observing. 
Alternatively, the pattern ‘work – education – work’ can be the result of a 
planned delay of enrollment (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005; Hearn, 1992; Kempner and 
Kinnick, 1990; Rowan-Kenyon, 2007). From this second perspective, the comparison 
between re-entrants and those who never re-enroll is rather meaningless because the 
decision to enroll at all has been made earlier, at the same time as their peers decided 
to enroll directly after finishing secondary school. The relevant empirical question for 
inequality research is thus different. One would rather ask if disadvantaged groups 
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more often interrupt their educational careers (‘gap-perspective’). The result could 
then be differentiation of education by educational career patterns. 
The empirical questions resulting out of this distinction are linked to the 
scenarios discussed above. Based on different assumptions about timing of 
educational decisions, each of the different scenarios above is more or less likely. 
Empirically testing which model approximates best the decision process on the micro-
level will be subject of section 4, in particular chapter 4.2. For the moment, the 
distinction should be kept in mind to inform the development of hypotheses on the 
macro-level. The next two chapters following from here on will be devoted to the 
transition-perspective, 3.4 deals with the gap-perspective. 
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3.1 Explaining Inequality in Higher Education Career Patterns 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3.1 is devoted to a discussion about the contribution of macro-institutions to 
inequality. Its aim is to develop hypotheses on the connection between institutional 
environments and inequality in delayed educational careers, based on explicit 
assumptions about young adults’ choices on the micro-level. Findings show that 
inequality persist over the life-course into adulthood within those context which allow 
flexibility and open access into college in adulthood. These, however, are fairly well 
explained by characteristics which are determined much earlier in the life courses, in 
particular scholastic performance in the secondary school system. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Educational Career Patterns and Intergenerational Social Mobility: a 
Short Review of Previous Studies 
Delayed entry into postsecondary and higher education is sometimes – mostly under 
the label of lifelong learning – seen as a second chance for (previously) disadvantaged 
individuals, e.g. those from lower social origin (Organization for economic 
cooperation and development (OECD), 1996; Wolter, 2010). As a result, late 
education can contribute to a reduction in social inequality. It remains, however, an 
open empirical question whether the implementation of such chances reduce or even 
foster inequality (Weedon and Riddell, 2012). 
The majority of all existing empirical evidence points towards decreasing 
social inequality throughout young adults’ life course. The later an educational 
transition usually occurs in the life course, the smaller are usually the class differences 
that are found. However, inequalities still remain to be important in several cases. For 
the US most studies show that late enrollments are affected by social origin, (Elman 
and O'Rand, 2004; Elman and O'Rand, 2007; Goldrick-Rab, 2006; Jacob and Weiss, 
2011; Milesi, 2010) and at the same time young adults from lower origin have a 
higher probability of delaying college entry (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Roksa et 
al., 2007). There are only few exceptions to this overall negative evidence for the US, 
one being the analysis detailed out in chapter 4.5 of this volume (see also Weiss and 
Scholten, 2012). I show there that among women late entries have the potential of 
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reducing disadvantages for lower social origin daughters to a small degree. In 
Germany the most important type of detours is the completion of multiple degrees, i.e. 
of first completing vocational education and later higher education. This pattern 
confirms the inequality which is found for most other contexts since the detour via 
vocational training into college is more often taken by youth from lower social origin. 
Furthermore, once a vocational program is completed, the decision to transfer into 
higher education is less often made by working class children than by those from the 
upper classes (Becker and Hecken, 2008; Jacob, 2004). Results for Sweden are rare, 
but in principle point towards the same direction: the most disadvantaged groups in 
initial education loose further ground through lower re-enrollment rates after the age 
of 30, while the moderately disadvantaged can catch up somewhat (Hällsten, 2010). 
Thus, the overall evidence is rather pessimistic on the possibilities to reduce 
inequalities by adult formal education in all of the three contexts. 
As shown in section 2, the amount of late participation varies greatly 
between countries. Hence, comparative studies should ask whether the different 
policies aiming at increasing participation have different impacts on inequality. The 
following discussion of hypotheses will refer to the background information on 
Germany, Sweden and the US in chapter 1.4. 
 
3.1.2 Macro Conditions for Inequality: Educational Careers of Young Adults 
from Different Social Origins in Different Contexts 
Inequality can be moderated in different ways by the macro-structures of a society. 
The behavior of students on the individual or micro level always depends on their 
opportunities and restrictions which are to a high degree shaped by the educational 
system and the labor market. Two important factors in the explanation of educational 
inequality are the costs for education and expectations to successfully complete an 
educational program. Hence, it has to be expected that the impact of social origin on 
educational career patterns varies between institutional contexts too. Probably the 
most central aspect is the educational system itself which I will discuss first. Beyond 
that, characteristics of the labor market – which I discuss in second place – may also 
shape the framework for individual decision making. 
As discussed in the previous chapter 2, key institutional aspects – enabling 
flexible pathways – are manifold, but openness of the educational system seems to be 
very closely related to educational career patterns in a given society. But how does 
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flexibility relate to inequality? And beyond that, are there other important factors, 
such as costs of education or the selectivity of entrance qualifications? 
 
3.1.1.1 The Differentiation of Educational Systems and Inequality in Postsecondary 
Educational Career Patterns: Flexible and Inflexible Systems 
Differentiation in timing of postsecondary education in many respects parallels with 
differentiation in higher education on other aspects, which have been discussed 
extensively regarding their potential to create new inequalities in higher education 
(Alba and Lavin, 1981; Arum, Gamoran and Shavit, 2007; Ayalon et al., 2008). To 
exemplify, higher education differentiates into institutions with different prestige and 
into different fields of study (Davies and Guppy, 1997). Timing patterns are another 
way how differences between college students emerge. While the expansion and 
differentiation of lower tiers in higher education created new opportunities, they 
might at the same time divert lower-class children away from the most prestigious 
institutions and create a new dimension of differentiation within the higher education 
system. Many previous studies have argued along this line (Becker and Hecken, 
2009b; Brint and Karabel, 1989; Müller and Pollak, 2007) – but the chance that 
expansion improves integration is also acknowledged (Arum, Gamoran and Shavit, 
2007). For the differentiation of educational careers by different time patterns, a 
similar situation can emerge. Although the introduction and expansion of second or 
late chances create new opportunities, they might only be the second best options, 
similar to lower tier institutions. 
A certain degree of differentiation in timing of education is a pre-condition for 
inequality in it. There could, nevertheless, be inequality in timing patterns those 
systems where educational careers are mostly following the norm with only a few 
deviations. But this would not be a relevant aspect for the overall educational 
inequality. Moreover, one could guess that the differentiation in these systems is less 
systematic and the few deviating students have rather idiosyncratic reasons to be off 
the norm. In inflexible systems, decisions about education become ‘one and all’ 
decisions. In flexible systems the decision is broken down into steps. Students in this 
educational system will have to make more decisions, which are smaller in terms of 
the stake associated with them. As a consequence, conditions for young adults of 
varying social origin are different. 
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As briefly discussed in section 2, in privately funded systems those institutions 
with lower prestige should have a particular strong motivation to attract students with 
arrangements which allow flexibility. Hence, in how far this process is related to an 
increase or reduction in inequality needs to be explained by structural differences too. 
As discussed at the outset of this section, interrupted educational careers can be seen 
from two perspectives: delayed entry (gap perspective, assuming long-term plans for 
educational sequences) or re-entry (transition perspective, assuming myopia in 
educational transitions). The more successful re-entry opportunities act as device for 
compensation of earlier inequalities, the more inequality in the time patterns of actual 
educational careers emerge. In order to arrive at hypotheses that are explicit on the 
micro-level, assumptions on the individual timing of decision-making have to be 
made. Depending on the assumptions about individual behavior, we have to expect a 
different moderation of inequality by institutional settings. Against the background of 
the different assumptions of micro-level decision making, I will discuss how three 
different institutional characteristics influence inequality in educational career 
patterns and in belated entry into postsecondary education. 
The institutional aspects that I discuss with regard to both of these micro-
assumptions are the degree of expansion and selectivity of earlier educational 
transitions as well as the costs of higher education. Sweden and the US both have a 
strong differentiation into different time patterns of educational attendance, but their 
educational systems enable students to follow flexible pathways. Germany is in a 
strong contrast to these open systems. And yet there is empirical variation in the 
timing of attendance in higher education, although fewer students follow non-
traditional patterns (see section 2). In contrast, the opposite could be expected with 
respect to the specific nature of educational detours taken in Germany: the empirically 
most frequent non-standard patterns are participants of vocational training programs 
before entering higher education. For this group, the difference in the educational 
career compared to the direct way to higher education is rather large. Their 
educational careers consist of at least two years of vocational training in addition to 
higher education, and often also additional time in the labor market. Since this 
deviation is rather large and more often chosen by lower-class children, inequality in 
the degree of deviation from the most straightforward educational career could overall 
be large in Germany, even though driven by a smaller number of cases. 
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3.1.1.2 Direct Costs of Higher Education 
Higher education is in many education systems much more related to direct and 
opportunity costs as other, earlier educational transitions. Comparing private spending 
for higher education between countries (OECD, 2000), it can easily be seen that 
private systems tend to have higher tuition fees; and at the same time the fees vary 
more between institutions
9
. Direct costs and opportunity costs are suspected to be a 
major deterrent to participation in higher education of lower-class students in some 
societies. For the US especially for institutions with high prestige (Davies and Guppy, 
1997). 
High costs for higher education can influence the timing of entry into 
postsecondary education by forcing poorer students to delay their enrollment or make 
stop-outs (DesJardins and McCall, 2010). If young adults cannot finance higher 
education themselves and credit markets fail at providing financial resources as well, 
one possible solution for making higher education possible is to amass savings first. 
Once tuition fees and living expenses can be covered, they re-enter the educational 
system. The same strategy could solve liquidity problems during postsecondary 
education. It is to expect that students from lower social origins will more often face 
financial constraints. As a consequence, inequality in time patters of educational 
careers will be high in educational systems where costs are high. Then again, at least a 
part of students who opted against higher education due to financial restrictions will 
return to the education system later. Thus, high costs would increase inequality both 
in initial and in delayed entry into postsecondary education. Or the high rate of 
delaying students leads to a low or reversed inequality in the late enrollments. If delay 
is a strategy more often used by able and motivated lower-class students they would 
then be overrepresented among the late entrants. However, this straightforward logic 
might not grasp the full reality, as it will only occur under certain circumstances: 
- Following from the discussion in 3.1.2.1 the educational system has to 
allow interruptions, stop-outs and other measures increasing the flexibility 
for young adults. If this is not the case, only those students will eventually 
return who do not need flexibility. Therefore, in inflexible and costly 
education systems, costs will trigger inequality in participation rates, but 
less so in time patterns of participations. 
                                                 
9
 This even applies to public institutions in these countries. 
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- The costs of education may not exceed reasonable expectations for returns 
to it in the labor market. In particular when education is very expensive, 
some young adults might never be able to accumulate enough resources for 
education, and again inequality in the total participation prevails. 
- The labor market must allow earning enough with a degree from secondary 
education only. Otherwise, the strategy of the delayers would not work out 
or they would have to acquire vocational certificates before starting to 
work. 
Applying the mechanisms above to the different country contexts, allows mainly for 
more differentiation between the flexible systems of the US and Sweden. In Germany, 
flexibility is low and the main option for taking ‘detours’ are vocational degrees and 
subsequent higher education. The labor market in the US and Sweden allows entering 
without a completed vocational degree and young adults, as chapter 2 has shown, 
frequently do so. The US is the system standing out with highest costs for higher 
education, while studying is comparatively inexpensive in Sweden. Hence, if the 
delay mechanism is at work, the strongest inequality has to be expected in the US, 
accompanied by a catching up of lower-class children through later re-entry. 
For the re-entries, the opposite should be expected in the US. The high costs 
of higher education there can continue to be a deterrent from higher education for 
lower-class children (cf. Valentine and Darkenwald, 2008). Remaining inequalities in 
the re-entry phase must be expected to be lower in the European contexts Sweden and 
Germany. This hypothesis generally applies to both European cases, but it could be 
that the institutional conditions discussed cannot unfold in Germany due to a lack of 
openness for non-traditional students and because the long duration of study programs 
also increases costs. 
 
3.1.1.3 Degree of Selectivity on Earlier Educational Thresholds 
On the macro-level, the amount of educational inequality both in entry rates and 
educational career sequence patterns can depend on the composition of the group 
qualifying to enter higher education. Educational systems differ to a large extend in 
the institutionally introduced exclusion of young adults from an entry into 
postsecondary, but especially higher education. There are systems which exclude a 
part of the population almost permanently from access to higher education – or 
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introduce at least high barriers for entry, depending on the type of secondary 
education. To exemplify, this applies to German young adults without a 
Fachhochschulreife- or Abitur-degree. 
Referring back to the hypothesis of effectively maintained inequality (Lucas, 
2001; Lucas, 2009), one could indeed expect lower inequality within the 
postsecondary education system where access is more restricted and limited to a 
smaller group. If higher education is a very distinctive asset on the labor market, not 
even upper-class students will seek further advantages beyond it. But once higher 
education becomes more common, passing through it quickly and straight can become 
a new advantage. Upper-class students can, in expectation of later socioeconomic 
advantages, use different resources to take the most direct road into the labor market. 
Then, inequality in time patterns increases when access opportunities to higher 
education are expanded. 
The other important pathway through which the exclusiveness of the 
postsecondary education sector can affect inequality in late enrollment is the sample 
selection of possible re-entrants. While selection effects are mostly discussed as a 
methodological problem for estimating causal effects, the reason for selectivity can be 
sought in the institutional set-up of the secondary education system (e.g. Holm and 
Jæger, 2009). Selection into the group which is qualified for higher education depends 
on the policy of educational institutions and educational policies. Still they can bias 
certain conclusions, such as counterfactuals on institutional features of certain 
systems or the comparison of inequality over several transitions of the life course. 
Therefore, the problem will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.3. 
With regard to flexibility of higher educational careers, I expect more non-
standard careers in countries with lower selectivity. First, since the young adults who 
are qualified for higher education are more homogeneous in their aspirations to 
achieve it. The choice or selection into higher education takes place at earlier stages 
of the educational career and hence, fewer students with only a weak motivation to 
enter higher education are found among those who are eligible. Second, since those 
young adults who change their interests and develop an aspiration for higher 
education are not hindered in the realization of their plans. Or in other words, in 
systems with fewer restrictions in access to higher education, a larger group of 
‘potentially non-traditional students’ from lower-class origins is present in the labor 
market. This also affects social inequality in postsecondary educational career 
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patterns. Systems with early, rigid and persistent selection for eligibility to higher 
education shift a large part of the social selectivity to earlier stages of the educational 
career. Therefore, I expect more differentiation of educational careers in open systems 
on the macro level. While they might increase the participation of lower-class 
children in higher education, they can go along with a new dimension of social 
inequality in postsecondary education, namely the timing pattern of participation in 
education. 
The German system resembles two characteristics which undermine the 
development of inequality in postsecondary education. On the one hand, flexible 
arrangements for studies in higher education are very rare and on the other hand, 
access to higher education is restricted on a small, selective group in comparison to 
Sweden and the US. This shifts inequality to early stages of the life course and the 
remaining group of students who qualify for higher education will be already pre-
selected and comparatively homogeneous. Higher education is comparatively cheap, 
but returns can only be expected after the completion of a degree. Moreover, without 
vocational education it is very uncommon, and presumably also unattractive, to enter 
the labor market at all. All of these characteristics of the German system suggest that 
inequality in educational careers is more a question of becoming eligible for higher 
education or not than a question of the time pattern of students attendance in higher 
education. The Swedish and the US system on the contrary both follow a policy of 
broad access to higher education and manifold offers for re-entrants into the system 
after gathering some work experience. Therefore, I expect to observe more inequality 
in re-entry in these two cases. 
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Table 3.1.1: Summary of institutional characteristics of Sweden, Germany and the US that 
are expected to determine inequality in educational career patterns. 
 Germany Sweden United States 
educational system    
 flexibility for non-traditional students: 
 how common and how difficult or easy 
 are stop outs and re-enrollments? 
low high high 
 selectivity:  
 what is the share of a cohort who 
 qualifies for higher education? 
high very low, for 
delayed entries 
almost 
universal 
low 
 direct costs of higher education low very low high 
labor market    
 chances of labor market entry without 
 any vocational degree 
low medium good 
 uncertainty of returns to higher 
 education: 
 how much do wages differ between 
 individuals with the same educational 
 degree? 
 
low low high 
 labor market flexibility: strictness of 
 employment protection legislation 
high high low 
 
 
 
3.1.1.4 Structure of the Labor Market 
So far, I discussed features of the education systems only. However, labor market 
opportunities are the major alternative to postsecondary education. As discussed in 
chapter 1.3.2, the labor markets differ in flexibility and the safety of jobs, which 
defines the opportunity costs for quitting a job and re-enrolling. And beyond, returns 
to education on the labor market are presumably the main motivation to attend 
education. Hence, the structure of the labor market is another institutional factor 
which can moderate inequality in educational careers. I hypothesize that two aspects 
of labor market returns will be influential in this context: average returns to education 
and the predictability of these returns. Further, both of them can be different for 
secondary education on the one hand and postsecondary education on the other hand. 
As discussed in chapter 1.3.2, the labor market institutions in Germany, Sweden and 
the US structure work-related life course events and sequences in different ways. The 
US labor market can be characterized as less regulated than the two European cases.  
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3.1.2.5 Deviations and Safety Nets: Total Labor Market Returns for Upper 
Secondary Education Graduates without Postsecondary Education 
In a labor market which offers good opportunities without higher education, more 
young adults might be deviated from studying. This implies at the same time a larger 
group of potential re-entrants. This deviation mechanism has been extensively 
discussed for the rather attractive system of apprenticeship training in Germany. 
Several authors argue that the attractiveness of apprenticeship training deviates young 
adults who qualify for higher education away from it, especially those from lower-
class background (Becker and Hecken, 2008; Müller and Pollak, 2007). Besides a 
permanent deviation, vocational training can also be pursued as a safety net before 
entering higher education for the case of failure (Büchel and Helberger, 1995; 
Hillmert and Jacob, 2003). Especially young adults with high uncertainty about 
successfully finishing their studies (i.e. those from lower-classes or who previously 
had bad grades) should then take a detour to get a fall-back option. When generalizing 
this idea, we can expect that all labor markets offering good job-opportunities without 
having completed postsecondary education will distract secondary school graduates 
away from continuing their educational career. I.e. one would expect deviation for 
those systems where the higher education wage or job security premium is small due 
to relatively high labor market outcomes for educational alternatives below the 
postsecondary or tertiary sector. The argument can be transferred to any point in time 
of the young adults’ biography. It applies to continuation decisions after graduation 
from secondary school, after completion of a first postsecondary education such as an 
apprenticeship or A.A.-degree or after dropping from higher education. 
The other important characteristic of the labor market for upper secondary 
graduates is the security of jobs. Re-entering higher education means in many cases 
losing a job. Even in the case of part time education it might lead to a reduction of 
effort in the job and to invest it in education instead. If the job that has to be given up 
is a save position with a long term perspective, the give-up of this job constitutes 
opportunity costs for higher education. Now, the employment protection legislation as 
discussed in chapter 1.3.2 comes in again. The security of jobs as warranted by legal 
regulations under strict employment protection legislation defines how attractive jobs 
below the labor market segment for the highly educated are for children from 
different family backgrounds. If the security is high and labor market entries are 
comparatively difficult, as can be expected under stricter employment protection, the 
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opportunity costs of giving up an attractive job below the labor market segment of the 
highly educated is even higher. I hypothesize that under strict employment protection 
legislation lower class young adults are ‘locked-in’ into jobs, they hesitate to give up 
a save position in the labor market for different reasons: 
- First, because the risk of failing in higher education or getting a job 
after graduation is harder to buffer with private resources by their 
parents; a secure job is a more valuable asset to them as for their 
upper-class peers. 
- Second, due to the relative risk aversion mechanism (discussed in 
detail in chapter 4.3), the first priority in status attainment is 
hypothesized to be the maintenance of the parental status. When 
entering the labor market after secondary education, this is most 
likely already achieved by children from lower-class backgrounds, 
but not by upper-class children. Hence, for young adults from the 
working classes, giving up a secure class position which fulfills the 
criterion of status maintenance is a higher opportunity cost than 
giving up an insecure position that might be lost anyhow. For upper-
class students on the other hand, the labor market insecurity should 
matter less, they would in any case try to re-enter education until 
having achieved the parental status. 
Thus, employment protection legislation can expected to amplify the locking-in of 
young adults with lower class backgrounds once they have found into a relatively 
attractive labor market position. This will reduce their willingness to re-enroll. 
Comparing the three systems again, the German case stands out with a 
combination of low returns to incomplete education and attractive options to smoothly 
enter the labor market via vocational training right away and being secured in this 
position by a comparatively strong employment protection. For the US, the safety-
hypothesis is less likely to explain delayed entry into higher education by lower-class 
youth. As the US labor market also merits incomplete education to some degree, the 
strategy of a preliminary degree would not be an effective insurance strategy. The 
two-year college may play a similar role, but offers the option of credit transfer to the 
full college. Therefore, it can both be the starting point of academic education and 
serve as a safety net. Working before entering higher education would be less 
beneficial than for German young adults who complete apprenticeship training. 
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Furthermore, the gains that can be realized from higher education compared to any 
other degree are much higher in the US than in any European context including 
Germany or Sweden (OECD, 2010; Reisel, 2013). In this case the losses in the 
amount of forgone earnings have to be traded in for the gain in security. For Sweden, 
there could be similar strategies as in Germany, but presumably safety nets are less 
attractive for young adults due to the absence of an apprenticeship training which 
offers both a vocational certificate as insurance and a smooth transition into the labor 
market. In the Swedish system the vocational training would have to be completed in 
the schooling system. The strong certification and early integration of the German 
vocational training system can thus be expected to offer an even safer option. 
Obviously, the US stands out with low employment protection and thus 
young adults should be less strictly ‘locked’ in the labor market position and return 
more often. Moreover, the lower-class children should re-enroll more often as their 
labor market positions cannot warrant them the safety they would prefer. Sweden 
stands in between these two extreme cases. While there is no apprenticeship training 
system as in the German case providing a smooth transition into employment, once a 
job is found employment protection is more similar to Germany than the US. 
Therefore, when talking about those who already have found a labor market position 
and ask whether they would potentially re-enroll, I hypothesize that Sweden in the 
1990´s had more similarities with Germany than with the US and is therefore to be 
counted as a less flexible regime from the labor market side. 
 
3.1.2.6  Returns to (Interrupted) Education 
Returns to education vary between different labor market settings, not only in the 
amount but also in the type and the predictability of returns. Assuming individuals’ 
decisions about education are motivated by the rationality of maximizing labor market 
returns, the possible size of these returns will become important context 
characteristics for educational decisions. Social origin differences in re-enrollment, I 
expect, depend on the security of getting the returns. This involves the perceived 
probability of actually completing higher education, but also the predictability of 
returns to higher education. When returns to higher education are hard to predict, even 
if they are high on average, youth from the lower social origins will hesitate more to 
invest in it. This hypothesis again draws on the relative risk aversion assumption. If 
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children from lower social origins have achieved the status of their parents, not only 
the incentive to invest more in education should be reduced, we can also expect that 
they will become more risk aversive and prioritize the aim of keeping their current 
status over further upward mobility via additional education. Beyond, as for example 
Pfeffer (2011) points out, it can also be argued that upper-class children generally act 
more risky with regard to investment in education. The wealth of upper-class families 
serves their children as a safety net for risky investments into higher education. Risks 
going along with higher education can be seen in college drop-out or insecurity of 
returns to higher education. In the case of a difficult job search process, parents could 
for example buffer the search period with their wealth and thus increase the 
reservation wages of the children (cf. Pfeffer, 2011, pp., 4). 
In sum, the risk associated with re-entering higher education can be expected 
to determine educational decision making and its timing. However, from the 
assumptions made above, different hypotheses can be developed about inequality in 
postsecondary education careers as a whole. On the one hand, in societies with good 
predictability of returns, inequality in the decision to delay would be reduced; lower-
class children would enter directly more often. Hence, inequality in educational career 
sequences is lower in societies with high predictability of returns. If there are, on the 
other hand, other factors which deviate lower-class children away from entering 
higher education directly, the rate of later re-entries among working class students 
should be comparatively high and hence their educational careers would differ more 
from those of young adults with upper-class background. Thus, the mechanism of the 
predictability of returns to education works in exactly the same way as costs of higher 
education. Even though comparative research into this issue is rare and mainly refers 
to German-UK comparisons, the uncertainty of the returns to higher education can be 
expected to be lowest in Germany. First, since graduation from higher education is 
comparatively exclusive (Kim and Kim, 2003) and second, for some fields of studies 
occupational destinations are strongly pre-defined (Leuze, 2010)
10
. 
Overall, the two institutional areas I have regarded as moderators of 
inequalities in educational career patterns (gap perspective) and late re-enrollments 
                                                 
10
 Certainly, one can doubt that a direct transfer of the occupational labor market structure of German 
secondary education can be made to the tertiary sector. However, I will not discuss this issue here in 
detail since Leuze (2010) as well as Kim and Kim (2003) could show that labor market entry pathways 
are rather smooth in Germany for graduates from higher education too. The exact mechanisms should 
be irrelevant for the individually perceived certainty of returns to education. 
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(transition-perspective) have some contradictions. From a labor market perspective 
one would expect the German and the Swedish case to be coupled together as low-
inequality contexts. With regard to the education system, in particular the selectivity 
argument, the US and Sweden should have a higher inequality in common, while the 
German system selects earlier and should not produce additional inequalities through 
lifelong learning. With regard to educational career patterns, again the Swedish and 
the US system should be coupled when arguing based on flexibility, while the 
German and the Swedish system should produce similar levels of equality in the order 
of educational career patterns if costs are the driving force. In the rest of this section, I 
will test these hypotheses against each other empirically. 
The question of re-entering or interrupting has accompanied the discussion in 
this chapter until here constantly. The underlying assumptions about how educational 
decisions are made have far reaching implications for the influence of institutional 
settings. But moreover, they lead to different empirical questions: interruptions 
characterize completed educational careers that are otherwise identical, i.e. lead to 
identical outcomes. Re-enrollment on the other hand is a transition process. 
Examining such a process requires to follow a group of potential ‘re-enrollers’ (risk 
set) and to observe who actually returns. Thus, the empirical questions are rather 
different and will therefore be treated in different chapters. In the following two 
chapters, I scrutinize on the re-enrollment process; first, on the different transitions 
until re-enrollment and then – in chapter 3.3 – on the specific question of selection 
bias. In chapter 3.4, I then turn back to the questions of educational career patterns 
and interruptions. 
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3.2 Less and Later? Educational Inequality in a ‘Transitions-in-
Life-Courses’ Perspective 
 
 
 
 
This chapter scrutinizes inequality in transitions in educational careers beyond 
secondary school in comparative perspective. Event history methods are used to 
describe the timing and the rate of eligibility for higher education, entry into the labor 
market and re-entry into postsecondary education. I find that systems which are 
nominally very open – the US and Sweden – have higher inequalities in re-entries. 
These class gaps can fairly well be explained by controlling for few characteristics of 
the secondary school career. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Transitions in Life Courses and Inequality 
This chapter turns to the study of social inequality in educational careers through 
postsecondary education. Among the two perspectives on inequalities in the life 
course that I have sketched in the introductory chapter of this section, I will first take 
the perspective of ‘transitions through biographies’. The assessment of inequalities in 
entire sequences of life courses will be saved for chapter 3.4. Studying transitions 
needs to start at defining a certain group being eligible to pass a transition, 
conventionally denoted as ‘population at risk’. The population at risk is in a certain 
state, e.g. ‘without higher education degree’. As time passes, more and more 
individuals are absorbed by the transition to a different state, e.g. they do the 
transition ‘graduation’ to the state of ‘being graduated’. The occurrence of the event 
‘enrollment’ can be influenced by external factors in two ways. On the one hand it can 
be delayed. On the other hand, the probability that it occurs at all can be reduced. 
Three transitions are central to characterize inequality in late entries into 
postsecondary or higher education in a society: 
a. becoming eligible for higher education, 
b. entering the labor market in spite of using eligibility for higher education and 
c. given eligibility and entering the labor market in spite of using it; re-entering 
postsecondary education later. 
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The empirical question of this chapter is how the transition patterns through 
the three relevant transitions are shaped by social origin and how these processes 
differ between countries. These analyses refer directly to the theoretical hypotheses 
set out in the previous chapter, which I will discuss again at the end of the chapter. 
The analyses are twofold: I will start out comparing inequality in transition 
rates between the three country cases. Then, I present more elaborate analyses for 
each country separately. These will allow to better control for possible compositional 
explanations of the descriptively shown inequality pattern. As far as possible, these 
models also introduce some analyses of the role of earlier educational stratification 
and of scholastic performance for later transitions in the life course. After this 
country-by-country comparison, similarities and differences in the analyses will be 
discussed. In the appendix 3.2.10, I describe technical details, including checks on 
alternative specifications of the regression models. 
 
3.2.2 Methodology 
The question, ‘when’ inequality evolves in the biography is not new to stratification 
research. Sequential logistic regression models (Mare-models) have been widely used 
to assess these questions (Mare, 1980; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). As a tool to 
describe the factual distribution of origin effects over the educational career, their 
usefulness can hardly be questioned (Mare, 2011; Tam, 2011). Their problematic 
nature for counterfactual interpretations of results, in particular for country 
comparisons, will be discussed in chapter 3.3. However, there is another caveat in 
these models for studying transitions which can occur continuously over a longer 
period of time. As a consequence, the timing of the transition event becomes a 
question of interest as well. Furthermore, the data will typically be right-censored, i.e. 
the observation period ends before all individuals have made a transition and thus the 
researcher does not know what will happen after the end of the survey. Among the 
transitions described here, right censoring is most likely for the re-entry into 
postsecondary education. In particular since it is known that in some societies, e.g. in 
Sweden, re-entries beyond the age of 30 do indeed occur (Hällsten, 2010). The 
processes of becoming eligible, entering the labor market and particularly re-entering 
postsecondary education are time dependent events which not only vary in the rate of 
transition in their sequential order, but also in timing. To describe the time 
3 .  Late  Educat ional  In equal i ty  in  Co mparat i ve  Persp ec t ive  
126 
 
dependence of biographical transition processes in different groups as well as to 
tackle the issue of right-censoring, ‘survivor curves’ and ‘hazard rates’ are useful 
(Mills, 2004). Survivor curves are a simple descriptive tool which I already used in 
section 2. They report the probability of having not made the respective transition, 
e.g. re-enrollment, until a time t. In event history analysis the survivor curve is usually 
expressed as 
 
                 . 
 
Where the survivor curve        depicts for each individual i at any time    the 
probability Pr that the individual time of the transition even    exceeds   . In the 
terminology of event history analyses the survivor curves describe for the three 
transitions (a., b. and c. above) how the population (all those individuals who are 
qualified for the transition) leaves the pool of ‘waiting individuals’ over time. To 
sketch the immediate risk of those individuals who remained in the population until    
to make a transition (or in event history analysis-terms: to die), survivor curves are 
not very useful. One would have to get an intuition for the slope of the curve and set it 
in relation to the proportion of those individuals remaining, i.e. the value of survivor 
rate itself at the specific time   . The slope of the survivor rate is its first derivative, 
the density function f(t). Intuitively, setting the slope of the survivor rate in relation to 
the survivor rate itself would lead to a more viable measure to capture the 
development of risk over time and see the momentum of transitions for different 
groups. This ratio is given by the hazard rate 
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The hazard rate has the unit 1/t, i.e. it is both, informative about the number of failures 
per a time unit t as well as about the time t that we would have to wait for the next 
failure at any specific time during the process
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Hazard rates are the basis for most event history analysis and the multivariate 
analyses following below will be based on them too. A detailed discussion of 
regression models for survivor models would exceed the available space. A growing 
number of textbooks explain the basics of these tools and their interpretation detailed 
and intuitively (Cleves et al., 2008; Mills, 2011; Singer and Willet, 2003). As first 
step of the analysis I give a comparative illustration of the bivariate differences, 
expressed in survivor curves. By simple eyeballing, a lot of aspects of a transition 
process in a society can be spotted. However, they ‘mix’ different aspects. The main 
problem is seeing clear differences in the slope of the function and how it develops 
over time for different groups. Hazard rates are clearer in that respect as they are the 
first derivative of survivor curves and hence show the slope at each point on the x-
axis only. Therefore, I include plots of hazard rates in addition in Appendix 3.2.10. 
Multivariate models are needed to estimate the effects of social origin on the 
respective transition process net of compositional differences correlated with social 
origins. The relevant covariates vary between countries and will be discussed below, 
but ethnic or racial composition and regional disparities are important in all three 
cases. The models I report in the main body of the text are part of the class of fully 
parametric survival models which model the hazard rate as a log-logistic distribution 
in accelerated failure time (AFT) form. In such a model, covariates are modeled as 
accelerating (or decelerating) the effect of time as a factor on the survival rate. For 
interpretation it is important to note that coefficients are switched compared to 
coefficients in the frequently used proportional hazards metric: positive coefficients 
indicate a delay and negative coefficients an acceleration of event occurrence. The 
hazard rate is modeled as a log-logistic distribution, which is a rather flexible way of 
modeling
12, with an additional shape parameter γ that needs to be estimated. These 
models have several advantages. One advantage is that their interpretation suits better 
                                                 
12
 Thus, the hazard rate is thus defined as 
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and the respondent survivor rate S 
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this closely responds the odds formulation of the semi-parametric Royston-Parmar-models, as from the 
above follows that 
 
       
  
 . 
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for modeling timing differences only instead of permanent differences in the 
transition rate. For the re-enrollment into education, this is not very relevant, since 
inequality in both the timing and the rate occurs. Another advantage is the relaxation 
of the proportional hazard assumption of the proportional hazard models, including 
the Cox-model (Kay and Kinnersley, 2002; Orbe, Ferreira and Núñez-Antón, 2002). 
This assumption is violated in several occasions with regard to the central 
independent variable, the parental social class. Although there are alternative 
strategies to overcome this problem, e.g. the PEPE-approach suggested by Bernardi 
(2001), parametric modeling is rather parsimonious and allows predictions more 
easily. Further – and for country comparisons I perceive it as an advantage – the 
parametric model does not leave the absolute ‘risk’ of transitions out of sight. The 
popular Cox proportional hazards model only models the relative risk of the transition 
(Royston and Lambert, 2011, p. 2ff.). However, these advantages are traded in for 
another assumption. One has to specify a functional form, for which I choose the log-
logistic distribution. Therefore, examining the underlying process and the 
appropriateness of the shape chosen becomes a very important question for the 
correctness of the models. In order to evaluate the choice of the log-logistic 
distribution, I compare the model with different other possible distributions. I have 
carefully checked each model by comparing it with varying specifications of semi-
parametric Royston-Parmar models which allow estimating smooth baseline hazard 
rates in flexible shape by using cubic splines (Lambert and Royston, 2009; Royston 
and Parmar, 2002). Though the Royston-Parmar models show much better fit to the 
data, by and large they arrive at the same results as I present in below. The 
comparisons including all alternative models are documented in Appendix 3.2.10. In 
particular the graphical illustration can serve as a rich source for comparing timing 
processes over different societies. For the main part of the text I chose to report the 
simpler and more parsimonious AFT-models only. 
The multivariate analyses are carried out for each country separately. Due to 
the different measurement and availability of covariates for the countries ‘construct 
comparability’ cannot be assured. The differences in most cases are not merely 
inconsistencies in measurement but substantial differences of the countries. To 
exemplify, migration background is a relevant control variable in Sweden, while for 
the US race is important. Therefore, allowing some specificity of the modeling by 
country seems necessary for not overlooking relevant aspects. However, there are also 
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several methodological limitations in some of the country datasets, mainly the limited 
measurement of scholastic performance in the American and the Swedish datasets. 
Also the lack of measures for motivations and cognitive abilities in the German and 
the Swedish datasets are regrettable. 
 
3.2.3 Data 
For this analysis I use for Germany the German Life History Study, for the US the 
NLSY79 and for Sweden the LNU. In contrast to the section 2, I do not analyze the 
ALWA study since information on the social origin is rather limited in this dataset 
and difficult to compare to the other data sources. A more detailed description of the 
three studies and the selection of the initial samples can be found in chapter 1.5. Here, 
the selection of the sample differs in some aspects, since more covariates are needed 
for the multivariate analysis. The Swedish sample is identical, due to the low number 
of missing values. In order to tackle the missing value problem for the other two 
contexts, the datasets where multiply imputed using chained equations (Royston, 
2005; Rubin, 1996). For Germany, this leads to an analysis sample of 2227 cases (761 
qualified for higher education; 459 entered the labor market before higher education) 
of which 237 had at least one imputed value. The US dataset has the highest number 
of missing values. Out of the sample of 3107 cases (2522 qualified for higher 
education; 2233 entered the labor market before higher education), only 777 could be 
used after imputing at least one missing value. 
The key variable social background is measured as a simplified version of 
the EGP class scheme as introduced in 3.0.1 (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 
1979; Goldthorpe, 2000). The original version is collapsed into three categories, the 
service classes (upper and lower salariat), intermediate classes (intermediate upper 
sales and service occupations, self-employed and supervisors/foremen) and lower 
classes (lower sales and service occupations and blue collar working classes). 
 
3.2.4 Results 
Figure 3.2.1 depicts the process of all three transitions by social origin and for all 
three societies using survivor curves. While the first two transitions are expressed as 
survivor curves by age, the duration until the third transition – re-entry into higher 
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education – is measured in months from the first labor market entry (i.e. months from 
the second transition). 
 
3.2.5 Inequalities in Qualification to Enter Higher Education 
In figure 3.2.1, the first column illustrates the entry-process into the population that is 
qualified for higher education, i.e. the event of interest is ‘becoming eligible for 
higher education’. Survivor curves by social origin range from age 18 to 30. Without 
doubt, inequality is strongest in Germany, indicated by the large gaps between the 
three lines. Children of service class parents are able to achieve eligibility to a much 
greater extent. Among all social origins, not everybody qualifies immediately at the 
age of 18 or 19 as the national school systems expects; empirically, there is a number 
of delayers following later between the age of 20 and 25. Thereafter, the curves turn 
flat. Hence, while there is only a very small chance of qualifying for entry into higher 
education beyond the age of 25, many young adults are not ‘on time’. They finish 
their Abitur or Fachhochschulreife later than age 18 or 19. In the US, many more 
students get a high school degree, although there is a remaining gap between classes 
of origin. When looking at the lines closely, it can be seen that this gap reduces 
slightly over adolescence. For upper-class children, eligibility to higher education is 
nearly universal. Throughout the 20´s, a low proportion of intermediate and lower-
class students catch up (mainly through completion of a GED). 
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Figure 3.2.1: Survivor curves of school-to-work transition sequences. 
Country All cases: Qualifying for higher education If qualified: fulltime labor market entry 
For SE: definition of Erikson/Jonsson, 2007 
If entering the workforce w/o postsecondary 
education: re-entry 
Germany 
   
United  
States 
   
Sweden 
   
 service classes intermediate classes working classes 
Data Source: German Life History Study; Swedish LNU; NLSY79;own calculations.
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However, these late-qualifiers do not change the overall pattern much. For Sweden 
eligibility is defined according to all institutional rules that make students 
theoretically eligible for higher education. This is possible directly through the 
completion of respective a secondary school (cf. Chapter 1.4), but also (in principle) 
according to the 25/4-rule allowing entry into higher education after completion of 
four years of fulltime work or after reaching the age of 25. The graph includes all 
cases that are qualified theoretically by any existing rule and therefore shows 
universal qualification at the age of 25. However, this is an overestimate and the 
definition of Jonsson and Erikson (2007), which is closer at the ‘de facto’ 
qualification for higher education, would lead to a higher degree of inequality. 
Further, the graph illustrates the consequence of this rule for the timing of 
achievement of qualification for higher education: the total rate of becoming eligible 
is the same, but children from upper-class families are more often able to do so faster 
via the secondary education system. Probably, the theoretical qualification according 
to the 25/4-rule is a rather limited representation of eligibility, as there are strong 
differences between different ways of eligibility. Not only is the completion of the 
Teorigymnasium the fastest way with the least additional barriers into higher 
education, it can also be assumed that the academic preparation of the students for 
their studies is better. Therefore, eligibility to higher education can follow different 
definitions and is hard to capture in one event. Since this graph has the purpose of 
showing the proportion of permanently excluded students, this definition seems 
useful, but other definitions have to be used in other occasions. 
Country differences in inequality concerning eligibility to higher education 
exist and lead to differences between the populations being able to go through the 
later transitions. The graphs also indicate that inequality in timing of qualifying for 
higher education is small compared to the differences in the overall entry probability. 
As a consequence, initial inequalities are preserved over time. Neither are there 
substantial reductions in the inequalities by catching up, nor are they increased by 
continuing disadvantages of lower-class students. There are some exceptions which 
are often linked to a presumably low preparedness for higher education, e.g. the 25/4-
rule in Sweden or the GED in the US. In the case of GED´s for example, the 
schooling requirements for eligibility to enroll are lower than for high school 
diplomas (Cameron and Heckman, 1993). 
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To sum up, both Sweden and the US have lower inequality-levels at the point 
of qualification for higher education compared to Germany. Early inequalities, 
however, are only corrected to a very small degree. Further, one should keep in mind 
that nominal eligibility is often linked to low schooling requirements, such as for 
GED’s or entrants according the 25/4-rule. The catching up in terms of nominal 
qualification of lower classes is thus probably an overestimate of the de-facto catching 
up in being prepared for higher education. 
 
3.2.6 Inequalities in the Timing of Entering the Labor Market 
Among those young adults qualified for higher education many start to work full time 
instead of continuing education. Some do so immediately after secondary school, 
others drop out from higher education. The survivor curves in the second column of 
figure 3.2.1 show the timing and rate of the labor market entry for young adults who 
could enter higher education. Shown is only the time between age 16 and age 25. The 
time patterns as well as the total entry rates differ again both by class and society. The 
figures illustrate that in all societies a higher share of lower-class students enter the 
labor market fast, instead of getting (some) higher education before starting to work. 
But strong patterns of class inequality only exist in Germany and Sweden
13
. There, 
lower-class students enter the labor market faster. Their entry rate is especially high 
before the age of 20. This pattern is much less pronounced for the US. In contrast to 
the European countries, especially Germany, the share of upper-class students staying 
in the education system without starting to work at all is much lower in the US. Here, 
the upper classes are even more likely to enter the labor market before 25, which is 
probably a result of the comparatively short study programs. 
Overall, the timing of the transition to the labor market depends on class of 
origin too. In Germany and Sweden, children from higher social origins are able to 
stay away from the labor market and invest into other activities – often into education. 
Lower-class children enter the labor market faster even though the sample is restricted 
to those who are (nominally) eligible to study. The main difference to the US is that 
even the upper classes enter the labor market at very high rates in the early 20’s and 
catch up with the lower classes much faster. This reflects the high rate of early labor 
                                                 
13
 Note that for Sweden the population at risk is now limited to those students who are eligible directly 
through their secondary education. The definition follows Erikson and Jonsson (2007) and deviates 
from the survivor curve on ‘qualifying for higher education’ in the very left column of figure 3.2.1. 
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market attachment among young Americans. For the population of re-entrants this 
means a more homogeneous composition in terms of social origins in the US (at given 
overall distribution of origin in the country) than in Sweden and Germany. A caveat 
for the comparison to European countries lies in the fact that the curves say nothing 
on the duration of work and how much it may conflict with higher education – 
inequality might be hidden behind other aspects such as the quality of work (cf. Weiss 
and Roksa, 2012). 
 
3.2.7 Inequalities in the Re-Entry to Higher Education 
The third column shows survivor curves for the re-enrollment into postsecondary 
education by social class origin. Starting point is the entry into the labor market for 
those who enter before completing higher education (for at least six month and 
without studying parallel to their work). The gap between the curves describes 
differences in the entry rate into education by parental class for the population 
selected in the processes describe in the first two columns. The figures visualize a 
clear country pattern: inequality in Sweden and the US is higher than in Germany, 
where the highest share of young adults re-enrolls; the differences by class of origin 
are even stronger in the Swedish education system than in the US. What the curves 
show as well is a strong tendency to enter postsecondary education in Germany, 
compared to the lower rates that we observe for Sweden and in particular for the US. 
This pattern mirrors the difficulty to enter the labor market without any vocational 
education, either vocational training or higher education, in Germany. Somewhat 
more puzzling are the social origin differences in the entry rates between the systems. 
The graphs show that, beyond the inequality in earlier transitions, inequality 
in re-enrollment still exists. The effects of parental social origins on participation in 
education last on and reach into adulthood. This is noteworthy, as young adults 
become more and more independent from their parents. Further, the effects are 
stronger in Sweden and also in the US, where inequality in early educational 
transitions is lower than in Germany. It seems that these countries to some degree 
delay social origin differences rather than eradicate them. It is also interesting to note 
that there is no catching up of previously disadvantaged groups. In none of the 
systems can students with lower social origin use second chance enrollment to a 
higher degree than their peers who grew up in higher class households. If this would 
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be the case, the service classes would have to have lower re-enrollment rates than the 
working classes. Furthermore, the hazard rates plotted in the Appendix to this chapter 
show that the catching up does not occur over time. 
Inequality patterns in rates differ between countries remarkably. The 
difference lies to some degree in the role of the labor market entry. In all contexts, but 
to a much greater extend in Germany, upper-class children stay away somewhat 
longer from work and commit to education. Labor market entries in the US and 
Sweden occur in a more ‘casual’ manner, and are more often preliminary. In these 
two systems, where the higher education system has been opened by broadening the 
nominal qualification for a larger group, I observe more inequality in late entries. 
Inequality in the timing of labor market entrance is notably high in Germany, where 
labor market entries without a vocational degree are presumably difficult and go along 
with disadvantages. Re-entries into some kind of postsecondary education are 
therefore almost universal in Germany, and no inequalities could be observed. 
The survivor curves offer many insights both with regard to timing as well as 
with the rate differences in event occurrence for the different classes. However, such a 
graphical description misses systematic comparison in many respects. First and above 
all, the survivor curves say nothing about the immediate rate of event occurrence at 
each point in time – the hazard rates. To get an idea about the hazard, the slope of the 
survivor curve would have to be eyeballed and set into context of the number of those 
who already transferred. Thus, plotting the hazard rates would yield additional 
information on the processes for each country. Second, even though statistical tests 
for the differences between survivor curves are possible, inference statistics on 
specific class differences are missing. And third, multivariate modeling would allow 
to account for other compositional differences between children from different classes 
of origin and to control for mechanisms possibly explaining the class differences. As 
some of the mechanisms are country specific, I will estimate regression models by 
country, and thereafter compare the results. 
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3.2.8 Inequalities in Transitions – Regression Results 
Beyond this background of different transition patterns by class, the question arises 
how to model these transitions in multivariate models. A large number of regression 
models for time processes can be used for this purpose. By using semi-parametric 
Royston-Parmar models and graphs of actual hazard rates, Appendix 3.2.10 shows 
step by step for each country how log-logistic parametric accelerated failure time 
models are able to capture the shapes of the time patterns. Such a step by step set-up 
of the models seems necessary to be able to trace the process within each country 
detailed enough for a comparison between them. As the AFT-models capture the 
country-specific transitions well, only those will be presented on the following pages 
as a country-wise analysis of the effect of social class background on each transition. 
The main focus lies on the re-entry into postsecondary education. 
 
3.2.8.1 Germany 
The graphical description of all three transitions shows that the German system filters 
out early and there is no inequality left in the question of re-enrollment. Multivariate 
results shall now strengthen or refute this finding. In a first model, I keep 
compositional variables constant which might vary between classes and at the same 
time might predict re-enrollment. These are the federal states – as federal states vary 
in their social composition – the rates of young adults qualified for higher education, 
labor market chances and the rates of immediate enrollment into higher education. 
Further, the number of siblings and the sex of the respondent as well as the birth 
cohort are included into the model. The number of siblings can be correlated with 
social origin and at the same time determine parents ability to finance higher 
education. Sex and birth cohort can be unequally distributed by class after 
qualification for higher education, if e.g. among the lower classes typically men 
qualify. These compositional variables are kept constant in the first series of models, 
presented within the columns ‘a.’ in table 3.2.1. Model b. further includes the grade 
point average of the school-leaving certificates from secondary school. After 
controlling for this performance measure, the remaining effect would be what Boudon 
has defined as the ‘secondary effect’ of educational inequality (Boudon, 1974), i.e. 
effects of social origins that are not mediated by lower performance of working class 
children. The net effects after controlling for the GPA are of interest for another 
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reason: selection into higher education is in most cases caused by this score. For some 
programs, a low score can be compensated by waiting time until enrolment. Then, 
upper-class children with low performance could wait and later re-enroll instead of 
entering immediately a different program with lower restrictions in access. Thus, class 
effects would only become visible after controlling for performance as a suppressor-
variable. A further important question is whether students qualify for all higher 
education institutions, i.e. achieve an Abitur, or whether only the lower tier can be 
entered, which is included as an additional performance measure in model b. in the 
last row of table 3.2.1. 
The results confirm the pattern of the graphical description using survivor 
curves throughout: inequality is found to be high in early transitions, but not in the 
later transition of re-enrollment. For this last transition, the class coefficient is only 
negative for the working classes and not statistically significant at all. Controlling for 
performance does not change class effects at all. It seems that the fact that re-
enrollment is universal among upper secondary graduates who enter the labor market 
without a degree removes class difference in re-enrollment
14
. Class effects on earlier 
transitions are strong, on the qualification for higher education as well as on a fast 
full-time labor market entry. 
 
  
                                                 
14
 Then, the question arises whether the inequality does instead occur regarding other criteria, such as 
the type of institution into which children from different classes enroll. Additional analyses which are 
not shown here have shown that lower class children indeed tend to choose lower, more practical tracks 
for re-enrollment. They are more likely to enter apprenticeship training or the Fachhochschule, while 
upper class children are more likely to enter full research universities. 
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Table 3.2.1: Parametric accelerated failure time regression: qualification for higher 
education, labor market entry and re-enrollment: Germany. 
 all cases:  
Abitur or 
FHR 
if Abitur or FHR: 
entering the labor market 
before higher education 
if in the labor market:  
re-entering postsecondary 
education 
 a. a. b. a. b. 
parents class (ref.: service classes)     
- intermediated classes 0.40*** 
(11.83) 
-0.07*** 
(-5.78) 
-0.06*** 
(-5.50) 
0.52 
(1.81) 
0.51 
(1.77) 
- working classes 0.66*** 
(10.98) 
-0.04 
(-1.5) 
-0.02 
(-0.90) 
-0.43 
(-0.76) 
-0.43 
(-0.79) 
male -0.06* 
(-2.05) 
0.05*** 
(4.64) 
0.06*** 
(5.50) 
-0.84* 
(-2.98) 
-0.96** 
(-3.37) 
Abitur or FHR-GPA    -0.03** 
(-3.05) 
 0.32 
(1.23) 
Abitur (ref.: FHR)   0.12*** 
(6.26) 
 -1.11* 
(-2.24) 
constant 3.36*** 
(37.77) 
3.20*** 
(93.00) 
3.10*** 
(85.33) 
4.68*** 
(6.51) 
5.64*** 
(6.72) 
ln γ -1.08 
(-34.25) 
-2.43*** 
(-80.96) 
-2.48*** 
(-81.58) 
0.35*** 
(5.47) 
0.34*** 
(5.26) 
N 2227 761 459 
standard errors in parentheses , 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001; FHR: Fachhochschulreife. 
Further compositional covariates, not shown in the output: birth cohort, number of siblings (dummy 
variables), state of Abitur or Fachhochschulreife. 
a. compositional covariates kept constant 
b. compositional covariates and scholastic performance kept constant 
Data source: German Life History Study 64/71; own calculations.  
 
 
 
3.2.8.2 Sweden 
For Sweden, I keep a similar set of compositional covariates constant as for Germany: 
the birth cohort and the size of the municipality approximate the availability of 
options for higher education; the number of siblings, sex and whether the respondent 
was born in Sweden are additional covariates. These covariates are likely to be 
correlated with earlier transitions into the relevant sub-sample of possible re-entrants. 
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Table 3.2.2: Parametric accelerated failure time regression: qualification for higher 
education, labor market entry and re-enrollment: Sweden. 
 all cases:  
qualifying 
for higher 
ed. by 
secondary 
ed. 
if qualified by sec. ed.: 
entering the labor market 
before higher education 
if in the labor market 
before completing HE:  
re-entering postsecondary 
education 
 a. a. b. a. b. 
parents class (ref.: service classes)     
- intermediated classes 0.44*** 
(5.45) 
-0.03* 
(-2.42) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
0.30 (1.75) 
0.14 
(0.69) 
- working classes 0.67*** 
(8.49) 
-0.08*** 
 (-7.11) 
-0.05*** 
(-4.63) 
0.55*** 
(3.45) 
0.33*  
(1.96) 
Male 0.09 
(1.44) 
0.02* 
(2.07) 
0.02 
(1.83) 
0.88*** 
(6.58) 
0.88*** 
(6.64) 
born outside of SE 1.48*** 
(7.81) 
0.07* 
(2.27) 
0.05 
 (1.72) 
0.48 
(1.51) 
0.36  
(1.11) 
full qualification for 
higher education 
 
 
 
0.09*** 
(10.07) 
 
-0.71*** 
(-4.51) 
Constant 1.21*** 
(7.48) 
3.02***  
(138.84) 
2.94*** 
(137.62) 
5.23*** 
(15.14) 
5.62*** 
(15.87) 
ln γ -0.42*** 
(-13.69) 
-2.64*** 
(-85.58) 
-2.71*** 
(-87.19) 
0.32*** 
(9.57) 
0.31*** 
(9.28) 
N 1822 765 1622 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Further compositional covariates, not shown in the output: birth cohort, number of siblings (dummy 
variables), size of community of the birth place. 
a. compositional covariates kept constant 
b. compositional covariates and scholastic performance kept constant 
Data source: LNU 1990 and 2000; own calculations. 
 
 
 
Now, qualification for higher education is no longer defined in virtue of the 25/4-rule 
as above. Rather, only directly qualified young adults according to the definition of 
Erikson and Jonsson are considered being ‘qualified for higher education’. In table 
3.2.2 the coefficients of the AFT-models show that there is class inequality in all three 
transitions in Sweden. Upper-class children have a higher rate of qualifying for higher 
education early, of staying away from the labor market for a longer time and they 
have a higher rate of re-enrollment if they enter the labor market before achieving a 
higher education degree. The flexible parametric models in Appendix 3.2.10 show 
that this class effect is only there for the first four years after entering the labor 
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market. For the later enrollments, which are comparatively frequent in Sweden, social 
class origin seems to matter much less. 
Holding compositional variables constant, does not change the conclusion 
derived from the descriptive survivor curves: in Sweden, inequality is distributed over 
all of the three transitions – even though none of the coefficient for the intermediate 
classes is statistically significant for each transition. Inequality is carried through even 
by those who re-enter education at a later time in their life course. Comparing the 
median survival time and certain survival probability for an ideal case, illustrates how 
the model coefficients translate into individual differences in the re-entry into 
education by class. A young male adult born between 1955 and 1957 within Sweden 
and growing up in a large city without siblings has a predicted probability for not 
being back in school of 0.64 after five years for service class origins, 0.68 for 
intermediate class origins and 0.71 for working class origins. Hence, a minority is 
expected to re-enroll, but class still makes a substantive difference. 
Indicators of scholastic performance are not included in the LNU. However, 
a major dimension of performance with regard to access to higher education is 
available: the type of qualification for higher education which had consequences for 
the type of institution that could be accessed. As discussed before, defining eligibility 
for higher education is rather difficult for Sweden. The most direct way is through the 
Teoriegymniasium, the higher general education track in the secondary education 
system in Sweden. Alternatively, other ways such as the vocational tracks or the 
Komvux-System with less intensive theoretical schooling lead to restricted access. In 
model b. in table 3.2.2 the variable, whether eligibility for higher education is 
achieved through general upper secondary education, is introduced into the models 
from model-series a. It is noteworthy how strong its impact on the re-entry itself is, 
and especially how much it carries away from the original effect of social origin. 
Thus, the broader eligibility in Sweden to some degree nominal eligibility, but does 
de facto not lead to enrollment of previously disadvantaged. Or in other words, the 
inequality in late enrollment in Sweden stems to a certain degree from earlier 
inequalities in the secondary education system. For the working classes, however, 
there are significant coefficients of parental working class origin left after controlling 
for the secondary track. 
The strong reduction through the simple ‘type of eligibility’-variable suggests 
that more information on the secondary educational career should be controlled before 
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attributing inequality to mechanisms at the time of re-enrollment itself. The filtering 
function of the secondary system seems to be stronger than expected from the 
beginning – but granting entry into higher education nominally to everybody, makes 
the effects only visible when scrutinizing on participation in postsecondary education. 
In sum, in Sweden social origin remains influential even on later transitions 
back from work to school. Origin effects are strongly reduced by a very simple 
measure for earlier scholastic performance, the type of upper secondary degree. 
Further, although not studied in more detail in this chapter, the bivariate analysis in 
Appendix 3.2.10 suggests that the difference in the hazard rates by class comes to an 
end after several years in the labor market. 
 
3.2.8.3 United States 
For the US, the data availability is the best among all of the three cases. Important 
compositional variables are: 
- race, since affirmative action policies might otherwise lead to an 
underestimation of the class of origin effect; 
- regional disparities in working class residence and the availability for 
college education – captured by a multiple dummy variable for being 
born in a rural area and growing up in the south of the US or being 
born outside of the US; 
- the birth cohort – even though the range of birth cohorts in the NLSY 
is very small and they are close together – as correction for business 
cycle effects and for the fact that some measures have been taken at a 
different age for the different birth cohorts; 
- the number of siblings for the same reason as in Germany and 
Sweden: lower-class families on average have more children, which 
reduces their capabilities of financing higher education. 
Holding these variables constant, a significant effect on the disadvantage of both 
lower classes remains throughout the models. The pattern with inequality through all 
of the three transitions – including the re-entry – is robust. 
A number of intermediate variables play a role in the US that may explain the 
class inequality. First, performance in school and test-scores from cognitive tests are 
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indicative for performance in college entry tests. The NLSY79 contains the afqt-test
15
 
on cognitive performance for the full sample. For the cohorts I selected, the test has 
been carried out before the completion of high school. Furthermore, the track chosen 
in high school can be used as a proxy for school performance; here as a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent was in a college preparatory track or not. 
These performance measures are included into the models together with two 
alternative explanations: the poverty status of the respondents’ household at age 18 
corrects for the familiarly un-affordability of higher education. While there are at least 
theoretical possibilities in Germany and Sweden to finance higher education for 
poorer families, costs are much higher in the US and credit constraints can be 
assumed to play a stronger role. Finally, one may wonder whether early aspiration are 
built before leaving high school and then define what will happen throughout the 
entire sequence of transitions. This can be captured in the NLSY79 as young 
respondents have been asked about their favorite occupation. These occupations can 
be coded into classes according to the same scheme as the social origins. 
Controlling for these three simple mechanisms already captures most of the 
inequality. The resulting models are shown in the b.-columns of table 3.2.3. There is 
no remaining net effect of class on the attainment of a high school diploma or GED, 
and inequality in re-enrollment reduces drastically to an insignificant coefficient. 
Even though later analyses in section 4 will show that inequality in higher education 
has to be studied in a more differentiated way for the US, the three mechanisms can 
explain the overall inequality in re-entry quite well. What is not shown in the analysis 
here but has been uncovered in a number of different model specifications, is that the 
most important intermediate variables – explaining away by far most of the class 
inequality – are the afqt-test scores and the attendance of an academic track in high 
school. The other two mechanisms are relatively unimportant. 
Nevertheless, the poverty variable reveals an interesting insight. It has strong 
impact on the first transition, but then its effect reverses: young adults from poor 
families do not enter the labor market as fast as those from more affluent 
backgrounds. Then on the re-enrollment transitions, there is no more significant effect 
left. First of all, this shows that there is a group of poor households with children who 
                                                 
15
 The Armed Forces Qualification Test (afqt) is a test on cognitive performance (IQ) which includes a 
number of different dimensions such as word-knowledge, math skills or paragraph comprehension. 
Often it is referred to as the asvab-battery. 
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at the same time are not able to either find work or finance education. Second, even 
though this interpretation is paired with the violation of some methodological 
assumptions, it seems that the effect of poverty vanishes more over time than the 
influence of scholastic performance. This suggests – similar to the findings for 
Sweden – that late inequality has its roots earlier in the life course and early 
investments are crucial. But it also implies that late entry may have its contribution to 
a reduction in educational inequality as far as financial constraints are the reason for 
refraining from enrollment. 
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Table 3.2.3: Parametric accelerated failure time regression: qualification for higher 
education, labor market entry and re-enrollment: United States. 
 all cases: 
high school diploma or 
GED 
if HS-Diploma or GED: 
entering the labor market 
before higher education 
if in the labor market: 
re-entering postsecondary 
education 
 a. b. a. b. a. b. 
parents class (ref.: service classes)      
 - intermediated classes 0.04***
 
(3.32) 
-0.00 
(-0.17) 
-0.14*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.10** 
(-3.91) 
0.44** 
(2.42) 
0.22 
(1.19) 
 - working classes 0.07***
 
(6.33) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
-0.17*** 
(6.10) 
-0.11*** 
(-4.04) 
0.59** 
(2.97) 
0.22 
(1.06) 
 - single parent, inactive 0.22*** 
(8.95) 
0.12*** 
(5.05) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.03 
(0.50) 
.16 
(0.42) 
-0.24 
(-0.63) 
Male 0.04***
 
(4.62) 
0.03*** 
(3.64) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.14) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.27) 
0.62*** 
(4.14) 
0.58*** 
(3.75) 
race (ref.: white)       
  - black -0.01 
(-0.65) 
-0.08*** 
(-4.77) 
0.15*** 
(3.99) 
0.12*** 
(3.17) 
0.08 
(0.29) 
-0.26 
(-0.90) 
 - Hispanic 0.01 
(0.45) 
-0.03 
(-1.52) 
0.04 
(0.84) 
0.02 
(0.53) 
-0.06 
(-0.21) 
-0.20 
(-0.64) 
Rural -0.00 
(-0.64) 
-0.01 
(-0.88) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(1.42) 
0.15 
(0.84) 
0.08 
(0.46) 
place of birth (ref.: non-south)      
 - south 0.04***
 
(4.54) 
0.03** 
(2.93) 
0.01 
(0.28) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.23 
(1.35) 
0.15 
(0.86) 
  - non-US 0.04
 
(1.80) 
0.03 
(1.12) 
0.18** 
(3.18) 
0.16** 
(2.87) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(-0.21) 
afqt percentiles  -0.003*** 
(12.60) 
 0.001** 
(2.57) 
 -0.01*** 
(-4.09) 
high school track: 
college preparatory 
 -0.04*** 
(-4.29) 
 0.12*** 
(5.35) 
 -0.32 
(-1.94) 
hh at age 18 poor   0.08*** 
(6.30) 
 0.05* 
(1.97) 
 0.16 
(0.75) 
class aspiration (ref.: service)      
 - intermediate class  -0.00 
(-0.32) 
 -0.03 
(-0.99) 
 0.21 
(1.03) 
 - skilled working  0.03* 
(2.11) 
 -0.07** 
(-2.48) 
 0.30 
(1.30) 
 - unskilled working  0.05** 
(2.84) 
 -0.02 
(-0.40) 
 0.79* 
(1.98) 
Constant 2.83*** 
(99.87) 
3.05*** 
(96.56) 
1.29*** 
(18.55) 
1.10*** 
(14.51) 
5.83*** 
(13.10) 
7.12*** 
(13.32) 
ln γ -1.93*** 
(-108.18) 
-1.99*** 
(-113.78) 
-1.22 
(-73.87) 
-1.27 
(-76.26) 
0.29*** 
(6.39) 
0.28*** 
(6.12) 
N 3107 2522 2233 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Further compositional covariates, not shown in the output: birth cohort, number of siblings (dummy 
variables). 
a. compositional covariates kept constant. 
b. compositional covariates and likely mechanisms related to scholastic performance and motivation 
kept constant. 
Data source: NLSY79; own calculations. Not weighted.  
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3.2.9 Discussion and Conclusion: Early Openness, Late Inequality? 
The results of the different countries differ at the core between Germany on the one 
side and Sweden and the US on the other side. Using a step by step-approach from 
non-parametric methods towards a parameterization I have compared three 
educational transitions during young adulthood in detail between the three societies. 
The Swedish and the US system are both characterized by low inequality in the early 
transitions and higher inequality on later transitions, the German system on the 
contrary manifests stronger inequalities in the earlier transitions. The fact that Sweden 
and the US lump together and not the two European systems indicates a central role of 
the education system instead of the labor market regulation. Sweden and the US are 
both similar in their strong open access policy to postsecondary education, while the 
Swedish employment protection legislation is rather similar to Germany. In 
contradiction to the hypothesis that stricter employment protection legislation will 
reduce the number of lower class entrants after they established themselves at work, 
inequality in re-enrollment is low in Germany and in Sweden at least not higher than 
in the US. 
What makes the US and the Swedish system so similar is a combination of 
high rates of young adults being nominally qualified to enter higher education and the 
openness of the education system. Both grant the theoretical chance to enter higher 
education to less well prepared young adults. At the same time, the higher education 
system welcomes non-traditional students with comparatively open arms – re-
enrollment is possible at any time at rather convenient conditions for students with 
parallel commitment in other life domains. The broad nominal eligibility and an open 
and flexible system for non-traditional students may overall reduce inequality. 
However, it is also a part of the reality of these systems that higher education is 
delayed and transition patterns are more complex. And, as this chapter has shown, that 
over time inequality in educational attainment prevails: later enrollment is, just like 
earlier enrollment, strongly influenced by class. In this way, a part of the class 
inequality that has been hidden behind expanding eligibility for higher education 
almost to universality manifests later in educational attainment throughout adulthood. 
Thus, even though these systems equalize education by expanding access 
opportunities, at least a part of it becomes ineffective later through unequal re-
enrollment rates in particular of lower class children, in Sweden as well as in the US. 
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This ‘rollback’ of inequality has, however, the interesting characteristic that 
it can be explained to a large degree by scholastic performance measures from 
secondary school. The nominal eligibility does not replace the early preparation for 
academic schooling. The overall pattern of the results can be seen as another hint that 
early investments into the cognitive development of children might be the more 
promising way to reduce educational inequalities. One should keep in mind that late 
flexibility can still reduce inequality by replacing earlier transitions which would 
select more strongly on social origin. The scope in how far later education can be 
equal still depends on the secondary education system to some degree, even if it does 
not nominally or ‘officially’ select those who are eligible for higher education. 
Overall, the situation in Sweden corresponds quite closely to the one in the 
US. This confirms previous studies comparing the US to Scandinavian contexts and 
finding a similar magnitude of educational inequality (for a recent example comparing 
the US and Norway see Reisel, 2011). But it contradicts the expectation expressed in 
chapter 3.1 that the US could have higher inequality due to the fact that the high costs 
are too high even for enrolling later. The finding also contradicts the opposing 
hypothesis that high school graduates from poorer families wait or rather work until 
they enroll, and thus inequality in the US is lower than in other countries or even 
reversed for later enrolments. In an unlucky situation for the research design, the two 
mechanisms could counterbalance each other and thus produce such similar results for 
Sweden and the US. However, a precondition for this scenario would be a higher rate 
of direct entrants into postsecondary education in the US. Even though there are direct 
entries and the timing for entry into the labor market is unequal according to social 
origin, for excluding enough upper class children from the population of potential re-
enrollers a much higher rate of direct college entrants would be needed. 
One particular explanation for the late inequality in the Swedish and the US 
system – which is mainly absent in Germany – is the higher selectivity on earlier 
transitions in the German case and thus a less homogeneous population of potential 
re-enrollers. This possibility has been left out of the discussion, but could also explain 
the patterns I have found. Therefore, the next chapter will be devoted for a more 
thorough discussion.  
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3.2.10 Appendix: Comparing Parametric and Semi-Parametric Models 
Qualitative comparative case studies allow for a much more detailed study of processes within the 
single countries. This has the great advantage that, besides consideration of substantive historic 
differences, the methodological approach can be much better evaluated for each single case, avoiding 
e.g. misinterpretation from simplified findings due to wrong parameterization. This Appendix shows 
the derivation of the event history model assuming a log-logistic distribution in three steps: first, I plot 
non-parametric hazard rates, in addition to the survivor curves in the main text of the chapter. Second, I 
estimate hazard rate models with flexible shapes and hence fewer parametric assumptions and plot a set 
of predicted hazard rates. And third, I compare these models to the fully parametric models reported in 
this chapter, using a graphical illustration as well as comparing the coefficients and the entire models 
according to the AIC-statistic. There are, at least, two things that can be learned from such an 
investigation. First, it provides a more refined picture than the survivor curves in the main text, in how 
far a certain transition is indeed time-dependent. And second, whether the log-logistic model-
specification used throughout this chapter is an appropriate representation of the timing process for all 
three transitions in all three countries. 
When modeling event histories, the choice of a model can be a crucial decision with a strong 
impact on the results. In this chapter, I have modeled each transition assuming a log-logistic 
distribution on the hazard curve. Although this shape is rather flexible and can take many forms, it can 
still be a wrong specification of the fundamental process. The alternative, the widely used Cox-model, 
leaves the shape of the hazard function unspecified, but makes the assumption that the curves for 
different values of independent variables are parallel (parallel hazards assumption). This assumption is 
violated in several instances what makes the Cox-model a not very useful alternative. Another 
alternative to the fully parametric models above are semi-parametric models using cubic splines or 
fractional polynomials. Their underlying strategy is to model the baseline hazard, but allow more 
flexibility by modeling the shape on different sections of the time scale in a different way. This is 
achieved by adding a set of additional shape parameters for different ‘slices’ of the time axis. One class 
of such models using splines have been suggested by Royston, Lambert and Parmar (Lambert and 
Royston, 2009; Royston, 2001; Royston and Parmar, 2002). These models allow a very flexible 
modeling of the shape of the baseline hazard which is much closer to the ‘real’ shape. But in contrast to 
the Cox-model, they are able to specify the shape of the hazard function and model it. That enables to 
compare these models with fully parametric models, both on the basis of model-fit statistics such as the 
Bayesian (BIC) or Akaikes information criterion (AIC) and on the basis of the graphical illustration of 
predicted hazard rates from the model (e.g. the baseline hazard rate). 
The following models will be compared leading to the AFT-models used in the main chapter. 
For each model, three figures show the ‘evolution’ of the parametric baseline hazard rate: 
- first, the non-parametric hazard rate by social origin. This curve gives the real hazard rate 
without any parameterization and without modeling of any covariate. The curves are 
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel to make a somewhat more general pattern visible and 
cancel out small bumps from the distribution. 
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- Second, a set of hazard rates predicted from the ‘Royston-Parmar’- or semi-parametric 
spline models for an ideal case for all three classes of social origin and 
- third, the same set of predictions as above from the fully parametric AFT regressions with 
a log-logistic distribution used in the main chapter. 
Further, I report all models in order to check whether strong violations of functional 
assumptions lead to fundamentally different results. Finally, I report the AIC in order to evaluate the 
trade-off between model parsimony and correct specification of the hazard rate. 
Altogether, this set of robustness check should enable an informed decision for the choice of 
the models. It serves the purpose of checking whether central results for the different countries could be 
influenced by modeling issues. Thus, for comparative research such robustness checks seem to be 
indispensable. As a result, although the log-logistic model turns out to be an extremely rough and 
imprecise specification, the fundamental conclusions of the chapter are unaffected. 
The semi-parametric models are estimated using different sets of knots, but generally a quite 
large number of user defined knots are set. Increasing the number of knots reduces the model fit due to 
a loss of degrees of freedom, but leads to a closer approximation of the true shape. The odds metric is 
chosen over the hazard metric since models derived from odds metric closely correspond to log-logistic 
models and the model fit often turned out to be slightly better in previous work (Royston and Lambert, 
2011). 
In conclusion, for most cases the figures show that the models represent by and large the 
process appropriately – with few exceptions. The BIC statistics show that the AFT-models are a 
possible and more parsimonious simplification of the modeling. In the following, I will discuss the 
models and the graphical illustrations country by country. 
As discussed before, the German system filters early and early inequality is comparatively 
high. This is mirrored in the hazard rates in the first column of figure 3.2.2. Hazard rates of qualifying 
for higher education are heavily concentrated around the age at which this transition is expected in the 
education system, between 18 and 21, and class inequality is high. Only very few young adults catch 
up. The other two graphs in the first column confirm the results of the survivor curves: there are almost 
no differences between classes on later transitions. 
The second and the third column show predicted hazard curves for a man from the northern 
state of Schleswig-Holstein, born in 1964 and without any siblings. In the second column the 
underlying model is the flexible parametric solution. The third column shows the identical prediction 
from a log-logistic accelerated failure time regression. The shape of the hazards approximates the non-
parametric curves fairly well, with the exception of the transition to qualification for higher education, 
where the parametric model fails to capture the strong decline of all classes. As, however, only very 
few cases are entering postsecondary education late, coefficients depend on the first section of the time 
axis. Therefore, this circumstance is not problematic and the coefficients from the non-parametric and 
the parametric model are in line. 
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Figure 3.2.2: From non-parametric to parametric models, Germany. 
 Non-parametric, bivariate hazard rate Baseline hazard rate, semi-parametric spline model Parametric AFT-model (log-logistic distribution) 
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Table 3.2.4: Semi-parametric cubic spline model (Royston-Parmar model), three transitions to re-
enrollment, Germany. 
 all cases:  
Abitur or 
FHR 
if Abitur or FHR: 
entering the labor market 
before higher education 
if in the labor market:  
re-entering postsecondary 
education 
 a. a. b. a. b. 
parents class (ref.: service classes)     
- intermediated classes -1.10*** 
(-11.10) 
0.75*** 
(5.55) 
0.82*** 
(5.92) 
-0.20 
(-0.65) 
-0.20 
(-0.66) 
- working classes -1.87*** 
(-10.37) 
0.39 
(1.38) 
-0.06 
(-0.22) 
0.23 
(0.35) 
0.29 
(0.42) 
male 0.08 
(0.82) 
-0.52*** 
(-3.94) 
-0.65*** 
(-4.80) 
0.26* 
(0.89) 
0.36 
(1.18) 
Abitur or FHR-GPA  
  
0.40** 
(3.09) 
 
-0.58* 
(-2.24) 
Abitur (ref.: FHR) 
  
-1.29*** 
(-5.78) 
 
2.24 
 (2.13) 
constant -0.36 
(-.38) 
-0.30 
(-0.78) 
2.02 
 (4.46) 
-2.02** 
(-2.24) 
-4.31 
(-3.38) 
AIC* 302 -613 -803 989 1000 
AIC*: corresponding 
ll-AFT-model 
2657 -598 -612 646 648 
N 2227 761 459 
t statistics in parentheses , 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001; FHR: Fachhochschulreife. 
Further compositional covariates, not shown in the output: birth cohort, number of siblings (dummy 
variables), state of Abitur or Fachhochschulreife. 
Coefficients for knots omitted. 
a. compositional covariates kept constant. 
b. compositional covariates and scholastic performance kept constant. 
Data source: German Life History Study; own calculations. 
 
 
 
The main focus of the analysis within this chapter was though on the re-entry. Here, the 
picture differs. The non-parametric hazard rates show no bivariate class differences in re-entry and the 
semi-parametric model controlling for compositional effects confirms this result, even though the 
parametric model points towards a disadvantage of intermediate class children. Therefore, in order to 
make a conservative decision, the disadvantage of the middle class has to be attributed to the choice of 
parameterization. We cannot conclude that social origin has any effect on later entry into postsecondary 
education in Germany. 
The AIC-values show that the first two transitions would both be modeled better with a 
flexible model than using the fully parametric model. From the predicted hazard rates it can be 
extracted that the inequality is centered on the first months, but also the overall hazard rates are much 
higher around this time. In other words, what happens later does not matter too much for the overall 
process – and therefore the AFT-model can also be justified as a representation of the overall process. 
The flexible model shows even the early filtering-out in the German system. For re-enrollment, the 
AFT-model is to be preferred over the flexible parametric model according to the AIC. 
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Figure 3.2.3: From non-parametric to parametric models, United States. 
 Non-parametric, bivariate hazard rate Baseline hazard rate, semi-parametric spline model Parametric AFT-model (log-logistic distribution) 
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For the achievement of a high school degree, inequalities in the hazard rates are centered on 
the first years in accordance with typical age when this degree is achieved. In later years, the hazard 
rates reverse at least a bit and lower-class children manage to catch up slightly. However, this should 
be interpreted with caution. First, since the rates are overall, so the initial inequality will weigh more 
heavily. Therefore the survival curves above showed rather stable inequality, which still exists in the 
achievement of a high school diploma. Hazard curves simply show that this pattern is already produced 
in early years. Second, the later achievements are quite often GEDs. As Cameron and Heckman 
highlight (1993), these are not a full equivalent to a high school degree. 
Other life course events arrange according to class in line with this finding. Young adults 
from lower social origins have a higher hazard rate of entering the labor market earlier in their life, 
instead of education being the obvious decision during this phase. After these first years, upper-class 
children – who are still in the risk set (i.e. who have not yet completed higher education) – have a 
higher chance of starting to work. A possible modeling procedure for this would be piecewise effects 
models (Bernardi, 2001). However, as the major concern here are early entrants into the labor market 
instead of postsecondary education, the later catching up of upper-class young adults will be ignored in 
the following. Given the complex shape of the hazard rate, finding a good approximation for the shape 
of the survivor curve is rather difficult, as shown by the inconsistent baseline hazard rates for the semi-
parametric and fully parametric models. Again, as class differences in early entrance are the main 
interest and these are captured well by both models, this simplification seems to be not problematic. 
For the re-enrollment, there seems indeed to be a violation of the functional form 
assumptions – as well as from the parallel hazard assumption. Even though, modeling with a rather 
flexible model can account for the crossing of the hazard curves, a non-continuous effect would thus be 
the better specification. For a closer look into the US case and a better model also with regard to the 
gender specificity of the process I here refer to chapter 4.5. For the comparison it should be noted that 
the finding of continuous inequality is driven by the first three or four years after the labor market entry 
– and cannot be generalized to later re-entries. This might also be the reason that the AIC-values of the 
AFT-model are about the same size as for the more flexible model. As the flexible model, however, 
also suffers from the problem that it cannot model piecewise effects on the time axis, a yet different 
modeling strategy is needed and I will stick to the AFT model for the moment. 
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Table 3.2.5: Semi-parametric cubic spline model (Royston-Parmar model), three transitions to re-
enrollment, United States. 
 all cases:  
high school diploma or 
GED 
if HS-Diploma or GED: 
entering the labor market 
before higher education 
if in the labor market:  
re-entering postsecondary 
education 
 a. b. a. b. a. b. 
parents class (ref.: service classes)      
 - intermediated classes -0.42*** 
(-4.94) 
-0.08 
(-0.88) 
0.26** 
(2.97) 
0.21** 
(2.36) 
-0.31* 
(-2.30) 
-0.17 
(-1.20) 
 - working classes -0.65*** 
(-7.18) 
-0.05 
(-0.49) 
0.34*** 
(3.60) 
0.25** 
(2.50) 
-0.43** 
(-2.95) 
-0.16 
(-1.01) 
 - single parent, inactive -1.31*** 
(-8.58) 
-0.47** 
(-3.03) 
0.15 
(0.82) 
0.14 
(0.74) 
0.11 
(0.75) 
0.15 
(0.52) 
male -0.42*** 
(-6.60) 
-0.37*** 
(-5.56) 
0.21*** 
(3.10) 
0.23*** 
(3.19) 
-0.40*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.45*** 
(-3.89) 
race (ref.: white)       
  - black 0.01 
(0.05) 
0.52*** 
(4.40) 
-0.34** 
(-2.78) 
-0.28* 
(-2.16) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.79) 
 - hispanic -0.20 
(-1.49) 
0.12 
(0.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.11) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
0.15 
(0.64) 
rural -0.11 
(-1.41) 
-0.08 
(1.05) 
-0.06 
(-0.69) 
-0.12 
(-1.43) 
-0.16 
(-1.19) 
-0.08 
(-0.57) 
place of birth (ref.: non-south)      
 - south -0.26*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.11 
(-1.46) 
-0.04 
(0.58) 
0.05 
(0.62) 
-0.13 
(-1.00) 
-0.10 
(-0.76) 
  - non-US -0.38* 
(-2.19) 
-0.31 
(-1.76) 
-0.42* 
(-2.18) 
-0.40* 
(-2.07) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.22) 
afqt percentiles  0.02*** 
(15.32) 
 -0.003 
(-1.65) 
 0.01*** 
(4.25) 
high school track: 
college preparatory 
 0.31*** 
(4.21) 
 -0.30*** 
(-3.79) 
 0.24* 
(1.95) 
hh at age 18 poor   -0.43*** 
(-5.18) 
 -0.11 
(-1.15) 
 -0.14* 
(-0.86) 
class aspiration (ref.: service)      
 - intermediate class  0.06 
(0.64) 
 0.06 
(0.69) 
 -0.15 
(-1.01) 
 - skilled working  -0.11 
(-1.13) 
 0.15 
(1.45) 
 -0.23 
(-1.33) 
 - unskilled working  -0.10 
(-0.81) 
 0.18 
(1.17) 
 -0.60* 
(-2.17) 
constant    -1.11 
(-9.33) 
 0.27 
(1.53) 
AIC* -7277 -7114 -4849 -4698 3052 2795 
AIC*: corresponding 
ll-AFT-model 
-5862 -5914 -3909 -3839 3057 2798 
N 3107 2522 2233 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001; Data source: NLSY79; own calculations. 
Further compositional covariates, not shown in the output: birth cohort, number of siblings (dummy 
variables); Coefficients for knots omitted. 
a. compositional covariates kept constant. 
b. compositional covariates and likely mechanisms related to scholastic performance and motivation 
kept constant. 
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Figure 3.2.4: From non-parametric to parametric models, Sweden. 
 Non-parametric, bivariate hazard rate Baseline hazard rate, semi-parametric spline model Parametric AFT-model (log-logistic distribution) 
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The predicted survivor curves in columns two and three of figure 3.2.4 refer to a male born 
between 1955 and 1957 in a large city in Sweden who grew up without siblings. The shape of the 
hazard rates can, overall, be approximated well by the semi-parametric model. The log-logistic AFT-
model fails to model the process of early sorting out, as the distribution is extremely right-skewed. In 
this case, the model cannot capture the basic process. The reason is the definition for ‘qualifying for 
higher education’: only qualifying by secondary education is counted as an even in this model. Thus, 
the underlying event typically happens early and class inequality in this ‘regular’ way to higher 
education is much stronger than a plot of nominal eligibility – such as the survivor curves in figure 
3.2.1 – would suggest.  
 
Table 3.2.6: Semi-parametric cubic spline model (Royston-Parmar model), three transitions to re-
enrollment, Sweden. 
 all cases:  
qualifying 
for higher 
ed. by 
secondary 
ed. 
if qualified by sec. ed.: 
entering the labor market 
before higher education 
if in the labor market 
before completing HE:  
re-entering postsecondary 
education 
 a. a. b. a. b. 
parents class (ref.: service classes)     
- intermediated classes -0.52*** 
(-4.31) 
0.39** 
 (2.42) 
0.09 
(0.53) 
-0.18 
(-1.31)  
-0.07 
(-0.53) 
- working classes -0.84***  
(-7.18) 
1.18*** 
 (7.38) 
0.77*** 
(4.77) 
-0.42***  
(-3.24) 
-0.27*  
(-1.95) 
male -0.25**  
(-2.67) 
-0.27*  
(-2.12)  
-0.23  
(-1.84)  
-0.55*** 
(-5.15) 
-0.56***  
(-5.22) 
born outside of SE -1.59*** 
(-5.81) 
-1.04** 
(-2.49) 
-0.85** 
 (-2.00) 
-0.07 
(-0.28) 
-0.02 
(-0.07) 
full qualification for 
higher education 
 
 
 
-1.76*** 
 (-11.35) 
 
-0.55*** 
(4.27) 
constant 0.45 
(1.85)  
-0.16* 
(-0.52) 
1.28***  
(3.81) 
-0.48  
(-1.73) 
-0.78***  
(-2.70) 
AIC* -32.12 -1016 -1149 3327 3880 
AIC*: corresponding 
ll-AFT-model 
1556 -888 -979 3890 3311 
N 1822 765 1622 
t statistics in parentheses, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Further compositional covariates, not shown in the output: birth cohort, number of siblings (dummy 
variables), size of community of birth place. Coefficients for knots omitted. 
a. compositional covariates kept constant 
b. compositional covariates and scholastic performance kept constant 
Data source: LNU; own calculations. 
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As with the AFT-models in the main text, most of the inequality among re-enrollers can be 
explained by the type of eligibility. I.e. the early inequality in the eligibility has long-lasting 
consequences. For the labor market entry and for re-enrollment, the shape of the hazard function can be 
better approximated with the AFT-model than for the transition to eligibility. The AIC-values suggest 
that a more complex modeling in Sweden would lead to a better fit – but the substantive conclusion 
confirms the findings from the AFT-models in the main text.  
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3.3 Selective Processes and Late Inequality 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the problem of sample selection in a multiple-transitions 
setting. While not offering a definite solution, the problem is discussed and illustrated. 
I apply different solutions which have been suggested in the literature and show that 
their results largely confirm my conclusions from chapter 3.2. However, there are 
several inconsistencies calling for a cautious interpretation of these results. Overall, 
selectivity is shown to be a potential explanation for some the country differences, 
while the overall pattern presented in chapter 3.2, with higher inequality in the open 
and non-selective systems, is confirmed. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
One possible explanation for the observed higher inequality in re-enrollment in open 
education systems is that these systems select the population that could potentially re-
enroll less restrictively. The potential of this technical selection hypothesis will be 
discussed in the current chapter. Selection into the risk group is, just as in other 
educational transition models, can technically interfere with the comparability of 
countries. Cameron and Heckman (1998) challenged the common finding of waning 
coefficients over the life course – i.e. that inequality is lower in transitions at older 
age – and show that sequential binary choice models are sensitive to selection bias. 
Hence, a documentation and careful description of possible selection processes is a 
necessary precondition for comparative research. In addition, I present results from 
applications of the common attempts to model the selection process. These, however, 
all rely on very restrictive assumptions. The main aim of the chapter lies on the 
documentation and discussion of selective processes in educational careers, their 
illustration and discussion of the consequences for the country comparison. 
Assessing the influence of social origin on the re-entry into higher education 
can be understood as an extension to the ‘Mare’-model or sequential logit-/probit-
model which has been a standard tool of educational research for many decades 
(Mare, 1980; Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993). In such a model, educational outcomes are 
not studied as an ordinal or nominal variable of educational achievement. Instead – 
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just as in chapter 3.2 in this volume – they are modeled as a process of transitions in 
which individuals stay in or leave education. Figure 3.3.1 illustrates which transitions 
are involved and how the sample selects into a more and more selective sub-
population possibly returning into postsecondary education. 
 
Figure 3.3.1: Transitions into ‘late’ education 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to re-entry from work into education chapter 3.2 has shown that there are 
social background effects on the re-entry into school, just as in any other educational 
transition. These effects are at a moderate level compared to earlier transitions and 
they differ between countries. In Sweden and the US, the two countries with lower 
inequality in eligibility for higher education, the inequality in the re-enrollment rates 
were higher. As discussed below, this finding could be due to technical selection 
processes. 
 
3.3.2 How Sample Selection Works and Why it is a Problem for Comparing 
Inequality in Late Enrollment between Societies 
Sample selection is often seen as a source of bias for estimates from observational 
studies in the social sciences. King et al. (1994) give an intuitive description of the 
impact of sample selection on empirical studies and summarize it as follows: 
 
‘… the inferences are likely to be biased since, if the explanatory variables do not take into 
account the selection rule, any selection rule correlated with the dependent variable attenuates 
estimates of causal effects on average.’ (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p. 130) 
 
Such a selection rule is obviously given in the case of re-enrollment decisions of 
young adults: previous transitions in the educational system determine whether re-
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enrollment is possible and relevant for an individual. The impact of sample selection 
on the association between any variable x and a dependent variable y is intuitively 
easiest understood when imagining the most extreme case: a dependent variable that 
does not vary at all. If for example y is poverty, a sample of either only poor or non-
poor people will not allow any inference on its causes. Most cases are less extreme, 
but selectivity will nevertheless attenuate the association between variables that we 
observe. If a linear relationship between any independent variable x and poverty (y) 
exists, the relationship would be underestimated if poverty also determines whether 
the cases are in the sample. The poverty example is a realistic one: if for example 
homeless people are not in the sample, it is likely that the poorest of the poor are 
missing. The resulting dependent variable is then called ‘truncated’. If there is a true 
relationship between this truncated variable and another variable, estimators based on 
this sample will be downwardly biased. 
A similar situation occurs when the sample is complete, but the dependent 
variable is limited in a certain way, defined as a ‘censored’ dependent variable. In the 
case of censoring, we know about the existence of those cases without valid 
observation on the dependent variable, but in beyond the problem remains. In 
educational transition models, both truncation and censoring can occur as a function 
of the independent variables and the exact sampling process. 
How does this selection problem relate to the research question on re-
enrollment into education in young adulthood? I hypothesize that all estimates of 
effects on re-entry are likely to be attenuated by sample selection, in particular in 
more selective country contexts such as Germany. However, I argue that this not 
necessarily to be seen as a source of bias. 
First, truncation of the dependent variable ‘re-enrollment’ is likely to occur. 
Sample selection in the educational transition model generally derives from the fact 
that all earlier transitions determine each later transition and therefore the remaining 
group at risk to make the next transition (Buis, 2011; Cameron and Heckman, 1998; 
Hansen, 1997; Mare, 1980). It is very likely that the passing of previous transitions 
depended on the same factors as the probability of making the present transition; the 
processes have to be understood as interrelated whenever conclusions are drawn. The 
first selection process is the qualification to enter higher education. Hence, social 
origin effects on the entry into higher education depend on the strictness of selectivity 
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of becoming eligible. Using simulated data, figure 3.3.2 gives a graphical illustration 
of this process. Assuming 
a. that a latent variable y* predicts whether a person i enters education at any 
point: the higher y*, the higher the probability to enter education 
b. y* is – at least to some degree – constant over the life course and  
c. y* cannot be observed in empirical studies. 
With the dashed lines the figure mark the level at which y* is truncated by earlier 
educational transitions. For the populations that can potentially re-enroll into 
postsecondary education from the labor market, two such lines have to be drawn: on 
the one side, highly aspiring youth is more likely to qualify for higher education. As 
we know, levels of selectivity of qualification for higher education vary greatly 
between countries (cf. chapter 1.4). The lower dashed line exemplifies the truncation 
of y* by qualification for higher education. Highly aspiring youth on the contrary are 
more likely to start higher education right away after high school instead of entering 
the labor market. The upper dashed lines in the figure illustrate this process. The solid 
line is the hypothetical regression line on the full sample; the dashed regression line is 
estimated based on the truncated sample. The upper graph simulates the link between 
class and re-entry in a society with low selectivity: potentially everybody is eligible to 
enter higher education and the majority of youth does not enter before working some 
time. The lower graph shows the more strict selection case where few individuals 
qualify for higher education but those who qualify typically enroll immediately. 
Comparing the difference of the full sample regression line and the realized sample 
regression line between both graphs, illustrates two important properties of the results 
from highly selective samples: even though the solid lines depicting the ‘true’ 
relationship are identical, the slopes of the actually estimated regression lines (dashed 
lines) differ and are lower under the stronger selection condition. Both, truncation at 
the lower and at the upper end of the distribution of y* contribute to this. 
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Figure 3.3.2: Different grades of selection and their consequences on the estimation of 
slope-coefficients, simulated data. 
Condition 1: Weak selection: access nearly universal, few entering higher education directly 
 
Condition 2: Strong selection: access exclusive, many entering higher education directly 
 
 
black dots: cases within sample 
grey dots: cases out of sample 
 
 
 
‘true’ slope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
slope estimated from selected sample 
 
 
 
 
Second, the degree of selectivity is determined by the education system. In the context 
of a comparative study on the re-entry decision into education, I will not discuss the 
problem as a source of bias, rather as a possible explanation for country differences 
that has far reaching implication for conclusions from comparative research. 
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Selectivity is rather closely linked to characteristics of the educational system, and 
hence for comparative research, rather an explanans of country patterns than a 
methodological problem. I will therefore avoid the frequently used term ‘selection 
bias’ and refer to ‘sample selection’ instead. 
 
Previous studies found lower inequality coefficients at later educational 
transitions over the life course (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993), and these have been 
attributed to different causes (see Lucas, 2009 for a brief discussion). From a life 
course perspective, one could interpret lower coefficients at later transitions as a result 
of the older age (Müller and Karle, 1993). While younger individuals might be more 
dependent on their family, for older individuals more independence can be expected. 
Also resources which are important for inequalities in early educational transitions 
might become obsolete, such as cultural or parental economic resources (Bourdieu 
and Passeron, 1977). Re-enrollment as the latest possible transition would then be 
least affected by social origin. If this hypothesis holds true, policies ‘removing’ earlier 
institutional selectivity would lead to more independent decisions and hence equalize 
education. While this mechanism might be able to explain the waning coefficients 
pattern or findings on generally lower inequality in countries with less earlier 
selection, the findings of larger effects on later transitions in less selective countries 
(presented in chapter 3.2) cannot be explained with this mechanism. 
The selectivity mechanism on the other hand, which has already been 
discussed by Mare when he initially formulated the continuation ratio- or Mare-model 
(Mare, 1980), was since then repeatedly suggested as the reason for waning 
coefficients (e.g. Cameron and Heckman, 1998). Education systems pre-select the 
population of potential re-entrants – at differing degrees – and the patterns found in 
the previous chapter would be consistent with this explanation. If the higher effects of 
origin found in the US and Sweden are due to the lower selectivity of an open and 
flexible education system, the German system has to expect an increase in inequality 
in later educational transitions if the higher education system undergoes reforms 
towards de-institutionalization via more flexibility. 
An alternative interpretation of bias is endogeneity of later transitions to 
earlier decisions. This would be the case if the later enrollments are all a function of 
the same process which determines whether individuals enter the population at risk or 
not. In the scenario of delayed higher education, this could be the result of wrongly 
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assuming that educational choices are made with a short time horizon. If this 
assumption does not hold and the same process determines early and late enrollment, 
inequality in early transitions would be biased downwardly under settings allowing 
delayed entry while the inequality in the later stages would be an overestimate. It only 
occurs due to the process which has already taken place, but was determined to occur 
from the beginning. The results from chapter 3.2 point towards such a situation: the 
existing inequalities in higher education are explained fairly well by much earlier 
educational performance. In this case, coefficients could also be biased upwardly due 
to endogeneity. Inequality in the early transition out of the education system can 
predefine re-enrollment for some (presumably upper class) young adults and a 
permanent exit from education for others. Then, inequality actually occurs at this 
transition but only manifests later. In chapter 3.4 I discuss the consequences of this 
hypothesis and in chapter 4.1 I empirically test the assumptions using German survey 
data. 
 
3.3.3 Variables Possibly Causing Selectivity or Endogeneity: Academic 
Performance, Motivation, Aspiration, and More? 
In theory, if variables could be observed that are intermediate between social origin 
and the decision to re-enroll, we would be able to model the mechanisms for 
selectivity in each country and estimate their relative importance for the existence of 
social origin effects. If mainly selectivity is at work, variables truncated by earlier 
transitions should be able to explain more of the origin effects in flexible contexts and 
ideally, if all relevant variables would be perfectly measured in the model, the 
remaining class coefficients in the different country contexts would be equivalent. 
Obvious candidates for variables being presumably truncated in more selective 
systems are scholastic performance and motivation or aspiration for education. 
Mare (2011) discusses the dilemma of this approach: many of the variables 
causing selection at earlier transitions are outcomes of the family background. 
Variables such as ‘ability’ test scores or educational aspiration are at the same time 
mechanisms explaining the family background effects, as they are correlated with the 
selection rules. As a consequence, he raises the question whether it is always wise to 
control for these variables. Keeping them statistically constant results in estimates net 
of selection but also net of a mechanism explaining a part of the inequality. As Mare 
summarizes: ‘A blanket control for all unobserved variables is likely to over-control 
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for the effects of the treatment’ (Mare, 2011, p. 244). Conclusions would then be as 
difficult as without modeling selection on unobserved variables. The possibilities of 
statistical modeling is limited at this point by the nature of the situation (see also Xie, 
2011). 
 
System Characteristics and Selectivity 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the selectivity into the risk group of re-enrolling 
students can be the reason for any country differences. With regard to social origin 
effects, Holm and Jæger (2009) show that the countries vary in the grade to which 
social origin effects are biased by early selection. The same authors find that the 
effects are rather constant over the transitions, and show the waning pattern to a much 
lower degree than in the ordinary educational transition model, when accounting for 
selectivity (Holm and Jæger, 2009; Holm and Jæger, 2011). 
The case with strongest selectivity on the first transition into eligibility for 
higher education is Germany. Only a small share qualifies for higher education and 
class effects are already strong in even earlier selections. Hence, for the first step of 
selection the hypotheses for the system characteristics are straightforward: the strong 
selection in Germany reduces the origin effects that are observed on later stages, i.e. 
we should find the smallest class effects there and the highest in the US and Sweden. 
Sweden could stand somewhere in between, since selectivity of labor market entries 
instead of a direct transfer from secondary school to college is lower in the US. 
Furthermore, only after a longer phase of work the pre-selection is completely 
annulated in Sweden by the 25/4-rule. 
On the re-entry decision, again selection should attenuate the origin effects 
most in the German sample, since selection in the first step is so strong that the 
relatively low number of students who do not achieve higher education before their 
first labor market experiences should not be able to counterbalance this. 
Beyond the selection mechanism over transitions, the challenges in the case of 
a comparison between countries with regard to inequality throughout the educational 
career are even greater and other technical problems may occur. First, because the 
selection into the population at risk for re-enrollment occurs not in one but two steps. 
The group selecting into the sample by qualifying for higher education differs most 
likely in many respects from the group selecting into the labor market instead of a 
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straight enrollment in higher education. Second, because of the additional problems of 
comparing logit- or probit-coefficients over populations due to differing unobserved 
heterogeneity even with regard to non-confounding variables (Auspurg and Hinz, 
2011; Best and Wolf, 2010; Buis, 2011; Holm and Jæger, 2009; Mood, 2010). While 
this scaling-problem is indeed likely to affect the following probit models, the rather 
similar results based on predictions from the parametric models and the flexible 
parametric models in chapter 3.2, especially the comparison of median times, ensure 
me that the basic pattern exists independently from bias through different scaling. 
Although much effort has been invested, a final solution that could quiet all 
concerns seems impossible at the moment. In the following I will discuss different 
attempts of dealing with this question, namely detecting sample selection, observing 
and controlling variables measuring selection and modeling sample selection directly. 
In particular the recent special issue of the journal Research in Social Stratification 
and Mobility edited by Marten Buis (Volume 29, Issue 3: Unobserved Heterogeneity 
in Mare Models) is a helpful resource in this context. 
 
3.3.4 Selecting on Purpose in a Non-Selective Society 
For a qualitative comparative case studies the selective process can be illustrated 
graphically by imposing selection rules that are assumed to apply for the most 
restrictive societies on the least selective country cases, even though under yet other 
assumptions. This approach can only offer an illustration of the scope that different 
selectivity of earlier educational transitions might have, under the assumption that we 
know the criteria of the selection. The idea is simply to select a sample which, under 
several assumptions, would have been the selected group in e.g. the US if selectivity 
of the German system would be applied. This transfer can never be perfect and has a 
number of obvious problems; it is however a straightforward way to show the 
potential of selectivity if convincing criteria for purposive selection can be found. In 
the following, I will present several scenarios applying the selection rules as present 
in the very selective German case on the US.
16
 
The first scenario assumes that the selection occurs due to differences in 
cognitive performance. The NLSY79 includes ‘IQ’- or ‘cognitive performance-’test 
                                                 
16
 The reason for choosing the US is that a better set of variables being potentially able to explain 
selection is available in the NLSY79 dataset than in the Swedish LNU. 
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scores (afqt-scores). For checking whether the higher inequality of late entrants occurs 
due to a broader sample selected into the population at risk, I use these scores and 
select the upper same 30 percent who made the transition to eligibility in the GLHS 
sample. Obviously, the assumption that the selection in the German system is based 
on the type of cognitive performance being measured within the afqt-score is hard to 
justify, but this criterion can serve as a crude approximation for equalizing the 
selection rules over the countries. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.3: Achieving high school diploma or GED, direct transfer into higher education 
and the position within the distribution of afqt-percentiles. 
 
 
 
 
Note: X-axis represents the afqt-percentiles, range of the y-axis is 0, existing variation introduced 
randomly to improve visibility of the different educational careers pathways (data-points ‘jittered’). 
Data source: NLSY79, not weighted. 
 
 
 
As figure 3.3.3 shows, the transition patterns are highly correlated with the afqt-score. 
There are hardly any respondents below the afqt-median and making a direct 
transition into higher education (depicted as small +-signs). On the other hand, the 
vast majority of the young adults without a GED or high school diploma (depicted as 
small circles) are clearly below the median afqt-achievement. 
  
0 20 40 60 80 100
percentiles: afqt-score
HS/GED - no direct entry HS/GED - direct entry
no HS/GED
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Table 3.3.1: Class effects on re-enrollment in the US after imposing sample selection 
according to different scenarios of purposively selection. 
 
 
Scenario 1: 
selection on 
basis of afqt-
score as 
depicted above 
Scenario 2: 
selection by 
track in high 
school 
Scenario 3:  
selection by 
track in high 
school plus 
aspiration 
BASELINE:  
full model 
     
 service classes ref. cat.    
 intermediate 
classes 
-0.23 (-1.85) -0.10 (-0.88) -0.02 (-0.12) -0.20 (-2.33) 
 working classes -0.31 (-2.02) -0.22 (-1.63) -0.21 (-1.21) -0.29 (-3.12) 
     
N 627 845 531 2233 
Data source: NLSY79; own calculations, not weighted. 
 
 
 
This indicates how much the selection process in the US depends on the score as 
measured in the afqt-test. In table 3.3.1 the class coefficients, estimated within a 
sample selected according to this first scenario, are shown. The coefficients turn out 
to be almost identical with the probit coefficients of re-enrollment from the full 
sample in the same table below. Thus, there is no indication for strong selection from 
these test scores. 
In the second scenario I alter the selection rule. Instead of a threshold on a 
continuous variable, the criterion for selection into the sample is now the track in high 
school. This rule is probably the scenario which corresponds closest to the selection 
rules applying in Germany. Early selection in the secondary school system, which is 
nominally much less important in the US and Sweden, could still work in similar way 
through different channels. Results are reported in the second coefficient-column of 
table 3.3.1. The coefficients and z-values within this sample are again smaller and 
those young adults from the intermediate class of origin are almost identical in the 
probability of re-enrolling with those from the upper classes. 
In the third scenario I restrict the selection further on those who most 
strongly manifest their motivation towards higher education. This selection rule is 
likely to correspond to a context where upper class parents channel their offspring 
early towards the academic track to ensure status reproduction. Furthermore, this 
somewhat more restrictive rule may be better suited given the difficulty of measuring 
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high school track in the US via self-reports (Rosenbaum, 1980). In order to ensure 
capturing a population with a strong intention to realize a certain class position 
through education, I restrict the population to those young adults reporting a service 
class position as the desired occupation. As the third coefficient-column of table 3.3.1 
shows, applying this restriction reduces the coefficients further in size, especially for 
the intermediate classes. Even for the working classes, only non-significant 
differences to the service classes are left. This finding, even if one might not want to 
make too much out of it, can at least serve as a warning sign not to draw too strong 
conclusions from the country differences. Selection might change the story at least to 
some degree and the overall country differences would probably be smaller if all 
countries would be more selective. Further, selection on different variables results in 
completely different degrees of attenuation of the class coefficients. The strength of 
the impact on the coefficients strongly depends on which variable causes selection. 
 
3.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
While often doubts are left about measuring all variables of selectivity, it might still 
be possible to detect the vulnerability of the results against selectivity. Manski (1995) 
has suggested to start with worst case bounds assigning all censored observations into 
the treatment group for one bound, and doing the opposite (i.e. assigning all censored 
cases to the control group) for the other bound. For the case of students re-enrolling 
into postsecondary education, this leads to far too broad bounds, in particular for 
Germany where only a very small number qualifies for higher education. 
A more useful strategy for the context of sequential logit models of 
educational transitions is suggested by Buis (2011), who also implemented it in the 
statistical software Stata as part of the ‘seqlogit.ado’-package (Buis, 2007; Buis, 
2010). As a sensitivity analysis, this package allows estimating sequential logit model 
under different scenarios concerning the presence of an unobserved variable. Table 
3.3.2 reports the results of one out of many possible applications of this software for 
all of the three transitions and the three relevant country cases. For technical details, I 
refer to the respective publications; in particular Buis (2011). Apart from estimating 
different scenarios according to the effects of the unobserved variable over the 
transitions, the module allows specifying a functional form at which the unobserved 
variable is to be presented. In line with the illustrations above, I specified a uniform 
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distribution throughout which implies that the order of the elements causes selection, 
rather than the ‘real’ values according to a metric scale. In table 3.3.2, logit 
coefficients over various scenarios assuming differently strong effects of an 
unobserved variable are shown. The main interest lies on the third transition.  
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Table 3.3.2: Sensitivity analysis: the effect of a uniformly distributed standardized 
unobserved variable on all three transitions. 
 effect of a standardized variable on each of the three transitions: 
 
Reference: service classes 
0 
(baseline Mare 
logit model) 
0.2 0.5 1.0 
     
United States     
1
st
 transition: eligibility for higher education 
 intermediate classes -0.75 (3.96) -0.75 (3.96) -0.77 (-3.96) -0.80 (-3.97) 
 working classes -1.28 (-6.90) -1.29 (-6.90) -1.31 (-6.90) -1.39 (-6.92) 
2
nd
 transition: not entering higher education directly 
 intermediate classes 0.98 (4.92) 0.98 (4.90) 0.99 (4.85) 1.00 (4.68) 
 working classes 2.18 (6.35) 2.18 (6.34) 2.19 (6.30) 2.19 (6.15) 
3
rd
 transition: re-entering postsecondary education 
 intermediate classes -0.29 (-1.99) -0.29 (-1.98) -0.29 (-1.96) -0.31 (-1.92) 
 working classes -0.42 (-2.66) -0.42 (-2.67) -0.44 (-2.69) -0.48 (-2.74) 
     
Germany     
1
st
 transition: eligibility for higher education 
 intermediate classes -1.27 (-11.70) -1.28 (-11.70) -1.34 (-11.71) -1.54 (11.74) 
 working classes -2.17 (-10.91) -2.19 (-10.93) -2.28 (-11.07) -2.57 (-11.48) 
2
nd
 transition: not entering higher education directly 
 intermediate classes 0.55 (3.18) 0.54 (3.11) 0.50 (2.79) 0.37 (1.86) 
 working classes 0.22 (0.59) 0.20 (0.55) 0.13 (0.33) -0.12 (-0.28) 
3
rd
 transition: re-entering postsecondary education 
 intermediate classes -0.22 (-1.01) -0.24 (-1.04) -0.28 (-1.18) -0.39 (-1.56) 
 working classes 0.27 (0.54) 0.25 (0.51) 0.19 (0.37) 0.01 (0.02) 
     
Sweden     
1
st
 transition: eligibility for higher education 
 intermediate classes -1.02 (-7.61) -1.03 (-7.61) -1.08 (-7.62) -1.23 (-7.63) 
 working classes -1.40 (-10.93) -1.41 (-10.93) -1.47 (-10.96) -1.69 (-11.04) 
2
nd
 transition: not entering higher education directly 
 intermediate classes 0.74 (3.40) 0.73 (3.36) 0.71 (3.14) 0.63 (2.49) 
 working classes 1.10 (4.90) 1.09 (4.84) 1.06 (4.57) 0.96 (3.71) 
3
rd
 transition: re-entering postsecondary education 
 intermediate classes -0.58 (-2.50) -0.59 (-2.52) -0.63 (-2.61) -0.76 (-2.84) 
 working classes -0.84 (-3.90) -0.86 (-3.93) -0.92 (-4.06) -1.11 (-4.44) 
     
Data sources: NLSY79, GLHS 64/71, LNU 91/2000; own calculations, not weighted. 
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Looking at the third transition, which is re-enrolment, the result shows that both the 
working classes and the intermediate classes are much more affected by such a 
scenario in Germany than in the US. The US coefficients hardly change over the 
strength of the unobserved variable, while the consequences for the German sample 
are somewhat stronger. However, this also applies to the least selective Swedish 
system. Particularly strong is the distortion on the first transition – again for all of the 
three contexts.  
Overall, the results from the scenarios estimated do not change the central 
conclusion within any of the contexts, but point towards some attenuation of later 
coefficients in particular for Sweden. The conclusion, that inequality in the German 
context is not present remains even in the scenario with high values for the effect of 
an unobserved variable, and Sweden remains the context with the highest inequality 
in re-enrollment. For the hypothesis that the higher values are produced by the non-
selectivity of the systems in the US and Sweden, this is negative evidence. I would 
have expected that the German coefficients change considerably more, and especially 
that the last transition – back from work to school – is affected most. 
 
3.3.6 Modeling Sample Selection 
Contrary to the approach suggested by Buis, which was applied in the last paragraphs, 
most researchers dealing with the problem follow the strategy of modeling the 
distortion of coefficients by estimating the influence of an unobserved variable under 
strong assumptions. Modeling sample selection has been a major concern to 
econometricians for decades and also entered the debate on the development of 
inequality throughout educational transitions. A number of statistical techniques have 
been proposed to correct for selection, all of them relying on strong assumptions. In 
sum, either an instrumental variable (exclusion restriction) is needed, what is hard to 
justify for a chain of such similar process as the sequential entry into more education. 
Or strong distributional assumptions are required (Cameron and Heckman, 1998)
17
. 
Both of these broad strategies for modeling sample selection have recently 
been used to deal with similar problems in education transition research. Modeling 
                                                 
17
 The solution Cameron and Heckman suggested first is an ordinal choice model and leads, according 
to a simulation by Tam, to stable and valid results if applied on large datasets (Tam, 2011) As an 
ordinal choice model does not describe the process of re-entering appropriately, I will follow a 
different strategy. 
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selection based on distribution assumptions was suggested e.g. by Holm and Jæger 
(2011). Applying bivariate probit models over two transitions, the authors seek to 
model unobserved heterogeneity based on the assumption of a bivariate normal 
distribution of an unobservable variables. The bivariate normal probit model can be 
extended to multivariate probit models for more than two regression equations with a 
binary outcome. The estimation relies on multivariate normal probabilities and is 
performed by simulated maximum likelihood (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006; Greene, 
2008, pp. 582-83)
18
. In principle, this strategy might enable to model the two 
transitions out of the education system and back into it simultaneously. Setting up the 
models in Stata is made a great deal easier by the cmp-command (Roodman, 2011). In 
comparison to the original Mare-model and the approach suggested by Buis, this 
solution needs to rely on probit- instead of logit-models due to the non-existence of a 
multivariate logistic distribution. 
Both, identification through an exclusion restriction as well as through 
distributional assumptions are possible. If the size of the datasets allows estimation, I 
will apply both strategies in the following. This serves as a documentation of their 
outcomes and as an attempt to illustrate the rather unclear nature of selection 
remaining after usage of these approaches. Further, by showing that the basic results 
remain stable after this additional check I want to indicate robustness of my findings 
from chapter 3.2. Estimating the models, however, was accompanied by several 
problems. In addition, for Germany the very demanding condition of a very strong 
selection on both of the first transitions might be problematic. Since the modeling 
strategies are all prone to error and the number of cases is small for estimation, I will 
not spend much space on this analysis.  
Avoiding the assumption of a multivariate normal distribution is only 
possible when identifying the multivariate probit model by way of an exclusion 
restriction approach for certain transitions. Even though justifying the choice of an 
exclusion restriction is equally difficult as justifying the multivariate normal 
distribution, this strategy is sometimes followed in research on educational inequality 
(e.g. Bernardi, 2011). The problematic prerequisite for a variable which serves as 
exclusion restriction is that it must cause the earlier transition but be unrelated to the 
second one. Bernardi suggested using the local rate of probability for entering the 
                                                 
18
 The estimation employs the implementation on the Monte Carlo method of Geweke, Hajivassiliou, 
and Keane (GHK) (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2006) 
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population at risk. I followed this approach for the first transition and use the rate of 
eligible students available for given geographical conditions. Rather than states, I 
have to rely on broader geographical conditions since information on the states are not 
always available for Sweden and the US. For the US, I refer to the south/non-south or 
foreign residence in youth crossed with the criterion of urban or rural residence at the 
same age. The same strategy is applied for Sweden, where I use the direct 
qualification rate of rural, urban or foreign birthplaces. For Germany I take the 
respective rate on the state-level (Bundesländer). 
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Table 3.3.3: Class coefficient from a multivariate probit model. 
 
 
 
 
Reference: service classes 
no exclusion 
restriction 
exclusion 
restriction: 
geographical 
elig. rate  
incl. grades / 
test scores, 
no excl. 
restriction  
incl. grades / 
test scores, 
excl. 
restriction 
Baseline 
Mare-model 
in probit 
form, no test 
scores 
      
United States      
1st transition: eligibility for higher education 
 intermediate classes -0.36 (-3.81) -0.34 (-3.55) -0.07 (-0.72) -0.07 (-0.68) -0.35 (-3.68) 
 working classes -0.62 (-6.46) -0.59 (-6.23) -0.12 (-1.11) -0.11 (-1.09) -0.60 (-6.26) 
2nd transition: not entering higher education directly 
 intermediate classes 0.51 (4.52) 0.53 (5.34) 0.65 (3.87) 0.30 (2.70) 0.50 (4.98) 
 working classes 1.01 (5.55) 1.05 (7.26) 0.30 (2.69) 0.65 (3.84) 1.00 (6.74)  
3rd transition: re-entering postsecondary education 
 intermediate classes -0.11 (-0.91) -0.01 (-0.11) -0.05 (-0.70) -0.06 (-0.76) -0.20 (-2.33) 
 working classes -0.16 (-0.82) 0.03 (0.20) -0.00 (-0.05) -0.01 (-0.12) -0.29 (-3.12) 
rho 1st and 2nd  0.59 0.60 0.68 0.61 - 
rho 1st and 3rd  -0.23 -0.82 -0.94 -0.95 - 
rho 2nd and 3rd  -0.01 -0.32 -0.50 -0.42 - 
      
Germany      
1st transition: eligibility for higher education 
 intermediate classes -0.77 (-
11.62) 
-0.78 (-11.6) collinear w. 
GPA 
collinear w. 
GPA 
-0.74 (-11.5) 
 working classes -1.23 (-11.7) -1.21 (-10.9) coll. w. GPA coll. w. GPA -1.16 (-11.2) 
2nd transition: not entering higher education directly 
 intermediate classes 0.34 (2.09) 0.45 (2.37) 0.31 (2.83) 0.30 (2.74) 0.31 (2.83) 
 working classes 0.12 (0.39) 0.33 (0.87) 0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.02) 0.06 (0.24) 
3rd transition: re-entering postsecondary education 
 intermediate classes -0.13 (-0.33) 0.22 (0.82) -0.25 (-2.26) -0.25 (-2.27) -0.11 (-0.74) 
 working classes 0.20 (0.33) 0.71 (1.77) 0.15 (0.59) 0.14 (0.56) -0.14 (-1.32) 
rho 1st and 2nd  -0.06 (-0.10) 0.18 -1.0 -1.0 - 
rho 1st and 3rd  -0.03 (-0.05) -0.62 X X - 
rho 2nd and 3rd  0.01 (0.06) -0.23 X X - 
      
Sweden      
1st transition: eligibility for higher education 
 intermediate classes -0.61 (-7.43) -0.56 (-6.69) -0.61 (-7.44) -0.55 (-6.69) -0.56 (-6.71) 
 working classes -0.83 (-
10.69) 
-0.79 (-
10.10) 
-0.82 (-
10.65) 
-0.79 (-
10.09) 
-0.80 (-10.1) 
2nd transition: not entering higher education directly 
 intermediate classes 0.37 (1.55) 0.45 (1.91) 0.31 (1.51) 0.39 (2.90) 0.45 (3.44) 
 working classes 0.56 (1.76) 0.63 (2.05) 0.41 (1.58) 0.56 (3.74) 0.66 (4.98) 
3rd transition: re-entering postsecondary education 
 intermediate classes -0.15 (-0.46) -0.51 (-2.23) -0.36 (-2.22) -0.03 (-0.18) -0.35 (-2.43) 
 working classes -0.26 (-0.61) -0.75 (-2.67) -0.55 (-3.12) -0.09 (-0.55) -0.55 (-4.06) 
rho 1st and 2nd  0.89 -0.03 -0.24 0.83 - 
rho 1st and 3rd  0.03 0.44 0.15 -0.18 - 
rho 2nd and 3rd  0.20 0.53 0.09 -0.13 - 
      
Data sources: NLSY79, GLHS 64/71, LNU 91/2000; own calculations, not weighted.  
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Results of this analysis are documented in short form in table 3.3.3. The furthest right 
column contains the baseline Mare-model in probit formulation. In the first 
coefficient-column from the left, the coefficients of a model ‘correcting’ for selection 
bias on the transitions without exclusion restriction are reported. In the second column 
the same model applying an exclusion restriction is shown. For the US, the results on 
the third transition show that the baseline model-coefficients are overestimates, which 
is in line with the selection hypothesis.  
For Germany, results are highly inconsistent between the techniques. 
Nevertheless, one core result of chapter 3.2 is confirmed: inequality on the third 
transition back to school is small or does not exist. How ambiguous the results of such 
models can be is best illustrated by the Swedish example. When following the 
distribution assumption approach, the uncorrected Mare-probit-coefficients would be 
an overestimate of the ‘true’ coefficients. When specifying an exclusion restriction, 
the opposite would be true: the baseline model would appear to be an underestimate. 
Hence, there is not too much that can be learned from these results but the conclusion 
that certain questions might not be solved at the moment and no robust statistical 
result could be achieved.  
In the third and fourth column from the left, the former models (column one 
and two in table 3.3.3) are repeated including controls for the scholastic performance 
as in chapter 3.2. The differing quality of the measures makes the models impossible 
to directly compare coefficients between countries. There is, however, an interesting 
finding from these coefficients too. The models confirm the story from chapter 3.2 
that early characteristics are able to explain away later inequality rather well, 
irrespective of the selectivity as modeled here. This confirms the role of earlier 
educational achievements for late inequality again. The only exception is the Swedish 
model without exclusion restriction (third column). Here, the class coefficients turn 
out quite large for the last transition, in spite of the control for secondary school track.  
Even though inconsistent, the values of rho are overall rather high. This is 
interesting, as it indicates that inequality in the different transitions is to a large degree 
influenced by the same variables.  
 
 
In conclusion, and in line with the discussions of Mare (2011) and Xie 
(2011) on the limitations of statistical modeling, the effects of selection on the size of 
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inequality in different transitions could not be fully evaluated. Selecting on 
observables and several sensitivity analyses have shown that the country comparison 
can be affected by differing selectivity. Overall, the hypothesis that reducing 
selectivity on early stages could go along with increased inequality in later education 
still seems reasonable, but a hard test for it failed. On the one hand, restricting the 
sample of a non-selective context by observables as well as the sensitivity analysis 
suggested by Buis both point towards this direction. On the other hand, country 
differences remain after such tests and all of the central results of chapter 3.2 could be 
confirmed. The different strategies for modeling sample selection resulted in different, 
if not inconclusive results. Therefore, such studies relying on one of the two modeling 
approaches should be interpreted cautiously. 
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3.4 The Second Chance as a Second Best Chance? Inequality in 
Pathways Through Higher Education as a Result of 
Equalization Through Second Chance Education 
 
 
 
 
Inevitably, late entry into education has the consequence of a delayed educational 
achievement. This chapter turns the perspective from inequality in re-entry, to 
inequalities in educational career patterns. First, I discuss in what way educational 
career patterns result from individual decisions and transitions. This illustration has 
the aim of showing that inequality in delay of education can be both, the result of high 
inequality within initial entry into higher education and of low inequality in re-
enrollment. Second, I present several different measures for the degree of 
differentiation in educational timing patterns. The results show that the flexible 
educational systems with attractive options for non-traditional students have a 
somewhat higher inequality in educational career patterns. 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters I have discussed analyses showing inequalities which are 
persistent throughout the life course. These late inequalities were stronger in societies 
with an open and flexible education system. The following descriptive country 
comparison asks about one specific consequence of late entries: the diversification 
and des-standardization of the overall pattern of educational careers with regard to 
inequality in the way of achieving postsecondary and higher education.  
This chapter will discuss inequality in entire pathways between students from 
different origins. It is a logical consequence of later (re-)entry into education that 
those opting for a second chance will complete their education at a later stage of their 
biography. As trivial as this statement seems to be, the sometimes overwhelmingly 
positive assessment of ‘lifelong learning’ discussed at the outset of chapter 3.1, 
ignores the consequence of delayed achievement mostly. Interference of education 
with other biographical events – e.g. family formation – is just one likely consequence 
of entering higher education in more mature age. Although there is evidence that 
graduates who delayed their education can realize returns to their studies (Hällsten, 
2011), it goes without saying that the period in which returns can be realized is shorter 
(cf. section 5 of this volume). Another evitable consequence of second chance 
education is de-standardization in educational careers among graduates from 
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postsecondary programs. Inevitably, if second chances are offered for improving the 
chances of lower-class students, this results in a higher probability for them to become 
non-traditional students. As a consequence, a new line of inequality could be timing 
of education. This chapter illustrates the connection between the frequency of late 
enrollment and empirically compare the stage of de-standadization by social origins 
for all three comparison countries. 
Is the broader availability of higher education linked to frequent detours, 
delays or interruptions of lower-class students? Do working class students, even when 
achieving eventually the same final level of education, less often take the ‘royal 
road’? Although institutional conditions can be expected to be important pre-
conditions for the existence of such a pattern of delaying lower class children, 
comparative research on these questions is rare. The aim of this chapter is a 
comparison of social origin effects on the educational career pattern in the three 
countries being studied in this volume, the US, Germany and Sweden. First, I will 
discuss some conceptual issues on the relation between transitions into educational 
programs and timing patterns. This is complemented by a more systematic approach 
in the Appendix. Second, the chapter describes inequality in the emerging patterns of 
higher education careers in the three societies using different methodological 
approaches. Finally, I discuss some implications of this analysis. 
Non-traditional patterns through higher education, such as late re-enrollment 
after an initial phase of work, vocational training or motherhood occur in all societies, 
but differ in frequency. Previous studies for Germany (Jacob, 2004; Jacob and Weiss, 
2010b) and the US (Elman and O'Rand, 2007; Jacob and Weiss, 2011; Milesi, 2010) 
revealed that in particular lower class offspring follow non-traditional entry routes 
and take ‘educational detours’. For Germany, this finding is stable over a series of 
cohorts of 20 years (Jacob and Weiss, 2010b). 
 
3.4.1 An Illustration of the Link between Career Transitions and Career 
Patterns 
Intuitively, one would expect that upper class individuals, who re-enroll more often, 
are in consequence the ones who have to accept a ‘time penalty’ if they achieve the 
same level of education. However, this is not necessarily the case. If the direct 
transition rates of disadvantaged students into higher education are small, they can 
still be overrepresented among the delayers in spite of the non-enrollers. For 
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disentangling this circumstance, a sequence of possible transitions into college has to 
be regarded simultaneously (see Hillmert and Jacob, 2010 for a similar argument). A 
short visual illustration seems to be helpful before continuing (Appendix A3.4 
illustrates this matter in more technical detail). For the sake of simplicity, only two 
transitions are regarded and illustrated in the tree diagram below (figure 3.4.1): from 
secondary education to either the labor market or education and from the labor market 
back into education
19
. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.1: Transition tree: direct and indirect entry into higher education. 
 
 
 
 
In order to assess the timing advantage, group ‘B’ and group ‘C’ have to be 
compared. The share of students delaying higher education – 
 
     
  – shows the 
amount to which absence from higher education is turned into delay. The pre-
requisites for a situation where this share is high within a certain group are 
- that there is high initial absence from higher education (i.e. 1-p1 is large) and 
- that this is reduced through a high number of re-enrollments (i.e. p2 is large).  
The dependence of students’ educational career structure on the interaction between 
the two transitions is illustrated in the Appendix to this chapter, in particular in figure 
3.4.8.  
Figure 3.4.2 describes the situation for the three comparison countries. The 
ordinate denotes the share of late entrants among all entrants into higher education – 
 
     
 – which is a very simple measure for inequality in college-timing. The abscissa 
denotes the probability of re-enrollment into higher education. In this case, rather 
                                                 
19
 Multiple interruptions and college drop-outs are ignored for the moment. 
1-p1 
p2 
p1se
cond
ary 
scho
ol 
1-p2 
qualified for higher 
education 
B: entering higher 
education 
A: entering other 
activity than higher 
education 
D: not entering 
higher education 
C: entering higher 
education later 
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higher education is the focus and not postsecondary education in general, since the 
flexibilization-debate (e.g. the debate about the Bologna-reforms) focuses on this sub-
system. Which group of students will now lag behind in their pathways through the 
educational system depends both on the values of p1 and p2. If for a given group the 
value of p1 is very high – even if all students re-enroll – only a small minority ((1-
p1)*p2) will be ‘non-traditional’ students. The curves show 
 
     
 for two different 
classes of origin resulting for certain empirically given levels
20
 of inequality in p1 at 
any value of p2. For each country, the upper curve stands for the working classes and 
the lower curve for the service classes. The diamond-markers show the empirical 
combination of p1 and p2 – and the resulting inequality in delay – for each group. 
Moving the markers along the curves shows the change of inequality in timing if the 
problem of overall inequality is solved to a specific degree by second chances, 
keeping p1 constant at its empirical level for a given group. The square-markers 
indicate the hypothetical re-entry rate (Hp2) that would be needed to completely 
equalize inequalities in direct college entry by re-enrollments. Although I am aware 
that complete equalization is unrealistic and will most often not be the aim of policies, 
I choose this to illustrate the technical connection between the two different 
probabilities. 
 
  
                                                 
20
 The empirical values of p1 are defined as ‘transferring directly into higher education after qualifying 
for it and staying on until completion of a degree’. For the US, the rate of transfer into four year 
colleges is used, in Sweden and Germany all full programs of higher education are included. 
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Figure 3.4.2: Share of late entrants among students in Sweden, Germany and the US for 
working and service classes. 
 
 
Data sources: NLSY79; GLHS 64/71; LNU91/00; own calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.2 shows that within the inflexible German system (with low p1) only in the 
case of a very high share of re-entrants (i.e. p2 close to being 1), delay becomes an 
important dimension of inequality (as indicated by the vertical distance between the 
diamond-marker on the lower solid line and the square-marker on the upper solid 
line). In comparison to that, Sweden – with a moderately higher value of (1-p1) – has 
already a much higher share of delayers among all students. For the US, the most 
extreme case in terms of low direct transfer rates, there is a high rate of inequality in 
timing even though the chances to re-enter education are lower for the working 
classes than for the service classes. Under low direct transition rates (p1) into higher 
education for one or both groups, compensating inequality even by a small degree 
through second chance education results in inequality in timing. In figure 3.4.2 this is 
illustrated by the stronger curvature of the lines under the condition of large (1-p1), 
e.g. in the US. In the US, where the amount of re-entering students outnumbers direct 
entrants, there is a disadvantage pattern in all aspects: working class children do not 
transfer directly more often, re-enroll later less often, and nevertheless have a higher 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
la
te
 e
n
tr
an
ts
/a
ll
 e
n
tr
an
ts
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
probability of re-enrollment
GER working p1:0.42
GER service p1:0.46
SE working p1:0.15
SE service p1:0.34
US working p1:0.02
US service p1:0.12
3 .  Late  Educat ional  In equal i ty  in  Co mparat i ve  Persp ec t ive  
182 
 
probability of a non-standard educational career if they complete a degree. In Sweden, 
the situation is less extreme. Both groups take detours at about the same rate, due to 
the high number of re-entrants among the service class children. Germany – as the 
least flexible system – shows less inequality on that level of the educational career. In 
this country context, detours are taken by service class children somewhat more often. 
The square-markers show that equalizing access to education through second chances 
would introduce inequality in the timing and standardization of education in all three 
countries at quite a high degree (i.e. large distances on the vertical dimension). 
Furthermore, they show that extremely high values of re-enrollment by lower class 
offspring would be needed for equalization (i.e. large values for the service classes on 
the abscissa) – at given constant rates of p1 for the service classes! 
Beyond illustrating the link between re-enrollment rates and inequality in 
educational career timing, this graph shows how unlikely it is that re-enrollment will 
contribute to a mass-equalization of postsecondary education. Direct entry rates seem 
to be the more powerful gateway to equalize education: 
- First, because they avoid new inequalities linked to delayed education to 
lower persistency rates and differing rates of returns for late entrants (see 
section 5). 
- Second, since remaining upper class students are more likely to re-enroll 
than working class children who opt out early from the education system. 
Therefore, inequality might even be increased. 
- Third, since inequality in the first transition conditions the leverage that a 
moderate level of re-entrants can contribute to equalization in education. 
- Fourth, since the first transition p1 also influences the leverage which re-
enrollment rate has on the inequality in higher education. 
It seems important to keep in mind these compositional preconditions when looking 
‘backward’ on sequences of educational careers. In the following, I will describe more 
carefully the levels of inequality in educational career patterns for those who actually 
go to school. As the main arguments on the role of institutions centers around the 
higher education system, I will focus on students entering or completing education 
within this sub-system. 
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3.4.2 Empirical Inequality in Educational Career Patterns 
Again – as discussed in chapter 2.4 – several more holistic approaches are available 
for the analyses of entire educational career sequences. A very detailed approach for 
each country, as e.g. Adelmans toolbox-studies for the US (Adelman, Daniel and 
Berkovits, 2003; Adelman, 1999; Adelman, 2004; Adelman, 2006), would require 
much information and makes a comparison more difficult. Therefore, I apply an 
approach which is somewhat more abstract and disregards the several concrete 
aspects of the single education systems. The empirical question is whether class 
inequality in the degree of de-standardization of educational career patterns, which 
lead to the same outcome, differ between country contexts. 
First, I will document the differences in work experience before graduation 
by class, which is a simple metric for comparing the degree of interruption within 
educational careers. Second, for a more elaborate description, I compare sequences 
using the sequence analyses techniques introduced in 2.4.: comparing each sequence 
based on an optimal metric to the ‘ideal’ career trajectory. The measure must be able 
to capture ‘timing’ or ‘complexity’ of educational attainment – instead of the 
‘diversity’, e.g. in institutional types of higher education. I therefore distinguish only 
two states of the life course: ‘higher education’ and ‘other activities’21. Only military 
service is ignored and cut out of the sequences, as it is a compulsory activity for most 
German men of the cohorts I study. The datasets used and the analysis samples are the 
same as in the previous chapter: the NLSY79 for the US, the GLHS for Germany and 
the LNU for Sweden. 
3.4.3 Work Experience before Graduation 
One of the consequences of the intermittence of higher education with work is the 
considerable amount of work experience that graduates sometimes have accumulated 
when entering the labor market after completion of higher education. An assessment 
of the consequences of this circumstance for the labor market entry will be subject to 
                                                 
21
 Only two states are distinguished - studying and not studying - and all life courses are left censored 
below the age of 18 and above the age of 32. In the empirical operationalization of these two events, I 
regard for Germany both apprenticeship and being enrolled in higher education as ‘being in education’. 
For the US, I have defined participation in education according to the NLSY definition of being 
enrolled in ‘regular school’ after receiving a high school degree or GED. This encompasses 
junior/community colleges and 4-year colleges/universities. For Sweden, all postsecondary education 
phases being reported retrospectively in the LNU were included. First and last exit (until age 34) from 
education are reconstructed by the first three months or a longer period of not being in education. 
Entering the labor market is defined by any work of more than 25 hours per week. 
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section 5. Fulltime work experience (without being enrolled in parallel!) before 
graduation also characterizes the educational career. It shows, in how far education 
was the dominant activity before entering the work career, or if and to what extent 
labor force participation was also important. Figure 3.4.3 shows the distributions of 
the number of months of work experience prior to graduation by social origin in all 
three countries. The distributions are presented as kernel smoothed line plots with a 
band-with of 12 months. 
In all three countries, lower class students gather more work experience 
before graduation. Social class differences in the amount of work experience are 
strongest in Sweden, but also exist in the US and to a lower extent in Germany. This 
suggests that non-traditional careers are more frequent among lower-class than among 
upper-class students. But it shows too that lower class students have already gathered 
more work experience when entering the labor market after graduation. From this 
finding, more careful analyses of the higher education to work transition can be 
motivated. For graduates, this work experience could be a useful resource in the job 
search process and the early career. In consequence, lower class children might be 
able to compensate other disadvantages by their work experience. For the present 
purpose, however, the amount of work experience is only one dimension of de-
standardization of educational careers. The measure is still simplified to a great deal 
and disregards several other aspects of the participation patterns in education. 
Therefore, I will go further on by comparing young adults from different social class 
origins on measures which combine more different dimensions of the educational 
career pattern. 
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Figure 3.4.3: What happens between entries into the labor market? Distributions of work 
experience before graduation by class of origin – only those individuals 
interrupting education. 
Germany 
  Mean N 
service classes: 25.9 118 
interm. classes: 28.5 148 
working classes: 22.3 19 
 
 
Sweden 
  Mean N 
service classes: 59.7 144 
interm. classes: 48.8 74 
working classes: 77.9 69 
United States 
  Mean N 
service classes: 33.7 169 
interm. classes: 38.1 329 
working classes: 38.3 57 
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The gap between the first and last transition from education to work for those who do 
interrupt, i.e. the time between the first work experience and leaving the educational 
system for good, shows another aspect of educational career timing. It shows the 
duration of the ‘transition phase from school to work’. Conditional on having an 
interruption within the educational career, the time between the two labor market 
entries specifies the extension of the school-to-work transition. The results for this 
aspect of educational career timing are shown in table 3.4.1. Class differences are 
very strong with regard to this measure. The overall pattern is similar in all contexts: 
students from lower social origins have remarkably longer gaps between the two 
events. The values are smallest in the US, where interruptions before higher education 
are most common. A statistical comparison of the countries is problematic due to the 
few working class students who graduate from higher education in all three contexts. 
A further problem for the comparison is that educational programs have different 
durations. Gaps in the German system are spent mostly in education due to the 
comparatively long study programs. This fact also limits the possibility for class 
differences, since the long time-period for the second phase of studies applies to 
everybody. In Sweden and the US, the share of time spent out of education is higher 
and having more than one transition from school to work is much more common, as 
already shown in section 2. Despite the small number of working class graduates, 
inequality in de-standardization according to this measure is highest in Sweden – in 
particular since the service classes have rather short gaps. In the US, inequality is 
somewhat lower since the service classes – as well as the other classes – have a longer 
phase of transition. 
 
Table 3.4.1: Gap between first and last transition from school to work in months for those 
visiting the most selective track of the educational system – individuals 
interrupting education. 
Germany 
 
visited university: 
- service classes: 24.6  
- intermediate classes: 36.9 
- working classes: 44.2  
 
United States 
 
visited 4-year college: 
- service classes: 64.3  
- intermediate classes: 66.8  
- working classes: 74.7  
Sweden 
 
visited university: 
- service classes: 45.9 
- intermediate classes: 58.8 
- working classes: 87.2 
 
 
 
Although showing class differences in educational career structures, this indicator is 
yet another single aspect of inequality in educational career patterns only. A more 
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refined measure of the degree to which educational careers are ‘non-traditional’ for all 
graduates also has to consider how the time between events is spent. A measure 
combining timing and events in capturing the deviation of educational careers from 
the national norm has already been discussed in chapter 2.4: the optimal matching 
(OM) distance to the ‘direct career path’ within a given educational system. 
 
3.4.4 Inequalities in the Patterns of Higher Educational Careers among 
Graduates 
In the following, the optimal matching distance to the direct pathway is applied in 
order to describe in how far the career patterns of young adults coming from different 
class backgrounds correspond with the most ‘straightforward’ career in each country. 
The measure is based on each individual’s optimal matching distance to this ‘direct’ 
career (see chapter 2.4). The values are standardized on the maximal possible distance 
in the given society, since the a priori range for distances differs according to the 
different reference sequences. In figures 3.4.4 to 3.4.6 I report the mean of the 
distance by social origins for each country and for typical educational outcomes and 
illustrate their distribution using the respective kernel density estimates. It turns out 
that the full range of the measure normally lies between 0 and 0.5, where 0 means that 
a sequence is identical with the ideal career path. This shall be kept in mind when 
interpreting generally rather small class differences. 
  
3 .  Late  Educat ional  In equal i ty  in  Co mparat i ve  Persp ec t ive  
188 
 
Figure 3.4.4: Distances to a direct educational career, Germany. 
a. all graduates from higher 
education 
b. graduates visited 
Fachhochschule 
c. graduates visited university 
   
 
 service classes  intermediate classes working classes 
  
 
   N 
service classes 0.25 228 
intermediate classes 0.25 172 
lower classes 0.27 66 
 
total N   466 
 
 
   N 
service classes 0.25 73 
intermediate classes 0.23 84 
lower classes 0.23 37 
 
total N   194 
 
 
   N 
service classes 0.24 168 
intermediate classes 0.27 104 
lower classes 0.28 33 
 
total N   305 
 
 
 
 
For Germany, I selected three groups by their educational attainment. Only students 
obtaining a degree are considered, since drop-outs are rare compared to the US and 
Sweden. The left plot includes all students and shows that the majority of graduates 
from higher education achieve their degree on the direct path, while all classes 
contribute somewhat to the more complex educational career patterns. The small peak 
on the right hand of the distribution is attributable to a German particularity: most 
young adults who interrupt their striving for higher education have to complete 
vocational training before entering the labor market, and hence have to accept longer 
detours compared – for instance – to labor market entrants with a high school diploma 
in the US. This pattern occurs somewhat more frequently among lower-class children. 
Due to the small number of cases, splitting up the groups into institutional 
tracks must be seen as a preliminary analysis. It gives an interesting hint: in column b. 
and c. of table 3.4.4, the curves differentiate much more by class than in the first 
column. There is class inequality among university-graduates, but not among 
Fachhochschul-graduates. Inequality is strongest in the most selective track – and is 
reversed in the lower track where lower classes are progressing somewhat more 
directly to their degrees. 
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In the US, the distribution is bi-modal, which indicates that a dichotomy of 
interrupters and non-interrupters would suffice for describing the situation well 
(figure 3.4.5, column c.). Most students graduating do so via a comparatively direct 
pathway through college, which is a result of the known low probabilities of 
completion of non-traditional students in the US (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005; Roksa 
and Velez, 2012). When looking at graduates with a Bachelor-degree, inequality in 
the timing patterns is not very large. In the left column, where all students with a 
B.A.-degree are pooled, most students, regardless of their class origin, center on the 
left part of the distribution. There is, however, a difference between classes in the 
number of outliers at the right tail of the distribution. Here I observe a clear inequality 
pattern. The working class students achieve their degree most often through non-
traditional pathways; the service class students least often. On the right tail of the 
distribution above a value of 0.4, there are almost only students from the two lower 
class-categories. Thus, the rare case of completing higher education on a non-
traditional way occurs much more often among graduates from lower social origins. 
 
Figure 3.4.5: Distances to a direct educational career, United States. 
a. all B.A.-degrees b. community college: B.A.-
degree 
c. attended any higher 
education 
   
 
 service classes  intermediate classes working classes 
  
 
   N 
service classes 0.17 425 
intermediate classes 0.18 235 
lower classes 0.20 113 
 
total N   773 
 
   N 
service classes 0.19 133 
intermediate classes 0.24 74 
lower classes 0.22 51 
 
total N   258 
 
   N 
service classes 0.24 392 
intermediate classes 0.30 411 
lower classes 0.34 292 
 
total N   1095 
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Plot b. in figure 3.4.5 shows the same comparison between classes of origin for 
students visiting a community college during their educational career. In this case, the 
class differences are somewhat more pronounced. As in the German sample, direct 
pathways are even more frequent among the working classes than among the service 
and the intermediate classes. At the same time the number of outliers to the right is 
somewhat higher among the lower classes. 
Incomplete higher education frequently occurs in the US – in particular 
among non-traditional students. Leaving out this group limits the description to a very 
selective sample: those who manage to complete a degree in spite of a late entry. 
Therefore, I repeat the analysis in plot c. on the right of figure 3.4.5, including all 
those students ever entering higher education. This changes the picture completely: 
the mode of the distribution is shifted to the right – to a pattern that deviates strongly 
from the reference sequence. As, however, drop-outs can deviate due to the fact that 
they drop out and not only due to interruptions, this analysis mixes more different 
sources of deviation. The mean values are now very much in favor of the service 
classes. This, however, is most likely fueled by a higher number of drop-outs and only 
partly due to a larger degree of ‘career-complexity’ of working class Americans. For a 
characterization of the role of late education for inequality, high drop-out rates of late 
entrants reported by previous research should be taken into account. If the rate of non-
traditional students completing a Bachelor-degree could be increased, the class-
inequality in the educational careers to higher education degrees would probably 
increase as well, since a part of the inequality in plot c. would be ‘included’ into plot 
b. 
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Figure 3.4.6: Distances to a direct educational career, Sweden. 
a. obtaining degree b. attending higher education 
  
 
 service classes  intermediate classes working classes 
  
 
   N 
service classes 0.26 88 
intermediate classes 0.28 28 
lower classes 0.25 22 
 
total N   138 
 
   N 
service classes 0.22 154 
intermediate classes 0.24 39 
lower classes 0.28 32 
 
total N   225 
 
 
 
In Sweden, as shown by plot a. in figure 3.4.6, the class differences are less important 
and rather unsystematic – furthermore the number of cases is too small to really draw 
conclusions. Just as in the US, the drop-outs – which are included in plot b. – make a 
great difference. Their inclusion into the analysis, leads to a remarkable deviation of 
the working classes from the standard sequence, i.e. the class inequality in college 
drop-out must is high. 
To sum up, patterns of higher education attendance differ by social origins. 
Even though the service class offspring more often uses the option to re-enroll, their 
ways to a degree are on average more often direct and smooth. This leads to the 
contradictory situation that young adults from lower classes both re-enroll less often 
and at the same time take less direct ways to a degree. When looking at gaps between 
the first and the last transition from school to work or at the amount of fulltime work 
experience among graduates, inequality is largest in Sweden. Inequality in timing is 
smaller among lower tier graduates in Germany and the US, and the share of working 
class students completing their degree directly is even higher in these contexts. In 
Sweden and the US the inequality in the timing pattern among drop-outs is higher. 
Thus, institutional environments seem to matter a great deal. This, however, is most 
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likely triggered by higher drop-out rates of lower-class students. The major problem 
of the analysis is the low number of cases for the German and Swedish case. This 
does not allow differentiating more by institutional types of higher education, even 
though the results I have presented suggest that this is an important aspect. 
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
Late entries inevitably have the consequence of a growing number of educational 
careers through detours. Knowing about these consequences of the promotion of 
second educational chances is a further prerequisite for evaluating the role of such 
policies for educational inequality. If countries with generous ‘second chances’ 
manage to cancel out inequality in the final attainment by educational credentials but 
instead have inequality in the pathways to achievement, this would constitute a new 
form of inequality which has previously been disregarded. Even though one might 
qualify this as a weaker form of disadvantage than being excluded from education 
permanently, it should not be ignored. 
The illustration in figure 3.4.2 at the outset of the chapter showed that 
reducing early inequality would make later corrections irrelevant. Opening second 
chances leads to a new form of differentiation into different timing patterns of the way 
to higher education. The leverage inequality in re-enrollment has on this 
differentiation in educational career patterns depends on the inequality in first 
transitions. 
Empirically, I showed that openness and flexibility of education systems not 
only result in less standardized individual patterns, but beyond that also in more class-
inequality in these patterns. Even though the re-enrollment rates of lower classes are 
smaller, their higher exit rates out of the direct educational career pathway in the 
beginning result in a less direct pathway to their educational degree. 
One might qualify getting postsecondary education later as a smaller 
disadvantage than the alternative situation of not getting postsecondary education at 
all. This normative question cannot be resolved empirically and is therefore not of 
much interest for a discussion. What can be discussed empirically is the contribution 
of this form of inequality to intergenerational class inequality. There are several ways 
how non-standard educational patterns can act in that way: late students can fare 
worse in school, e.g. have lower grades or lower chances of degree completion, or 
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they can have disadvantages (or advantages) upon labor market entry. Section 5 will 
follow on later by empirically looking at the labor market entry stage and also refer to 
results from the literature on the performance within education. 
Evaluating the strategy of open access for re-entrants into the postsecondary 
or tertiary education system on the macro- or system-level would be highly policy-
relevant. To do so, more information would be needed. One would have to answer the 
counterfactual question whether young adults delay their education under this 
condition on the system-level. Delaying could be a consequence of second chances, 
and the open and flexible education systems would invite students to not enroll in the 
first place. Then, one can expect that a part of the ‘delayers’ or ‘interrupters’ would 
‘cool-out’ (Clark, 1960) and never return to school. And, as described within this 
chapter, another group would become late- or non-tranditional students instead of 
early students. Whether or not this can be balanced by those young adults who – due 
to the flexible system – revise their earlier decision against enrolling cannot be 
answered yet. An evaluation of the Bologna reforms could serve as a good basis for 
answering this question in the future. Furthermore, it is important to know in how far 
upper secondary graduates revise their decisions at all over time, or if early plans 
govern most of the patterns observed later. With this knowledge at hand we could get 
a better understanding of how likely the scenarios discussed above are.  
This last point again returns to the question, how individuals decide: are gaps 
in the educational career a product of a delay, or of a decision to leave education 
which is later revised. The entire book until here had to rely on assumptions about this 
question. For the German case I will study this question in chapter 4.1. 
Against the results of all of the comparative chapters so far, the question 
about explanations on the micro-level becomes more and more important for drawing 
informed conclusions on the system level. The last paragraph is a good example: the 
underlying timing patterns of decisions are still unresolved but might have great 
impact on the macro-level conclusions. Other aspects which are closely related to the 
education system are important as well, such as costs of education. Section 4 now 
comprises a number of single studies on these micro-processes. Even though not all 
aspects can be enlightened, I discuss and test a number of theoretical explanations. 
Their selection is informed by previous research on educational inequality, but also on 
the previous sections on comparative research. Out of the previous comparative 
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chapters, a number of relevant questions on the individual level emerged. Answering 
them can then in a next stage hopefully improve further studies on the system level.  
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3.4.6 Appendix: An Illustration of Flows and Populations in the Generation of 
Inequality in Patterns of Educational Careers 
 
 
 
This Appendix gives a short illustration of the discussion at the outset of this chapter, but in a 
somewhat more formal manner. On the one hand, the relation seems trivial, but similar problems are 
frequent in the social sciences and the difference between inequality in entry probabilities and 
inequality within populations is often neglected in discussions. One example is the debate on a quota 
for female CEO´s, researchers, professors etc.: depending on the existing inequality in the population, 
it would need an intake of female group members for quite a long period to adjust the inequality within 
the population only to a small degree. Therefore, it seems important to give a short illustration how the 
different probabilities depend on each other. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.7: Transition tree: direct and indirect entry into higher education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Be  
- p1 the probability of a transfer into higher education right after qualifying for it and 
- p2 the probability of a re-entry into higher education among those who did not transfer 
directly; 
- p1 and p2 are independent from each other; 
- then 1-p1 defines the risk for becoming a re-entrant.  
- The size of the population P equals 1. 
 
Inequality in the transition rates p1 and p2 was the concern of chapters 3.2 and 3.3. What makes the 
relation of inequality in these transitions and inequality standardization of life-courses among the full 
population difficult to follow intuitively is that they are connected via two multiplicative steps. 
 
Population B is then given as 
 
       
 
and C as 
 
              
 
1-p1 
p2 
p1 
1-p2 
P=1: qualified for 
higher education 
B: entering higher 
education directly 
A: entering other 
activity than higher 
education 
D: not entering 
higher education 
permanently 
C: entering higher 
education later 
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Inequality beyond access probabilities in the pathways through the entire system does now refer to 
all those who access, i.e. the share of sub-population C among all entrants into higher education, which 
consist of the two sub-populations C and B. Thus,         can serve as strongly simplified measure 
for de-standardization of educational career patterns for a given population P. 
 
 
While the size of group B only depends on p1, C is the outcome of two transitions and hence depends 
on both p1 and p2, and not only on p2. The re-enrollment decision is defined as p2 only, but inequality in 
 
       always depends on p1 too. Thus, even if the condition applies that 
 
                                        
 
it can still be the case that  
 
of                           
 
                      . 
 
or inequality in the patterns of educational careers towards higher education, defined as  
 
                          
 
                      . 
 
is positive. 
Intuitively, this is more likely to be the case, the larger B(service) gets or the smaller B(working) gets, since B 
is the sub-population which only occurs in the denominator. Reconsider now that        and is 
therefore completely independent from p2.  
 
 
 
For any given population, i.e. the all students or subgroups such as those defined by class of origin, the 
dependence between rates and ‘de-standardization’ can be expressed as 
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and shows that both C and B+C inevitably depend on p1 and p2 simultaneously. Furthermore, due to the 
multiplicative interrelation between rates and the groups B and C, there is linear relation between the 
two de-standardization and re-enrollment rates. Figure 3.4.8 illustrates how 
 
     
 depends on p2 at 
given values of p1.  
Each line depicts the relation between the share of interrupting graduates among all graduates, i.e. 
the extend of differentiation of higher education careers by patterns, on the one hand (y-axis) and the 
probability of re-entry on the other hand (x-axis). This illustrates that 
- the impact re-entries have on interruptions depends on the number of direct transfers; the 
leverage of re-entries on differentiation in patterns is greater when p1 is small; 
- the curvature is higher when p1 is small. This implies that when p1 is small, any re-entrant will 
already define inequality in patterns. If p1 is large, the impact of re-entry on inequality is 
growing linearly with a growth in the probability of re-enrollment. 
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Figure 3.4.8: De-standardization by interruptions in educational careers and their dependence on 
the re-enrollment rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
Values can be defined in Stata as follows: 
 
drop _all 
set obs 101 
gen p2=. 
foreach p1 in 0 .05 .10 .25 .5 .75 .90 1{ 
di " " 
di " " 
local p100=`p1'*100 
gen x`p100'=. 
di "p1=`p1'" 
foreach p2 of numlist 0(.01)1{ 
replace p2=`p2' if _n>100*(`p2') 
di "p2=`p2'" 
di (`p2'-`p1'*`p2')/(`p1'+(`p2'-`p1'*`p2')) 
replace x`p100'= (`p2'-`p1'*`p2')/(`p1'+(`p2'-`p1'*`p2')) /// 
 if _n>100*(`p2') 
lab var x`p100' "p1=`p1'" 
} 
} 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.8 shows how the share of interrupting students in a given group depends on p1 and p2, as 
discussed before, and how the contribution of p2 depends on p1: the higher the share of students 
transferring directly to higher education, the lower the dependence of         on the probability of 
re-entering higher education. 
For a given set values for p1(service), p2(service), p1(working), we can easily calculate the hypothetical 
value x for p2 at which equalization or a certain level of inequality would be achieved when solving  
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Or, re-formulated and expressed in probabilities for transitions 
 
                                                                                            
 
for x=0 meaning equalization. This exercise is helpful to realize the small leverage that second chances 
may have on an overall equalization of social inequality. 
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4 SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN POSTSECONDARY 
EDUCATIONAL CAREERS – THE INDIVIDUAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within this section, five single chapters are subsumed which all aim at further 
enlightening the micro-process of re-entry into postsecondary education over the life 
course. I start out with a summary of relevant theoretical concepts in chapter 4.0. 
Chapter 4.1 then analyses the timing of decision making for the German context. 
Within chapters 4.2 and 4.3 I test an implication derived from one mechanism for the 
explanation of educational social origin – the relative status hypothesis. While chapter 
4.2 refers to the US context only, chapter 4.3 compares the US and Sweden. Chapter 
4.4 takes a closer look at the operationalization of parental class and asks who out of 
both parents has a stronger influence on their sons and daughters late schooling 
behavior in the US. Finally, in chapter 4.5 I seek to explain why working class 
daughters to re-enroll more often than their upper-class peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous sections 2 and 3, country differences were the central interest which 
was motivated by the aim of comparing structural conditions. Within this comparison, 
I made assumptions about decisions on the individual level, but neither linked them 
back to the recent discussion on educational decision making, nor explicitly tested 
them. Implicitly, it has become clear at several instances that the assumptions about 
the behavior on the micro-level have the potential of both affecting the results and of 
changing the interpretation of late schooling with regard to its contribution to social 
inequality. For the comparison, I have relied on strongly simplified assumptions on 
the micro-level. This might overlook several aspects. In order to improve the basis for 
comparative work, the micro-foundations of inequality in late education should be 
understood better. This chapter comprises several articles for deepening the 
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understanding of these processes at the micro-level, which are not comparative. 
Beyond, chapter 4.3 makes one step further and uses findings on the micro-level for 
refining comparative analysis. 
This section aims at addressing a number of questions related to the decision 
making of individuals, leading to different postsecondary educational career patterns 
and to contribute to some more detailed questions. It does not aim at encompassing all 
aspects of the emergence of individual decision making. First, the ‘when and why’ of 
decisions about participation in schooling has far-reaching consequences that I have 
discussed at several instances already, but never tested empirically. Second, the 
question of how social origin might lead to social origin differences in educational 
decisions even in adulthood – and how long this influence of the parental background 
can persist. And finally, some reactions on certain institutional details, which do not 
fit the broad framework but rather explicit policies, could help to link the findings 
back on the aggregate level. 
Chapter 4.1 will empirically assess the question of ‘myopia’, i.e. of the 
timing of postsecondary (re-)entry decisions. In other words, the distinction between 
the ‘ad hoc’-decision to re-enroll vs. the intended planning of educational career 
sequences including a delay. I scrutinize the social origin differences in the time of 
decision making and its persistence is enrollment in higher education in Germany 
following the completion of vocational training. The dataset used also allows testing 
several hypotheses on mechanisms explaining the delay or re-entry. 
In chapter 4.2 I test one specific explaining mechanism – the hypothesis that 
families prioritize the reproduction of parental status ahead of upward mobility (Breen 
and Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996a) – leading to expect inequality in 
re-enrollment. The situation in the US, where a comparatively high share of young 
adults enters the labor market before studies, allows observing whether these young 
adults react with additional educational attainment on falling behind their parents’ 
social class. This complements the known tests for this mechanism (often referred to 
as ‘relative risk aversion’ of families) by a study based on the observation of ‘real’ 
relative status demolition. 
In chapter 4.3 go beyond a pure micro-level perspective and present a study 
comparing Sweden and the US. However, other than in the previous sections where 
describing and explaining the results of institutions was the main aim, I now use the 
comparison of two similar education systems to test how individual react on different 
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restrictions on the micro level. This serves on the one side at strengthening the results 
from chapter 4.2 and comparing the role of the relative status maintenance motive 
over societies. On the other hand, the chapter uncovers other factors leading to re-
enrollment in the different societies which might trace back to the different costs of 
education in the two otherwise similar contexts. 
Chapter 4.4 takes a life course perspective and combines two questions. First, 
I ask about the different roles of mother´s and father´s class for the late enrollment of 
sons and daughters into college education in the US. This serves the purpose to test 
the accuracy of several hypotheses on the sex typing of the transmission of social 
inequality from one generation to the next. It turns out that among women inequality 
in attending college changes indeed over life course. While among the disadvantage 
of lower class offspring is stable, lower class women compensate for their early 
disadvantage somewhat by a higher enrollment rate at later stages of their biography. I 
test a number of explanations which could potentially explain this particularity in the 
second part chapter 4.4. To broad categories of explanations might be distinguished: 
time constant factors fuelling a particular late schooling entry of women from lower 
class backgrounds on the one hand; and typical events and changing environmental 
conditions, opportunities and restrictions of individual life courses of these women on 
the other hand. 
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4.0 Explaining Class Inequality in Educational Transitions – The 
Case of Education in Adulthood 
 
 
 
The number of hypotheses about the social selectivity of educational decisions is 
numerous, while a single predominating factor could not be identified by the research 
efforts of the past decades
22
. With regard to delays and re-enrollment decisions, 
several new challenges emerge. Not only is the question for how long decisions are 
made, i.e. how long actors’ time horizon is and how persistent they are in following 
their intentions. Compared to the educational decisions occurring earlier in the 
biography, different actors are involved for postsecondary education. While the 
parents decide solely about the earliest educational attainment, the responsibility is 
gradually shifted to the child over time. Parents might still be involved, but we can 
expect the children to become more and more independent. When and on which 
aspects parents or children have discretion can only be assumed – but those 
educational decisions which are met after an initial phase of work (and thus with own 
income) should generally be made most independently by children. Furthermore, the 
contexts framing the decision change over time. Factors which are stable over time, 
such as social reference groups, wealth or cognitive development might change the 
parameters triggering the one or the other decision. Many of these changes can be 
related to events in other life course domains, e.g. marriage or the death of parents. 
 
Why are Individual Level Explanations Important for Explaining Social Phenomena? 
Why talking about individual behavior, if structural conditions are the main interest? 
Investigating individuals’ decision making is also motivated in its own interest. 
However, beyond that, in the long run the aim is to inform and improve explanations 
of macro phenomena. In order to structure sociological explanations, several authors
23
 
suggested applying a macro-micro-macro schema where the relationship between 
collective phenomena is explained via three steps (Esser, 1999, Chapter 6): First, the 
                                                 
22
 For an overview, see Erikson and Jonsson (1996a). 
23
 Most prominent in the English language literature is the work of Coleman (1990). For an extensive 
list on other authors suggesting a similar structure of sociological explanations see footnote 3 on p. 98 
in Esser (1999). 
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social situation and its impact on individuals. ‘Bridge hypotheses’ (Esser, 1999, p. 
120) are developed on the conditioning of contextual, societal circumstances on 
individual behavior. Second, the individual selection according to given rules out of 
the set of choices they have. And third, the aggregation of individual choices to 
societal outcomes. As a blueprint for explaning social inequalities in educational 
participation, this schema is useful, both for structuring the discussion of explanations 
for social origin effects as well as explanations for country differences. Social origin 
differences define the context, as well as the country level. Within these conditions 
individuals decide about their education. In particular in policy-oriented comparative 
research, the link between the micro- and the macro-level are often not discussed 
explicitly. 
For comparative research, knowing the micro-processes is of great relevance 
for developing sound hypotheses on the macro-level. Wouldn’t there be any 
individual reaction on structural conditions these conditions would not change social 
realities. Knowing the processes of individual decision making will thus lead to more 
realistic assumptions and therefore also improve macro-explanations. However, 
psychological processes on the individual level can be very complex. Strong 
simplifications are needed for not arriving at very complex explanations. The 
challenge is thus to capture the broad lines of individual decision making in a 
parsimonious way. This trade-off, I argue, justifies that I have first investigated 
institutional research questions with strongly simplified assumptions on individual 
behavior. And that I now, after the first step, investigate the mechanisms of the 
generation of inequality on the micro-level. 
 
Why Keeping the Focus on the Contextual Level? 
In the course of this process, one might in the end find mechanisms such as genetic 
inheritance that are indeed truly individual and not contextual. However, in particular 
comparative studies and existing difference in educational outcomes or inequality 
show that context matters without any doubt. Research on the contribution of contexts 
should thus not allow being distracted by individualistic explanations. The rule of 
parsimony on the individual level is a helpful tool to avoid this trap: simple, general 
approximations for individual behavior should be searched, to be able to focus on 
contextual effects as the main interest. The motivation to focus on contextual effects 
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and treat individual explanations broadly can be manifold – and mirrors the free 
choice of the researcher rather than following empirical or theoretical imposition. 
Choosing a research question according to its contribution to a normative debate on 
equalization of opportunities can serve as a strong motivation to ask for the impact of 
institutional conditions. While the purely individualistic and context-independent part 
of the causes might exist, their only implication for policies might be to suggest 
inactivity. Finding out ‘what can be done’ on the other hand needs knowledge on the 
contextual, institutional conditions. Individual level explanations discussed in the 
following will be selected by the aim of parsimony for explanations of individual 
behavior and by the connectivity to institutional research. While not claiming to 
document the full spectrum of reasons for non-participation in higher education of 
lower-class children, I discuss a number of explanations in the following to which 
previous studies have referred chosen on this criterion. Other mechanisms which may 
contribute less to understanding institutional differences, such as genetic inheritance 
of cognitive ability
24
, will be left out. The mechanisms I consider can be categorized 
in four groups. First, investment into education (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) in order 
to maintain the family status. Second, being (or perceiving to be) restricted in choice 
due to financial resources or credit constraints. Third, the perceived probability of 
success in higher education. And fourth, lower performance (‘primary effects’) in the 
school-leaving exam at upper secondary school (Boudon, 1974). Beyond that, I will 
tackle the question of timing of individual decision making. 
 
4.0.1 When do Young Adults Decide about Enrollment? 
The timing question appeared already in many instances in this volume before. With 
regard to institutional hypotheses, this belongs to the most important aspects of 
individual decision making. Only if it is known when decisions are made, the 
institutional conditions of the decision can be ascertained. As an example, if it would 
be known that all late enrollment decisions are made immediately at the time of re-
enrollment, more situational factors and experiences in the labor market or financial 
constraints should trigger belated educational attainment. If this is not the case and 
young adults plan well ahead that they will merely work for a while and later re-enter, 
                                                 
24
 For a recent review on the contribution of this mechanism to inheritance of social positions and 
income see Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008). 
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it might be more fruitful to search for reasons why they refrain from immediate 
enrollment in the given country context. It is these two ideal-typical situations that can 
be distinguished for the timing question. The two modes are depicted in figure 4.0.1. 
In reality, other or mixed forms might occur. 
 
 
Figure 4.0.1: Modes of decision making resulting in re-enrollment in education after a first 
school-to-work transition. 
 
 
 
 
In several instances I called the first mode of decision the ‘ad hoc decision’ or the 
‘assumption of myopia’. It requires, that the decision to leave the educational system 
and enter full-time employment antedate. The second decision mode I call the 
‘planned decision’. In this case, at the labor market entry it is already anticipated that 
there will be a re-entry into the educational system. 
 
4.0.2 Social Origin and Scholastic Performance 
A well-established classification of mechanisms explaining social inequality in 
educational achievement is the distinction of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ effects of 
social origin in education (Boudon, 1974). Even though not exactly described in that 
way by Boudon, primary effects are in most studies defined as social origin 
differences in (school) performance leading to different educational outcomes (e.g. 
Jackson, forthcoming; Jackson et al., 2007; Schindler and Reimer, 2010). Secondary 
effects are attributed to class specific decisions, and are measured net of performance 
education labor market education 
education labor market education 
‘planned decision’ when leaving the educational 
system the first time, to delay entry into higher 
education. 
‘spontaneous decision’ to re-enroll and leave the 
position in the labor market. 
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differences between classes. As popular as the concept has been in empirical research 
in the recent years, it is controversial how substantive such a classification of 
mechanisms is as an explanation
25
. There is further a certain danger that performance 
based differences are interpreted as being meritocratic, which is a problematic and in 
many respects inappropriate interpretation (cf. Goldthorpe, 1996). However, even 
though the classification of different mechanisms cannot be sufficient as an 
explanation for social inequality, the discussion has rightly highlighted the importance 
of performance differences between classes of origin. Implicitly, this also highlights 
the importance of taking the previous educational biography into account. 
Performance differences can both affect delays and ad hoc re-entries. For the 
case of delays, straightforward hypotheses depend on the higher education system. 
Numerus clauses regulations can hinder immediate enrollment and a delay of the 
intention to enroll. Later enrollment will then occur as soon as a place in the preferred 
study program is available. Furthermore, e.g. in the German case, there used to be a 
regulation allowing preferred access for students with ‘waiting time’ spend in 
apprenticeship training. But the more likely impact of primary effects is if young 
adults decide ad hoc on re-enrollment into higher education. The mechanisms are the 
same as for early entrants. First, admission can be denied when entrance regulations 
use school marks as entry criterion. Second, poor scholastic performance can 
discourage young adults from re-enrollment due to lower expectations about the 
probability of completing higher education successfully. 
 
4.0.3 Status Maintenance 
The status maintenance argument is based on the assumption that decision makers in 
principle make rational decisions about investment in education. At the same time the 
argument, however, relaxes this assumption and introduces the motivation of families 
to achieve at least the same social position for their offspring as they have themselves 
(‘relative risk aversion’). This preference implies that failure in achieving at least the 
parental status would be evaluated as a larger loss than forgone benefits from not 
                                                 
25
 Nash (2003; 2006) has criticized the static nature of the separation of the effects. It is highly intuitive 
that performance effects in one single transition can be caused by earlier decisions. Social origin 
differences in the entrance to university can be explained to a certain degree by different grades in 
upper secondary school leaving exams (Schindler and Reimer, 2010). However, these grades could 
easily be the results of earlier decisions of parents, e.g. if they provide private tutoring. Moreover, later 
transitions can depend on earlier grades as grades indicate abilities to decision makers (Breen and 
Goldthorpe, 1997; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996a). Then, performance and decisions get mixed. 
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achieving upward mobility (Boudon, 1974; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). Therefore 
upper-class families will invest more in education in order to avoid downward 
mobility. 
Children with a higher educational background can see late enrollment as a 
chance to overcome intergenerational status demolition if they did not enroll right 
after leaving secondary education for any reason. Therefore, a change in educational 
intentions can be expected to intensify existing educational inequalities further. Late 
enrollment thus offers a second chance to avoid status demolition. Re-enrollment after 
status demolition therefore is an interesting test case for the model, which can go 
beyond previous test of this mechanism (Breen and Yaish, 2006; Davies, Heinesen 
and Holm, 2002; Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish, 2009; Holm and Jæger, 2008; 
Stocké, 2007; van de Werfhorst and Hofstede, 2007) by directly measuring status 
demolition, which all find at best small contributions of the relative risk aversion to 
explaining educational inequality. 
The model remains silent on the question of inequality in delaying entry into 
higher education. In order to reproduce the family status, the important factor is the 
decision to invest in a sufficient level of education – and not so much its timing. 
Delaying enrollment might also delay the successful reproduction of the parental 
status, but does not jeopardize this aim. Any time pattern that is most efficient to 
achieve an educational ambition or opens gateways for upward mobility would be 
alright. If any, working class should be more willing to delay, e.g. to implement a 
safety net by getting vocational training before enrolling in higher education (Becker 
and Hecken, 2009a; Büchel and Helberger, 1995; Hillmert and Jacob, 2003). 
Applying the status reproduction mechanism on this specific form of delay in the 
German context one would expect that school-leavers from a lower class background 
more often choose such an ‘insurance strategy’. Service-class children inevitably have 
to achieve higher education. All alternatives would most likely lead to ‘failure’ in 
achieving parental status. Completing vocational training as insurance against failure 
in higher education would not have any value for those coming from higher social 
class-background. In contrast, working-class students are able to achieve parental 
status via vocational training. Outside the German context with its strong vocational 
education system, the insurance strategy is very unlikely to motivate delays. Or at 
least one would have to make additional assumption for arguing in these lines. E.g. if 
we assume that families with higher class backgrounds are afraid of the known 
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‘cooling out’ function of lower tracks and working experience, and thus would see a 
threat to their status maintenance in the delays. Then, they would avoid delaying 
higher education. 
 
4.0.4 Financial Resources and Direct Costs of Higher Education 
After graduation from upper secondary education, young adults from lower-class 
families might not have enough resources to finance higher education or might want 
to earn their own money as soon as possible. Either a real lack of financial resources 
or the missing willingness of lower-class parents to invest in their child’s education 
could lead to this situation. Opportunity costs from forgone labor market earnings are 
another important cost-component which varies especially with labor market policies. 
Its influence was already discussed in chapter 3.1 and 3.2. Here, I will only refer to 
direct costs. 
With regard to re-entry, an increase in wealth from labor income should 
change young adults’ opportunities and help working-class children to catch up in 
educational achievement through re-entry into higher education. Hence, if this 
explanation holds good, we can expect a higher potential of changes towards 
participation in higher education for children from a lower educational background 
and also higher re-enrollment rates among those who initially did not intend to study. 
The costs of higher education depend to a large degree on the context. For Germany, 
where there existed no tuition fees for the group I study and students from poor 
families can get means-tested support for their studies, we cannot expect that this 
mechanism applies. 
Costs or perceived costs are reported by lower class students to be a major 
obstacle for not enrolling (Schindler and Reimer, 2011) and can impose stop-outs by 
poorer students (DesJardins and McCall, 2010). In order to solve the problem of a 
lack in financial resources, the strategy to delay higher education is one possibility. 
After some time of work, young adults can amass savings to cover the costs for higher 
education – while other factors might then prevent them from enrollment. Direct 
financial costs can thus not be ignored as an important explanation for delays in 
higher education. In system comparison, this would lead to expect more interrupted 
higher education careers in Sweden than in the US – where costs are highest. At the 
same time, inequality in the delay of higher education should grow whenever the costs 
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of higher education are increased. On the contrary, low income-inequality and 
growing wealth has to lead to lower educational inequality directly. 
For ad hoc decisions to re-enroll, costs can matter as well, even though the 
link between available material resources and social origin can be assumed to decline 
over time. Young adults from less wealthy families will be less often able to mobilize 
parental resources to cover the costs also of later education. In particular if late 
educational programs are private funded, such a MBA-programs where social origin 
difference are known to be high (Mullen, Goyette and Soares, 2003). If schooling is 
provided by the state on the other hand, this factor could lead to new social 
inequalities. 
 
4.0.5 Perceived Probability of Success 
The perceived probability of success is also known to vary with parental education. 
Young adults with lower educational background might perceive their risk of failing 
in higher education as higher than those young adults with a higher educational 
background. As e.g. Archer and Yamashita (2003) find in a qualitative study, 
working-class students claim often to ‘know their limits’ or do not ‘feel good enough’ 
for higher education. This could lead to the intention to enter less demanding 
educational tracks. Furthermore, it could be a motivation to implement a ‘safety net’ 
in case of failure in higher education. We can therefore expect children from less 
educated families to obtain vocational training more often before entering tertiary 
education (Hillmert and Jacob, 2003). The achievement of vocational training before 
starting higher education can reduce the risk of entering the labor market without any 
completed degree (which is problematic in Germany). On the other hand, if upper 
secondary graduates leave the educational system without plans to re-enter, they can 
change their minds and develop the intention to enroll. Oettinger (1993) proposes that 
this occurs due to changes in the perceived probability of success during one's 
lifetime. 
According to his hypothesis, less confident young adults with lower grades in 
secondary school learn about their abilities through experiences in the labor market. 
Consequently they gain more confidence about their own educational success and re-
enroll more often. For re-entries, this leads to an expectation contradicting the 
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implications all other mechanisms: inequality should reverse and the lower origin 
youth would catch up over time. 
Developing a hypothesis on the delay of enrollment on basis of this 
mechanism is not straightforward. Expecting a low probability of success in higher 
education at time t should not lead into a delay of enrollment until t+x. The 
probability of success at any later time is the a priori the same, but at later time 
enrollment an additional uncertainty has to be added in comparison to immediate 
enrollment since the prediction of success based on past achievement should be less 
precise. Therefore, based on this mechanism, inequality in the delay of entry into 
higher education should be absent. 
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4.1 Timing and Persistence of Postsecondary Educational Career 
Intentions by Social Origin 
 
 
 
 
This chapter goes beyond the observed patterns of educational attainment and asks for 
social origin differences in the realization of educational intentions being reported at 
the time of qualifying for higher education in Germany. In general, the reported plans 
are found to be highly persistent. However, effects of parental education on the 
changes of educational intentions increase the existing social inequality in the 
participation in higher education. This can be explained partly by previous 
educational performance. In conclusion, while both delays and re-enrollments occur 
and are sensitive for social origin, inequality already manifests to the largest part at 
the time of graduation from upper secondary school. 
 
The chapter is a revised version of the following article: 
- Weiss, Felix and Hanna-Marei Steininger, 2012: Educational family 
background and the realisation of educational career intentions: participation 
of German upper secondary graduates in higher education over time. Higher 
Education. Online First. 
 
 
 
 
From the first chapter on, I have repeatedly argued that information about the timing 
and the process of educational decisions is necessary for developing sociological 
explanations of inequality in educational decisions. As long as the conditions for 
actors are constant over time, the timing of decisions is not important. However, when 
a sequence of more than one decision shall be explained timing matters, in particular 
during youth when social contexts change rapidly. Most previous studies have relied 
on assumptions. One example within the sociology of education is the widespread 
continuation ratio model (Mare, 1980) that implicitly assumes that actors are short 
sighted and decide from transition to transition independently. In their critic on the 
approach of continuation ratio models Cameron and Heckman (1998) have 
highlighted that the assumption of myopia could be violated. The discussion at the 
outset of both section 2 and 3 have already highlighted the far reaching consequences 
for the interpretation of the assumption on the timing of decisions. While Cameron 
and Heckman criticize the research tradition of ‘educational transition research’ and 
suggest alternative statistical modeling, the empirical question of the decision making 
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process on postsecondary education of individuals remains unresolved. There exists, 
however, literature that has dealt with ‘ambitions’ and ‘aspirations’ over time. 
One study dealing with the change of educational intentions over time has 
been conducted by Brint and Karabel (1989) for the US. The authors confirm Clark’s 
‘cooling out’-hypothesis of educational ambition over time for the context of 
Community Colleges (Clark, 1960). Other studies for the US have as well shown that 
declines in the expectation to complete higher education are more frequent among 
young adults from lower material background (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005) or that 
parental socioeconomic-status affects educational attainment even among highly 
motivate and able students (Trusty, 2001; Trusty and Harris, 1999). Also among 
students with lower achievement, lower SES students had high abstract, but to a lesser 
degree concrete educational expectations which they realized less often than high SES 
students (Trusty and Niles, 2004). A cooling out for disadvantaged youth with regard 
to attendance patterns over time was also found by Alexander et al. (2008). Outwith 
the US-literature, studies on the process of cooling out are rare. The absence of 
research for the context of postsecondary education in Germany is surprising. Even 
though interruptions in educational careers less frequent than in the US (see section 2 
of this volume), the frequent occurrence of completing both vocational training and 
higher education could invoke exactly the same process as the community colleges in 
the American context. 
This chapter examines the cooling out-hypothesis for the case of Germany. 
While the US-research has mainly focused the expectation to make it to the four year 
college or complete a degree, the decision that German upper secondary graduates 
have to make has a much more voluntary character since costs for higher education 
are much lower in Germany. Therefore, instead of expectations or the less frequently 
used term ‘plans’ (Rosenbaum, 1980), I will refer to intentions. Beyond describing 
how intentions result in educational attainment when students plan their educational 
career ahead of time, this chapter addresses the question in how far parental education 
is influences this process. This is a particularly interesting question for those students 
who delay their entry into higher education, since they have more time to lose their 
ambitions to study. Hence, several of my hypotheses refer to those students who did 
not enter higher education immediately after qualifying for tertiary education. 
Following their biography, I will assess whether they enter higher education later or 
not. 
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Chapter 1.4 at the beginning of this volume describes the German education 
system. The phenomenon of young adults choosing vocational training instead of 
higher education is widespread. Besides tertiary education, vocational schooling and 
especially apprenticeship training are relevant alternatives for upper secondary 
graduates. Apprenticeships consist of in-company training, complemented by part-
time vocational schooling. Completing an apprenticeship typically takes 2 to 3 years. 
Thereafter, a considerable number of graduates enroll in tertiary education (Jacob, 
2004). 
In a second step I ask whether these changes are due to mechanisms that are 
known from established explanations of educational inequality. Beyond establishing 
an explanation for changes in educational intentions over time, the relevance of this 
endeavor also derives from a methodological issue. Since educational intentions are 
sometimes used as an approximation of educational decisions in studies assessing 
educational inequality (e.g. Becker and Hecken, 2009a; Becker and Hecken, 2009b; 
Heine, Quast and Beuße, 2010; Heine, Spangenberg and Sommer, 2006), it is 
important to know about the relationship between both. Testing the persistence of 
plans allows evaluating the impact of this practice on the findings of previous studies. 
The results show that educational intentions are in most cases realized. 
Children from families with a lower educational background are less motivated to 
enter higher education. Careers that are inconsistent with previous intentions tend to 
show more conformity with parental educational achievement, irrespective of the 
intentions the young adults initially had. 
 
4.1.1 Hypotheses 
At the outset of this section I have discussed four mechanisms being frequently put 
forward when explaining educational inequality. Not all of them contradict in their 
prediction of inequality in the stability and re-formulation of educational intentions. 
However, there are differences in whether a cooling out of the aspiration for higher 
education must be expected when attending a vocational training program or if lower 
classes develop towards participation in higher education over time. 
The cooling out hypothesis as well as a persistently low participation of 
lower class children over the life course can be backed by several arguments. The 
status maintenance motive of families is the most straightforward mechanisms clear 
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for this prediction: young adults from lower social backgrounds will have reached 
their parents status with vocational training and thus less often change their plans 
towards higher education. Upper class children on the other hand can see late 
enrollment as a chance to overcome intergenerational status demolition. Therefore, a 
change in educational intentions can be expected to further intensify existing 
educational inequalities. The same hypothesis can be derived from the claims that 
either costs or lower performance hinders children from lower social origins to enroll 
in higher education – when assuming that the lack of these resources remains 
persistent over time. If – however – these resources are increased over time, revisions 
in educational expectations more often occur among previously deprived working-
class children. A resource which is unlikely to change over time is the individual 
perception of performance. When assuming that these perceptions are formed by 
young adults according to their grades from secondary school, one would expect a 
stable disadvantage of children from lower class backgrounds. 
On the other hand, it can also be hypothesized that after completing 
vocational training lower class children are more likely to enroll in higher education 
and catch up somewhat with the privileged since their situation changed. E.g. since 
the availability or the value of their resources has improved. For financial resources 
this is very likely to be the case, since the young adults become more and more 
independent from their parents financial support and amass their own savings from 
labor market income. However, since there were no tuition fees in Germany for the 
group I study and students from poor families can get means-tested support for their 
studies, I do not expect this mechanism to be a major explanation for social 
differences in the change of educational intentions. For the primary effects, i.e. 
differences in performance in secondary school between children of different social 
origins, a similar scenario is possible. The numerus clausus system in Germany used 
to have a ‘rule of compensation’ for lower grades. In some programs, the time spent 
involved in other activities permits access regardless of grades. Then, the 
disadvantage in access to higher education due to a lower GPA decreases over time. 
However, there is no guarantee for admission via this rule, so the grades remain 
important to some extent. Even the perceived probability of success may increase, if it 
is not derived from GPA but from practical experience in the labor market or life 
experience, as Oettinger (1993) proposes. According to his hypothesis, less confident 
young adults with lower grades in secondary school learn about their abilities through 
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experiences in the labor market. Consequently they gain more confidence about their 
own educational success and then enroll more often. 
In order to distinguish between the mechanisms that could drive the 
existence of inequality in the revision of educational plans, I attempt estimating them 
directly using a set of variables which is included in the dataset. These variables are 
presented in table 4.1.1. 
 
4.1.2 Data, variables and methods 
The dataset used for this analysis differs from the datasets used for the previous 
chapters. The results are based on the 1999 HIS Panel Study of young adults qualified 
for higher education ('HIS Studienberechtigtenbefragung', Durrer and Heine, 2001), a 
mail survey in two panel waves. The first of these was conducted six months after 
leaving secondary school and the second wave three years later. The study covers 
educational career intentions in the first wave. In the second wave, retrospective 
information about the actual pattern of the educational and labor market career is 
collected. Parental educational achievement is measured, as well as a rich set of 
variables describing the previous educational achievement of the respondent, e.g. type 
of secondary schooling, school-leaving certificate and grades (GPA). As a limitation, 
the operationalization of parental social class is only possible in a reduced form and 
not comparable to the other datasets. I therefore refer to parental education instead for 
the following analysis. There are 7,374 respondents with completed records for both 
waves, but after intentionally excluding respondents who had completed an 
apprenticeship by the time the first wave was conducted
26
 (560 cases) and cleaning 
the sample of missing values, only 5,893 cases are left for the analysis sample. 
The interpretation of the results has to take into account the right-censoring 
of the data three and a half years after receiving an upper secondary degree. Although 
it is generally possible to finish a vocational degree and enter tertiary education in the 
observed time frame, young adults might often interrupt this sequence by working to 
earn money before starting higher education. In this case, enrollment could be later 
than the censoring date leading to an underestimation of the persistence of plans. In 
order to test the impact of the censoring of the data, I run the central analyses (discrete 
                                                 
26
 This group was excluded as they are in a completely different situation. To choose entering 
vocational education first is not a possible option. They would need to be analysed separately, which is 
not possible with the small number of these young adults in our sample. 
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time logistic regression models) again with the 1990 HIS Panel Study, an identical 
mail survey in three panel waves covering a period more than five years after leaving 
secondary school. This replication confirmed the results of the more recent survey. 
The first step of the analysis describes inequality in educational plans. 
Educational origin differences in the intentions for a certain educational career in 
comparison to direct entry into tertiary education are to be expected given the known 
origin effects on participation in higher education. In a second step I evaluate the 
influence of parental education on the persistence of these intentions. Furthermore, I 
investigate whether the theoretical mechanisms discussed above can explain the effect 
of parental education on the change in educational intentions. The last analysis uses 
discrete time event history logistic regression models. In order to overcome the 
comparison problem of coefficients from binary choice regression models, I report y-
standardized coefficients. Although this strategy helps somewhat, it is suboptimal 
with regard to model-comparison (Mood, 2010). Therefore, all models are estimated 
as linear probability models in addition. For each group with a certain educational 
intention there are three models: 
- A model that shows the total effect of the academic education of mother and 
father. 
- A model showing only the net ‘secondary effects’ of parental education, 
holding performance constant. 
- A model that includes explanatory variables based on subjective indicators. 
Primary effects of parental education (differences in scholastic performance) are 
measured based on the following characteristics of the school-leaving exam: type, 
grade point average (centralized in groups by federal state and type of degree), and 
the type of school. In order to correct for differences in the sample composition by 
correlates of socioeconomic status, the age and the sex of the respondent are kept 
constant. To rule out the possibility that cooling out is a function of participation in 
compulsory service I also control for participation in either military or civil service 
(only males), which lasted about one year in the cohort I study. The time spend in 
service is deleted from the process time in the event history models. This implies that 
the time during which respondents are in compulsory service is treated as if time had 
been stopped. 
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Table 4.1.1: Operationalization of theoretical constructs. 
theoretical 
constructs 
question used for operationalization and original version in German 
 ‘How relevant are the following reasons and motives for the choice of your 
post-school career?‘ 
‚Welche Bedeutung haben die folgenden Gründe und Motive für den von Ihnen 
gewählten nachschulischen Werdegang?‘ 
 
status 
maintenance 
- ‘to achieve a high social status.’ 
-‚einen hohen sozialen Status erreichen.‘ 
response possibilities: 1 (very important/sehr bedeutend) to 6 
(irrelevant/bedeutungslos) 
 
financial 
resources 
- ‘to be financially independent as soon as possible.’ 
-‚baldige finanzielle Unabhängigkeit.‘ 
possible responses: 1 (very important/sehr bedeutend) to 6 (irrelevant 
/bedeutungslos) 
 
- ‚short duration of training.‘ 
-‚kurze Ausbildungsdauer.‘ 
possible responses: 1 (very important/sehr bedeutend) to 6 (irrelevant 
/bedeutungslos) 
 
perceived 
probability of 
success 
- ‘I expected good career and income prospects.’ 
-‚meines Erachtens günstige Berufs- und Einkommenschancen.‘ 
response possibilities: 1 (very important/sehr bedeutend) to 6 (irrelevant/ 
bedeutungslos) 
- ‘it matches my performance.’ 
-‚gute Übereinstimmung mit der eigenen Leistungsfähigkeit.‘ 
possible responses: 1 (very important/sehr bedeutend) to 6 
(irrelevant/bedeutungslos) 
 
‘primary effects’ 
of social origin 
(performance) 
grade point average of school-leaving exam 
Source: HIS Panel Study of young adults qualified for higher education questionnaire, 1999 
 
 
 
Parental education as the central independent variable has three categories: 
‘both parents have completed higher education’, ‘at least one of the parents’ has 
completed higher education’ and ‘neither of the parents’ has completed higher 
education’. In table 1 I give an overview of the operationalization of the theoretical 
concepts from my hypotheses. 
The retrospective nature of the questions about intentions is a methodological 
limitation. Students were interviewed half a year after becoming eligible for higher 
education, i.e. in most cases after completion of upper secondary school. Although 
one can assume that upper secondary graduates at a young age are able to recapitulate 
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this important decision, their answer could be biased towards their actual choice. I 
argue that this problem is less serious than it seems at first glance. First, I still find 
differences between the educational intention and the present enrollment status. 
Second, there is a considerable number of students for whom the first possible entry 
into higher education is still ahead, namely all (male) draftees (1,620 respondents in 
the analysis-sample). Military or civil service normally lasted roughly one year for 
this cohort. Although an analysis of the plans and persistence of male respondents in 
compulsory service showed that they differ somewhat in their educational career 
compared to male respondents who are not enlisted, the findings of table are 
confirmed for the draftees. I thus argue that the overall findings are unaffected by the 
retrospective nature of the survey. 
 
4.1.3 Results 
First, I describe the educational intentions and their realization, concentrating on the 
differences in intentions and their realization by parental education. Thereafter, the 
theoretical hypotheses are tested. I only present the results for the central variable, 
parental education. The full models are documented in the Appendix 4.1.4. 
4.1.3.1 Parental education and educational intentions 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the intentions of all young adults in the sample by 
parental education. In the upper part of the figure the group sizes are shown. The 
results are weighted with a weight provided by the data-collecting institute HIS to 
correct for possible sampling error. However, the weighted results are only slightly 
different from un-weighted results. 
More than half of the sample intends to enter higher education immediately. 
Another 14 per cent would like to do so after vocational training. A minority of 11 per 
cent is undecided about their future, and 13 per cent report having no intention of 
entering higher education. The fact that such a high number of students intend to enter 
university raises the question where and at what time the intentions to do higher 
education ‘cool out’. With regard to parental education, figure 1 shows the number of 
respondents with a certain intention by parental degree. It clearly confirms previous 
findings that children from families with a lower educational background are less 
motivated to enter higher education. The sons and daughters of parents without a 
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higher education degree are more likely to intend ‘higher education after vocational 
training’ or ‘no higher education at all’. Furthermore, they are more often undecided 
about their future. Interestingly, graduates whose parents both have higher education 
have the highest likelihood to expect to study after other activities, e.g. voluntary 
service. 
 
Figure 4.1.1: Educational intentions by educational family background. 
 
Source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education. 
Own calculations. N=10580. 
 
 
 
Apart from the fact that young adults with a lower educational background generally 
less often choose higher education, they also intend more often to delay their entry. 
This is even so if they intend to study at some time in the future. At the same time 
they are more often undecided. 
Now, I will turn to scrutinizing possible explanations for educational careers 
that are inconsistent with the initial intentions, focusing on the question of enrollment 
in tertiary education. 
4.1.3.2 Parental education and the persistence of educational intentions 
In the lower part of figure 2 the career intentions, the persistence of these intentions 
and the rate of students entering higher education are broken down by parental 
education. Within the bars, showing the higher education participation rates in 
0%
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percentages, I also report the y-standardized coefficients of a (discrete time event 
history) logistic regression model with the dependent variable ‘entered higher 
education’ (1 = yes). These coefficients show the dependence of enrollment into 
higher education on educational background by intention. 
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Figure 4.1.2: Descriptive overview on transitions into education after achieving university entry qualification in our analysis sample. 
 
 
  
Both parents high education degree   One parent HE degree   None of parents HE degree 
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 respective logit coefficients within bars 
All cases: 5523 
(both waves completed) 
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There is a notable correspondence between participation in higher education and the 
intention to do so, with two exceptions. First, a re-entry after vocational training is 
less frequent than the students reporting that it was their intention. Second, among 
those who do not intend to enter higher education at all, approximately one fourth 
change their minds. Besides a possible ‘cooling out’ through apprenticeship training, 
the reason for the first exception could be right-censoring of the data. However, 
checks with other datasets suggest that this should not be the case. The second 
exception, those young adults who report no intention to enter higher education at all, 
is not surprising. The time horizon is, especially compared to those who intend to 
enter higher education immediately, much longer. The risk of a change in intentions is 
certainly higher if a person is observed over a longer period of time. Even if the risk 
might be the same at one moment in time, there will be more events if the observation 
period is longer. 
The notably high persistence regarding the plan to study as soon as possible 
is even stronger among entrants into higher education at any point in time during the 
observation period. A surprisingly high share of more than 97 percent of the students 
does enroll. In the table only those respondents are defined as persistent who enrolled 
as soon as possible. Hence, the non-persistent respondents in this group are mainly 
those enrolling later than they intended to. Only a small minority of them never enter 
higher education at all. 
The plots at the bottom of figure 2 show the impact of parental education on 
the enrollment rates by educational origin for each intention. There is a consistent 
pattern of a higher enrollment of respondents with a higher educational background 
throughout all intention-groups. The strongest dependence on parental education 
exists among those students who are undecided (shown by the differences between the 
bars and a standardized logit coefficient of 0.40
**
). This can again be explained by the 
fact that the undecided young adults are the most heterogeneous group in their affinity 
to higher education. An alternative explanation could be that indifferent people are 
particularly likely to follow the example of their parents due to a lack of alternative 
(more rational) motivation. Regrettably, these two arguments cannot be separated 
from each other here. 
For testing the cooling out hypothesis, the more interesting categories consist 
of those students with ambitions to enter higher education. The vast majority of those 
who want to enter as soon as possible do realize this. There are small differences by 
4 .  Plans  and  Pat terns:  T imin g  o f  Educat ional  Deci s ion s  and  Inequal i t y  
 223 
parental education. Even among those male respondents who have to complete a one-
year compulsory service (military or social service) before enrolling, virtually all 
respondents eventually enroll (97 per cent, independent of service duties). That the 
share is the same among those (male) respondents having to complete compulsory 
service is interesting. This suggests that ‘cooling out’, i.e. giving up the intention to 
achieve tertiary education, is not merely a question of time. Young adults with the 
intention to enroll eventually enroll, even if forced to wait for some time. This is not 
the case for participants in apprenticeship training. Although these programs take 
longer, the stronger ‘cooling out’ in this group is probably due to the considerably 
better labor market opportunities with a vocational degree. This is clearly contradicts 
Oettinger's hypothesis, expecting that young adults discover their potential and rather 
increase their educational aspirations. 
In the next step I address the question of the explanations of these 
regularities. To the initial regression models from figure 2 (which is reported again as 
model 1 in table 2) variables representing the theoretical mechanisms discussed 
before are added in the subsequent models. 
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Table 4.1.2: y-standardized discrete time logistic (log y*, first row) and linear probability 
(lpm, second row) regression models of social origin on entering higher 
education (HE). 
(ref. cat.: none of parents 
holding academic degree) 
model 1: total effect model 2: M1 + primary 
effects 
model 3: M2 + 
indicators for other 
mechanisms 
educational intention both 
parents HE 
degree 
one parent 
HE degree 
both 
parents HE 
degree 
one parent 
HE degree 
both 
parents HE 
degree 
one parent 
HE degree 
 
study immediately, started 
studying as soon as possible 
dep.variable: entered HE as 
soon as possible 
N=3362 
log y*: 
0.11+ 
lpm: 0.03+ 
0.03 
-0.00 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.00 
-0.02 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.00 
-0.01 
 
study after vocational 
education 
dep. variable: entered HE 
N=790 
0.24** 
0.18** 
0.11x 
0.07+ 
0.17* 
0.13* 
0.08 
0.04 
0.16+ 
0.12+ 
0.06 
0.03 
 
study after another activity, 
enrolled in higher education 
dep. variable: entered HE 
N=374 
0.17+ 
0.10* 
0.09 
0.05 
0.02 
0.04 
0.06 
0.04 
-0.00 
0.04 
0.05 
0.03 
 
undecided,  
enrolled in higher education  
dep. variable: entered HE 
N=627 
0.41** 
0.27** 
0.17** 
0.10+ 
0.27** 
0.18** 
0.17** 
0.09+ 
0.24** 
0.15+ 
0.15* 
0.06 
 
no plans to study in tertiary 
track, non-persistence:  
enrolled in higher education 
dep. variable: entered HE 
N=740 
0.23+ 
0.12+ 
0.10 
0.05 
0.16 
0.08 
0.02 
0.01 
0.10 
0.06 
0.01 
0.01 
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, unweighted. Own calculations. 
N=5893. 
two-sided z- or t- test: significance x p<.10, + p < .05, * p < .01, ** p < .001 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows the results of discrete time logistic regression models separately by 
sub-samples reporting a certain intention. As logistic regression coefficients from 
nested models are incomparable due to unobserved heterogeneity influencing the 
dependent variable, I report y-standardized logit coefficients (Mood, 2010) and linear 
probability models. Model 1 is the ‘total-effects’ model with parental education as the 
only independent variable. The ‘net secondary effects’ model also contains my 
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indicators for primary effects (grade of upper secondary degree centralized by federal 
state, type of school where upper secondary degree was obtained, type of upper 
secondary degree, age at time of the survey). In figure 1 that shows the total effects of 
parental education, there were inequalities in the entry rate to university for all 
groups. This result is repeated in model 1. In model 2, I introduce explanatory 
variables operationalizing effects of educational origin due to previous performance in 
the school system. Comparing this with the results of model 1 these indicators explain 
inequalities for those students who reported that they had planned to either study 
immediately or not to study at all, as well as for those students who planned to study 
after another activity. However, for the larger inequalities among those young adults 
planning higher education after vocational training or who are undecided, inequalities 
can only be partly explained. Altogether, performance-based effects of parental 
education can explain inequalities in later changes of plans to a large extent. Hence, it 
can be argued that students implement most of the secondary, decision-based origin 
effects in their earlier intentions with regard to their post-secondary education, while 
changes in their educational intentions depend to a large degree on their previous 
performance. This finding can have several reasons. Students with a lower 
educational background could have less realistic aspirations for their further 
educational career, taking into account their scholastic performance. Alternatively, the 
numerus clausus for several fields of study could divert more students with a lower 
educational background away from higher education due to poor grades, although 
they had hoped to be accepted. 
In most cases, young adults with a lower educational family background will 
follow their intentions with the same steadfastness as their peers form higher 
backgrounds. This, however, depends on the intention itself and is not true for all 
students. Among the models in column 2, there are clear and significant effects of 
educational background left after checking educational performance, if the students 
intended to study after vocational education or did not have any expectations about 
their future educational careers. Among those students who do not want to enter 
higher education, there still is a remaining effect which is, however, not statistically 
significant (but not trivial in size, it shows a ceteris paribus 8 percentage points higher 
entry rate into higher education for students where both parents have a degree in 
higher education). 
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The third series of models corresponds to all other explanations discussed 
above. All indicators are introduced at once, since this is enough to see the essence of 
the results: all of these indicators for explanation of the secondary effects do not 
change the results. Effect sizes in the linear probability model are reduced only 
marginally, none of the substantive findings about parental influence changes. It turns 
out that these factors do not explain secondary effects of parental education on the 
changes in educational intentions. 
 
4.1.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter aimed at localizing the impact of specific sources of educational 
inequality over a period in the biography of students that is crucial for their entry into 
post-secondary education. I started out by looking at the intentions of young adults 
with respect to their future educational career and found that children coming from 
diverse family backgrounds differ markedly. These intentions are then found to be 
highly persistent with the actual educational career. This implies that early decisions 
are the major source of unequal educational attainment. Students are not ‘short-
sighted’ and plan their educational career ahead of time –and at least for the German 
context rather ‘delays’ than ‘re-entries’, i.e. later corrections of earlier decisions are 
less important. If, however, the educational career deviates from what was intended 
when the students left secondary education, the young adults tend to change towards 
stronger conformity with the parental model, i.e. those young adults with better 
educated parents more often enroll in higher education. Therefore, ‘cooling out’ of 
lower-class students exists to some degree, but its contribution to the total inequality 
in the entry to higher education is small. The impact of changes in intentions could 
though be stronger if I considered drop-outs in the analysis, who certainly are another 
important group of students not persistent in their plans. Revisions of educational 
intentions leading away from university were most likely when the respondents 
planned to enter higher education after vocational education. Those who planned to 
study after another activity in on the other hand in most cases indeed do so. Hence, 
the vocational training system in Germany ‘cools out’ the educational ambition of 
working-class students to some degree. The reason could be that vocational training 
offers a smooth transition to stable labor market positions. Similar to the findings 
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from US community colleges (Brint and Karabel, 1989), even students who intended 
to achieve more education often stayed in the labor market. 
These findings show that major sources of parental education effects on 
educational career patterns in Germany are to a large extent the results of the long-
term intentions and plans of young adults. The high consistency of educational careers 
with previous plans implies that the sources for educational origin differences have to 
be looked for in the different plans of young adults at the time when leaving 
secondary school. 
From what is known about country differences, this could be a German 
peculiarity. As section 2 has shown, in the US and Sweden students move between 
work and education much more frequently. The rather inflexible German system of 
higher education and labor market could force students to think more carefully about 
their educational future. Therefore, the conclusion of ‘all pre-planned’ educational 
careers cannot easily be generalized to these contexts. Even though the strong 
explanatory power of earlier characteristics for the social origin differences reported 
in section 3 did point into the same direction. 
Previous studies as in section 3 often showed for many contexts that social 
origin affects delayed entries, but neither asked for the mechanisms nor the time-
points of educational decisions in the life course. The results presented in this chapter 
go beyond this point and start to test several hypotheses about possible mechanisms to 
explain social inequalities for changes in educational intentions. As just as inequality 
in re-entry in Sweden and the US, class differences the conformity of educational 
intentions with the actual educational career is to a large extent attributable to the 
lower scholastic performance of working-class students. On the contrary, the 
indicators used to operationalize secondary effects of educational background did not 
explain parental background effects. In this respect, undecided young adults are the 
exception. There seem to be strong barriers for less well-performing students in 
Germany, who come more often from families with a lower educational background. 
It is unclear if this is due to a reduction of success of lower-class children in the 
educational system and thereafter in the labor market, or a result of the numerus 
clausus system. At least part of the students probably cannot meet the requirements to 
be accepted in their favorite study program and therefore choose alternatives to higher 
education to spend waiting time until they get admitted. With regard to financial 
resources, the perceived probability of success, and the status maintenance motive 
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explaining different educational decisions, the indicators used do not contribute much 
to the explanation of educational inequality. It should be noted that the costs of higher 
education vary strongly between country-contexts and that this mechanism could play 
a more important role where tuition fees are higher than in Germany, such as in the 
US. 
The fact that the biggest changes occur with regard to those intentions that 
imply a rather late enrollment in higher education could be caused by other 
biographical events becoming more important with increasing age, e.g. marriage or 
childbirth. Possibly, such events occur more frequently among young adults with a 
lower educational background, and the change in their life situation hinders them 
from entering higher education. This should motivate further research into the 
question of how the situation of young adults in different stages of life conditions 
their educational attendance. An alternative interpretation would be that lower-class 
children are less convinced with their intentions from the beginning and pursue them 
with less steadfastness. This explanation is supported by the fact that students with a 
lower educational background are more often in the category of those who are 
undecided about their future attendance in higher education. Again, this calls for 
further research. 
The findings also help to evaluate the practice of taking intentions, 
expectations or plans as a proxy for actual attendance of certain educational tracks 
(e.g. Becker and Hecken, 2009a). This practice will introduce some bias into the 
results of these studies, but is very unlikely to alter the substantial conclusions. 
Furthermore, it leads to conservative estimates in the sense that they will rather 
underestimate than overestimate the impact of educational origin. 
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4.1.5 Appendix 
 
Table 4.1.3: Logistic and linear probability regression models; social origin on persistence of the 
intention to study immediately. 
 model 1: total effect model 2: M1 + 
primary effects 
model 3: M2 + 
indicators for other 
mechanisms 
 coefs. z-value coefs. z-value coefs. z-value 
 
both parents HE degree 
log y*: 
0.11** 
lpm: 
0.03** 2.57 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.15 
 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.04 
 
one parent HE degree 0.03 
-0.00 
0.69 -0.00 
-0.02 
0.06 
 
-0.00 
-0.01 
-0.03 
 
second. school final exam: GPA   0.03*** 
0.01*** 
10.71 
 
0.03*** 
0.01*** 
10.18 
 
sex (male=1)   0.25*** 
0.07*** 
2.76 
 
0.25*** 
0.07*** 
2.81 
 
type of sec. degree (Abitur=1)   0.38*** 
0.13*** 
4.54 
 
0.39*** 
0.13*** 
4.66 
 
type of sec. school (Gymnasium=1)   0.11** 
0.03* 
2.14 
 
0.12** 
0.04** 
2.46 
 
draftee: compulsory military service 
(males) 
  -0.39*** 
0.00 
-4.24 
 
-0.39*** 
0.01 
-4.34 
 
age   0.01 
0.00 
0.71 
 
0.02 
0.01 
1.15 
 
status maintenance     -0.03** 
-0.01 
-2.00 
 
financial resources       
financial independence     0.05*** 
0.02*** 
4.37 
 
short duration of training     0.01 
-0.00 
0.69 
 
perceived probability of success       
expectation of good career 
opportunity 
    -0.05** 
-0.03*** 
-3.08 
 
positive congruence with own 
capability 
    0.09*** 
0.03*** 
4.47 
 
constant 0.856***  0.576***  0.507***  
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, not weighted. 
Own calculations. N=5893. 
two-sided z- or t- test: significance *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.1.4: Logistic and linear probability regression models; social origin on persistence of 
intentions to study after vocational education. 
 model 1: total effect model 2: M1 + 
primary effects 
model 3: M2 + 
indicators for other 
mechanisms 
 coefs. z-value coefs. z-value coefs. z-value 
both parents academic degree 
log y*: 
0.24***  
lpm: 
0.18*** 
3.71 
 
 
0.17*** 
0.13*** 
2.74 
 
0.16** 
0.12** 
2.45 
 
one parent academic degree 0.11* 
0.07* 
1.80 
 
0.08 
0.04 
1.45 
 
0.06 
0.03 
1.02 
 
second. school final exam: GPA   0.03*** 
0.02*** 
5.39 
 
0.02*** 
0.02*** 
5.22 
 
sex (male=1)   0.21** 
0.11* 
2.37 
 
0.22** 
0.12* 
2.33 
 
type of sec. degree (Abitur=1)   0.30*** 
0.19*** 
3.11 
 
0.28*** 
0.19*** 
2.89 
 
type of sec. school (Gymnasium=1)   0.14** 
0.08* 
2.04 
 
0.14** 
0.08 
2.03 
 
draftee: compulsory military service 
(males) 
  0.29*** 
-0.15** 
2.84 
 
0.29*** 
-0.16** 
2.82 
 
age   0.04 
0.01 
1.43 
 
0.03 
0.01 
0.94 
 
status maintenance     -0.05** 
-0.03** 
-2.09 
 
financial resources       
financial independence     0.07*** 
0.05*** 
3.92 
 
short duration of training     -0.06*** 
-0.03*** 
-3.92 
 
perceived probability of success       
expectation of good career 
opportunity 
    -0.00 
0.01 
-0.00 
 
positive congruence with own 
capability 
    0.04 
0.02 
1.62 
 
constant 0.439***  -0.029  0.248  
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, not weighted. 
Own calculations. N=5893. 
two-sided z- or t- test: significance *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.1.5: Logistic and linear probability regression models; social origin on persistence of the 
intentions to return to higher education after other activities. 
 model 1: total effect model 2: M1 + 
primary effects 
model 3: M2 + 
indicators for other 
mechanisms 
 coefs. z-value coefs. z-value coefs. z-value 
both parents academic degree 
log y*: 
0.17**  
lpm: 
0.10***  
2.05 
 
 
0.02 
0.04 
0.24 
 
-0.00 
0.04 
-0.00 
 
one parent academic degree 0.09 
0.05 
0.96 
 
0.06 
0.04 
0.80 
 
0.05 
0.03 
0.56 
 
second. school final exam: GPA   0.03*** 
0.01*** 
5.00 
 
0.03*** 
0.01*** 
4.69 
 
sex (male=1)   0.30 
-0.05 
1.38 
 
0.30 
-0.02 
1.31 
 
type of sec. degree (Abitur=1)   0.30 
0.14* 
1.49 
 
0.33 
0.15** 
1.62 
 
type of sec. school (Gymnasium=1)   -0.14 
-0.08 
-1.00 
 
-0.14 
-0.09* 
-1.00 
 
draftee: compulsory military service 
(males) 
  -0.35 
-0.10 
-1.21 
 
-0.35 
-0.12 
-1.19 
 
age   -0.01 
-0.05** 
-0.26 
 
-0.03 
-0.05*** 
-0.60 
 
status maintenance     -0.03 
-0.00 
-0.89 
 
financial resources       
financial independence     0.08*** 
0.03** 
3.06 
 
short duration of training     0.01 
0.01 
0.39 
 
perceived probability of success       
expectation of good career 
opportunity 
    -0.03 
0.00 
-0.85 
 
positive congruence with own 
capability 
    0.04 
-0.00 
1.16 
 
constant 0.861***  1.697***  1.824***  
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, not weighted. 
Own calculations. N=5893. 
two-sided z- or t- test: significance *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.1.6: Logistic and linear probability regression models; studying after being undecided 
initially. 
 model 1: total effect model 2: M1 + 
primary effects 
model 3: M2 + 
indicators for other 
mechanisms 
 coefs. z-value coefs. z-value coefs. z-value 
both parents academic degree 
log y*: 
0.41***  
lpm: 
0.27***  
5.70 
 
 
0.27*** 
0.18*** 
3.93 
 
0.24*** 
0.15*** 
3.45 
 
one parent academic degree 0.17*** 
0.10** 
2.64 
 
0.17*** 
0.09** 
2.73 
 
0.15** 
0.06 
2.46 
 
second. school final exam: GPA   0.02*** 
0.01*** 
3.75 
 
0.02*** 
0.01*** 
3.48 
 
sex (male=1)   0.14 
0.05 
1.59 
 
0.18** 
0.06 
2.10 
 
type of sec. degree (Abitur=1)   0.64*** 
0.43*** 
5.42 
 
0.63*** 
0.41*** 
5.58 
 
type of sec. school (Gymnasium=1)   0.01 
-0.02 
0.10 
 
-0.03 
-0.03 
-0.43 
 
drawn for compulsory service 
(males) 
  0.06 
0.01 
0.06 
 
0.05 
0.03 
0.56 
 
age   0.01 
-0.00 
0.30 
 
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.15 
 
status maintenance     -0.07*** 
-0.03** 
-3.03 
 
financial resources       
financial independence     0.13*** 
0.08*** 
6.17 
 
short duration of training     0.01 
-0.00 
0.69 
 
perceived probability of success       
expectation of good career 
opportunity 
    0.02 
0.02 
0.56 
 
positive congruence with own 
capability 
    0.03 
0.01 
1.36 
 
constant 0.606***  0.258  0.523  
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, not weighted. 
Own calculations. N=5893. 
two-sided z- or t- test: significance *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.1.7: Logistic and linear probability regression models; social origin on persistence of the 
intention not to enter higher education (HE). 
 model 1: total effect model 2: M1 + 
primary effects 
model 3: M2 + 
indicators for other 
mechanisms 
 coefs. z-value coefs. z-value coefs. z-value 
both parents academic degree 
log y*: 
0.23**  
lpm: 
0.12**  
2.19 
 
 
0.16 
0.08* 
1.64 
 
0.10 
0.06 
1.00 
 
one parent academic degree 0.10 
0.05 
1.28 
 
0.02 
0.01 
0.26 
 
0.01 
0.01 
0.15 
 
second. school final exam: GPA 
  
0.03*** 
0.01*** 
4.26 
 
0.03*** 
0.01*** 
4.25 
 
sex (male=1) 
  
0.37*** 
0.17*** 
3.02 
 
0.30** 
0.14** 
2.43 
 
type of sec. degree (Abitur=1) 
  
0.65*** 
0.21*** 
4.09 
 
0.62*** 
0.20*** 
3.95 
 
type of sec. school (Gymnasium=1) 
  
0.17* 
0.09* 
1.89 
 
0.18* 
0.09* 
1.94 
 
drawn for compulsory service 
(males)   
0.15 
-0.01 
1.10 
 
0.17 
-0.00 
1.18 
 
age 
  
0.08* 
0.04* 
1.83 
 
0.08* 
0.04* 
1.77 
 
status maintenance 
    
-0.06** 
-0.02* 
-1.99 
 
financial resources 
      
financial independence 
    
0.06** 
0.03** 
2.35 
 
short duration of training 
    
-0.01 
-0.01 
-0.26 
 
perceived probability of success       
expectation of good career 
opportunity     
-0.05 
-0.03 
-1.40 
 
positive congruence with own 
capability     
0.08** 
0.04** 
2.42 
 
constant 0.254***  -0.678*  -0.594  
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, not weighted. 
Own calculations. N=5893. 
two-sided z- or t- test: significance *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4.1.8: Linear probability regression models of social origin on persistence of study plans for 
those who are enlisted in compulsory military or civil community service (HE = 
higher education). 
(ref. cat.: none of parents 
holding academic degree) 
model 1: total effect model 2: M1 +  
primary effects 
model 3: M2 + indicators 
for other mechanisms 
educational intention both parents 
Higher educ. 
degree 
one parent 
HE degree 
both parents 
HE degree 
one parent 
HE degree 
both parents 
HE degree 
one parent 
HE degree 
 
study immediately, 
started studying as soon as 
possible 
dep. variable: entered HE as 
soon as possible 
N=1175 
0.03 0.04x 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
study after vocational 
education 
dep. variable: entered HE 
N=166 
0.15 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.04 
 
undecided, enrolled in HE 
Dep. variable: entered HE 
N=150 
0.28* 0.17+ 0.25+ 0.19+ 0.22+ 0.18+ 
 
no plans to study in tertiary 
 track, non-persistence: 
enrolled in HE 
Dep. variable: entered HE 
N=104 
-0.20 -0.03 -0.24 -0.05 -0.25 0.01 
       
Data source: HIS Panel Study of students entitled to higher education, not weighted. 
Own calculations. N=5893. 
one-sided z-test: significance x p< 0.10, + p < 0.05, * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001 
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4.2 Class Origin and Young Adults’ Re-Enrollment Decisions in 
the US – is Parental Status the Minimum Acceptable Status? 
 
 
 
 
This chapter examines re-enrollment events among young adults who have previously 
participated in the labor market in the US. The influence of social origin on re-
enrollment is examined to test hypotheses based on the motive that families assign 
high priority to the reproduction of their status over generations. To make this 
possible, the effects of the childrens’ class position relative to the families’ class 
position are estimated. The children from lower classes re-enroll less often than those 
from the upper classes, but once the parental class has been reached, re-enrollment is 
less likely to occur. This supports the frequently assumed theoretical mechanism that 
families attempt to avoid downward mobility and to reproduce their status in the labor 
market. But it only partly explains class differences in re-enrollment. Class-related 
differences in test-scores and scholastic performance are even more important. 
 
This chapter is a revised version of the following article: 
 Jacob, M. and F. Weiss (2011). ‘Class Origin and Young Adults Decision to 
 Reenroll.’ Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 29(4): 415-426. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Against the background of inequalities even in late re-enrollment, this chapter focuses 
on one key aspect of nontraditional postsecondary enrollment patterns in young 
adults, the transition from the labor market (back) into higher education and the 
impact of social background on re-enrollment. The return from the labor market to the 
education system can justly be regarded as a further educational threshold – assuming 
other than in the previous that at least a part of the students decides to re-enroll as the 
result of revised decisions. Children from higher social backgrounds may be more 
likely to re-enter education because their parents encourage them to do so. This 
hypothesis is related to the theory of aversion to downward intergenerational class 
mobility (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), presented at the outset of this chapter as one 
of the mechanisms for explaining lower enrollment rates into postsecondary education 
even for late transitions. The case of late educational enrollment is a favorable 
constellation for testing hypotheses derived from this theory, since status reproduction 
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failure can be operationalized directly by comparing parental class to the class 
position the child has already reached. 
This hypothesis is tested empirically by analyzing the US National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth 79 (NLSY79). This dataset enables to operationalize the 
relative status achievement of parents and children directly and time varying. As a 
result, there is evidence for the ‘relative risk aversion’ mechanism, but beyond that, 
the influence of performance-based predictors is in toto much stronger. 
 
4.2.2 Social Inequality in Educational Decisions: Re-enrollment and 
intergenerational social mobility 
In line with the few other studies dealing with inequality in later re-enrollment, social 
origin differences in the re-enrollment decision became evident in section 3.2. Using 
NLSY79 data, Oettinger (1993) and Light (1996) find that both low parental 
education and low family income have a negative impact on the decision to enroll in 
adulthood. Effects of mother’s education have been shown by Marcus (1986), who 
analyzes the NLS Young Men Data, and also by Astone et al. (2000), who find higher 
re-entry rates for inner-city African Americans whose mothers have attended at least 
‘some college’. Elman and O’Rand (2007) consider the father’s occupational prestige 
and find a significant and also positive influence on the probability of re-entering 
education. While previous research has confirmed links between re-enrollment and 
parental education, income, and occupation, none of these studies explicitly refer to 
relative risk aversion as the main theoretical explanation, nor do any of them model 
relative class position directly by comparing the child’s current class position to the 
parents’ class status up to the point at which re-enrollment occurs. In the following I 
discuss this theoretical mechanism in greater detail and derive hypotheses from this 
framework that can be tested empirically. 
In the Breen-Goldthorpe-model, the central assumption of purely rational 
decision-making is relaxed. One mechanism in this model is that families strive to 
achieve at least the same status for their offspring as they have achieved themselves 
(‘relative risk aversion’ or ‘status reproduction’). As families interpret non-
achievement of this status as ‘failure’, upper-class families have greater incentives to 
invest in education in order to avoid downward mobility. The other mechanisms 
discussed under chapter 4.0 are regarded in this model as well. With regard to the 
relative status mechanisms, the re-entry situation has the appeal that failure in the 
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achievement of the parental class status can be operationalized directly. According to 
this theory, the ultimate goal of educational decisions is the achievement of a certain 
class positions. Educational achievement is an intermediate good in this process of 
achievement. Since education is an efficient vehicle for the achievement of class 
status, one obvious option in the case of status reproduction failure is further 
investment in education. In early educational decisions, education can only be seen as 
a resource for avoiding downward mobility. In the case of late educational decisions, 
however, failure to achieve parental class status can be experienced directly. 
Therefore young adults can be expected to react to non-achievement of parental class 
status with an ad hoc decision to re-enroll. 
If achieving at least the parental status is an empirically important motive, 
not only parental class would be expected to have an effect on re-enrollment, but also 
the relative achievement of the child in the labor market compared to that of the 
parents. If parental class status has been achieved – regardless of college graduation – 
then re-enrollment should not occur, even if the parents’ or the student’s own 
resources would make it a viable proposition. There should be higher re-enrollment 
rates for children who fail to achieve at least the same class status as their parents, 
since additional education could be seen as a way of achieving the parents’ class. 
According to this view, it is not the absolute status of the parents that matters (for 
provision of resources, confidence about abilities, etc.) but the child’s relative class 
status compared to that of the parents. This leads to the hypothesis that the 
achievement of parental (or higher) class status via participation in the labor market 
reduces the likelihood of re-enrollment. 
 
4.2.3 Data and Methods 
As in the previous chapters on the US, I draw upon the National Longitudinal Study 
of Youth 1979 (NLSY79, U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). Again, only the birth-
cohort respondents from the main sample as of 1961 are selected, restricting the 
perspective to those attaining either a high school degree or GED. This leaves 2140 
cases for the empirical analyses. In practice, I look at students already working full-
time in the labor force
27
, and analyze whether they re-enter education or not, and if so, 
how long it takes before they re-enroll. As this depends on both re-enrollment itself 
                                                 
27
 ‘being in the labor force’ is defined as working at least 25 hours per week or being unemployed. 
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and its timing, techniques of event-history analyses are appropriate. I specify an 
accelerated failure time (AFT) model.
28
 Applying a parametric model of this kind 
requires the specification of a functional form for the hazard rate assumed. I have 
opted for the log-logistic distribution, as it specifies hazard rates very flexibly and can 
model a less steep curve than, say, the Weibull-distribution would assume. In the AFT 
model, the dependent variable is the logarithm of survival time, rather than the hazard 
rate figuring in the frequently used Cox regression. Accordingly, the estimated 
coefficients have to be interpreted in terms of the failure functions, i.e. if  is greater 
than zero, then x(t) has a positive effect on failure time, and the event (here: re-
enrollment) is expected to occur later. If  is smaller than zero, the event will occur 
sooner. Time varying covariates can be included. For each person I use one 
observation for each month, which enables us to include covariates that change from 
one month to the next. 
Social origin as the central independent variable is again measured by a 
simplified version of the EGP class scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 
1979) as described in chapter 3.0.1. The classification is in principle the same as in 
section 3 of this volume, but classes are differently grouped. Parental class is 
measured retrospectively in terms of the occupation of the adults in the household 
where the child was living at the age of 14. In cases where only one adult is present, 
his/her class position is defined as the dominant class. Class construction is based on 
the 1970 census classification of occupations, using the coding scheme developed by 
Hout (2005). From 2002 onwards, the 2000 US census classification of occupations is 
the only one available. On this basis I have constructed a classification of my own that 
follows the Hout coding scheme as closely as possible. EGP classes are then collapsed 
into four categories, as set out in Table 1. After simplifying the class scheme, the 
remaining categories can be treated as an ordinal variable. In previous chapters the 
scheme has been simplified further by collapsing the working classes into one 
category. For the questions tackled in this chapter, it is important to exploit as much 
                                                 
28
 The AFT model assumes a linear relationship between the log of survival time t and the independent 
variables x: iztxt  )()ln(  where  is a vector of parameters and z is an error term. An AFT regression 
coefficient relates proportional changes in survival time to a unit change in a given regressor, with all 
other characteristics held constant. The advantage over proportional hazard models is – as discussed in 
length in section 3 – that it does not require the proportional hazard assumption, and the interpretation 
of the coefficients is easier than for proportional hazard regressions (Cleves et al. 2002). Using a 
proportional hazard regression model, a test for Schoenfeld-residuals indicated that the proportional 
hazard assumption cannot be justified for the central independent variable ‘parental class’. 
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as possible of the ordinal dimension of the class-scheme and to keep the bottom 
category as small as possible since this category cannot contribute to an analysis of 
downward mobility. The children’s current class is then set into relation to the highest 
class of both parents to define the relative class position. The respondent’s current 
class is constructed in the same way as the parents’. 
 
Table 4.2.1: EGP class scheme and simplified version. 
full EGP class scheme categories simplified version 
I professionals and managers, higher grade Service Class (1) 
II professionals and managers, lower grade; technicians, 
higher grade 
Service Class (1) 
IIIa routine non-manual employees, higher grade Intermediate (2) 
IIIb routine non-manual employees, lower grade Working Class (3) 
IVabc small employers and self-employed workers coded to other classes according to 
occupation 
V technicians, lower-grade supervisors of manual 
workers 
Intermediate (2) 
VI skilled manual workers Working Class (3) 
VIIa/b unskilled manual workers Routine Working Class (4) 
 
 
 
The resulting variable for relative class position takes the value of one if the parental 
class has already been reproduced by the respondent’s current class position. 
Otherwise the value is zero. Unemployment of the young adults is counted as ‘non-
achievement of parental class’. Accordingly, the respondent’s relative position to the 
father’s is a time-varying variable that can change over process time. It can take a 
different value every month and is included in the analysis with a time lag of 6 
months. 
To cancel out performance-based primary effects accounting for social class 
differences in re-enrollment patterns, I use the percentiles of the ‘Armed Forces 
Qualification Test’ (afqt), an aptitude test conducted with all NLSY79 respondents.29 
As controls, several variables are included that either have strong links with selection 
for the sample or may lead to misinterpretations of the class-origin effects. These are 
gender, race, birth cohort, age when the school-leaving certificate was obtained, type 
                                                 
29
 The ‘Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery’ was administered to the whole NLSY sample in 
1980. The score is a weighted average of different scores achieved in tests on such things as 
arithmetical reasoning, numerical operations, vocabulary, and paragraph comprehension. For the use of 
the score in a similar context see Oettinger (1993). 
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of previous degree (high school diploma vs. GED), and achievement of an A.A. 
degree by the respondent. To cater for the hypothesis that the main mechanism 
operative in class-biased selection for re-enrollment is the lack of financial resources 
in lower-class families, I control for the poverty status of the household the student is 
living in at the age of eighteen. Poverty level is included in the NLSY dataset by 
using the ‘Poverty Income Guidelines’ issued annually by the US Department of 
Health and Human Services. Table 4.2.4 in the Appendix provides a descriptive 
overview of all variables. 
 
4.2.4 Results 
The empirical analysis takes place in two stages. First I shortly reproduce the effects 
of class inequality in the in re-enrollment rates from section 3 with the current sample, 
model specification and parental class definition. This analysis disregards the child’s 
own achievement. Second, I look at ‘relative’ class status, taking into account whether 
the class of origin has already been achieved or not. The modeling strategy differs in 
each case. In the first stage I include all the respondents in the sample, whereas in the 
second stage I estimate separate models for different classes of origin. 
The bivariate model 1 in table 4.2.2 considers only the (highest) parental 
class and shows the ‘gross’ effect of social origin on re-enrollment. It turns out that all 
other classes enroll in higher education significantly more slowly and less often than 
the service classes (reference category). This effect is particularly marked among the 
unskilled working classes, which could not be seen in the comparative models in 
section 3. As a second step, a more elaborate model includes the poverty status of the 
household when the child was eighteen years old and academic performance to rule 
out the two alternative explanations of ‘primary effects’ and monetary constraints. 
Primary effects are operationalized as aptitude, measured using the afqt-percentiles, 
whether the respondent holds a GED or a high school diploma and whether he/she 
holds an A.A. degree at the time of re-enrollment as a time-varying variable (Model 2 
in Table 2). Further, I control for race to account for racial discrimination or policies 
compensating racial disadvantages at college entry (cf. Grodsky, 2007). 
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Table 4.2.2: Log-logistic regression models on the time till re-enrollment in college 
education. 
explanatory variables model 1 model 2 
max. class of parents    
intermediate  0.42*  0.35 
(ref.: salaried)  (2.08)  (1.76) 
skilled working class  0.45*  0.23 
  (2.30)  (1.19) 
unskilled working class  0.91***  0.53* 
  (4.10)  (2.35) 
poor   0.27 
   (1.32) 
GED   -0.16 
(ref.: high school diploma)   (-0.71) 
A.A. degree obtained   -2.21*** 
(time-varying)   (-8.20) 
afqt score   -0.02*** 
   (-6.87) 
male   0.60*** 
   (4.06) 
race: black   -1.02*** 
(ref.: white)    (-3.91) 
race: hispanic   -1.18*** 
   (-4.17) 
cohort 1961 (ref.: 1964)   -0.18 
   (-0.82) 
cohort 1962   -0.29 
   (-1.37) 
cohort 1963   -0.14 
   (-0.64) 
constant  6.29***  7.79*** 
  (44.44)  (24.25) 
ln gamma  0.46***  0.41*** 
  (12.92)  (11.62) 
N (persons) 2131 2131 
number of failures  635  635 
t statistics in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Data source: NLSY79 
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In Model 2 in table 4.2.2 (the full model), the coefficients of skilled-working-class 
and intermediate-class parents are reduced and become insignificant. In particular, the 
afqt-score and the A.A. degree have strongly positive effects on re-enrollment, 
indicating the importance of aptitude and previous achievement for admission 
procedures into higher education in the US. Class differences remain, but they need to 
be interpreted with caution due to their weak statistical significance (see section 3). 
The following section focuses on the role of the ‘relative risk aversion’ or ‘status 
reproduction’ argument in the decision to re-enroll as a possible explanatory 
mechanism for the residual secondary effects of parental social class. 
With the ‘relative class’-hypothesis I argued that it is important for later 
enrollment whether parental class has already been attained or not. In Models 6 to 8 I 
add a time-varying 0–1–variable for attainment of parental class. These models need 
to be estimated separately for the three classes that can make downward moves. The 
routine working class is not considered, because here class reproduction failure is 
ruled out. All other control variables are the same as in Model 2 of table 4.2.2. 
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Table 4.2.3:  Log-logistic regression models on the time till re-enrollment in college 
education by parental class – the effect of ‘achieving parental class status’. 
explanatory variables service intermediate skilled working 
achieved parental class status 0.393 0.607* -0.252 
(time varying) (1.19) (1.99) (-0.93) 
poor 0.110 0.805 -0.144 
 (0.27) (1.69) (-0.41) 
GED 0.0994 -0.829 -0.316 
(Ref.: high school diploma) (0.20) (-1.78) (-0.82) 
A.A. degree obtained  -1.776** -2.436*** -1.873*** 
(time varying) (-3.23) (-4.90) (-4.08) 
afqt score -0.0202** -0.0247*** -0.0300*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.70) (-4.95) 
male 0.137 0.794** 0.967*** 
race: black  -1.861** -0.729 -0.939* 
(Ref.: race white) (-3.00) (-1.24) (-2.27) 
race: Hispanic -0.493 -1.432* -0.939 
 (-0.79) (-2.50) (-1.74) 
cohort 1961 (Ref.: 1964) -0.505 -0.0760 -0.0827 
 (-1.29) (-0.18) (-0.21) 
cohort 1962 -0.401 0.0913 -0.0414 
 (-1.04) (0.22) (-0.11) 
cohort 1963 0.364 -0.519 0.333 
 (0.90) (-1.30) (0.81) 
constant 7.800*** 7.877*** 8.082*** 
 (13.58) (13.43) (14.92) 
ln gamma 0.467*** 0.349*** 0.334*** 
 (7.53) (4.70) (4.82) 
N 609 493 576 
no. of failures 213 148 168 
t statistics in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Data source: NLSY79 
 
 
 
In the samples of service-class and intermediate-class children I find positive 
coefficients for those who have reached at least the class status of their parents. This 
indicates a deceleration in the re-entry process, which is in accordance with the 
suggestion in hypothesis 2 that relative class position has an impact above and beyond 
other class effects. This means that children from the service and intermediate classes 
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withdraw from their efforts to re-enroll in higher education if they have already 
attained at least the class status of their parents. However, the coefficient for the 
service classes is not significant, and for intermediate-class offspring it is only weakly 
significant at the 0.05 level (two-sided test). This may partly be due to the smaller 
sub-samples in comparison the analyses of inequality in re-enrollment in table 4.2.2. 
The coefficient for the skilled working classes is negative, implying that children 
from those classes who have managed to get a job at that level are more likely to re-
enroll. This is not surprising, as I am only considering post-secondary education, 
which will probably not be necessary for attaining skilled as opposed to unskilled 
working status. In sum, for the secondary effects of educational inequality I find 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that class-achievement goals are geared to 
relative parental class and that intergenerational downward mobility is avoided by 
giving up a position in the labor market and re-enrolling for college. 
 
4.2.5 Conclusion 
In accordance with section 3 I find that effects of parental class are present even in 
very late educational decisions, i.e. for re-enrollment back from the labor market to 
higher education. There are ‘secondary effects’ still present after controlling for 
primary effects and can be explained by the ‘status reproduction’ or ‘relative risk 
aversion’ motive. This is a central mechanism in the model for explaining secondary 
effects proposed by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997). Testing it at the time when young 
adults enter the labor market has the advantage that it can be operationalized by 
directly comparing young people’s class status with that of their parents. This chapter 
has shown supporting evidence for this argument, as young adults re-enroll to a lesser 
extent once they have achieved the same class as their parents. 
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4.2.6 Appendix 
 
Table 4.2.4: Descriptive overview on the distribution of all explanatory variables. 
explanatory variables Mean (SD) / % 
max. class of parents   
salaried 28.6 
intermediate 23.1 
skilled working class 27.0 
unskilled working class 21.3 
poor 16.8 
GED 
(Ref.: high school diploma) 
13.3 
A.A. degree obtained 
(time-varying, here: ever obtained) 
4.2 
afqt score 52.5 (26.7) 
male 51.3 
race  
black 10.0 
hispanic 6.5 
white or other 83.5 
cohort 1961 25.5 
cohort 1962 27.6 
cohort 1963 25.5 
cohort 1964 21.4 
N (persons) 2131 
Data source: NLSY79 
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4.3 Status Demolition and Re-Enrollment in Context: Comparing 
Sweden and the US with Respect to Re-Enrollment Decisions 
upon Intergenerational Downward Mobility 
 
 
 
 
This chapter now goes one step beyond the micro-level and involves a country 
comparison again. It follows the strategy of chapter 4.2 by asking whether factually 
status demolished young adults will be more likely to re-enroll than those who have 
achieved their parents’ class position. From a comparative perspective this 
mechanism is now hypothesized to be more important in Sweden than in the US. This 
hypothesis can be confirmed, even though the overall impact of status demolition on 
re-enrollment is still not very strong. 
 
A previous version of this chapter has been presented at the final conference of the 
EQUALSOC-network in 2010 in Amsterdam. I would like to thank the commentators 
at this workshop for their constructive comments. 
 
 
 
 
This chapter deviates from the individual focus of this section in going one step 
further and taking a comparative view on the results of chapter 4.2. Comparing re-
enrollment between different financial support-systems for non-traditional students 
allows studying the sensitivity of re-enrolling students from different social origins. 
Challenging my findings from section 3, the strong system similarity between the US 
and Sweden is put into question. While inequality in educational careers is on the 
macro-level distributed fairly similar in these two countries, the contexts differ by 
micro-level conditions they impose on the decision makers. While the systems 
institutionalize educational careers in a similar way and are rather open for second-
chance education, the costs of postsecondary education are markedly lower in 
Sweden. Thus, the two countries qualify for a comparison of individual decisions with 
respect to this mechanism. In the following I will therefore employ a similar analysis 
as in chapter 4.2 in order to compare whether the specific institutional environments, 
linked to direct costs of education, trigger re-enrollment. Furthermore, following on 
with testing the relative risk aversion argument from chapter 4.2, I argue that the 
effects of the relative status should be even stronger in Sweden than in the US due to 
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the high direct costs of postsecondary education in the North American context that 
could to some degree undermine the chances of working-class students even when 
achieving their parents’ status. Higher class students on the other hand have higher 
earnings than the former when achieving parental status and thus due to the direct 
costs would enroll more often than lower class students. To avoid that this effect 
cancels out the relative status mechanism, the Swedish context with its low direct 
costs of education and compressed wages is a good, but less conservative, comparison 
case to the US. 
 
4.3.1 Why Should Individual Decisions to Re-Enroll Differ between Swedish 
and American Young Adults?  
The results of chapters 2.5 and 3.2 show Sweden and the US being in the same camp 
with regard to the role of social origin for belated education: educational careers are 
flexible, and inequality in later entries is still high compared to e.g. Germany. The 
opportunity structures, with regard to the educational system, are similar so one could 
assume that these are the only conditions accounting for inequality in late enrollment. 
But are the other remarkable differences between the contexts, which were 
highlighted by previous research, indeed irrelevant? Given the manifold differences 
shaping the decision on the micro-level, more investigation is needed before arriving 
at this conclusion. The main mechanism to expect differences between the two 
systems is the different cost for postsecondary education in the two countries. The 
openness of the higher education system is not only defined by whether there are 
nominal opportunities, but also the costs for studies which differ remarkably between 
the two systems. The costs in Sweden are significantly lower, as comparatively 
generous financial support is granted and no tuition fees apply. While the 
qualification requirements are equally low in the US, costs for higher education are 
high. 
The mechanism of re-enrollment as a strategy to ‘escape’ intergenerational 
status demolition does not directly imply a hypothesis on the country differences. 
However, coupled with other assumptions, hypotheses differ by context. Generally, 
openness of the system is a precondition for students re-enrolling upon the threat of 
status demolition. If the system restricts re-entries, status demolished students cannot 
re-enroll and have to seek other ways towards higher class positions. 
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In the US system, colleges charge in most cases at least moderate tuition 
fees. Colleges leading to better career prospects charge, in comparison to other 
countries, very high tuition fees. In Sweden, a comparatively generous system of 
student support exists. This system difference should favor status demolished young 
adults with upper class parents: in comparison to their peers in the same labor market 
position, the parents of status demolished young adults are more often able to give 
financial support and probably also more willing to finance additional education for 
their offspring - if the status maintenance motive applies. For Sweden I can thus 
expect the motive to avoid status demolition is more important. 
Furthermore, another institutional factor has to be regarded. If young adults 
re-enroll to maximize their status position via education, they will more likely do so if 
education is a sufficient condition to enter high class positions with some certainty. 
And, even more important for the avoidance of status demolition, participation will be 
more likely if the respective education is a necessary condition to achieve the parental 
status. In systems with high average returns to education, but more importantly high 
certainty in these returns, re-enrolling is thus a more suitable strategy to overcome 
status demolition. The predictability of labor market outcomes differs between the 
two contexts. Due to the wage compression in Sweden, monetary benefits from higher 
education can be regarded lower, but not occupational class benefits. In the US, 
monetary returns can be expected to be higher, since taxation is lower than in 
Scandinavian countries (see Reisel, 2013 for a US-Norwegian comparison of returns 
to higher education). Class destinations on the other hand are more loosely coupled to 
education. Arum and Hout summarize the school-work linkage in the US in the 
following way: 
 
‘The weak to non-existent links between school and employers make the transition to work 
uncertain for US school-leavers. Those who first leave school before completing high school 
or immediately upon leaving high school seldom receive any institutional support in their job 
search. Many are disappointed by the outcome of that search and return to school. (…) Only 
those with post-graduate professional education can count on a circumscribed labour market to 
translate their credentials into an appropriate occupation. Even that narrowing of job tracks 
does not remove all of the uncertainties. The widest spread of earnings in first jobs is among 
the college graduates.’ (Arum and Hout, 1998, p. 508) 
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Empirically, this link is somewhat tighter in Sweden, as Erikson and Jonsson point 
out: 
 
‘… there is generally a substantial association between formal qualifications, on the one hand, 
and occupational prestige and social-class positions, on the other. This association is pervasive 
in that it exists in all subgroups identified by our structuring variables. Moreover, the effect of 
education on position is on the whole unmediated by industrial sector and firm size, although 
these factors have independent effects on labour-market outcomes.’ (Erikson and Jonsson, 
1998b) 
 
Thus, as long as social class is the relevant outcome for status reproduction, Sweden 
can again be expected to show somewhat clearer and stronger effects of status 
demolition. This expectation is strengthened by a finding of Breen and Luijkx (2004), 
who identified Sweden among a large set of European countries as the country where 
the intergenerational transmission of class (and in particular the hierarchical element 
of the class scheme) depends most on education. 
Taken together, the arguments though point towards one important aspect: 
Sweden is an even stronger test case for the relative-status-achievement mechanism 
compared to the US. As the higher education system is open and offers financial 
support, the remaining inequality is more likely to stem from individual preferences 
than from constraints. Inheriting the family status to the next generation is a motive, 
not a constraint. Its effect should thus appear more strongly in Sweden. 
 
4.3.2 Methods 
The methodology of this chapter differs in several respects to chapter 4.2. This has not 
only the aim of improving the comparability of the results over countries. It is also a 
replication and robustness check for the analyses presented there. The two datasets, 
the NLSY79 and the Swedish LNU, are used again as in other chapters before (cf. 
chapter 1.5). The NLSY79-sample differs from the previous chapter. Since the date of 
six months after starting the first job was the starting point of this analysis instead of 
the high school degree achievement date, it was possible to include one more cohort, 
the birth cohort of 1960. Furthermore, the inclusion of additional right censored cases, 
which had previously been excluded to have a consistent sample with chapter 3, led to 
a larger number of cases compared to chapter 4.2. For the US, only cases with high 
school diploma or GED were analyzed. For Sweden, the sample contains all life 
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histories of LNU. I did not restrict to those who qualified via secondary school, since 
re-enrollment into a college is – at least theoretically – possible for everybody and 
upper class children could use these opportunities more often. 
Now I estimate Cox proportional hazard models (Cox, 1972), instead of 
accelerated failure time models as in all previous chapters. The difference is of 
technical nature and in general one would expect identical results, even though a 
number of assumptions differ. The shape of the hazard rate can be left unspecified so 
that the careful step by step modeling of the different hazard shapes, as I have done in 
sections 2 and 3, is not necessary. On the other hand, the Cox-model assumes that the 
hazard rates of different covariate values are parallel (ph-assumption), which has been 
violated in several previous analyses but is not as problematic for the core analysis on 
re-entry within this chapter. Furthermore, instead of an estimation of all covariate 
effects, I stratify the model by the relevant covariates which avoids assuming parallel 
hazards (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 194) and an equal absent violation of the ph-
assumption for all covariates in all contexts. Ideally, this model could be extended 
into a fixed effects regression which is rather powerful in ruling out individual 
differences if multiple events per individual are measured (Cleves et al., 2008). The 
number of multiple re-entries is, however, small in the US and even smaller in the 
Swedish case and probably restricted to a very specific sub-sample and certain 
educational programs. Therefore, only the first re-enrollment is modeled (as in all 
other chapters before). The Cox proportional hazard regression will also be used in 
the next chapter 4.4. 
For the analysis of re-enrollment, I now consider only the service classes and 
the intermediate classes. This is motivated by the fact that the skilled working classes 
could be downwardly mobile, but postsecondary education is in most cases no 
pathway up to the skilled working classes. 
 
4.3.3 Results 
The precondition for this study is that there is a sufficient number of status 
demolished young adults in both societies. If families all follow the strategy of 
maintaining their status directly without any detours, the group of potential re-
enrollers would not contain any downwardly mobile youth and the relative status 
position to their parents cannot trigger re-enrollment. I therefore first illustrate the 
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occurrence of intergenerational downward status mobility over generations before 
continuing with regression analyses. 
 
Figure 4.3.1: States in the school to work transition over 12 years following the first entry 
into the labor market: relative frequencies of young adults with status 
demolition compared with other states. 
Sweden United States 
 
12 years starting with labor market entry 
 
12 years starting with labor market entry 
Data source: LNU 
 
Data source: NLSY79 
 
 working, >= parental class position 
 working, parental status not achieved 
unemployed 
studying 
inactive 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1 shows the activities of 12 years following the first entry into the 
labor market. In both countries exists a number of young adults who fall below the 
class positions of their parents, as indicated by the blue space on top of the graph. The 
share is even higher in Sweden, where the size of the status demolished population 
decreases much less over time. The smaller share of the activity ‘studying’ in Sweden 
can be partly due to the higher number of students who complete postsecondary 
education before entering the labor market. Another reason could be the less selective 
sample. While in Sweden all respondents are regarded as potential entrants, in the US 
only those young adults with a high school degree or GED are taken into account. For 
both countries, as figure 4.3.3 in the Appendix shows, the share of young status 
demolished young adults diminishes faster for those who re-enroll. 
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However, the state distribution plots in figure 4.3.1 cannot show the typical 
duration and stability of status demolition spells on the individual level. Figure 4.3.2 
illustrates how stable status demolition is once it occurs in the two contexts. The 
starting point is the onset of actual intergenerational downward class mobility. 
Overall, the persistence is low. Upper class children seem to manage well to make 
their way back up to at least their parents’ status. Also, in both contexts the service 
classes are most successful in overcoming intergenerational downward mobility even 
though the distance between their own and their parents’ class can theoretically be the 
longest among all social origins
30
. The main country difference is the somewhat 
longer duration of the status demolition in Sweden. While in the US the vast majority 
of all spells ends soon, Swedish youth stays in lower positions for a longer time. 
However, status demolished young adults in the US have a higher number of spells in 
the lower class position. Once affected, the median number of repeated US is falling 
back into status demolition three times. In Sweden, the median recurrence of status 
demolition is only two spells. Therefore, in the lower part of figure 4.3.2 I plot the 
respective survivor curve until a person manages to overcome status demolition, i.e. 
until a job in the same broad class-category as ones parents have is found or education 
is entered. Becoming inactive, unemployed or entering another lower class job is 
counted as continuing status demolition. Now, the rate of those who overcome status 
demolition is smaller in both countries (note the short y-axis), but the US continues to 
be the case where revisions are realized faster and more often. Inequality is prevalent 
in Sweden. In the US, the intermediate and the service classes do not differ in the rate 
their children get out of status demolition, but the working class lacks behind 
(implying that the move back from the unskilled to at least the skilled working classes 
is less often realized).  
Overall, the longer duration of status demolition spells in Sweden and the 
lower rate of overcoming strengthen the hypothesis above that status demolition 
triggers more re-enrollments into postsecondary education in this context. For the US, 
these spells are often shorter and more young adults manage overcoming status 
demolition after a while, most likely also via labor market mobility which is harder to 
                                                 
30
 Proportional hazard regression models show that the difference between both, lower classes and 
service classes is statistically significant at the 0.05-significance-level with the exception of the 
working-to-service-classes difference in Sweden. 
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achieve without additional education in Sweden. Then, education is more often 
needed as an alternative route out of lower class jobs. 
 
Figure 4.3.2: Survivor curves for the duration of intergenerational status demolition spells 
and status demolition in the life course. 
Sweden United States 
 
duration of status demolition spells 
 
 
 
duration of status demolition spells 
 
 
 
duration until overcoming status demolition 
 
 
 
duration until overcoming status demolition 
 
 
 
Data Source: LNU, not weighted 
 
 
Data source: NLSY79, not weighted 
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intermediate classes 
working classes 
 
 
 
 
For any further analyses I omit the working classes as moving back from the 
unskilled to the skilled working class should be largely independent from 
postsecondary education. The models I report differ from chapter 4.2, where I only 
included a dummy-variable for achieving parental status or not, Here, I include the 
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detailed actual class position of the respondent. This has the advantage of a much 
more detailed picture, whereas the test of the hypothesis on status attainment is 
diluted since each of the single coefficients lack statistical power. Based on these 
models, status demolished young adults re-enter the educational system, if at all, 
slightly more often than those who reach their parents’ class directly. The current 
class position of the respondent is measure with a time lag of six months.  
 
Table 4.3.1: Cox proportional hazard model of respondents own current class on the re-
enrollment, by parental social class position, United States. 
respondents current class: model 1 
family class: service class 
model 2 
family class: intermediate 
classes 
 service classes ref. ref. 
 intermediate classes .17 -0.53* 
 skilled working classes -.03 -0.17* 
 unskilled working classes .05 -0.39 
 inactive .21 -0.16 
N 895 695 
 
model stratified by / controlled for 
- sex 
- birth cohort 
- age 
- full eligibility to higher education 
- race 
- cognitive ability 
time lag for class position of children: 6 months 
 
Data source: NLSY79, own calculations. 
*p>=.10; **p>=.05; *** p>=.01 
 
 
 
Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 present the results of proportional hazard regression 
models as described in the methods section. For the US, I now do not find evidence 
for the claim that young adults from service-class families would re-enroll more often 
when falling behind their parents’ class. Even though the pattern is there, the single 
coefficients are no longer significant. For children from intermediate-class families 
most re-entries are observed for those who already have a service-class position 
(which are the reference category in all models). However, in support of the relative 
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status argument, re-enrollment is particularly low for those who have already 
achieved an intermediate class position. 
 
Table 4.3.2: Cox proportional hazard model of respondents own current class on the re-
enrollment, by parental social class position, Sweden. 
respondents current class: model 1:  
family class: service classes 
model 2:  
family class: intermediate 
classes  
 service classes ref. ref. 
 intermediate classes -.06 .21 
 skilled working classes .27 1.42* 
 unskilled working classes .35 1.85** 
 inactive 2.17*** 3.32*** 
N 537 486 
 
model stratified by / controlled for 
- sex 
- birth cohort 
- first job permanent contract 
- age 
- full eligibility for higher education (via Gymnasieskolan) 
time lag for class position of children: 6 months 
 
Data source: LNU, own calculations. 
*p>=.10; **p>=.05; *** p>=.01 
 
 
 
For Sweden, the results are somewhat more clear-cut. While service-class 
children do not change their behavior if failing in status reproduction by becoming an 
intermediate class member, they do so when entering the skilled working classes and 
the unskilled working classes. Model 2 in table 4.3.2 shows the respective results for 
the intermediate classes. In this case, it turns out that those realizing positions below 
their parents’ class re-enroll much more often.  
The most remarkable difference between the countries is the role of 
postsecondary education for young adults becoming inactive, which is mostly 
unemployment for the respective group. In Sweden, this increases the enrollment into 
postsecondary education significantly, while the respective coefficients are non-
significant for the US and even negative when the parents have intermediate class 
positions. 
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4.3.4 Conclusion 
The analysis presented above has shown that the pattern of re-enrollment upon failure 
of parental class reproduction does occur in some instances, but stands statistically yet 
on weak grounds. Overall, it is also to admit that factual status demolition (as 
operationalized here) cannot explain much of social inequality in late educational 
enrollment. Possible explanations for the inability of the status maintenance 
mechanism to explain the real world observations without further modeling are 
manifold. 
- First, it could be that the motive only exists for children, but not in the parents’ 
minds. If that is true, late enrollment is the worst test case one could think of, 
as it is the transition at which children are most independent from their 
parents. 
- Second, following on in the line of reasoning of the first argument, all effort 
for status maintenance would take place in earlier stages of the life course. 
Then, however, the question would remain open why inequality appears on 
these late transitions too. In particular for such contexts as Sweden and the US 
where educational decisions are generally moved to quite late parts of the life 
course. If any status maintenance occurs, even if only the parents pursue it, it 
has to happen rather late in the life course since there are few earlier 
opportunities for differentiation. However, several earlier educational 
decisions can prepare participation during the twenties, as section 3 could 
show. 
- Third, rather than the maintenance of class, other outcome measures could be 
more important for young adults, such as reaching the same education, wealth 
or standard of living as the parents have achieved. All of this could be reached 
without a certain class position, at least in societies with a less tight link 
between education and occupational achievement. Then, completely new data 
would have to be collected. In the light of the continuing significance of 
occupations as the material basis for the standard of living, I argue, that even if 
this holds good a class effect would be present. 
- Fourth, one could argue that first jobs are generally not meant to be permanent 
positions and thus not perceived as permanent and stable class positions. In 
this case, the assumption of myopia of educational decisions, which is 
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implicitly made, could be violated and re-enrollment is already planned when 
starting the job. This could be a likely explanation for both contexts; in 
particular for Sweden where permanent positions with unlimited contracts 
better define class positions. However, in additional analyses where I 
accounted for the contract type of the first job (temporary or permanent), the 
results do not change. 
- Fifth, in particular for the service-class students the chances for securing 
parental status could be limited to high status, upper tier colleges. Re-
enrollments into the lower tier colleges, such as community colleges, which 
are frequently entered by non-traditional students, could be useless for them. 
Then, late education could be speculated to be a generally useless instrument 
for status maintenance of service-class children, since the class positions they 
aspire would require demanding and long educational programs. This calls for 
further analyses restricting re-entry to more demanding, higher prestige 
colleges. 
- Sixth, the reason could lie in the specific composition of young adults entering 
the service class. They could be particularly likely to enroll again for other 
reasons – and also into other programs. For them, higher education could pay 
off more and could be a method of individual career advancement, 
independently from their social origins. Factors behind this could be that they 
were previously successful in schooling, or that their employers encourage 
them to re-enroll. Then, the generally higher re-enrollment would 
counterbalance the status maintenance motive among the service-class 
children. If service-class children who have not achieved such a position 
themselves re-enroll more often due to status demolition, it could still be that 
those who have managed to enter the service class re-enroll frequently for 
other reasons and we cannot observe the status demolition effect. In this case, 
the effects of status demolition must become visible in a clearer way among 
the intermediate classes, for whom the coefficients do indeed support this 
hypothesis in a much clearer way for both countries. 
Overall, the long list of possible explanations for the results should encourage further 
research on individuals whose status reproduction has come under pressure. In 
particular explorative research about strategies which are followed if re-enrollment 
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into education is not chosen could be useful to further enlighten the mechanisms 
behind intergenerational inequality. 
The country differences are in line with my expectations outlined at the start 
of this chapter. The relative status demolition can be observed better in the Swedish 
sample, in particular among the intermediate-class children. This supports the view 
that the cost argument is more important in the US, and hides some of the status 
maintenance mechanism. Furthermore, there is another indication that the costs of 
higher education are an important deterrent for American non-traditional learners. 
While in Sweden inactive (mostly unemployed) young adults react with re-enrollment 
on this situation, there is no link between inactivity and re-enrollment in the US. The 
Swedish combination of openness of the higher education system to non-traditional 
students and its low costs seems to offer chances for youth in problematic labor 
market situations, while the US system deters exactly those who are in financial needs 
by the high costs of education. 
The chapter, even though the analysis could not arrive at a final conclusion, 
shows that also micro-level explanations can be sharpened when their effectiveness is 
compared over different societies. Even though the difficulties of observing the 
consequences of status demolition occurred again as in chapter 4.2, the results for 
Sweden could add some support to this explanation. Costs as a deterrent from higher 
education are easy to understand in their implication for individual behavior on the 
one hand and comparatively easy to manipulate by policy makers on the other hand. It 
seems that the low-cost Swedish system is more successful in activating inactive 
young adults. 
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4.3.5 Appendix 
 
Figure 4.3.3: States in the school to work transition over 12 years following the first entry into the 
labor market: relative frequencies of young adults with status demolition compared 
with other states, by participation in postsecondary education (any participation 
yes/no). 
Sweden, no re-enrollment Sweden, re-enrollment 
  
Data source: LNU  
 
US, no re-enrollment 
 
US, re-enrollment 
  
Data source: NLSY79  
 
 working, >= parental class position 
 working, parental status not achieved 
unemployed 
studying 
inactive 
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In figure 4.3.3, I plot shares of the different activities as in figure 4.3.1 separately by educational 
attendance over the 12 years after the first entry into the labor market. What it shows immediately is a 
bivariate relationship between educational attendance and a faster reduction in the share of status 
demolished students in both societies for those who re-enroll in postsecondary education. 
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4.4 The Long Arms of Parents? Mothers’ and Fathers’ Social 
Class and Inequality among Men and Women in Belated 
College Entry throughout the Life Course in the US 
 
 
 
 
This chapter differentiates social origin effects on late enrollment by bringing in a 
gender and a life course perspective. I describe the re-enrollment process in its 
dependence on the parent’s and the children’s sex. Results show that for children the 
father is the more important reference in defining social origin, while mothers’ class 
brings in additional information. Re-enrollment, however, is more sex-specific on the 
part of the children. Lower class sons enroll less often than their upper class same-sex 
peers into postsecondary education over the entire life course. Daughters from the 
lower classes catch up somewhat via late enrollment. This last finding of decreasing 
class inequality among women over time is then the motivation for chapter 4.5. There 
I seek to explain this pattern and will test several hypotheses. However, the pattern 
persists even if a large number of alternative explanations are taken into account by 
statistical control.  
 
This chapter is based on the following article: 
Weiss, Felix and Mirte Scholten (2012). ‘Gender differences in the influence of 
parental class on young adults’ participation in postsecondary education in the US’ 
Journal of Further and Higher Education, Online First.  
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The gender perspective has always accompanied studies on educational inequality 
based on social origin. Classical studies in the area already showed that there are 
correlations between processes of educational achievement as well as status 
attainment and sex (Blau and Duncan, 1967 Ch. 5). In recent work on 
intergenerational inequality, this aspect has got a great deal of attention (Buchmann 
and DiPrete, 2006; Korupp, Ganzeboom and Van Der Lippe, 2002; Meraviglia and 
Ganzeboom, 2008). Late educational decisions ought to be even more sex-specific as 
women and men differ remarkably in their typical life course pattern with regard to 
work and parenthood (Bradburn, Moen and Dempster-McClain, 1995; Taniguchi and 
Kaufman, 2007).  
Instead of following on with the testing of more explicit mechanisms on the 
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micro-level as the previous three chapters, this chapter extends the inequality 
perspective in two ways. First, it refers to the gender specificity of social inequality in 
late enrollment. Gender role socialization is hypothesized to lead into different 
patterns for women and men. The chapter describes the influence of the social class of 
fathers and mothers on the re-entry into education of women and men over time, 
drawing on a study published in collaboration with Mirte Scholten (Weiss and 
Scholten, 2012).  
Late enrollments are a suitable situation for testing hypotheses based on the 
idea of gender role socialization. Many educational decisions are made by the parents 
on behalf of the child, or parents at least have a strong influence on these decisions. In 
contrast to earlier educational decisions, the question of whether the mother or father 
serves as a ‘role model’ or ‘status reference’ for re-enrollment is a question about the 
guiding factors of the child’s own choice. 
 
4.4.2 The Sex-Specific Late Participation in Postsecondary Education – do 
Fathers’ and Mothers’ Long Arms Reach their Sons’ and Daughters’ 
Lifelong Learning Behavior Differently? 
Over the last decades, women’s participation in education and the labor market has 
increased in industrialized western countries. This has given rise to doubts about the 
accuracy of the father-centered approach in defining social origin (Meraviglia and 
Ganzeboom, 2008). The gendered nature of the life course makes this issue 
particularly important for the study of delayed or ‘second chance’ entrance into 
education. Without considering the mother’s class position, an important aspect of 
intergenerational status transmission might be missed. I empirically compare several 
models and hypotheses for the explanation of sex-specific class inequality that have 
been proposed in the literature. The aim of this endeavor is to compare the role of the 
social status of mothers and fathers on their daughters’ and sons’ re-enrollment in 
college after starting their working lives, in order to improve our understanding of the 
relationship between the child’s educational attainment and the parental class position 
and gender. In addition, I will describe the development of the parental class effects 
on the child’s enrollment over the life course applying event history models on the 
NLSY79 data.  
The findings show that the fathers’ class position in general leads to broadly 
the same conclusions with regard to intergenerational inequality, but other 
4 .  Mothers  and  Fath ers  Cla ss  and  Sons  and  Daughters  Enro l lment  
 263 
operationalizations are more accurate. For sons, the influence of parental class 
remains constant throughout their lives. For daughters, it changes with age. While 
working-class daughters are disadvantaged at the beginning, 30 months after labor 
market entry they start enrolling more often than the most privileged group, the 
service-class daughters. This pattern of switching class coefficient among women 
over the life course motivates an additional analysis in chapter 4.5 which aims at 
testing several explanations for it.  
While class is still an important determinant of educational achievement, the 
disadvantages of women in educational achievement decreased in the US over the last 
decades of the 20
th
 century; including the disadvantages in higher education 
(Buchmann, DiPrete and McDaniel, 2008; Roksa et al., 2007). Not only the increasing 
participation of mothers in the labor market, but also the increasing participation of 
daughters in the educational system makes the question of the role of mothers a more 
important one. As well as the question whether there is a specific role of parental class 
for educational achievement of their daughters. A debate about the parents’ role in 
intergenerational inequality, especially that of mother’s, has already given rise to 
criticism of the ‘conventional approach’ to take only fathers’ class position into 
account. Suggested alternatives are the ‘dominance approach’, the ‘individual model’ 
and the ‘sex role model’, all proposing a certain definition of social origin beyond 
fathers’ class.  
Erikson (1984) proposed including women’s socioeconomic status in the 
model according to the rule that the ‘class position derives from the occupation of the 
spouse who has the ’higher‘ (or dominant) position in the labor market’ (Meraviglia 
and Ganzeboom, 2008, 34). Consequently, this dominance hypothesis predicts that the 
mother’s class position matters as long as she has a higher occupational status or class 
than her husband. However, other possible mechanisms related to the occupational 
class position of the mother, such as cumulative wealth of double-earner families, are 
not regarded as important. 
The individual hypothesis argues that the class position of both parents 
generates intergenerational inequality and the educational and occupational status of 
each parent best represents the socioeconomic background of their children (Acker, 
1978; Johnston, Ganzeboom and Treiman, 2005). Hence both parents independently 
have an impact on their child’s educational achievement. The following model 
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assesses the full influence of social origin and proposes that the mothers’ position is 
an additional, independent source of social inequality. 
Finally, the sex role model offers the most precise expectations about the 
importance of both parents and also explains gender differences on the part of the 
child. The idea builds on studies showing that the child regards the same-sex parent as 
the person to imitate when forming her/his identity (Smith and Self, 1980; Updegraff, 
McHale and Crouter, 1994). Other than the earlier hypotheses, it refers to 
socialization as an explicit micro-mechanism. Children are socialized according to the 
roles of their parents (Korupp, Sanders and Ganzeboom, 2002, 12). Transferring this 
to the decision to re-enter the educational system, the hypothesis can be derived that 
daughters’ educational attainment will be more influenced by their mothers’, and 
sons’ by their fathers’ status. This does not contradict the fact that the other parent has 
an independent influence on educational choices of the child, but specifies which 
parent is the more important reference. According to the role model mechanism, non-
working mothers should guide their daughters towards household work and, 
consequently, to lower rates of (re-)enrollment. This does not apply to sons. The role 
model socialization explanation can only be true for decisions that are made by the 
student him-/herself and not by the parents. If parents decide about their child’s 
participation in an educational program, the socialization of the child is irrelevant for 
his or her educational achievement and the students’ own motives do not matter. 
Previous empirical research has shown that the sex role model is valid for the sex 
typing of educational choices in terms of fields and specializations, but not for the 
hierarchical status achieved (Dryler, 1998; Korupp, Sanders and Ganzeboom, 2002). 
The older the children, the more independence from their parents can be assumed. 
Although parental advice might still play an important role, the goals and ideas of the 
children become more and more important. Young adults who have already worked 
for some time should be more independent from their parents than younger children. 
Furthermore, the financial resources of young adults increase and, therefore, the 
dependence on their parents’ wealth decreases. Now, the role model mechanism can 
become more important even for the amount of education achieved, and not only for 
horizontal dimensions. This makes the re-enrollment decision a viable test case for the 
sex role model. 
As in the last two chapters, I distinguish two mechanisms accounting for 
class inequality in educational decisions: (a) performance-based, primary effects of 
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social origin, and (b) the secondary effects of social origin that can be attributed to a 
difference in decision making between social classes (Boudon, 1974). This 
differentiation is important when assessing the sex role model. The mechanisms 
proposed here are again secondary, decision based effects.  
 
4.4.3 Data and Methodology 
Again, the database for this analysis is NLSY79 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). 
The sample is reduced to the cohorts born between 1961 and 1964. Further, I only use 
respondents with a GED or high school degree from the main, nationwide cross-
section sample. The central independent variable ‘social origin’ is measured by a 
simplified version of the EGP (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero) class scheme 
(Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1979; Goldthorpe, 2000)
31
. The classes are 
grouped in the same way as in chapter 4.2, into a simplified scheme documented in 
table 4.4.1 for two reasons: first, to avoid the estimation of coefficients for very small 
categories; second, and more important, classes in the simplified version can be 
ordered hierarchically. In order to construct the dominant or ‘maximal’ class out of 
both parents, this is crucial. In addition to the working population that is covered by 
the EGP class scheme, I include the categories ‘inactive’ for non-working parents and 
‘absent’ for parents not living in the household. The ‘inactive’ category is particularly 
large for mothers (48 percent). 
  
                                                 
31
 One could argue that, based on the socialization mechanism, parental education should be what is 
really transmitted from the parents to the child. I have theoretical concerns about this argument. While 
parental education is indeed more useful as a direct model for the child’s educational decision, parental 
occupation is more salient in everyday life and hence should be at least as important for socialization as 
parental education. 
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Table 4.4.1: EGP class scheme and simplified version. 
full EGP class scheme categories simplified class version 
I professionals and managers, higher grade service (1) 
II  professionals and managers, lower grade; technicians, 
higher grade 
service (1) 
IIIa routine non-manual employees, higher grade intermediate (2) 
IIIb routine non-manual employees, lower grade skilled working (3) 
IVabc small employers and self-employed workers assigned to other classes 
according to occupation 
V technicians, lower-grade supervisors of manual workers intermediate (2) 
VI skilled manual workers skilled working (3) 
VIIa/b non-skilled manual workers unskilled working (4) 
inactive inactive (5) 
absent absent (6) 
 
 
 
As the main interest is the differentiation of effects by different origin and over time, I 
keep the number of control variables smaller than in the previous chapter. This bares 
the danger of not controlling completely, e.g. for primary effects. Estimating more 
complex models such as the piecewise effects models on the other hand could be too 
demanding with more variables and the given sample size. I do not restrict the age of 
the respondents to a certain limit. However, right-censoring occurs in 2006, when the 
respondents are between 41 and 45 years old. To cancel out primary effects, only the 
‘Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery’ (afqt score) is included into the models. 
The score is a weighted average of test scores, such as scores of arithmetical 
reasoning, numerical operations, word-knowledge and paragraph-comprehension. In 
order to capture the different financial situation of families from different social 
origins at about the time of the child’s graduation from high school, household 
poverty status according to the guidelines issued by the US Department of Health and 
Human Services is included as well. This variable is measured when the respondent 
was eighteen years old. Race (white and other, black, Hispanic) and birth cohort are 
controlled for to avoid misinterpretations due to affirmative action (cf. Grodsky, 
2007) or cohort-specific macroeconomic and social conditions. The distributions of 
all variables are summarized in table 4.4.5 in the Appendix of this chapter. 
By means of the definition of the dependent variable all cases not entering 
the labor market for at least six months before completion of a college degree (B.A. or 
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B.Sc.) are irrelevant, since the role that re-entry plays for their educational 
achievement is different. Altogether, the usable sample contains 2,698 cases which 
were reduced further to 2,394 when excluding all cases with missing values (‘listwise 
deletion’). 
The remaining sample is a selective sample, probably also with regard to the 
tendency to partake in education. On the other hand, those students entering college 
directly did not have the choice to re-enter later, so they were not in a position to 
decide whether to re-enter or not. Using this criterion furthermore ensures that young 
adults had already been part of the labor force and had therefore gained a certain level 
of independence from their parents. In addition, by selecting young adults who 
generally tend to participate to a lesser degree in postsecondary education, my results 
can be seen as conservative estimates of the existence of differences by social origin. 
 
4.4.4 Statistical Models  
The analysis of the transition rate from employment to being a college student is 
based on Cox´s proportional hazard models which were also used in chapter 4.3 (Cox, 
1972). While all previous models had to tackle the problem of non-proportionality of 
the central independent variables, for analyzing the development of the effect over 
time, the Cox-model is the better choice. Changing effects of an independent variable 
over time implies non-proportionality, which is modeled explicitly by period-specific 
effects (Bernardi, 2001). Furthermore, the Cox-model overcomes the problem of 
specifying a parametric function for the hazard rate. 
The observation period starts when young adults enter the labor force (for at 
least 25 hours per week) and for at least six consecutive months. I split the time axis 
into two time periods, before and after the 24
th
 month of time at risk (which is then 
the 30
th
 month in the labor force, if employment continues). I split the time axis after 
this period since I assume that after this time young adults are independent from their 
parents and can make their own living
32
. Finally I want to distinguish how well the 
different operationalizations of parental class predict the behavior best with as little 
information as possible, i.e. how well the models fit. For a comparison of the model 
fit I refer to Bayes’ information criterion (as described below). 
                                                 
32
As a consequence, the proportionality assumption is now only made within these sections of the 
process time. Further, this choice was subject to comprehensive robustness checks. Shifts of the 
splitting point by one year do not alter the findings. 
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4.4.5 Results 
Starting the empirical analysis, I present a model similar to the ones from the 
comparative study in section 3 or chapter 4.2 using the present sample and the Cox-
model. However, now all analyses are carried out separately by the sex of the child. 
This gives justice to the expectation of the sex role model, namely that it depends on 
the sex of the child which parent determines the more important class reference. The 
service classes are the reference category throughout all models. That means that all 
class coefficients are effects of an underlying comparison of the respective class 
group with the service classes. Each model is estimated as a bivariate model of class 
and re-entry and after controlling performance and compositional effects. As the focus 
lies on the class differences in decisions and due to restrictions in space, I only report 
the bivariate models for the operationalization of conventional hypothesis. Note that 
all those bivariate models left out would have led to the same conclusions as the full 
models reported here. 
 
4.4.6 Cox Models with Time Constant Effects  
As a baseline, I reproduce the models from previous chapters, but defining the 
parental class according to the conventional approach as fathers’ class (table 4.4.2, 
model 1). In comparing men and women, only the coefficients for sons are 
statistically significant, while the influence of fathers’ class on daughters is much 
smaller and insignificant. Daughters are seemingly much less influenced by their 
father’s class position in their decision about re-enrolling. All class categories in the 
sample of sons have positive coefficients, and hence the event ‘re-enrollment’ occurs 
later or less often than for service-class children, which is the reference category. 
However, these class differences are only statistically significant for the comparison 
between the ‘working classes’ and inactive fathers on the one hand and the service 
classes on the other hand. When holding race, poverty status, aptitude (afqt 
percentiles) and birth cohort constant, the coefficients for sons still show the same 
tendency, but are only significant for the working classes. That means, when 
controlling statistically for variables which have a direct relation to college entry and 
represent certain mechanisms, sons from a lower class background still have a lower 
re-entry rate; even though much of the effect in the first model is attributable to the 
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Table 4.4.2: Cox proportional hazard model – only father (conventional hypothesis) – 
father and mother (individual hypothesis), for sons and daughters, log hazard 
ratios. 
    
 model 1: conventional hypothesis model 2: individual 
hypothesis 
explanatory 
variables 
sons daughters sons daughters 
       
fathers’ class       
   service classes ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
   intermediate -0.27 -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.14 -0.09 
   skilled working -0.32* -0.21 0.08 0.17 -0.18 0.13 
   unsk. working -0.81* -0.59* -0.09 0.08 -0.57
*
 0.06 
   inactive -0.54* -0.25 0.33 0.39+ -0.24 0.37
+
 
   no man present -0.18 -0.09 0.08 0.22 -0.07 0.16 
       
mothers’ class       
   service classes     ref. ref. 
   intermediate     -0.26 0.02 
   skilled working     -0.25 0.20 
   unsk. working     -0.26 -0.03 
   inactive     -0.18 -0.14 
   no woman 
present 
    0.36 -0.47 
       
race       
   white + other  ref.  ref. ref. ref. 
   black  0.57
*
  0.28 0.58
*
 0.28 
   hispanic  0.61
*
  0.53
*
 0.60
*
 0.58
*
 
       
cohort       
   born 1961  ref.  ref. ref. ref. 
   *1962  0.22  -0.01 -0.16 0.37
*
 
   *1963  0.31
+
  -0.11 0.04 0.34
*
 
   *1964  0.18  -0.36
*
 0.13 0.24 
       
afqt score  0.01
*
  0.01
*
 0.01
*
 0.01
*
 
       
poor  -0.30
+
  -0.04 -0.33
+
 -0.02 
       
N 1239 1155 1239 1155 
no. of failures 306 394 306 394 
Data source: NLSY79, own calculations; + p < .10, * p < .05  
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Model 2 in table 4.4.2 then further includes the mothers’ class position, as 
suggested by the individual hypothesis and the sex role hypothesis. Adding the 
mother’s class position does not alter the basic conclusion of the role of the father’s 
class position. 
The fathers’ influence remains only statistically significant for the unskilled 
working classes. At least for sons all coefficients are negative. This can be seen as 
support for previous studies pointing to the importance of the mothers’ class for 
intergenerational mobility (Korupp, Sanders and Ganzeboom, 2002; Korupp, 
Ganzeboom and Van Der Lippe, 2002; Meraviglia and Ganzeboom, 2008). However, 
in contradiction to the sex role model, the conclusion must be limited to sons, while 
daughters are neither influenced by their father’s nor by their mother’s class. 
Furthermore, when holding performance differences by social origin constant 
(primary effects) the effects of the mothers’ class on sons are not significant, while 
there is a clear effect of fathers in the unskilled working class. This could be a hint 
that the mothers’ influence relates more to the development of the scholastic 
performance of the child, while the father's class directly influences the decision to 
enroll. 
  
4 .  Mothers  and  Fath ers  Cla ss  and  Sons  and  Daughters  Enro l lment  
 271 
Table 4.4.3: Cox proportional hazard model – maximal class (dominance hypothesis) for 
sons and daughters, log hazard ratios. 
 model 3 
explanatory variables sons daughters 
maximum class   
   service classes ref. ref. 
   intermediate -0.32
*
 0.01 
   skilled working -0.40
*
 0.19 
   unskilled working -0.51
*
 -0.02 
   Inactive -0.02 -0.00 
 
  
race   
white + other ref. ref. 
black 0.57* 0.34* 
hispanic 0.61* 0.58* 
 
  
cohort   
  born 1961 ref. ref. 
  *1962 -0.19 0.36* 
  *1963 0.02 0.33* 
  *1964 0.14 0.25 
 
  
afqt score 0.01* 0.01* 
   
poor -0.33+ -0.02 
   
N 1239 1155 
no. of failures 306 394 
Data source: NLSY79, own calculations. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05 
 
 
 
The last operationalization follows the rule of the dominance hypothesis and measures 
social origin as the higher status of both parents in the ordered 4-class scheme. Once 
non-working parents are present, the dominant class is defined by the person who 
works. Present parents are always given priority over absent parents. The effects on 
sons are again stronger in the case of lower classes – the origin effects are even 
stronger than before. 
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For all models it is noteworthy that the AFQT percentiles – as a measure of 
aptitude – increase the tendency to re-enroll, while household poverty is not 
significant when keeping all other variables in the model constant. The absence of 
social class effects on daughters comes as a surprise. In the next section I turn to more 
complex models showing that this is due to misspecification of the proportionality 
assumption of the model. 
 
4.4.7 Piecewise Constant Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
As the proportional hazard assumption is violated all over in the female sample, but 
not in the case of men, I now specify separate coefficients for different sections of the 
time axis. This relaxes the proportional hazards assumption to such a degree that it 
only has to be met within one ‘time section’. For each covariate, there is one 
coefficient showing the hazard rate of re-enrolling during the first 24 months of time 
at risk (that is the first 30 months after the first school-to-work transition). Another 
coefficient shows the influence on the re-enrollment rate for the remaining time in 
which we observe the case. Table 4.4.4 shows the results of such a model using the 
dominance hypothesis-operationalization of parental class separately by the sex of the 
child. Again, sons with a service-class parent re-enroll most often in both periods. All 
class coefficients for sons show the same tendency as in the previous models and they 
do not yield additional insights compared to the time-constant models. This means 
that such a complex model is not necessary for sons. The situation is different for 
daughters. All lower-class daughters tend to re-enter less often than service-class 
daughters in the first 30 months of labor market participation. After this period the 
daughters of lower-class fathers re-enroll more often in contrast to the reference 
group. In other words, during the first 30 months in the labor market, the effects are as 
expected from previous research (lower rates for lower parental classes). But 
thereafter class inequality is reversed. This result shows that the ‘over-the-whole-
process-time’ coefficients in the previous models were a wrong specification of the 
true process, and daughters are in fact influenced by their parents’ class position33. 
  
                                                 
33
 The switching of the coefficients is not altered when including the class position of both parents 
individually in the model; instead, only the coefficients for the fathers’ class are significant (model not 
shown here). 
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Table 4.4.4: Proportional hazard model with time varying coefficients – maximal class 
(dominance hypothesis) for sons and daughters, log hazard ratios. 
Data source: NLSY79, own calculations. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05 
  
explanatory variables sons daughters 
time: 24 months 3.95 1.00 
   
max. class   
  service classes ref. ref. 
  intermediate, until 24
th
 month -0.53+ -0.21 
   after 24 months -0.23 0.19 
  skilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.30 -0.72* 
   after 24 months -0.46* 0.63* 
  unskilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.31 -0.36 
   after 24 months -0.62* 0.23 
  inactive, until 24
th
 month -0.05 0.09 
   after 24 months -0.04 0.01 
   
cohort   
  born 1961 ref. ref. 
  *1962, until 24
th
 month -0.39 -0.13 
   after 24 months 0.55* 0.04 
  *1963, until 24
th
 month 0.02 -0.41+ 
   after 24 months 0.53* 0.06 
  *1964, until 24
th
 month -0.16 -0.54* 
   after 24 months 0.43+ -0.25 
   
Race   
  white + other ref. ref. 
  black, until 24
th
 month 1.19* 0.32 
   after 24 months 0.17 0.35+ 
  hispanic, until 24
th
 month 0.97* -0.20 
   after 24 months 0.35 0.88* 
   
afqt scores, until 24
th
 month 0.02* 0.01* 
   after 24 months 0.01* 0.01* 
   
poverty at age 18, until 24
th
 month -0.43 -0.43 
   after 24 months -0.26 0.11 
   
N 1239 1155 
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4.4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
The results presented in this chapter so far show that sex is an important mediator in 
the process of late educational decisions, although the relationship is quite complex. 
My main aim however, was to test different operationalizations of the parents’ class 
positions against each other. In summary, the findings are somewhat in favor of the 
dominance hypothesis, since the small sample size requires a parsimonious measure 
of social origin. Including information on the mothers’ status in the way the 
dominance hypothesis suggests does not add additional explanatory power to the 
model. The conventional hypothesis, which only considers the fathers’ occupational 
class, can on the other hand be seen as a strong simplification. If the mothers’ 
occupation is available in the data this can easily be avoided by using the dominance 
approach. 
As an additional result, it turned out that sex differences on the part of the 
child are important beyond the exact definition of social origin. Sons and daughters 
clearly differ in their educational participation once they are integrated into the labor 
market. While for sons class origin remains influential throughout their lives, the 
influence on daughters’ changes with time. Service-class sons are more willing to 
give up their job to return to school. Service-class daughters are at first advantaged, 
but then the picture changes. In the second period, service-class daughters return less 
often to school than working-class daughters. None of the theoretical models I 
discussed can explain this pattern. The sex role model is to some degree justified by 
its emphasis on the sex of the child. But in contrast to the sex role model, daughters 
are more influenced by their fathers (as shown in a model with both parents’ class 
position which I do not report here), but not persistently over time. A more systematic 
comparison of the different models of parental background operationalizations is 
needed to judge their explanatory power. To achieve this I calculate fit statistics 
accounting for the number of model parameters; the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). Since the results are not of central interest for this chapter, the results are 
presented in the Appendix (table 4.4.6). In essence, this analysis shows that the 
dominance approach represents a good compromise between taking mothers’ class 
information into consideration and the parsimony of the model. 
Up to here, this chapter compared the mothers’ and the fathers’ class in their 
impact on late re-enrollment decisions of their sons and daughters. Starting with a 
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model assuming that the effects are constant throughout the entire observation period, 
I found disadvantages only for sons of unskilled working-class fathers compared to 
their service-class peers, but not for daughters. Specifying the model differently with 
separate coefficients for two time periods confirms the finding for sons and reveals a 
more complex pattern for daughters. While the inequality pattern is persistent 
throughout the life of men, working-class women are first disadvantaged in 
comparison to their service-class peers. Later, they catch up to some degree. This 
pattern has not been expected by any of the models discussed and calls for theoretical 
elaboration by further research. Attempting to explain this pattern will be subject of 
the next chapter (4.5).  
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4.4.9 Appendix 
 
Table 4.4.5: Distribution of explanatory variables. 
  
 mean (SD) % 
  
  
mothers’ class  
   service classes 9.48 
   intermediate 16.17 
   skilled working 15.54 
   unskilled working 12.61 
   inactive 45.07 
   no woman present 1.13 
  
fathers’ class  
   service classes 21.55 
   intermediate 12.16 
   skilled working 21.93 
   unskilled working 23.77 
   inactive 5.97 
   no man present 14.62 
  
race  
  white + other 82.21 
   black 11.28 
   hispanic 6.52 
  
cohort  
  born 1961 25.81 
  *1962 26.78 
  *1963 25.31 
  *1964 22.10 
  
afqt scores 51.37 (27.10) 
  
living in poor HH at 18 19.13 
  
N (persons) 2394 
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Table 4.4.6: Bayes’ Information Criterion for different operationalizations of social class 
origin. 
     
 Cox-model piecewise constant model 
 (bivariat) (full) (bivariat) (full) 
     
son     
   only father 4230.0 4220.6 4257.1 4273.2 
   only mother 4244.4 4228.7 4267.2 4275.8 
   both parents 4252.9 4246.3 4302.9 4320.2 
   maximum class 4223.3 4214.5 4244.4 4260.7 
     
daughter     
   only father 5362.9 5370.6 5373.6 5408.7 
   only mother 5360.7 5368.9 5382.6 5417.3 
   both parents 5385.7 5394.0 5421.7 5456.2 
   maximum class 5359.2 5367.3 5360.5 5395.4 
     
Data source: NLSY79, own calculations. 
 
 
 
The log-likelihood (LL) is used as deviance statistics. A larger BIC will result either from a larger 
deviance of the model from the real data or a larger number of model parameters weighted by 
ln(number of events) (Singer and Willet, 2003). Therefore, smaller values of BIC indicate a better 
model fit including a ‘penalty’ for less parsimonious models with more parameters (i.e. more 
independent variables). Table 4.4.5 summarizes the findings. 
Models referring to the fathers’ occupational class fit better than those referring to the 
mothers’ class only. This finding is very clear in the case of sons. There is almost no difference with 
respect to the BIC for daughters in the Cox-model without time split. I discussed the problematic role 
of this model for daughters earlier on: the influence of social origin changes over time, and hence the 
piecewise constant model is a much better basis for a comparison between models. When judging the 
appropriateness of the models strictly on the basis of the BIC-statistic, even for women a model with 
fathers’ class only would be preferred over a model operationalizing social origins as mothers’ class 
position. The value of the BIC for the ‘mother only’ model is higher than for the ‘father only’ model. 
This indicates that even for daughters, fathers’ class predicts educational attainment better than 
mothers’ class position which contradicts the sex-role model. Furthermore, for sons and daughters the 
piecewise constant models estimating the maximum class produce the smallest BIC value. It should be 
noted again that the process of inequality in re-entry for women can be captured best by a piecewise 
constant model, although the BIC values are larger than those for the simple models due to the larger 
number of coefficients. But these larger values of the BIC do not take into account the fact that the true 
influence of social inequality can only be uncovered when modeling its time dependence. Again, the 
best-fitting representation of social origin is one that includes both parents by always using the higher 
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class position. Taking both parents separately, the father is the better representation of social origin 
than the mother. 
In the literature, several hypotheses have been put forward challenging the conventional 
approach of only referring to father´s class as operationalization of social origin. I have applied the 
individual model treating father and mother separately, the dominance model which always refers to 
the highest status out of both parents and the sex role model which proposes that children are 
influenced most strongly by the same sex parent. The results suggest that mothers’ status matters for 
young adults’ decisions about educational re-entry. Thus, the conventional approach does not capture 
the full extent of the influence of family origin on young adults’ educational decisions. If, however, no 
other information is available it leads to broadly the same results as those measures which include the 
mother’s class. The dominance hypothesis, which defines social origin as the highest position out of 
both parents yields a clearer picture of social origin differences. Furthermore, as the number of 
variables needed to define social origin is the same as in the conventional approach, the model is 
equally parsimonious and leads to a better model fit. The individual model is more complex and thus, 
although it reveals additional insights on the extent to which the mother contributes independently, 
results in a less parsimonious model. There are only small and non-significant effects for the mother’s 
in addition to father’s class. The sex role model brings the sex of the child in. Differentiating between 
the sons and daughters and social origin effects on late college entry does indeed lead to different 
results. However, the hypothesis that the same sex parent is always the more important reference 
cannot be supported. While for both sexes the father is the major status reference, social origin 
differences in college enrollment throughout adulthood differ between men and women. 
For data collection, these findings imply that it is beneficial to know about the mother’s 
position and to concentrate only on the father’s position would lead to a loss of information. As the 
data cannot be changed, one will however most likely find a rather similar story if we know only about 
the father’s position. It is also interesting, that the mother’s position does matter in addition to the 
fathers’ position, even though to a lesser degree. This confirms a more general finding from the 
literature (Buchmann and DiPrete, 2006; Meraviglia and Ganzeboom, 2008) of intergenerational 
mobility on the specific question of belated entry into college. Including mothers into the analysis of 
intergenerational mobility is furthermore likely to become more important in the future as female 
employment, especially in higher status positions, is becoming more frequent. 
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4.5 Why are Working-Class Daughters More Often Re-Enrolling 
than Service Class Daughters? 
Some Attempts to Explain a Finding of Chapter 4.4 
 
 
 
 
The finding of decreasing class inequality among women over time from chapter 4.4 
is the motivation for this chapter. I seek to explain this pattern and will test several 
hypotheses on the specific life courses of working-class women – both related to their 
early disadvantage and to life-events in which they might be more often involved than 
service-class daughters. However, the pattern persists even if a large number of 
alternative explanations are taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
4.5.1 Explaining Women’s Diminishing Educational Inequalities over the Life 
Course 
Chapter 4.4 has revealed one result which came as surprise given the broad stream of 
findings showing that inequality continues to be to the disadvantage of working-class 
children over the life course – beyond the regular school career. As analysis in chapter 
4.4 show, origin effects on re-enrollment into college are highly gender specific in the 
US. The entry rate into college is lower for working-class women in comparison to 
their service-class female peers in the first months. After some time in the labor 
market, however, working-class women catch up with upper-class women to some 
degree. For men on the other hand, social origin effects are stable over the life course 
and lower class sons receive less education. Women from working-class origins 
showed after an initial disadvantage a higher entry rate into college. A different 
pattern was found among men, where the disadvantage of the lower classes continues 
over a long period in the life course. This chapter aims at explaining the results for the 
women and testing a number of possible explanations using the same dataset and the 
same conceptual framework and methodology as in chapter 4.4. 
I consider three groups of mechanisms: first, explanations for the switching 
of class coefficients for women referring to the selection into the group entering the 
workforce without a college degree. Second, explanations rooted in sex and class 
4 .  Why a re Wo rking  Class  Daughters  Catch ing  Up?  
280 
 
specific biographical events. Finally, changing macro-conditions along with the aging 
of the NLSY79-cohort in favor of women’s participation in higher education and 
biographical events. 
 
4.5.2 Selection of Young Working-Class Women into the Group of Potential 
Re-Entrants? 
The high working-class enrollment rate among those women, who already worked for 
several years, could be due to particularly strong educational aspirations among 
working-class women in this group. A reason for a higher share of highly motivated 
women among the working-class daughters could be that they were particularly often 
prevented from enrolling earlier, while service-class daughters can realize their plans 
right after high school. Assuming such a selection mechanism raises new questions. 
Why does this strong selection only occur for working-class women, but apparently 
not for men? And why do upper class women more often enter college directly than 
working-class women? 
Most research on occupational and educational aspirations scrutinizes either 
on the relationship between gender and occupational or educational expectations or on 
the effect of socioeconomic background on occupational or educational aspirations. 
Marks (2010) as well as Mau and Bikos (2000) find that women express higher 
occupational expectations than men. Hyman (1966) and Lipset (1955) attributed the 
positive correlation between student’s aspirations for occupational prestige and the 
social status of the family to values for achieving the parental occupational status 
position. This is in line with earlier studies conducted by Sewell et al. (1957), 
concluding that parental class values influence children’s educational and 
occupational aspirations. The authors suggest that social class makes an independent 
contribution to occupational aspirations (Sewell, Haller and Straus, 1957:73). This 
asymmetry could lead to the finding of switching coefficients among women due to a 
combination of lower chances for working-class children but at the same time higher 
aspirations among women. However, only if the sex and class do not interact and in 
addition the following two things are given: first, all young adults from the working 
classes, women and men, are disadvantaged with regard to entry into higher education 
right after high school to the same extent and second, women have on average higher 
aspirations for occupational achievement and therefore those from the working classes 
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catch up more often than men. This is fuelled by the higher share of working-class 
children with unfulfilled class aspirations among women (Hypothesis 1a). 
Moreover, besides deterrents affecting the entire population of working-class 
young adults, there could also be mechanisms which specifically affect working-class 
women. One such factor could be early family formation of working-class daughters. 
Early pregnancies or marriages can limit women’s mobility. In line with this 
explanation Taniguchi (2007) finds a negative correlation between college enrollment 
and having young children. It is further known that lower class women have a higher 
risk of teenage pregnancies than the female population has on average (Siebert, 1972; 
Stinchcombe, 1968; Stulberg and Chen, 2011). These circumstances could counteract 
young working-class women’s motivation to achieve higher education. Giving birth to 
a child or marrying before turning 23 (a typical age for on-time college completion) 
should hinder working-class women to enroll into college right after completing high 
school. As a consequence, the share of young women who are motivated for higher 
education, but could not realize this earlier, should be higher among young working-
class women than in any other group Then, the switching of class-coefficients among 
women has to disappear if early marriages and pregnancies are kept constant 
(Hypothesis 1b). 
Another possible deterrent for highly aspiring young adults from immediate 
enrollment after high school are parents’ difficulties to finance higher education. 
Generally, this would affect men as well as women, except that boys are served with 
priority (cf. Jacob, 2011). This explanation is unlikely, given that the participation 
rates of women in higher education grew faster than those of men. Even if lower-
origin men on average have lower aspirations and are kept out of higher education at 
the same rate, they must also catch up in educational attainment over the life course, 
just to a lower rate than working-class women catch up to upper-class women. This is 
not the case in the models in table 4.4.4 in chapter 4.4. Furthermore, even though 
wealth is not controlled in its full scope in the models in table 4.4.4, the results take 
the poverty status of the family already into account and the pattern persists. 
Therefore, the number of siblings and the number of brothers are unlikely 
explanations. As influence on the class inequality of women and men cannot be 
precluded, I keep the presence of older and male siblings constant in the models 
estimated to test for other mechanisms. 
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4.5.3 Historic Changes 
The second group of mechanisms, comprising explanations based on changing macro 
conditions over time, contains again several possible explanations. First, the historical 
trend towards more gender equality in educational achievement (Buchmann, DiPrete 
and McDaniel, 2008) could have encouraged mostly those to re-enroll who were most 
disadvantaged before. For example, a change in returns to education for women could 
have changed their motivation to participate in education. Second, I simplified the 
research question by putting all types of colleges into one broad category. However, 
different institutions target different populations. Community colleges, in general, are 
there to serve disadvantaged students, even in later life (Lucas, 2006, 227). This type 
of college enables students to follow more flexible educational careers, which also 
implies slightly more re-enrollments. Possibly the growth of this type of colleges 
helped the previously disadvantaged women. Since the NLSY79 is a cohort panel and 
the entire cohort moves through the same historically changing conditions together, I 
do not have the chance to compare it to other cohorts under different historical 
conditions. Only such a comparison would allow testing these mechanisms. 
Therefore, I do not elaborate explicit hypotheses for the historic change explanations. 
However, if all other explanations fail, one can assume that the true explanation is 
more likely to fall into this group of mechanisms. 
 
4.5.4 Life Events 
Third, gender specific life events could directly increase the chances of re-enrollment 
– instead of preventing an early ‘non-enrollment’ as argued above. Again, partnership 
formation and marriage can be important aspects, however in a different manner. In 
the group of mechanisms mentioned above we also expected events to be effective, 
but rather in keeping young and motivated women away from higher education in the 
time after high school. Besides this indirect effect on the composition of the 
population at risk, the same life events could immediately and directly trigger 
participation in postsecondary education. For example, previous research showed that 
divorce increases the subsequent rate of re-enrollments (Bradburn, Moen and 
Dempster-McClain, 1995; Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2007). Married women, and 
possibly working-class women to a higher degree, often occupy traditional family 
roles as homemakers in male breadwinner families. Divorce changes the expectations 
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in their role and possibly opens the opportunity for women to re-enter into education. 
Not to mention that divorced women can chose their place of residence often much 
more independently. Beyond opportunity structures, these women might also see a 
stronger need to make their own living in the future and therefore see higher 
education as a means to improve their job search. I expect to replicate and confirm the 
findings from previous studies that women who were divorced or not married are 
more likely to re-enroll into college than married women (Hypothesis 2a). Beyond, I 
propose that this, coupled with a higher divorce rate among working class daughters, 
can explain the higher late enrollment rates of working class women. Assuming that 
these women act upon divorces with re-enrollments, I expect that keeping divorce 
events over time constant explains the changing coefficients and cancels out the late 
advantage of working-class women (Hypothesis 2b). 
By contrast to the higher re-enrollment rate of single and divorced women, 
one could argue from the perspective of costs as a deterrent (cf. chapter 4.3) and 
hypothesize that married working-class women re-enter more often due to the 
financial aid of their husband. If partners play a role in financing higher education, 
this would affect working-class women more since they lack parental support. Then, 
married women would re-enroll more often and the controlling for marriage in a time 
varying way would explain the pattern of switching coefficients over the life course 
(Hypothesis 2c). For both hypothesis 2b and 2c, the presence of children can be 
related to the central explanatory variables as well as to the outcome. Therefore, for 
testing these hypotheses the presence of children is to be kept constant as a time 
varying variable. 
Other life course events may indirectly account for re-enrollment. To prevent 
families from falling into poverty, e.g. after a job loss, the U.S.-department of Health 
and Human services organizes the ‘Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF)’-program34. The TANF program replaced earlier programs which were more 
important for the NLSY79 cohort, and also cut the possibilities for enrollment during 
recipiency (London, 2005). A similar focus on the presence of young children had the 
AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Under these welfare programs, 
families with young children are eligible to a number of different services which are 
to a large degree state-specific. The federal government provides basic funding and a 
                                                 
34
 For an overview on the TANF program and its successors see 
www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/tanf/tanf-overview (Feb 11, 2013). 
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legal framework. Under the TANF-framework, shorter and vocational oriented 
educational programs might be counted as ‘work activities’ and thus initiate re-
enrollments (even though only for short term education). Previous studies could show 
that welfare benefits can indeed increase investment in human capital and that cuts in 
welfare and harder sanctions reduced, alongside with a higher employment rate, also 
enrollment rates (Dhaval et al., 2011). At the same time, there existed voluntary 
programs by several states which support adult education and were targeted 
specifically at AFDC-recipients (Greenberg, Michalopulos and Robins, 2003). Since 
lower class families are more likely to receive aid and at the same time women are 
more likely to care for children, the program could lead to an overrepresentation of 
working-class women among late enrollers. If this explanation holds good, controlling 
for recipiency would then explain the advantage of working-class daughters for 
enrolling after the early twenties (Hypothesis 2d). 
 
4.5.5 Empirical Analyses: Women’s Changing Inequality over the Life Course 
The following empirical analyses are based on the female part of the sample used in 
chapter 4.4. The models are specified in the same way: with a reduced set of controls 
compared to the previous chapter 4.2 and social origin being operationalized using a 
simplified version of the EGP class scheme (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 
1979; Goldthorpe, 2000). Following then, I extend the Cox-proportional hazards 
regression models (Cox, 1972) from table 4.4.4 in chapter 4.4. Biographical events 
can be modeled as time varying covariates increasing or decreasing the re-enrollment 
rate to college when they occur. 
 
4.5.6 Results 
In order to test the prerequisite of hypothesis 1a that both women and upper class 
children have generally higher class aspirations compared to men and lower class 
children respectively, I plot the occupational aspirations according to class of origin 
and sex. 
From the literature we know that abstract aspirations more than concrete 
expectations of educational achievement are underdeveloped among lower classes 
compared to upper classes (Trusty and Niles, 2004). The test employed here is thus a 
rather conservative approach. The NLSY79 cohort data contains a good measure for 
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abstract class aspirations, which should be rather free from being biased by concrete 
plans to enter college. All participants were asked about their most desired occupation 
in the future. I coded these occupational codes into the same class scheme as the 
parental class variables. In figure 4.5.1, I show that there are clear sex differences 
with respect to aspiring a skilled working or unskilled working class job: these jobs 
are more often desired by young men, in particular by those from (skilled or 
unskilled) working-class origins. The aspirations towards a service class or 
intermediate class job are much less sex-specific among children from higher social 
origins: most of them aim at jobs in the upper classes, as shown by the left group of 
bars. Comparing the highest to the lowest class of origin, the origin-differences are 
only half the size for women compared to that of men. These results support 
hypothesis 1a that women’s occupational aspirations are higher and that the 
distribution is more equal for women than for men when looking at the different 
parental classes. Thus, if women’s higher aspirations do not mirror in higher 
immediate enrolment rates, this pattern could potentially explain, as hypothesis 1a has 
suggested, the switching class coefficients among women. 
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Figure 4.5.1: Class aspirations before or at graduation from high school by parental class 
and sex. 
 
Data source: NLSY79, own calculations. 
 
 
 
The next step is therefore examining the transition into college according to class 
aspirations for all of the combinations of parental class and sex. Figure 4.5.2 clearly 
shows a difference between male and female students. While a higher share of lower 
class women than men have the ambition to achieve a higher class position, men more 
often enter college directly. And indeed, as projected by hypothesis 1a, the immediate 
enrollment rate of women with service class aspiration is lower than the equivalent 
value for men. This finding implies a larger high-aspiration share of women among 
highly-aspiring young adults. However, this percentage of ‘wasted motivation’ does 
not depend much more on parental class for women then for men. 
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Figure 4.5.2: College enrollment soon after high school, by parental class, child’s own 
class aspiration and sex. 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding fulfills a prerequisite for hypothesis 1b, which expects that women from 
the unskilled working class are deterred from entering college directly after 
graduation despite their high class aspiration. Since class aspirations and social 
origins are correlated as well, it is indeed plausible that more working-class women 
with high occupational aspirations are selected into the ‘population of risk’ for re-
enrollment. In order to test the class aspiration hypothesis more systematically, I 
return to the models presented in chapter 4.4 (table 4.4.4) and introduce the class 
aspiration as an additional variable. Possible deterrents which ought to be especially 
strong for women are, as expected in hypothesis 1b, marriage and childbearing before 
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the typical age of college completion. In the next step, I will test this hypothesis and 
thereafter scrutinize the effects of individual life course events. 
 
4.5.6.1 Does Early Family Formation Keep Women away From the Direct Track? 
First, I introduce additional control variables which could account for the class-
specific enrollment but are not discussed in the theoretical section above: the number 
of older siblings and whether the respondent was in a college preparatory track in high 
school. Since the number of missing values is higher for the class aspiration variable, 
I do not clean the sample from missing values on this variable for all models. Instead, 
I replicate the models from table 4.5.1 for each sample separately and then introduce 
the variable of interest. For the results shown, one should note that the switching 
coefficient pattern is even stronger in models where the class of the father is the 
reference instead of the maximal class out of both parents. 
Model 2 in table 4.5.1 tests the implication of hypothesis 1a that the 
composition of potential re-enrollers consists of many highly motivated working-class 
daughters. The results do not show any significant effects for the class aspirations. 
Furthermore, the pattern of switching class coefficients remains unchanged. Hence the 
pattern of lower class women’s college re-entry behavior cannot be explained by 
stronger class aspirations of women from the working classes in the population of 
potentially re-enrolling young adults. 
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Table 4.5.1: Model 1: Only compositional controls, model 2: controls for class aspiration 
included. 
 model 1 model 2 
   
time < 24 months 0.74 3.02 
   
max. class   
  service classes ref. ref. 
  intermediate, until 24
th
 month -0.04 -0.02 
   after 24 months 0.25 0.28 
  skilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.59* -0.59* 
   after 24 months 0.69* 0.70* 
  unskilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.18 -0.16 
   after 24 months 0.24 0.26 
  inactive, until 24
th
 month -0.01 0.01 
   after 24 months 0.10 0.09 
   
cohort   
  born 1961 ref. ref. 
  *1962, until 24
th
 month -0.22 -0.21 
   after 24 months 0.10 0.12 
  *1963, until 24
th
 month -0.57* -0.58* 
   after 24 months 0.14 0.14 
  *1964, until 24
th
 month -0.58* -0.56* 
   after 24 months -0.12 -0.11 
   
race   
  white + other ref. ref. 
  black, until 24
th
 month 0.25 0.24 
   after 24 months 0.36+ 0.33 
  hispanic, until 24
th
 month -0.12 -0.12 
   after 24 months 0.90* 0.88* 
   
afqt scores, until 24
th
 month 0.01* 0.01* 
   after 24 months 0.01* 0.01* 
   
poverty at age 18, until 24
th
 month -0.43 -0.41 
   after 24 months 0.22 0.23 
   
college prep track, until 24
th
 month 0.42* 0.41* 
   after 24 months 0.11 0.08 
   
sibling in household, until 24
th
 month -0.12 -0.09 
   after 24 months 0.20 0.25 
   
older sibling in hh, until 24
th
 month -0.23 -0.23 
   after 24 months -0.09 -0.09 
   
class aspiration   
  service classes  ref. 
  intermediate, until 24
th
 month  -0.15 
   after 24 months  -0.18 
  skilled working, until 24
th
 month  -0.01 
   after 24 months  -0.33 
  unskilled working, until 24
th
 month  -0.71 
   after 24 months  -0.46 
N (persons) 1102 1102 
events (enrollments) 383 383 
+ p < .10, * p < .05 
Data source: NLSY79. 
  
4 .  Why a re Wo rking  Class  Daughters  Catch ing  Up?  
290 
 
Hypothesis 1b expects that the selection out of the direct pathway to higher 
education can be triggered by early family formation, measured in the following as 
experiencing childbirth or marriage before a woman turns 23 years old
35
. In order to 
test this hypothesis, I include these two time-constant variables into the next models 
shown in table 4.5.2. While early parenthood does not have any significant effects on 
belated college entry, married women are hindered from enrolling into college only in 
the first time period. Holding all other variables constant, in the second time period 
the positive marriage effect is not significant anymore. Most importantly, neither 
births nor marriages at young age can explain the class effects. The switching of class 
coefficients for women still persists. Consequently, to early marriages and parenthood 
applies the same as to the class aspirations discussed above. They cannot be made 
responsible for the diversion of motivated working-class women from college. 
  
                                                 
35
 The cut-point for age has undergone thorough sensitivity checks. We could alter it to a younger age 
and would still arrive at the same conclusion. However, choosing ‘younger than 23’ as the criterion can 
also be justified theoretically, since before this age it is hardly possible to complete higher education. 
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Table 4.5.2: Proportional hazard models with time constant covariates – Effect of early 
parenthood and early marriage, log hazard ratios. 
 model 3 model 4 
   
time < 24 months 1.00 1.95 
max. class   
  service classes ref. ref. 
  intermediate, until 24
th
 month -0.18 -0.04 
   after 24 months 0.21 0.23 
  skilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.74* -0.54* 
   after 24 months 0.65* 0.67* 
  unskilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.34 -0.18 
   after 24 months 0.30 0.35 
  inactive, until 24
th
 month -0.03 0.15 
   after 24 months 0.08 0.07 
   
Control variables: sex, birth cohort, race, poverty at age 18, afqt score, college prep track in HS, if 
older siblings in household and early births and marriages. Coefficients reported in the appendix. 
   
birth before age 23   
  birth before 23, until 24
th
 month  -0.33 
  after 24 months  0.08 
   
marriage before age 23   
  marriage before 23, until 24
th
 month  -0.55* 
  after 24 months  0.23+ 
N (persons) 1181 1181 
events (enrollments) 398 398 
+ p < .10, * p < .05 
Data source: NLSY79. 
 
 
 
4.5.6.2 Changes in Family Status and Welfare Recipiency: Do They Bring Working 
Class Women Back to School? 
Another group of mechanisms consists of biographical events which could occur 
above the ordinary rate among young women from the skilled or unskilled working 
class. To test the proposed hypothesis, I now include the time varying covariates 
‘marital status’ and ‘having young or old children’ into the model (hypothesis 2a to 
2c) – instead of the event occurrence at young age as in table 4.5.2. Note that I do not 
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report the baseline models without these variables again, as the number of cases is 
now identical with the models reported in table 4.5.1. 
The results replicate the analysis of Taniguchi and Kaufman (2007). Just like 
them I find significant effects of divorces on re-entry into college. Women with 
children of the age between 0 and 5 are less likely to re-enter college than women 
without children, but also than women with children older than 5 years. The negative 
effects of having young children are found for the first as well as for the second time-
period, whereas the second-period effect is smaller than the first-period effect. For 
older children, only the coefficient in the second period is relevant and shows that 
women with older children are even more likely to re-enroll in college than women 
without children. It is the first of the competing hypothesis about the influence of 
family formation that can be approved. The positive and significant effects of 
divorced and not married women that, in accordance with hypothesis 2a, re-
enrollment is more common within these groups than among married women. 
The central of this analysis, however, was not to analyze the effects of 
women’s life-events on enrolling into college. Though, there is no support for the 
claim that this circumstance could be explained in the way hypotheses 2a to 2c 
suggest. While having young children and being married could be identified as 
deterrents to belated college enrollment, their occurrence does not explain the 
changing effect of social origin over time. 
Hypothesis 2d then suggested that recipients of welfare benefits which target 
at poor families with young children could be the explanation for the social origin 
differences among women. Model 5 in table 4.5.3 includes, instead of the changing 
state of the family biography, the recipiency of TANF or AFDC over time. The 
variable is coded 0 if no welfare benefits were received (the majority of all monthly 
observations), and 1 if the respondent received benefits from the respective program 
at that time. In line with previous research, the AFDC program can increase the 
probability of an investment in human capital. A positive effect is found for the late 
enrollments in the second period of time. Not so for early enrollments. This is 
reasonable given the rather small number of families with such young parents. In the 
same way as for the family biography, the social origin effects remain unaffected. The 
coefficients, especially the once for the skilled working classes, still switch from 
negative to positive for all classes and are still statistically significant for the parental 
skilled working class. Thus, hypothesis 2d is not supported either.  
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Table 4.5.3: Proportional hazard models with time-varying coefficients – Effect of marital 
status, children and welfare programs, log hazard ratios. 
 
model 5 
welfare programs 
model 6 
family formation 
   
time < 24 months 3.03 -27.49 
   
maximal class   
  service classes ref. ref. 
  intermediate, until 24
th
 month -0.04 -0.04 
   after 24 months 0.20 0.25 
  skilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.54* -0.51+ 
   after 24 months 0.66* 0.66* 
  unskilled working, until 24
th
 month -0.19 -0.12 
   after 24 months 0.35(+) 0.35+ 
  inactive, until 24
th
 month 0.14 0.19 
   after 24 months 0.05 0.03 
   
Control variables: sex, birth cohort, race, poverty at age 18, afqt score, college prep track in HS, if 
older siblings in household and early births and marriages. Coefficients reported in the appendix. 
   
children   
  no. of children younger th 6, until 24
th
 month  -0.64* 
  after 24 months  -0.25* 
   
  no. of children >=6 <35, until 24
th
 month  -0.40+ 
  after 24 months  0.09 
   
marital status   
   
married ref. ref. 
   
  never married, until 24
th
 month  0.63* 
  after 24 months  0.78* 
   
  divorced, sep. or widowed, until 24
th
 month  1.03* 
  after 24 months  0.39* 
   
program recipiency   
  AFDC, until 24
th
 month 0.50  
    after 24 months 1.20*  
  TANF after 24 months 0.15  
   
N (persons) 1181 1181 
events (enrollments) 398 398 
+ p < .10, * p < .05 
Data source: NLSY79. 
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4.5.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Subject of this chapter was to explain the fact found in the previous chapter that 
American women from the working classes catch up with service-class women 
somewhat by attending late college education more often. I have discussed and 
empirically tested a number of explanations for this pattern of ‘switching class 
coefficients over the life course’. The explanations that I have discussed fall into three 
blocks: first, the presence of deterrents of working-class women from direct college 
enrollment which lose their force over time while the motivation for education 
persists. Then, we could expect working-class women to make up leeway for their 
educational and occupational expectations they had. Second, historic changes over 
time in favor of women’s employment could encourage the motivated and able 
working-class women to acquire additional education. And third, class specific life 
events related to women’s family biography which could trigger enrollment. 
Examples are the marital status and, as an indirect consequence of childbearing, the 
recipiency of TANF or AFDC. 
Summarizing the results is straightforward: the tested hypotheses for all of 
the different explanations are not supported by empirical evidence. Even though their 
plausibility has been strengthened since I could could identify that there are more 
working-class women who are deterred from higher education than service-class 
women in spite of their aspiration for achieving a service class occupation. The 
strength of the respective coefficients would have been even larger if the fathers’ 
instead of the dominant family class would have been used to identify social origins. 
The mechanism I was not able to scrutinize is a historic change of labor market 
conditions in favor of women. One may or may not see the non-confirmation of 
alternative explanations as a support for this interpretation. On the one hand, a 
number of tests did not lead to support for any of the other explanations. On the other 
hand, several flaws could have caused these ‘non-findings’ as well. The measured 
aspirations for example could change over time and could be non-persistent. 
Measurement errors for the family events are unlikely, but could occur as well with 
regard to the aspirations or program recipiency. Therefore, the chapter cannot offer a 
final conclusion. 
Another alternative to the three discussed blocks of explanations is that 
(community) colleges indeed target specifically at women who are disadvantaged in 
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the labor market. The comparative findings of other coefficients going along with 
problematic labor market outlooks, such as early pregnancy, could be interpreted in 
this line. This would be an encouraging result for all those policy makers who suggest 
reducing inequality by offering lifelong educational opportunities. However, this 
policy implication should be carefully evaluated using more fine-graded studies. 
Furthermore, I have argued in section 3, overcoming inequality in earlier stages of the 
life course would make such second chances obsolete. 
Even though the analyses presented here leave the puzzle I set out to explain 
open for future research. It opens perspective for the design of such studies. Ideally, 
the historically changing labor market entry of women and the role of education as a 
part of it should be studied by comparing inequality in enrollment over the life course 
between different cohorts. 
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5 DIFFERENTIATION IN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL CAREER 
PATTERNS AND LABOR MARKET SUCCESS: 
SUSTAINABLE DISADVANTAGES OR GAINS FROM 
DETOURS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This last empirical section goes beyond the question of inequality in education and 
investigates how different educational careers might affect returns to education upon 
labor market entry. The relevance of this additional analysis is twofold. First, it allows 
to get a better idea how delay, interruptions or detours in educational careers are 
contribute to the intergenerational persistence of social positions. And second, the 
question of educational career patterns allows in several instances to empirically 
distinguish between contradicting explanations for returns to education in the labor 
market. I will give a short overview over the theoretical approaches to these questions 
and then present two empirical studies, one on the US and one on Germany. There is 
neither a chapter devoted to the Swedish context, nor a comparative chapter. The 
Swedish sample is too small for such an investigation, and there are already rather 
clear results for the Swedish context. For the US on the other hand, previous research 
is inconsistent. For Germany, I focus on a specific type of interruptions, the 
completion of a double qualification, which is quantitatively important. Further, I do 
not make an extensive comparison of contexts and do not formulate hypotheses on the 
macro-level. For the moment, the various interruptions and detours which are typical 
for the different countries seem too different to compare labor market institutions. 
Furthermore, results are similarly small for both contexts, which makes it appear that 
the processes are not moderated as much as other aspects of the school to work 
transition by the country context. 
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5.1 More than Schooling: Transitions to the Labor Market from 
Delayed or Interrupted Educational 
 
 
 
 
This chapter prepares the following chapters 5.2 and 5.3 by discussing theoretical 
explanations for returns to education. I will first illustrate the structure of the life 
courses and the possible empirical questions, which all imply different theoretical 
questions. Then I discuss different theoretical answers on the question why education 
pays off in the labor market. I develop hypotheses how the various and sometimes 
contradictory mechanisms can be differentiated empirically by comparing the pay-
offs of interrupted and non-interrupted educational careers. 
 
 
 
 
Throughout all previous sections, the focus of this volume was on the question of the 
educational career. This last section will go one step further in the sequence of status 
attainment in the life course and ask for effects of educational careers on the labor 
market entry. It directly complements the discussion in the previous section in several 
ways. 
Delays and stop-outs occur frequently and many students acquire education 
after a later re-entry into college. Furthermore, summarizing the findings of the 
previous chapters, later re-entries – such as earlier educational transitions – continue 
to be socially selective. They occur more often among children from the service 
classes. On the other hand, those young adults from lower class families who 
participate in higher education are more likely to do so with interruptions (chapter 
3.4). This pattern is in contrast to the hope of policy makers that second-chance 
educational opportunities will promote educational inequality (cf. introduction to 
section 3). In sum, the previous chapters show that in the open education systems with 
a strong differentiation of educational careers, Sweden and the US, inequality in late 
education is higher than in Germany. The question on intergenerational inequality, 
however, involves more than only educational attainment. Success in the educational 
program entered is important as well. And beyond, the total contribution to 
intergenerational inequality needs additional analysis on the labor market returns of 
specific educational pathways. 
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In the literature on intergenerational inequality, this is often referred to as the 
OED-triangle (Blau and Duncan, 1967): social origin influences both education (OE) 
and the social destination (OD). And in addition, education affects the destination as 
well (ED) and thus explains a part of the intergenerational transmission of status or 
class. Thus, to learn about the indirect effect of social origin on the destination – the 
present standing in a society via education – the link between education and 
destination needs to be studied as well. In the past, research showed that education 
plays a major role for the intergenerational transmission of inequality (Ishida, Müller 
and Ridge, 1995), in particular the hierarchical element of the class scheme (Breen 
and Luijkx, 2004). The link to unequal positions in the society seems to be all too 
obvious. With increasing educational expansion, a differentiation of education in a 
multitude of aspects has taken place and many new aspects of educational 
achievement are now connected with social origins beyond the level of education 
achieved (e.g. Ayalon and Shavit, 2004; Lucas, 2001; Lucas, 2009; Roksa, 2011; 
Roksa et al., 2007). The analysis of educational careers in the previous chapters shows 
this diversification along on the timing dimension. Only few studies, however, have 
made this further step towards assessing the consequences of educational 
differentiation for social inequality. Though, this ‘ED’-link is a crucial component to 
link findings on emerging inequalities by differentiation of previously more 
homogenous educational programs back to the inequality debate. Educational 
inequality has not only been present in attainment in youth, but also in the rates of 
enrollment throughout young adulthood and in the patterns of educational careers (as 
shown throughout sections 3 and 4 of this volume). And even is late flexibility for late 
entry is successful in equalizing education, as chapter 3.4 has illustrated, its impact is 
likely to be small and lead to a later entry of lower class children into postsecondary 
education. This circumstance leads to the follow up question how late entry affects 
labor market success and the standing in the society. How much can be gained 
individually by late entry into postsecondary education? Does the higher rate of re-
entrants benefit the higher classes? And what are the consequences for being late? 
Does the same education achieved earlier in life and without interruptions pay more 
than the one achieved via the long and winding road? These questions are broad and 
general. The following discussion will formulate theoretical expectations and the 
chapters thereafter attempt to answer a part of them empirically. 
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While the other sections of this book have engaged much into comparative 
work, this one will conduct analyses on single countries and only give some 
comparative insights in the discussion at the end. There are several reasons for 
limiting the analyses to single country studies. First, as the literature review will 
show, previous findings are inconsistent. Thus, it seems that working out a sound 
basis of empirical research on the micro level is a prerequisite for developing a 
reasonable theoretical framework for comparative research. Second, labor market 
institutions are one, but probably not the most important differences between 
countries. The educational system differs not only in its institutionalized connection to 
the labor market, but also in the characteristics of the interruptions themselves. I argue 
that it needs more research before a comparison can be reasonably made between the 
effects of German students completing vocational training before entering higher 
education and e.g. American students stopping out for one semester. At the end of the 
section, a concluding part will summarize the results and compare them between 
countries, also discussing other results from the literature. 
 
5.1.1 Returns to Education: Do they Depend on the Timing and the 
Trajectories of Postsecondary Educational Careers? 
The question how gaps and detours are related to returns to education has, not 
surprisingly, got the greatest attention in those countries where higher education 
careers were comparatively de-institutionalized and individualized. The existing 
research is, however, still a broad and unsystematic field. The various studies are 
mostly contributions to single aspects of the gains or penalties of certain groups 
compared to certain others. The empirical questions are manifold and each one 
implies a different empirical design. To exemplify, if individuals can boost their 
income by additional schooling this does not mean that they will eventually get as 
much as those who achieved the same schooling level as soon as possible. Most of the 
studies miss to put all possible effects of delays and detours into the context of the life 
course
36
. Since a delayed entry into- or an interruption of higher education can affect 
life chances in multiple ways, this seems a necessary contextualization for the 
interpretation of the single studies. Beyond the large variety of empirical questions 
and their different implications, the theoretical explanations are manifold as well and 
                                                 
36
 For an exception see Humlum (2007). 
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many have not yet been tested empirically against each other. The large number of 
mid-range theories for explaining why education pays off, such as the human capital 
or signaling approaches, are difficult to turn into contradictory hypotheses in a 
convincing way (Bills, 2003). As a rough classification, the theoretical mechanisms at 
work divide into two blocks. The first block consists of the effects of delays and stop-
outs on the educational career itself. The second block consists of mechanisms which 
are directly related to the labor market entry and would occur even if educational 
achievement was not affected by the non-standard career pathway. 
The first block is likely to be important in many different ways. Entering 
education with labor market experience in the respective field could affect both 
students’ performance and persistence through several mechanisms. One reason for a 
bonus of late entrants can be derived from on information-economics. As a side effect 
of work experience young adults can ‘discover their learning potential’ and get useful 
information, e.g. to improve their choice of a study program or study more efficiently 
and motivated within higher education. This argument is similar to the idea of 
Oettinger (1993; 1999), that students are more aware of the returns they can get for a 
certain type of studies after entering the labor market. 
As e.g. Oettinger has argued, young adults might discover their potential 
during their first time in the labor market and collect relevant work experience to 
improve their choice of the study program and learning (Oettinger, 1993; Oettinger, 
1999). However, empirical research points towards the opposite. In a study of Oregon 
high school leavers Kempner and Kinnick (1990) have shown that delayers have a 
lower chance of degree completion. Evidence from more recent studies confirms this 
finding using nationally representative data for the US. The completion rates of 
delayers are found to be extremely low, even in study which paying much attention to 
modeling unobserved heterogeneity (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005; Roksa and Velez, 
2012; Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2005). Stop-outs and delays often go along with 
repeated gaps in the subsequent educational career (DesJardins, Ahlburg and McCall, 
2006). Jacobs and Berkowitz-King (2002) also found lower completion rates, but only 
when not adjusting for conflicts in time allocation via the incorporation of family and 
employment status and the part-time college status. 
For Germany, Müller and Schneider as well as Meulemann found that those 
young adults who qualify for higher education through a non-standard pathway in the 
secondary education system as well as those with vocational training before enrolling 
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have higher drop-out rates (Meulemann, 1988; Meulemann, 1989; Müller and 
Schneider, 2012). 
That returns to education are probably impaired through this pathway should 
be considered when interpreting the results for later labor market returns: even if the 
detours pay off, they can come at the cost of lower success in the higher education 
system. Given that degree completion rates have declined over time in the US 
(Bound, Lovenheim and Turner, 2010), the lower chances of completion among 
delayers are already an important aspect of delayed education. The existing empirical 
evidence shows a consistent pattern: non-traditional students are unlikely to complete 
their degree in the US, and also in Germany graduation is less likely of late entrants. 
On the second pathway affecting intergenerational status transmission, 
effects on the labor market entry, a more thorough literature review will follow below. 
Here, the evidence is much less coherent as for the effects on the educational career. 
 
5.1.2 Timing and Success at the Entry into the Labor Market 
A multitude of mechanisms can be drawn from the literature on how returns to 
education are affected by work experience (Weiss, Klein and Grauenhorst, 2013). 
Most obviously, opportunity costs for delaying educational achievement will affect 
the lifetime income. The later any returns to education can be realized, the less time is 
until retirement. This simple and obvious disadvantage of delaying education – which 
is depicted in figure 5.1.1 – is rarely discussed in empirical research papers since it 
appears to be trivial. However, it will always be present as an inevitable disadvantage 
of the delayers and should thus not be forgotten in the debate about the pro´s and 
con´s of detours through the educational system (Humlum, 2007). 
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Figure 5.1.1: Opportunity costs of delaying higher education. 
 
 
Person A: direct pathway 
Person B: delayed/interrupted education 
 
 
 
The direct opportunity costs as depicted in 5.1.1 are probably just one aspect 
of ‘forgone’ returns for giving up an early start of the career. Another component of 
the total disadvantage of delayers will be added if career trajectories according to 
tenure exist. Such trajectories imply that after entry into the labor market, a typical 
career is followed, with increasing wages and upward status mobility over time in the 
labor market. These long term wage developments can be expected to be more 
pronounced in service class positions (Goldthorpe, 2000) – which are the class 
positions that are typically entered through higher education (see Goldthorpe and 
McKnight, 2006 for empirical evidence supporting this claim). For jobs within these 
class positions, employers and employees typically establish long term relationships 
with rewards according to job tenure. If such career trajectories apply, late entrants 
will pay for their late start with a ‘career-lag’. The later they start their career, the later 
they can realize career advancement. If career trajectories are on average the same as 
for the early entrants, late labor market entrants will lag behind throughout the entire 
career until retirement, as depicted in figure 5.1.2.  
age
„returns“
Education t2
Education t1
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Figure 5.1.2: Opportunity costs of delaying higher education and permanent lagging 
behind. 
 
 
Person A: direct pathway 
Person B: delayed/interrupted education 
 
 
 
Both components illustrated in figures 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 are yet nothing but 
forgone returns due to later entry – and thus rather trivial to explain theoretically. A 
possible third component is less straightforward. The compensation which can be 
achieved for work in the labor market or its increase over the career could also 
directly depend on previous educational career patterns. A theoretical explanation for 
such an effect would though need some more elaboration – and has multiple facets. 
There could be a penalty, as depicted in figure 5.1.3, but other theoretical approaches 
would rather expect a bonus for interrupters and delayers (which does not necessarily 
outweigh the opportunity cost effects, though). 
 
  
„returns“
age
Education t2
Education t1
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Figure 5.1.3: Illustration of comparison groups to investigate potential costs and bonuses 
for delaying education. 
 
 
Person A: direct pathway 
Person B: delayed/interrupted education 
 
 
 
5.1.3 Employer Behavior and Applicants Respondents: The Role of Previous 
Employment during the Job Matching Process 
Much of labor market success is determined by the demand of employers. Employer 
behavior is thus a critical factor in the determination of a penalty or a bonus for 
educational career patterns such as delays or drop-outs. A bonus for those who are off 
the norm by having gained work experience before leaving school can be expected 
mostly from the perspective of the human capital argument. This approach highlights 
the productive skills being acquired in the educational system and via ‘on-the–job’ 
training. These skills are – to human capital theorists – the core reason why education 
and experience pay off in the labor market (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974). Against this 
background, two outcomes are possible. Either interruptions are related to an increase 
in productive skills, then additional human capital would be collected and a bonus in 
the returns must be expected. Or it does not increase the stock of human capital – and 
the effect on the returns would be zero. For the human capital theory it needs 
additional assumptions to construct an argument why delayed and interrupted 
education should yield lower returns. In the classical model, the number of years of 
Education t2
age
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Education t1
A
B
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D
E
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schooling determines the returns, not their allocation in the life course
37
. Several 
scenarios are possible that might explain the impact of educational career patterns on 
returns in the labor market: 
- If assuming that previous work experience is brought to college when 
re-entering, the learning process could be improved and later gains 
would be higher than if college is just completed without prior 
practical knowledge about an occupation or an industry. 
- On the other hand, the earlier and more straightforward education is 
acquired, the more time can be spent in the labor force after 
education. This experience should be more valuable than experience 
before re-entering college, because it is on a higher qualification 
level. Finally, interrupted and uneven educational careers have a 
higher probability of being inconsistent in the field of study. Field-
specific human capital should have lower worth if with other fields in 
an educational career. To exemplify, two years of law and two years 
of medicine are likely to yield lower pay offs than four years of either 
of them (this is not necessarily the case, in fact, again the opposite 
could be true in some instances). 
In sum, the prediction based on the human capital perspective depends on additional 
assumptions. But lower returns are compatible with some extensions of this 
perspective. Further, the type of interruption comes into play. Interruptions grating 
human capital or at least information about work can be expected to have less 
negative effects on returns than those interruptions which do improve productivity. 
Among the mechanisms discussed so far, the human capital approach was the 
only one with an explicit statement about the behavior of employers. A plus in income 
is expected, because the employer values the higher productivity of the more 
experienced employees. However, at the moment when employers meet the employee 
the first time and decide about the hire, interruptions in the educational career can 
signal more than productivity. From the theoretical point of view of the signaling- and 
screening-argument, employers search for signals of desirable traits of their 
employees (Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973). And potential employees try to gain useful 
signals to ‘prove’ their productivity and potential of trainability. Against this 
                                                 
37
 Although Mincer highlights returns to experience, implying that work before or during studies 
should have rather positive returns (Mincer, 1974). 
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background, detours can also be related to lower returns compared to the same 
education achieved on the ‘royal road’. Having a long and winding ‘career road’ with 
many entries and exits from education could be seen by employers as an indicator of 
low performance, e.g. poor educational performance or a lack in motivation and 
steadfastness. The role of personal characteristics, instead of the growth in cognitive 
competences, has been highlighted by the socialization hypothesis of education 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1976). In contrast to the human capital theory, the increase in 
productivity of more educated individuals originates from socialization to work 
environment – and not (only) by an improvement of skills and competencies. This 
socialization is projected to go along with the development of personality traits being 
demanded by employers in capitalist economies (Bowles and Gintis, 2000), such as 
‘patience’ or being ‘used to following rules’. Combined with the signaling hypothesis, 
the way how the educational career is pursued can be used as a signal for the 
‘educative process’, i.e. in how far the individual was able to integrate into the system 
and turn its own potential into success at given rules. Featherman and Carter have 
argued along these lines in their seminal study on the career effects of interrupted 
education: 
 
‘Perhaps, tenure per se is not as important as continuity in schooling; perhaps those who go 
through without interruption (and without retardation) are those with personalities most highly 
valued by employers. For example, they may be more punctual, better planners, more 
efficient, more persistent, more compliant, and less distracted; these traits may well be related 
to efficient progress through school and to lower “training costs” on the job, but maybe they 
are not.’ (Featherman & Carter, 1976: 157). 
 
Such processes of sorting out of those deviating from the norm have been observed 
for other characteristics. The probably most striking case against the pure reading of 
the human capital idea are overeducated individuals, that fall off the norm and will 
thus often not be hired, even though in possession of more human capital (Bills, 
1992). 
Testing the mechanisms – or as Bills has termed it in accordance with 
Merton – middle range theories on the worth of education in the labor market against 
each other is a difficult endeavor. For most empirical questions they hardly lead to 
contradictory hypotheses. A large literature attempted to separate the effects of 
productivity and signaling, e.g. in the economics discipline under the headline of the 
sheepskin effect (Belman and Heywood, 1991; Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994; 
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Hungerford and Solon, 1987; Jaeger and Page, 1996; Silles, 2007; Weiss, 1995). Bills 
(2003) concludes that previous research has not been convincing in testing the 
signaling perspective. Arriving at contradictory hypotheses which are straightforward 
tests for any of the two opposing claims has sometimes been successful when 
education is treated more differentiated than merely looking at final achievement. 
Two situations can be helpful for performing such tests. Once degrees are constant 
employers have to either find further signals that vary independently from the amount 
of schooling, or find variation in schooling which is not associated with additional 
signals. To give an example, the study of Groot and Osterbeek (1994) used this 
circumstance and found for the Dutch context that delayers and repeaters in education 
can indeed receive a bonus rather than a penalty. The strength of the study of Groot 
and Osterbeek is that educational credentials are kept constant. At the same time the 
amount and the way (in terms of educational career patterns) of schooling varies. The 
signaling value from delay or repetition should then, in any case, lead to a penalty. 
But the authors find a bonus, and interpret it as support for the added value of 
additional schooling at constant credentials – a finding in favor of the human capital 
theory. While the findings persist after keeping test scores of cognitive performance 
statistically constant, anything that could be triggered in schools after the detour is 
included as control variable in the model. Thus, while the negative signal could be 
present, repeating school could for example have altered the child’s development and 
personality through the change of the relative position within the classroom. 
The link between occupation and productivity is assumed to be even weaker 
for ‘credentialist’ hiring. According to this mechanism, access to occupational 
positions has to overcome ‘closure’ (Weeden, 2002). Credentials – i.e. educational 
certificates – take the role of entry tickets into closed and to a certain degree 
privileged occupational positions. The way how employers let themselves be guided 
by standardized preconditions is that they ‘operate on widely shared societal 
assumptions about the appropriate relationship between schooling and job 
assignment’ (Bills, 2003, p. 452). In many contexts, these common assumptions are 
mirrored in legal regulations (e.g. Bol and Van de Werfhorst, 2011). Credentialist 
hiring has the effect that employers limit their criteria to educational degrees, other – 
direct or indirect – signals of productivity are disregarded (Bills and Brown, 2011). 
Educational career patterns should thus be totally irrelevant for the returns to 
education. However, there are potential degrees of freedom for other mechanisms to 
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operate since the credentialism hypothesis remains silent on the question how 
employers differentiate between applicants with the same degree and how incomplete 
education is rewarded. If there are aspects counting for returns that are beyond the 
mere credentials – such as interruptions or delays of educational careers – 
credentialism would at least have to be complemented by other mechanisms. In a 
strict reading of the theory, neither delays nor interruptions should be related to 
bonuses or penalties in the labor market, unless they are linked with additional 
educational credentials. 
Obviously, detours in educational careers offer several opportunity to 
empirically differentiate mechanisms of the link between productivity gains and the 
mere signaling value of education. In the following two chapters on Germany and the 
US, such tests will be attempted. The hypothesis resulting from the signaling 
approach is that interrupted and delayed higher education pays less in the labor 
market, because another signal is there that can be used to indicate negative 
performance as Featherman and Carter have described. But when would employers 
rely on such a weak and blurry signal? One would expect that they do not rely on 
these weak signals if other, supposedly more reliable, signals are available. Therefore, 
I expect that such weak signals as interruptions are a negative signal only if other 
signals are unavailable which have a greater potential of indicating the ‘true 
productivity’ of an applicant. 
 
5.1.4 A Life Course Perspective: Family Formation and Education 
In the typical patterns of life courses in industrialized societies education and the 
labor market entry are concentrated in adolescence and young adulthood. Shifting 
them into later age can cause conflicts between life-domains and may complicate 
completion, but also the labor market entry. 
As childbearing and family formation normally occur in certain age-periods, 
delaying college education will shift the educational career into a phase of the life 
course where it collides with other life events. This can lead to role conflicts or 
constraints in time budgets and geographical mobility. Between the age of 20 and 35, 
most of the initial family formation takes place. Hence, education which is completed 
later in the life course could pay less since the children’s and spouses’ situation limits 
flexibility for the job search. A successful labor market entry on the other hand plays 
5 .  Educat ional  Career  Pat t erns  and  the  Labor Marke t  Entry  
 309 
a key role for later labor market success (Scherer, 2004). Mothers with young children 
should be affected most, as their entry into the labor market would fall together with 
the labor market difficulties related to motherhood (Budig and England, 2001). Older 
students are known to work more and college work is strongly related to performance 
and drop out from college (for a review see Pascarella and Terenzini, 2005). Taken 
together, from a life course perspective we would expect that interrupted or delayed 
educational attainment leads to a forced choice between the societal-normative pattern 
of family formation and an optimal start of the early career. Hence, on average those 
individuals achieving education later would fare worse in their early returns on the 
labor market. 
 
5.1.5 Empirical Research Questions 
‘Returns to late schooling’ cannot only be a label which subsumes many theoretical 
research questions – as illustrated in the last section. Also the theoretical research 
questions are manifold. Table 5.1.1 summarizes and explains the empirical questions 
as illustrated in figure 5.1.3. 
Among the different aspects, the probably most frequently asked question by 
researcher is whether individuals can indeed gain returns from re-enrolling. From this 
individual perspective, those who move straight to the degree are an irrelevant 
comparison group. More important is to ask whether the completion of an additional 
educational program will help to improve the labor market returns compared to the 
present situation. For this question, the relevant comparison consists of those 
individuals who decide against re-enrollment. The common strategy to identify the 
average added value to individual returns is the difference-in-difference design
38
 
relying on the comparison (B-D)-(E-D) in figure 5.1.3. Such studies have been 
published in particular for those countries where late entries occur rather frequently. 
‘Intra-career-returns’ have been found to exist on income (Hällsten, 2011 - Sweden; 
Light, 1995 - US; Zhang and Palameta, 2006 - Canada) as well as on occupational 
prestige (Hong Li et al., 2000 - Switzerland) for different societies. The overall 
finding is, not too surprisingly, that individuals can improve their labor market 
situation by the acquisition of additional schooling. However, against the 
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 See the first chapters of the textbook authored by Singer and Willet (2003) for a n overview on the 
logic of this approach. 
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overwhelming evidence on the value of initial schooling (e.g. Klein, 2011), any other 
finding would have been a great surprise. 
From an inequality perspective though, more empirical questions arise. 
Figure 5.1.3 illustrates them as well. Re-entrants seem to have returns to their 
investments in education. But are these the same as for those who manage to get 
ahead earlier? The mechanisms discussed above suggest having a closer look on this 
question as well, for at least two reasons. First because it is relevant for the evaluation 
of the role that delays or detours play for inequality. If higher education does pay off 
when it is obtained later, but to a lower extent than ‘on-time’ education, this would 
constitute a disadvantage of lower class children. This additional disadvantage in 
educational achievement remains unobserved when looking the highest educational 
degree or the years of education completed only. Second, because this situation of 
differentiation of the graduates with the same amount of human capital has theoretical 
implications. Given that human capital is kept constant, scrutinizing on the remaining 
difference can be enlightening with regard to the other theoretical mechanisms 
discussed above
39
. 
With the exception of the simple opportunity costs, all of the above 
mentioned mechanisms jointly contribute to the difference between interrupters and 
continuous students. This implies that all of them increase the gap between C and B in 
figure 5.1.3. Thus, the empirical question of the comparing C and B has only weak 
theoretical grip since many possible mechanisms are mixed. The late entry into the 
age-wage structure can be the reason for a penalty at this point as well as conflicts 
with family formation or mechanisms related to employer behavior. Such a 
comparison can, however, still be very useful because it can make a strong point to re-
connect the findings to the general debate about intergenerational inequality. It 
summarizes the negative slope of the A-B line and the steady lagging behind in the 
career of the late entrants – and thus enables to answer the question whether delayers 
– who are more frequently from lower social backgrounds – are overall disadvantaged 
compared to their peers in the same cohort who got their education straight. 
                                                 
39
 Note that the distinction between the effects of interrupted careers on the one side and the gains 
through lifelong learning on the other side closely corresponds to the question what motivates the non-
traditional educational career patterns. If non-standard educational careers are the result of re-entries 
into the labor market, the gains that can be achieved by additional education are important information 
for re-entrants: does it pay on the individual level to go back? Then however, if interruptions are 
delays, the more important information, in particular from a policy perspective, would be on the 
consequences of gaps. 
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Furthermore, in some instances is might be possible to rule out several of the 
mechanisms and draw conclusions on others, e.g. by directly controlling the stage of 
family formation. 
 
Table 5.1.1: Empirical research questions for different perspectives on economic returns 
to educational careers. 
Empirical research question Research design: 
corresponding comparison in 
figure 5.1.3 
Individual returns: are individuals gaining ‘earning power’ (Mincer, 1974) or 
‘employability power’ by a marginal increase of their educational 
achievement? 
(B-D)- (E-D); ‘difference in 
difference’ 
Penalty or bonus at labor market entry: do individuals with educational 
careers deviating from the standard road do better or worse when entering the 
labor market? 
A-B 
Penalty or bonus for gaps and detours: do individuals with educational careers 
deviating from the standard road do better or worse at a certain age? 
C-B 
 
 
 
In the literature, the comparison between interrupters and non-interrupters is 
rarely considered compared to other aspects of non-traditional students’ participation 
in higher education. This is unproblematic, as long as the standing of graduates at the 
time of the labor market entry is the central interest. Then, the comparison between A 
and B would be more relevant. This comparison enables to scrutinize on the role of 
previous detours for the immediate labor market entry after leaving school. It is thus a 
more suitable situation, e.g. to test the ‘productivity’-driven mechanism of the human 
capital theory against the idea of educational signals. It can thus be argued to have a 
greater theoretical significance than the C-B comparison. However, for evaluating the 
contribution of educational career patterns, in particular stop-outs, to intergenerational 
inequality, the C-B-comparison is the relevant empirical question. 
The aim of the following chapters is to fill existing gaps in the literature for 
two of the three countries. As the typical form of interruptions and detours in 
educational careers differ greatly between the country contexts, the relevant research 
questions differ too. In the US, a large number of studies exist (as reviewed above) 
scrutinizing on the labor market entry situation after different educational career 
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patterns. Reasons to do more research still exist. First, due to the contradictory results, 
which can be to some degree caused by differences in the methodological approach. 
Second, because the question on the total disadvantage at a certain age within one 
cohort is neglected by previous research. Hence, in particular the relevant question for 
evaluating the relevance of educational career patterns for inequality lacks empirical 
evidence. Furthermore, as many studies exist on the impact on income, for measuring 
stable economic disadvantage measuring economic positions by occupational 
outcomes, such as social class or prestige, would lead to stronger results. Chapter 5.2 
aims at closing these gaps and refers to the impact of interruptions within educational 
careers on labor market outcomes, in particular occupational prestige. 
The situation differs for Germany. Only very few studies have scrutinized the 
value of practical experience for graduates from higher education. And those that 
exist invite methodological more advanced replications to be carried out. As the 
typical patterns of educational careers differ, research from other countries is hard to 
transfer. Detours and gaps are less frequent in Germany, but if they occur they are 
usually longer. Furthermore, they are frequently coupled with the acquisition of an 
additional, vocational degree. Hence, the mechanisms underlying a penalty or a bonus 
in the A-B comparison have probably more leverage. For Germany, only few studies 
exist on either of the comparisons. In chapter 5.3 I will therefore present a study on 
the question how the completion of a vocational training before enrolling in higher 
education influences the labor market entry for graduates. 
The lack of data does not allow adding a third country study on Sweden. 
There is, however, a series of recent and good studies for the Swedish context based 
on register data (which is not available for researchers not situated in Sweden). These 
can serve as a sound basis for final country comparative discussion in chapter 5.4. 
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5.2 You Snooze, you Lose? Returns to Interrupted and Delayed 
College Education in the US 
 
 
 
 
This chapter refers to the US. The research question is whether delayed entries into 
and interruptions of educational careers of varying type and duration affect 
employment outcomes upon labor market entry. The situation of graduates and 
college-goers never completing is analyzed separately applying propensity score 
matching. The labor market outcomes studied are whether a job could be found which 
offers medical insurance, the logarithmized wage and occupational outcomes 
measured as Hauser and Warrens 1997 version of the Socio Economic Index (SEI). 
Results show that graduates with a B.A.-degree are not affected by their educational 
pattern. For incomplete college, the timing matters more. While there are small 
penalties for interruptions in general, small bonuses can be gained if the time out of 
the education system was spent with full time work. 
 
 
 
 
In the US context, as the previous chapters have shown, interrupted educational 
careers and non-traditional students are frequent compared to e.g. Germany. Hence, it 
is not surprising that more published studies exist than in other contexts which 
address different questions on the labor market returns of graduates with different 
educational careers. Their findings, however, are somewhat inconsistent. Some find 
small penalties for delays and stop-outs, but others do not. And there are even studies 
finding (small) bonuses for graduates who interrupted their educational career or 
delayed their entry. In this chapter, I will address the question about the effect of 
interruptions in educational careers on labor market outcomes – adding several 
aspects that have not been discussed so far. By applying propensity score matching to 
account for the heterogeneity between ‘interrupters’ and ‘non-interrupters’, I will use 
a different statistical strategy. Furthermore, I differentiate the ‘stop-out’ and ‘delay’ 
more than previous studies did and compare the effects of gaps and delays of different 
duration and quality. Finally, I do not reduce labor market outcomes to wages as in 
most other studies. In addition to the wage at age 35, I also assess the impact on the 
occupational outcomes, operationalized using the socio economic index of Hauser and 
Warren (1997). Finally, social integration and social security in the US depend very 
much on the employment situation – and healthcare is an important aspect of social 
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security which is by far not universal. The fact that this constitutes an important 
dimension of inequality and social inclusion, beyond the question on the amount of 
returns, motivated me to add a third independent variable. I also test the effects on 
whether the respondent has employer-provided health insurance or not. This links the 
results closer to the debate on social inequality, since differences in occupational 
outcomes or access to health insurance at a time when most adults are fully 
established in the labor market can be seen as a more sustainable gap in the socio 
economic achievement than effects on wages shortly after graduation. 
In line with previous assessments of returns to interrupted education, I find 
that overall effects are small. Among young adults with a B.A.-degree, no difference 
in any of the three outcomes at age 35 could be found once the comparison was 
limited to matched cases according to their propensity of having delayed/interrupted 
educational careers. Young adults with incomplete college education are affected 
more by interruptions. Delays are not found to be problematic at all – at least not at 
given levels of educational achievement and when conditioning on the propensity 
score. The duration of continuous interruptions or delays did not make any important 
difference. Differentiation of the interruptions according to activities, e.g. whether the 
gap was work- or family-related, led to small refinements of the conclusions, but not 
to a full clarification of the inconclusive findings from previous research. If delays are 
due to fulltime work, incomplete education that was attended afterwards did pay off 
more than incomplete educational careers that started right after high school. 
 
5.2.1 Delays, Interruptions and Returns to Education: Selection Bias and 
Inconclusive Results for the US Context 
Results from previous studies are inconclusive. Much of them discuss the problem of 
selection bias carefully, but very different tactics are applied to tackle it. This could be 
one reason for the contradictory results. In a seminal study Featherman and Carter 
(1976) addressed the question whether the timing and pattern of educational careers 
affect success in later educational attainment and the labor market. The authors 
postulate penalties for those students who interrupt their post-high school education 
due to a deviation from the culturally specific normative pattern of a straight and 
uninterrupted career. The findings however point towards only small effects of 
interruptions in postsecondary education on success in the labor market, while the 
impact on educational attainment seems to be large. Similarly, Griliches (1980) and 
5 .  Educat ional  Career  Pat t erns  and  the  Labor Marke t  Entry  
 315 
Marcus (1984) have both found no substantial disadvantage in terms of earnings for 
those who ‘dropout for a while’. Monks found an equally negative but small effect for 
the age of graduation (Monks, 1997). For Sweden on the other hand, Holmlund et al. 
(2008) show that there is a wage penalty for graduates who interrupted postsecondary 
education, which they interpret as a hint that it is necessary to take the timing of 
human capital acquisition into account when estimating returns to education. 
The central methodological concern of the debate around the question of 
causal consequences of interruptions of educational careers is the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity. Even the early papers of Featherman and Carter as well as Griliches 
have discussed the problem of ‘inert differences’ between interrupters and non-
interrupters. All of the studies mentioned so far have tried to address this problem by 
conditioning on a more or less rich set of observable variables. As always in such 
situations, there is at least a potential for the existence of further, yet unobserved, 
characteristics and hence biased results. Griliches therefore urges to look for 
‘interruptions by exogenous force’, that could allow stronger conclusions. At least if 
this force is assigned independently from other factors that influence success in the 
labor market. In this situation, labor market bonuses or penalties could be attributed to 
the interruption in higher education. However, the caveat is that for a causal 
interpretation of interruptions per se, this same exogenous force may not affect labor 
market success itself. The latter condition seems to be such a substantial limitation of 
this approach that Griliches immediately admits that chances for finding such a 
natural experiment are very low. For example, all health related interruptions are more 
or less ruled out by the fact that health can affect success in the labor market at a great 
deal. Several decades after his paper has been published, there seems to be no study 
that can fulfill these strong criteria perfectly. Recent studies have attempted to come 
at least closer to such a natural experiment. Chenevert (2012) uses several 
instrumental variables in her study on graduates from a Master program in law. The 
instruments she employs are the ‘unemployment rate in the year of college 
graduation’, whether the ‘individual was a business or economics major, and the 
interaction of both of these variables with the measures of relatedness of their 
occupation’ (Chenevert, 2012, p. 21). Her findings by and large confirm the Swedish 
study. Interrupters receive a wage penalty, which decreases over time and is lower for 
those who interrupted education with field related work. The principal impossibility to 
test the assumption of ‘no direct effect on labor market outcomes’ however will 
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always leave some uncertainty about the results of such studies. The contrary is found 
by Ferrer and Menendez (2009) who apply a two stage least squares technique to 
model selection into the ‘gap-group’. They even find a premium for interrupters in 
Canadian sample. 
In sum, the previous literature on the question of returns to educational gaps 
and delays is inconclusive. Some authors found a premium, others found no effect and 
again others found a penalty. The contradictory situation can have different reasons. 
First and foremost, it is likely that flexible careers affect different populations in a 
different way. Some of the populations studied are rather specific. All of them are 
specific in their historical context. Second, interruptions and delays can imply very 
different forms of the actual educational career. The detours can be of very differing 
nature, in their duration, in the link to the content of studies and in their motivation. 
This latter explanation calls for a closer look at a third issue that has often 
been ignored in previous studies. All of the interruptions can be related to specific 
reasons which are at the same time related to success in the labor market. For 
example, interruptions can be triggered by – both physical and mental – illness, by 
financial constraints in funding of college, by a very good labor market offer that 
makes further studies seemingly obsolete, by family formation such as marriage or 
childbearing, and by other things more. Previous research paid much more attention to 
inert individual differences of the respondents rather than heterogeneity in the 
treatment. However, the precise definition of the treatment ‘interruption’ can affect 
the results at least as much as unobserved heterogeneity. This aspect will need some 
more discussion, even though it cannot be solved completely with the dataset used for 
the present analyses. In the following, I will as well discuss why I expect labor market 
consequences of interruptions per se. 
 
5.2.2 Delayed Education and Career Outcomes: Theoretical Expectations for 
Returns to Characteristics of Educational Careers in the US 
The hypotheses for the US context can be derived from the general theoretical 
discussion without much further discussion: the human capital perspective expects a 
bonus or at best a non-effect, credentialism a non-effect and the signaling approach a 
negative signal for falling off the norm. What should be kept in mind when the 
signaling hypothesis is discussed though is that in the US context the value of 
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different levels of educational attainment as a signal varies strongly. The high number 
of college drop-outs floods the labor market with young adults having some college 
education, but no degree. For these cases, additional signals – such as interruptions 
and delays – should be more informative to employers than in cases where more 
powerful signals are available. The latter would clearly be the case after completion of 
a Bachelor-degree. Once an applicant holds a degree, employers would not have to 
rely on other, potentially weaker, signals. Therefore, a disadvantage for less steadfast 
and direct educational careers should only emerge for young adults without B.A.-
degree. 
 
5.2.3 Data and Methods 
Operationalizing interruptions in educational career patterns must to some degree deal 
with the fact that the interruptions differ in many aspects, e.g. in duration and 
frequency. Although there are many characteristics, the simple dichotomy of 
interrupters/non-interrupters is the standard operationalization in the literature. It 
would be ideal to capture more characteristics of the sequence, and at the same time 
the qualitative differentiation in various activities would need to be considered in 
more detail. However, the sample size for the subsequent analysis of the NLSY79 is 
too small to be analyzed in greater detail. Starting from the simple dichotomy I 
differentiate stop-outs in two rather simple ways. First, I distinguish different 
durations by defining a stop-out alternatively as a continuous interruption of 6, 12 and 
24 months of the educational career. The same set of different durations is generated 
for delays. Second, I distinguish between interruptions regardless of their nature, 
interruptions where the respective time was spend in fulltime work and interruptions 
that were not spend in fulltime work. 
For my empirical study I analyze data from the four youngest birth cohorts of 
the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (see chapter 1.5). All outcome 
variables are measured as averages of the 36th year of the respondents’ life. 
Educational achievement and career sequences were all measured before completion 
of the 30th year of their life, so that there is a gap of at least five years between 
measuring educational participation and the outcomes for every individual
40
. In 
addition to the wage as an outcome which was used by most other studies before, I 
                                                 
40 Within this period, only very few respondents acquire additional college education. 
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analyze occupation based socio economic positions measured according to the socio 
economic index SEI (Hauser and Warren, 1997). While income can change rapidly 
among young adults, the SEI is a rather stable representation of the socio economic 
position in the labor market. A penalty in SEI in the mid-thirties should allow stronger 
conclusions on the contribution to social inequality by ‘educational snoozing’ than 
differences in mean income. All analyses are replicated using occupational earnings 
as well as occupational education. Since this does not lead to different conclusions, I 
will limit the presentation of results to the SEI for this chapter. 
The problem of selection into different types of educational careers bares a 
substantial potential for misinterpreting the effects of interruptions and delays as 
causal. As discussed above, different attempts have been made to correct for the 
heterogeneity between the ‘treated’ group having stop-outs and the ‘control’ group 
with straight educational careers. Some authors have based their approach on attempts 
to model the unobserved heterogeneity; others have accounted for observed 
differences between the two groups in multivariate regression analyses. As the NLSY 
dataset offers a very broad and rich set of covariates that can capture many important 
potential sources of heterogeneity, I will follow the second approach and account for 
‘observables’. In order to compare graduates that are as alike as possible to their 
counterparts with a different educational career, I estimate propensity scores for each 
type of interruption or delay and then match respondents who have the respective 
gaps in their educational careers to most similar cases who do not have. Between 
these two groups, the outcome variables are compared. To match the observations in 
both groups, I apply a kernel-matching procedure (Epanechnikov-kernel) since the 
number of cases in the sample would not allow for stricter but less efficient 
techniques (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Guo and Fraser, 2010; Morgan and Winship, 
2007). An advantage of propensity score matching over regression is the detection of 
common support. Only if similar cases in both groups do indeed exist, the comparison 
between treatment and control group will be made. 
As discussed above, the effects of interruptions could depend on the type of 
interruptions. If interruptions per se are a too broad concept that captures too many 
different things which have their own impact on labor market success, the overall 
effect would be a vague mix of different causes. In the NLSY79, students who 
dropped out from college were asked for the reason for dropping out. This could 
principally serve as useful information for differentiating different interruptions, but 
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the number of cases for the different drop out-reasons – such as ‘found good job’ or 
‘gave birth to a child’ – are too small. Therefore, only one further differentiation of 
interruptions will be made for this chapter: whether the detour was related to fulltime 
work or not. For an operationalization of this, I introduce a new set of two treatment 
variables. First, if the person had interrupted its education engaging in fulltime work. 
Second, whether there was an interruption that was not spent by working fulltime at 
all. 
A large set of covariates can be used to predict propensities in the assignment 
models for all treatments to arrive at a comparison between cases that are as similar as 
possible. Most importantly, the personal situation in the family, academic 
performance before going to college and other individual characteristics – that can be 
both related to school attendance and to labor market performance in young adulthood 
– are included. In addition, a set of covariates about the educational career itself is 
included into the assignment model. This comprises the type of college and the 
progress of family formation at age 22 and age 30 as well as the total work experience 
that was gained before the outcome is measured. Finally, I account for military 
enlistment to finance college
41
. For most models (whenever a sufficient number of 
cases was available), additional interaction effects were used to improve the balancing 
of the matching. A descriptive overview over the covariates and their distributions in 
the model can be found in table 5.2.1. An exemplary assignment model can be found 
in table 5.2.8 in the appendix of this chapter. 
  
                                                 
41
 Principally, these variables are measured at least to some degree simultaneously with the treatment, 
but not entirely. A better way of accounting for them would be stratified matching – i.e. separate 
analysis of the different populations. However, due to the small number of cases in each type of 
educational experience I prefer to include them into the assignment model. 
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Table 5.2.1: Covariates of assignment models and their distribution for the full samples of 
graduates and drop-outs respectively. 
variable graduate-sample 
% / mean (SD) 
dropout-sample 
% / mean (SD) 
   
dependent variables:   
SEI @ age 35 68.56 (13.02) 38.43(12.81) 
yearly labor income @age 35 in US$ 49902.16 (58430.06) 23728.55(29962.7) 
Having medical insur. through employer @ age 35 81.43 73.21 
   
high school and test scores   
 test score: asvab battery percentiles 75.92 (20.30) 55.57(24.61) 
 GED instead of high school diploma 1.29 9.69 
 date of high school or GED achievement not meaningful to 
report 
not meaningful to 
report 
 academic track in high school 58.88 38.81 
 ever been suspended from school 5.67 15.78 
   
personal characteristics   
 sex: male 50.88 48.63 
 birth cohort (born 1961, 62, 63 or 64) all ~25% all ~25% 
 race   
  white 89.22 77.22 
  black 7.86 16.17 
  hispanic 2.92 6.61 
 rural residence @ age 14 17.90 23.29 
 residence: south US @ age 14 29.72 32.42 
 religion/confession   
  none 3.59 3.31 
  others 36.36 31.98 
  baptist 13.10 24.76 
  methodist 12.37 7.01 
  roman catholic 34.58 32.93 
   
--- continued on next page ---   
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--- table 5.2.1 continued   
 
family of origin characteristics 
  
 fathers class position   
  service 43.28 23.38 
  intermediate 12.03 12.47 
  skilled working 16.85 19.86 
  unskilled working 9.91 21.34 
  inactive 8.41 9.65 
  no man present 9.53 13.30 
 household @ age 18: poor 7.26 17.26 
 foreign language @ home during childhood 10.88 12.95 
 broken family 16.20 24.29 
 age 14: hh-member rcvd newspaper 91.90 86.42 
 age 14: hh-member had library card 84.96 77.81 
   
working career, family formation and study 
characteristics 
  
 first college: 2 year college 21.86 58.54 
 any time enrolled in 2 year college 31.04 71.84 
 any time in part time college 56.65 61.31 
 child birth before high school degree 0.87 5.99 
 child birth before age 22 4.80 24.65 
 child birth before age 30 42.64 62.23 
 marriage before age 22 16.33 37.16 
 marriage before age 30 68.56 74.01 
 total work experience until age 35 (in 1000hrs) 24.16 (7.88) 21.99(9.98) 
 (total work experience until age 35)² not meaningful to 
report 
not meaningful to 
report 
 military enlistment for college finance 2.81 8.83 
   
values, expectations and personality   
 ‘a woman should stay at home with her family’   
  strongly disagree 35.60 30.46 
  disagree 47.57 48.79 
  agree 14.04 16.88 
  strongly agree 2.79 3.86 
 intend to work after finishing education: NO 2.92 3.66 
 Rotter Scale: Locus of Control 1979 8.22 (2.20) 8.69 
 Self Esteem Score 1980 23.17 (3.88) 22.69 
   
Data source: NLSY79. Own calculations, weighted analysis. 
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5.2.4 Delays and Stop-Outs 
In sections 2 and 3 delays and stop-outs have been described in detail – including the 
finding that lower class children are particularly often affected. In the literature on the 
impact of stop-outs and delays on later labor market success, however, interruptions 
are operationalized in the much more simplistic way of only distinguishing between 
‘interrupters’ and ‘non-interrupters’. This dichotomous variable will be my starting 
point in this chapter too
42
. Table 5.2.2 reports the percentage of delayers – among 
graduates from a B.A.-degree and among those with incomplete college. On first 
sight, it reproduces the finding of previous studies of lower chances of completion 
after delays and stop-outs: among the B.A.-degree graduates, delays after college are 
very uncommon. Even a slight delay of 6 months applies to only 14 percent of those 
achieving a B.A.-degree until age 30. This picture is completely different for young 
adults with ‘some college’ as their educational achievement until age 30. Almost half 
of them started their college career after a delay of at least 6 months after high school 
– almost a third has a continuous delay of 2 years before enrolling. This strong 
difference in occurrence of delays justifies a separate treatment of the two groups: 
B.A.-degree graduates and adults who enter the labor market with incomplete college. 
In the columns printed in grey, incomplete college is split into different durations. The 
respective cells show that the share of delayed entry does not differ much according to 
the amount of education gathered later. The major difference is completion of a B.A.-
degree. 
 
Table 5.2.2: Delays in enrolment given educational achievement at age 30. 
Educ. career 
delayed for… 
B.A.-degree 
(before age 
30) 
delay: 12 to 
less than 48 
months 
delay: 12 to 
less than 24 
months 
delay: 24 to 
less than 36 
months 
delay: 36 to 
less than 48 
months 
…6 months 14.01 % 44.35 % 48.63 % 39.55 % 42.47 % 
…12 months 10.89 % 37.22 % 42.07 % 32.46 % 34.23 % 
…24 months 8.21 % 30.27 % 34.08 % 27.15 % 27.16 % 
N 898 928 437 283 208 
Source: NLSY79; own calculations, results weighted.  
                                                 
42
 More advanced methods might be suitable to improve the operationalization of educational career 
structures, such as the number of transitions between the states ‘enrolled’ and ‘not enrolled’ in the same 
period of time. Several examples are given in section 2 and chapter 3.1 which could be turned into 
independent variables. However, the sample sizes are too small for making use of the additional 
information which might be gained by the sequence analysis measures. 
5 .  Educat ional  Career  Pat t erns  and  the  Labor Marke t  Entry  
 323 
For gap within educational career, I find a somewhat different situation 
compared to the delays of first entry. The results shown in table 5.2.3 reveal that the 
difference between graduates with B.A.-degrees and incomplete college graduates is 
not as significant as in the case of the delays. Still, interruptions are much more 
frequent in the case of incomplete college education, and it is noteworthy that long 
interruptions are not frequent among those who receive a degree, but by far less 
uncommon among those with incomplete education. 
 
Table 5.2.3: Stop-outs/gaps given educational achievement at age 30. 
Educ. career 
interrupted 
for… 
B.A.-degree 
(before age 
30) 
gaps: 12 to 
less than 48 
months 
gaps: 12 to 
less than 24 
months 
gaps: 24 to 
less than 36 
months 
gaps: 36 to 
less than 48 
months 
…6 months 25.83 % 39.09 % 26.23 % 44.55 % 56.98 % 
…12 months 14.92 % 28.81 % 18.99 % 34.52 % 39.80 % 
…24 months 8.22 % 21.88 % 12.13 % 26.36 % 34.26 % 
N 898 928 437 283 208 
Source: NLSY79; own calculations, results weighted. 
 
 
 
A strong difference appears when incomplete education is broken down into 
different total durations of participation in higher education. The respective numbers 
are reported in the columns printed in grey. The longer the duration of attendance in 
the education system is, the higher the percentage of interrupters. This is reasonable 
since the statistical chance of interruption is higher for those going to college for a 
longer period – simply because there are more chances for interruptions and because 
all re-entrants add more education and an interruption to their CV. Comparing young 
adults being close to degree completion to those who actually have completed a 
degree, a similar picture as in the case of delays emerges: incomplete education is 
closely linked to interruptions in the educational career. The distribution of delays and 
interruptions underlines the divide between traditional and non-traditional educational 
careers in the US. Therefore a separate estimation of the results by educational 
achievement seems necessary. Since the total duration is strongly related to 
interruptions, the following analyses were all computed separately for different 
durations of education, which did not alter the results substantially. 
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5.2.5 Results 
The results of the propensity score matching are summarized in tables 5.2.4 to 5.2.7. 
An exemplary assignment model for documentation can be found in 5.2.7, the 
Appendix of this chapter. Without conditioning the comparison on the propensity 
score a disadvantage of ‘delayers’ and ‘interrupters’ would be found for most cases. 
The values in table 5.2.4 are the conditioned comparisons based on a comparison of 
cases with similar propensity scores (ATT derived from kernel-matching). Analytical 
t-values are given in brackets. Empty cells indicate that there were not enough cases 
in the treatment category that fall into the common support area to estimate the ATT 
(Morgan and Harding, 2006; Morgan and Winship, 2007). 
Overall, the effect sizes and also the analytical t-values are very small – and 
inconsistent in their direction. In a way, they resemble the results of previous articles: 
small effects which are inconsistently either positive or negative. For young adults 
with incomplete education, those who delay their enrollment have on average a 
penalty of two SEI-points for delaying their entry into college (table 5.2.4). This, 
however, reverses when conditioning on the propensity score. All else equal, the late 
entrants even receive a bonus compared to their most similar peers entering directly. 
Furthermore, this effect does not exist for other outcomes than the SEI. Differences in 
monetary returns and the social security turn very small when they are estimated as 
ATT. It is important to note that the duration of the treatment does not matter much. 
The results differ somewhat when the ‘activity’ during and the reason of the 
interruption are regarded when constructing the treatment variable. In the lower rows 
of tables 5.2.4 to 5.2.7 the ATT-coefficients are reported that interruptions or delays 
have on the respective outcomes when being spent in fulltime work (continuously). 
Thus, the effect of delays in the overall model is driven by those who work fulltime 
before enrolling. The same result is found for the health insurance-outcome: those 
who enter fulltime work before enrolling are more likely to receive it as a fringe 
benefit from their employer. On the other hand, there are no substantial effects on the 
wages. 
As table 5.2.4 shows, interrupting college education has a different impact on 
later labor market outcomes than delaying enrollment. Again, effects on the health 
insurance status do not exist in this sample. But the SEI is attenuated by an 
interruption in the educational career by roughly two points. This effect is again 
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driven by the work-interruptions, and much less by interruptions for other reasons. 
Effects on income are similar to the ones on the SEI, but not statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 5.2.4: Gross differences and ATT between delayed and on-time educational careers 
in various labor market outcomes – labor market entrants with incomplete 
college education. 
  SEI Ln(yearly income) Health Insurance 
6 months    
 unmatched (t-value) -2.01 (-2.03) -0.36 (-3.81) 0.01 (0.43) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 2.18 [1.68] -0.16 [-1.28] 0.03 [0.71] 
 off common support 0 1 1 
     
12 months    
 unmatched (t-value) -2.62 (-2.55) -0.37 (-3.77) -0.01 (-0.21) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 1.68 [x] -0.20 [-1.44] 0.04 [0.92] 
 number of obs. 754 696 784 
 off common support 1 1 7 
     
6 months: not working    
 unmatched (t-value) -1.75 (-1.31) -0.29 (-2.32) 0.07 (1.59) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 1.85 [1.34] 0.09 [1.70] 0.10 [2.09] 
 off common support 0 0 0 
     
12 months: not working    
 unmatched (t-value) -4.56 (-3.65) -0.48 (-3.98) -0.08 (-1.85) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 1.62 [x] -0.13 [0.82] 0.06 [0.99] 
 off common support 2 3 6 
     
6 months: fulltime work    
 unmatched (t-value) 0.79 (0.66) -0.03 (-0.25) 0.12 (3.07) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 2.45 [1.72] 0.02 [0.17] 0.10 [2.34] 
 off common support 6 3 4 
     
12 months: fulltime work    
 unmatched (t-value) 2.71 (1.97) 0.04 (0.27) 0.12 (2.66) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 4.37 [x] 0.14 [-0.93] 0.07 [1.36] 
 off common support 1 2 4 
     
N  754 696 784 
Source: NLSY79; own calculations, not weighted. 
x: Bootstrap for z-value failed, ATT should be assumed to be not significant. 
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Table 5.2.5: Gross differences and ATT between interrupted and continuous educational 
careers in various labor market outcomes – labor market entrants with 
incomplete college education. 
Interruptions:  SEI Ln(yearly 
income) 
Health 
Insurance 
6 months    
 unmatched (t-value) -2.22 (-2.28) -0.15 (-1.56) -0.02 (-0.47) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] -2.43 [-2.00] -0.09 [-0.71] -0.02 [-0.55] 
 off common support 6 3 7 
     
12 months    
 unmatched (t-value) -2.24 (-2.14) -0.21 (-2.05) -0.03 (-0.74) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] -2.58 [x] -0.21 [-1.65] -0.01 [-0.16] 
 off common support 0 0 2 
     
6 months: not working    
 unmatched (t-value) -2.34 (-2.30) -0.33 (-3.33) 0.00 (0.07) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 0.61 [0.52] -0.07 [-0.52] 0.05 [1.22] 
 off common support 5 0 4 
     
12 months: not working    
 unmatched (t-value) -4.03 (-2.68) -0.37 (-2.52) -0.14 (-2.98) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] -1.45 [x] -0.03 [-0.14] 0.06 [0.68] 
 off common support 9 8 3 
     
6 months: fulltime work    
 unmatched (t-value) -0.87 (-0.80) -0.03 (-0.26) 0.00 (0.05) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] -2.04 [-1.91] -0.19 [-1.57] -0.04 [-1.15] 
 off common support 1 0 2 
     
12 months: fulltime work    
 unmatched (t-value) -0.59 (-0.49) -0.08 (-0.67) 0.02 (0.61) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] -2.82 [x] -0.23 [-1.63] -0.03 [-0.62] 
 off common support 0 1 1 
     
N  754 696 784 
Source: NLSY79; own calculations, not weighted. 
x: Bootstrap for z-value failed, ATT should be assumed to be not significant. 
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Tables 5.2.6 and 5.2.7 report the equivalent values to the tables above for 
labor market entrants with a completed Bachelor-degree. Effects are now much 
smaller in size compared to the drop-outs, and all over board not statistically 
significant. The only exception is the significant positive effect of longer interrupters 
(12+ months) on having a health insurance. This is, however, not consistent with the 
findings for shorter interruptions and should thus be treated with caution. 
Differentiating the effects into work and non-work detours fails in the case of 
graduates. The reason is simple and consistent with previous literature: those 
interrupting or delaying are unlikely to complete college – and thus unlikely to select 
into our sample (Bozick and DeLuca, 2005; Roksa and Velez, 2012). Therefore, the 
number of interrupters in the sample is too small to estimate an ATT. Those cells for 
which the estimation is not possible are marked in grey. 
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Table 5.2.6: Gross differences and ATT between delayed and on-time educational careers 
in various labor market outcomes – labor market entrants with Bachelor 
degree. 
Delay, 
graduates: 
 SEI Ln(yearly 
income) 
Health Insurance 
6 months    
 unmatched (t-value) 1.03 (0.64) -0.58 (-1.32) -0.01 (-0.28) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 1.02 [0.50] -0.51 [-0.92] 0.01 [0.13] 
 off common support 0 0 0 
     
12 months    
 unmatched (t-value) 0.50 (0.27) -0.68 (1.34) 0.02 (0.42) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 0.29 [0.13] -0.44 [-0.66] 0.04 [0.69] 
 off common support 0 0 1 
     
6 months: not working    
     
12 months: not working    
     
6 months: fulltime work    
     
12 months: fulltime work    
     
N  642 591 658 
Source: NLSY79; own calculations, not weighted. 
x: Bootstrap for z-value failed, ATT should be assumed to be not significant. 
Grey: not enough cases on common support for estimation of ATT. 
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Table 5.2.7: Gross differences and ATT between interrupted and continuous educational 
careers in various labor market outcomes – labor market entrants with 
Bachelor degree. 
Interruptions:  SEI Ln(yearly 
income) 
Health 
Insurance 
6 months    
 unmatched (t-value) 0.70 (0.56) -0.10 (-091) 0.03 (0.94) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 1.93 [1.29] -0.06 [-0.29] 0.08 [1.54] 
 number of obs. 638 530 656 
 off common support 6 7 6 
     
12 months    
 unmatched (t-value) -0.05 (-0.03) -0.15 (-1.10) 0.10 (2.09) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 0.61 [0.14] -0.07 [-0.32] 0.13 [2.59] 
 number of obs. 634 527 653 
 off common support 1 0 0 
     
6 months: not working    
 unmatched (t-value) 0.54 (0.25)  0.02 (0.29) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] 0.91 [0.27]  0.11 [1.12] 
 number of obs. 632  650 
 off common support 3  3 
    
12 months: not working    
    
6 months: fulltime work    
 unmatched (t-value) -0.71(-0.41) -0.22 (-1.48) 0.06 (1.15) 
 ATT [bootstr. z-value] -1.21 [-0.64] -0.25 [-1.19] 0.02 [0.45] 
 number of obs. 637 529 655 
 off common support 1 0 1 
     
12 months: fulltime work    
     
Source: NLSY79; own calculations, not weighted. 
x: Bootstrap for z-value failed, ATT should be assumed to be not significant. 
Grey: not enough cases on common support for estimation of ATT. 
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In sum, the results show that the impact of gaps and delays on SEI in the 
mid-thirties is low to non-existent once potential confounding factors are taken into 
account. However, there are some exceptions: a penalty of about two SEI points for 
interruptions for those who leave college without a degree; and a bonus for delayers 
without a degree if the delay is used for fulltime work. 
 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
One disadvantageous consequence of delayed and interrupted educational careers on 
the individual level could be lower-status positions in the labor market. These would 
be even more problematic if they persisted into the mid-thirties. This chapter has set 
out to empirically test whether such a ‘penalty for snoozers’ exists. If these would be 
large, the consequence would be that catching-up in educational achievement is to be 
seen as a rather ineffective way of reducing earlier disadvantages in educational 
attainment. 
The descriptive summary repeats the conclusion of earlier chapters: delays 
and interruptions are very common among college students in the US. They most 
often affected group are students who do not completed their education with a degree, 
which also implies that they are strongly related to college drop-out. A number of 
studies had already attempted to estimate the disadvantage for interruptions and 
delays in terms of wages or income – using various datasets and methodological 
strategies. The results were inconclusive, but the resulting differences generally small. 
This finding can be confirmed by analyses I presented in this chapter: a rather small 
penalty for interruptions and a small bonus for delays spent in fulltime work – among 
college drop-outs. There is no impact on the labor market entry of graduates with at 
least a B.A.-degree. This, however, rarely happens among students whose educational 
careers are characterized by delays and stop-outs. Hence, if non-traditional students 
manage to complete a degree, there will be no sustainable disadvantage on the labor 
market except for the opportunity costs. Then again, they often do not, and in this case 
a stop-out seems to lead into somewhat lower positions. 
This finding supports the signaling perspective: employers seek for signals 
about the performance and the training potential of applicants. A B.A.-degree is a 
strong signal – independent of gaps in the educational career. They only become 
important if such a strong signal is missing. In this case, the steadfastness and 
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consistency of a college visit can serve employers as a signal – e.g. for the motivation 
to learn. It contradicts the human capital perspective that the amount of education 
determines the returns. Assuming that completion is in many cases correlated with 
social origin, it follows that negative effects (even though small) mostly occur among 
college students from lower class backgrounds. 
Late re-enrollers on the other hand have slightly better jobs in their mid-
thirties among those who never graduated. Different explanations could apply to this 
finding. First of all, it is possible that the later students left college at the time of a 
better labor market situation and hence had a better start into their work career after 
dropping out. This explanation would, however, not be consistent with the finding 
that there is no additional bonus for students with a degree. An alternative explanation 
would be a better-informed choice of the study program. To exemplify, later entrants 
could chose vocational oriented programs according to their knowledge of skill-
requirements in the labor market and hence have a better match of the demand and 
their own abilities (cf. Oettinger, 1993 for a similar argument). 
The inconsistency between previous studies cannot be fully solved by my 
analyses. Modeling heterogeneity using a large set of covariates leads to by and large 
similar results of other studies on early income. The SEI results are somewhat 
stronger than the labor income models. For the basic social security standard of a 
health insurance, the college career was less important. The differentiation and 
reformulation of the definition of ‘interruption’ did also not result in a comprehensive 
clarification of contradictions emerging from previous research. Varying the 
minimum duration of interruptions does not lead to different findings compared to the 
conventional 6 months. Restricting the definition of the central independent variable 
to fulltime work-delays or -interruptions does matter. Hence, a further differentiation 
of the treatment variable – if possible with larger datasets allowing for more 
differentiation including family-formation related interruptions – should have some 
potential of further clarifying the somewhat contradictory findings. 
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5.2.7 Appendix 
Table 5.2.8: Exemplary assignment models for estimation of the propensity of having the 
respective treatment (6 months duration) in both relevant populations. 
Probit regression B.A. No B.A. 
 model 1 (delay) model 2 (interrupt) model 3 (delay) model 4 (interrupt) 
 coef. z-value coef. z-value coef. z-value coef. z-value 
         
fathers class position:          
  service classes ref. cat.        
  intermed. classes -0.20 (-0.78) -0.06 (-0.25) 0.15 (0.79) -0.24 (-1.39) 
  skilled working cl. -0.03 (-0.16) 0.14 (0.74) 0.16 (0.34) -0.23 (-1.44) 
  unskilled working cl. 0.02 (0.07) 0.17 (0.77) 0.27 (1.64) -0.36 (-2.30) 
  inactive -0.12 (-0.42) -0.01 (-0.02) 0.22 (1.15) -0.52 (-2.76) 
  no man present 0.55 (1.36) 0.14 (0.44) -0.02 (-0.10) -0.28 (-1.26) 
         
date of HS diploma/GED  0.01 (0.68) -0.01 (-0.57) -0.01 (-2.98) -0.007 (-1.50) 
         
sex: male -0.14 (-0.87) -0.15 (-0.94) -0.15 (-1.14) 0.06 (0.46) 
         
yr of birth         
  1961 ref. cat.        
  1962 0.64 (1.62) -0.51 (-1.20) -0.31 (-1.58) -0.41 (-1.86) 
  1963 0.66 (2.07) -0.27 (-0.87) -0.25 (-1.43) -0.23 (-1.25) 
  1964 0.61 (2.49) -0.22 (-1.03) -0.19 (-1.18) 0.02 (0.10) 
         
race:         
  white ref. cat.        
  black -0.41 (-1.61) -0.06 (-0.24) -0.67 (-3.60) 0.37 (2.05) 
  hispanic -0.15 (-0.47) 0.20 (0.73) -0.18 (-0.77) 0.21 (1.03) 
         
GED instead of HS dipl.     0.82 (3.68)   
         
poor household @ age 18     0.21 (1.33) -0.25 (-1.52) 
         
percentiles: afqt-score -0.00 (-1.10) -0.00 (-0.53) -0.00 (-3.91) 0.00 (1.14) 
         
any newspapers in the 
household @ age 14 
-0.15 (-0.64) 0.19 (0.88) 0.09 (0.69) -0.07 (-0.53) 
         
library card in the 
household @ age 14 
0.12 (0.58) 0.04 (0.22) -0.07 (-0.59) -0.23 (-1.94) 
         
locus of control:  
Rotter-scale 
0.02 (0.70) -0.01 (-0.33) 0.02 (0.77) 0.01 (0.26) 
         
self-esteem score 0.001 (0.06) -0.01 (-0.31) -0.003 (-0.22) -0.002 (-0.14) 
         
‘a woman should stay at 
home with her family’ 
        
  strongly disagree   0.13 (0.65)     
  disagree 0.17 (0.73) -0.10 (-0.53) 0.22 (1.91) -0.09 (-0.82) 
  agree 0.17 (0.74)   0.30 (1.86) -0.18 (-1.15) 
  strongly agree     -0.15 (-0.59) -0.22 (-0.87) 
         
intend to work after 
finishing education: no 
    -0.02 (-0.08)   
--- continued on next page         
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Source: NLSY79; own calculations. 
  
         
--- table 5.2.1 continued         
         
total work exp. until age 35 0.02 (0.32) -0.09 (-2.24) -0.04 (-1.07) -0.02 (-0.75) 
total work exp. until age 35, 
squared 
-0.001 (-0.73) 0.001 (2.43) 0.001 (1.70) 0.000 (0.47) 
         
academic track in high 
school 
-0.05 (-0.34) 0.05 (0.38) -0.08 (-0.70) 0.03 (0.22) 
         
foreign language at home 
during childhood 
0.17 (0.27) -0.24 (-1.05) -0.13 (-0.68) 0.14 (0.77) 
         
broken family -0.43 (-1.28) 0.25 (1.06) 0.32 (1.98) 0.14 (0.86) 
         
residence: 
rural area @ age 14 
0.05 (0.29) -0.12 (-0.73) 0.09 (0.68) -0.13 (-1.02) 
         
residence: 
south US @ age 14 
-0.02 (-0.09) 0.181 (1.26) -0.07 (-0.61) 0.05 (0.45) 
         
religious denomination         
  none ref. cat.        
  others     0.16 (0.52) -0.28 (-0.90) 
  Baptist     -0.13 (-0.87) -0.09 (-0.64) 
  methodist     0.32 (1.94) -0.01 (-0.06) 
  catholic     -0.16 (-0.72) -0.16 (-0.80) 
         
family formation         
  childbirth before age 22 0.17 (0.58) 0.63 (2.31) 0.47 (3.12) 0.17 (1.14) 
  childbirth before age 30 -0.004 (-0.02) -0.15 (-0.94) -0.03 (-0.22) -0.04 (-0.31) 
   childbirth before high 
  school degree completion 
    0.03 (0.11) -0.27 (-1.16) 
  marriage before age 22 0.38 (1.89) 0.19 (1.01) 0.18 (1.41) -0.16 (-1.28) 
  marriage before age 30 -0.17 (-0.92) -0.26 (-1.66) -0.20 (-1.52) 0.06 (0.50) 
         
interaction: race=black X 
sex=male 
  0.43 (1.46) -0.05 (-0.24) -0.20 (-0.92) 
         
interaction: poor X 
academic track 
  -0.57 (-1.74) -0.20 (-0.77) 0.20 (0.77) 
         
Collist 0.50 (1.30) 1.08 (2.87) 0.88 (4.12) 0.61 (2.98) 
         
ever suspended from school   0.29 (1.31) 0.48 (3.43) -0.05 (-0.35) 
         
first college entered = 2 
year college 
0.47 (1.76) 0.26 (1.20) 0.10 (0.67) -0.45 (-3.15) 
         
ever enrolled in 2 year 
college 
-0.01 (-0.05) 0.36 (1.85) 0.03 (0.22) 0.78 (5.20) 
         
ever enrolled in part-time 
program 
0.03 (0.18) 0.59 (4.36) 0.42 (3.99) 0.71 (6.80) 
         
delayed entry: at least six 
months  
  0.32 (1.75)    
 
         
constant -8.03 (-0.81) 6.06 (0.55) 11.63 (2.85) 6.74 (1.36) 
N 642  638  876  876  
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5.3 The More the Better? Multiple Degrees and Their Returns in 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
This chapter studies the returns to the an important part of the educational detours 
taken in the German system which is otherwise characterized by rather few deviations 
from the national standard educational career (see section 2). This case is particular 
useful for scrutinizing common theoretical explanations for the pay offs of education 
in the labor market. Empirically, the additional education from a vocational degree 
does not pay off much, but some evidence for a smoother transition of graduates with 
problematic labor market outlooks is found. This supports the view that human capital 
alone cannot explain the payoffs of education in the labor market. Entry routes into 
job are channeled by education in more ways than increasing the productivity, which 
is in line e.g. with signaling and credentialism approaches. 
 
 
 
 
For each society, effects of interruptions in educational careers depend on which 
interruptions occur in a given society. The German case is special with respect to the 
most frequent type of interruptions. The inflexible educational career regime (section 
2 in this volume) leads to comparatively straight educational careers, with the 
exception of a noteworthy number of young adults completing both vocational 
training and higher education (Hillmert and Jacob, 2004; Jacob, 2004) and university 
drop-outs (Müller and Schneider, 2012). In comparison to the US, however, the 
number of drop-outs is lower. The labor market is rarely entered before obtaining any 
vocational education degree, either from higher education or in the vocational training 
system. Between 2000 and 2008, approximately a quarter of all students being eligible 
to enter higher education were in vocational training (mostly apprenticeships) half a 
year after leaving secondary school (Heine and Quast, 2009). A recent series of 
papers have dealt with possible motives for this double qualification. One of the 
results from previous studies is that in particular lower class youth move through the 
educational system in this sequence (Becker and Hecken, 2009b; Hillmert and Jacob, 
2003; Jacob, 2004). Heine and Quast (2009) report for the years between 2000 and 
2008 numbers between 15 and 20 percent for the share of young adults who are 
qualified for entering higher education directly but aim for both a vocational and a 
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higher education degree. Thus, interruptions are most often the result of multiple 
degrees obtained in a row. And therefore the relevant question with regard to the 
effects of interruptions in educational careers on the labor market returns in Germany 
is rather a question about the effects of vocational training in addition to higher 
education. 
Empirically, it could be shown that double qualifications are more often 
planned by young adults with lower educational background – in the same way as 
other educational detours (Becker and Hecken, 2009b, chapter 4.1 in this volume). 
However, for many young adults completion of an apprenticeship vocational degree is 
not the end of their educational career. Every year, a certain share of graduates from 
vocational training who are eligible to higher education enroll into the tertiary level 
education later (Bellmann, Hall and Janik, 2008). 
Just as for the US, earlier studies on the German context have not led to 
consensus about the empirical question of returns to vocational degrees before higher 
education. Büchel and Helberger (1995) and Bellmann et al. (1996) find no premium 
for the additional education. In response to them, Lewin et al. (1996) report that 
graduates with double qualifications are as fast or even faster in graduating and 
finding a job afterwards. Furthermore, they claim that the vocational training 
compensates for a lack in practical, vocational content in higher education and that 
these graduates are more satisfied with their first jobs. All of these findings are based 
on bivariate analyses, only separated by field of study. Büchel (1997) summarizes 
both of the studies and points out that the differences in the results stem from 
conceptual and methodological differences. Several contradictories in the studies 
remain after his discussion. Furthermore, both methodological approaches are not able 
to account for the manifold differences that could select young adults with different 
characteristics into the different educational career patterns. Given the differences 
between double-qualifiers and graduates from higher education with a straight career, 
a causal interpretation of the results should be questioned. 
While the basic mechanisms discussed at the outset of this section have 
similar explanatory grip, there are also differences to the US which have to be 
considered when theoretically explaining the effects of detours in the German context. 
A major difference is that the German labor market is rarely entered without any 
vocational degree. Stop-outs just for work before having any kind of degree are 
therefore infrequent. In most cases, they are the result of completing a vocational 
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education degree before entering higher education. In the US the Bachelor-degree 
made the difference; work experience did not matter much further on. In Germany, 
not only additional work experience, but also an additional but lower-level vocational 
degree is obtained during an interruption period. This constitutes a very interesting 
case for the signaling approach. Unlike the interruptions and delays in the US, the 
double degrees in Germany are detours that consist of time spend in education. Thus, 
there is a deviation from the ‘norm-pattern’, but also more human capital is 
accumulated. Consequentially, in Germany a negative effect would contradict the 
human capital perspective. The German case thus corresponds much closer e.g. to the 
analyses of Groot and Osterbeek (1994) on the effect of educational detours, or that of 
Bills (1992) on over-education than the previous chapter on the US. The resulting 
human capital hypothesis is the same: more years in education are not penalized and 
on average should even lead to a bonus (Hypothesis 1). A penalty for a double 
qualification after keeping all else equal would be support for the signaling hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Furthermore, the German labor market follows a different tradition of 
rewarding degrees. Other than in the US, in particular in the lower sectors, the linkage 
between occupational titles and educational programs are close (Kerckhoff, 1996; 
Kerckhoff, 2000; Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre, 1986). Without vocational education 
the odds of finding a job are rather low. In such a system, the vocational degree can 
fulfill another function. According to credentialism an additional degree from 
education can be seen as an additional license allowing entering another type of 
position in the labor market. If occupations are to some degree closed by licenses, 
having another degree would increase the chances of finding a job by one additional 
potential position. In this case, the vocational degree can work as a safety net for risk-
averse students. This insurance utility is one hypothesis in the debate on the question 
why double qualifications are obtained at all: risk-averse young adults do not dare to 
enter higher education without having a fallback option into another job (Becker and 
Hecken, 2009b; Büchel and Helberger, 1995). The insurance strategy-argument, i.e. 
that young adults get an additional degree only with the motivation to have a safety 
net in the case of failure, is closely related to the mechanism of credentialist hiring in 
the German labor market. This second option would be used if higher education or the 
job search after graduation fails. And since the German dual vocational education 
system is known to offer a particular smooth way into the labor market (Gangl, 
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Müller and Raffe, 2003; Müller and Shavit, 1998b; Scherer, 2005), this strategy 
should work. On the other hand, if the labor market would allow entering skilled jobs 
without vocational degree, such insurance would not be needed. The cost for such a 
buffer would be high and the strategy therefore irrational, since it is unlikely that 
graduates have to search for a job for the same time period it takes them to complete a 
vocational degree (normally two years). Furthermore, the vocational training could in 
theory also be completed after failing in higher education. But it is known from 
descriptive studies by the HIS (Heine, Spangenberg and Sommer, 2004; Heine and 
Willich, 2006), that quite a number of double-qualifiers have planned the entire 
sequence from the beginning. 
The German context therefore offers a number of straightforward 
implications that allow developing empirically testable hypotheses on credentialism. 
If vocational training provides an alternative route into the labor market after 
graduation from higher education, this should lead into lower, less skilled jobs. The 
safety net would thus not be used if a job can be found based on the higher education 
degree. But it would help to avoid unemployment. Thus, we can expect for those 
graduates who have a vocational degree: 
- a reduction in the search time until the first job (Hypothesis 3). If no 
job can be found, those with a vocational degree have the option of 
searching their previous occupation. 
- A higher risk of being overeducated in their job (Hypothesis 4), 
because some graduates go back into their old occupation. 
- Among the overeducated, the vocational training should pay off with 
higher wages, since their degree pays off in the unskilled labor market 
(Hypothesis 5). 
Furthermore, we can expect for all of the above mentioned hypotheses that especially 
those young adults are affected who have found their job via contacts from training 
before higher education. In combination with over-qualification, this variable can 
serve as a more direct indicator, whether the safety net was used (Hypothesis 6).  
Beyond employer behavior, the returns to education could be affected in 
several ways in different stages of the career process through higher education until 
the establishment in the labor market. The first group of mechanisms works on the 
entry and during higher education. If those with a vocational degree have gained 
information which is useful for choosing a study program or helps acquiring skills 
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inside the higher education system, the experience in vocational training can lead to a 
premium (Oettinger, 1993). For example, apprentices may discover their potential to 
work in certain areas or get information from companies about beneficial fields or 
study programs (cf. Hypothesis 1). 
From a life course perspective, it should also be considered that a delay of 
higher education is inevitably related to an increase in age. This effect can be 
expected to be especially strong in the German case too. As German young adults 
enter by international comparison late, especially for women the probability that 
family formation will conflict with their studies and the sensitive early career phase 
increases with age. This does not necessarily lead to a disadvantage in the career. Men 
have the opportunity to delay marriage and childbearing: Women have at least the 
option to give up family formation and focus on their career instead. However, the 
empirically higher number of graduates who are married or have children among 
those with prior vocational training shows that not everybody does this (see figure 
5.3.1 and table 5.3.1). Therefore, an impairment of the working career can be 
expected. For an earlier cohort from the German state of Northrhine-Westphalia, it 
could be shown that this family formation disadvantage is largest among women 
(Meulemann, 1990). 
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Figure 5.3.1: Transitions into parenthood among female graduates during the first six years 
after graduation by educational career pattern. 
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In consequence, penalties in the labor market for double qualifications can be 
expected to be higher for women. On the other hand, these disadvantages of double 
qualifiers should be explained when the family status, i.e. relationship status and the 
presence of children, is included in the models (Hypothesis 7). 
 
5.3.1 Data and Methods 
For the purpose of this study, I consider a different dataset than the one used for the 
German case in the previous chapters. Since the GLHS does not have a sufficient 
number of graduates from higher education, an alternative data source focusing on 
this specific target group is needed. The graduate surveys of the HIS (Hochschul-
Informations-System) qualify very well for this purpose (see chapter 1.5.6). Several 
cohorts of graduates from higher education in Germany are surveyed six months after 
graduation and in a second panel wave five years thereafter. However, only two 
cohorts are available as scientific use file; the graduates from 1997 (Fabian, 2006; 
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Fabian and Minks, 2006) and 2001 (Schramm and Beck, 2010) which are pooled for 
my analyses. The usable sample consists of 8,105 graduates. 
For the analyses of the labor market entry, a large set of criteria is available 
in the dataset. Representing different relevant dimensions of the school to work 
transitions, I chose the log hourly wage five years after graduation; the international 
socio economic index score (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996) five years after 
graduation; the search time until the first ‘significant’ job, and whether the graduate 
was employed in an over-qualified job five years after graduation. Over-qualification 
is operationalized in two different ways: first, the question whether a degree from 
higher education is needed/expected for their job and second, if a salariat class 
position according to the ESeC-scheme (Rose and Harrison, 2007) could be achieved. 
These class positions are appropriate for higher education graduates, since they are 
the only classes that typically require higher education as an entrance criterion. The 
different dependent variables require different regression techniques to model them 
adequately. For the ISEI and the log hourly wages, I estimate linear (OLS) models 
(reported are log hazard ratio coefficients). The search time is modeled as a Cox event 
history model and the over-qualification-models as binary logistic regressions. 
Most of the hypotheses set out at the beginning of this chapter refer to 
employer behavior and the direct job search process, while processes within education 
are not discussed. In order to test hypotheses on the labor market entry, two groups of 
variables are potential colliders. First, those factors influencing the probability of 
having vocational training before higher education and correlating with success in the 
labor market. They are considered in order to solve the problem of conditional 
independence as in most observational studies. And second, those mechanisms that 
are triggered by the vocational degree but influence the subsequent educational career. 
This second block of mechanisms is important, since in an analyses that wants to 
explain the role of the vocational training as an attribute of graduates does not ask for 
the full causal effect of having a vocational training degree, but rather what the 
mechanisms at the labor market entry are that add up to – or counterbalance – the 
training effect.  
Furthermore, I include information in the model which approximates the 
propensity of entering vocational training, social origin (parental occupational status 
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and education
43
), the grades and educational career of the upper secondary education 
are included in the model. This may be criticized as an imperfect set of controls, since 
e.g. a direct measure of cognitive ability or motivation is missing. However, it should 
be noted that a part of the ‘pre-treatment’ differences are kept constant by controlling 
the post-treatment educational career. For the time in higher education, a much better 
set of control variables is available. Not only the actual career pattern, i.e. whether the 
studies were interrupted or a change in the study program occurred, but also the 
sources of finance and the satisfaction with the study program can be kept constant. 
Further, the work experience during studies and – probably most important – the 
percentiles of the final GPA achieved within each field of study are included in the 
model. The source of finance and the satisfaction with the study program are both 
measured in a broad set of variables. For each possible source of finance, the 
respondent estimated the percentage this source contributed to the total cost of living 
expenses and higher education. The satisfaction with the study program is captured by 
an item battery of many items measuring several dimensions of the satisfaction with 
higher education. Table 5.3.7 in the Appendix documents these variables. 
In order to reduce the number of variables to a smaller set of dimensions, a 
principal component factor analysis for both sets of variables was carried out and only 
factors with an eigenvalue >1 are included in the regression. For the item-battery 
measuring financial resources, six factors and for the item-battery measuring 
satisfaction, four factors were chosen by this criterion. Special attention is given to the 
family formation in the German context, since graduates are comparatively old. The 
family situation at the time of graduation is captured by the presence of children and 
the relationship status. The distribution of all model-variables is shown in table 5.3.1. 
To deal with the item nonresponse problem, which is critical in a voluntary 
mail survey, I use multiple imputation. The imputations are performed via chained 
equations (Royston, 2005; Royston, 2004; Rubin, 1987) adding twenty observations 
per case with at least one missing value. Dependent variables were not imputed, but 
all independent variables using an even broader set of determinants for imputation. 
The fact that in about 1,000 cases at least one variable had to be imputed shows the 
necessity to deal with item nonresponse. And even after that, this problem remains 
                                                 
43
 Parental education is measured via the CASMIN-scheme. An overview on the full scheme can be 
found in table 5.3.12 in the appendix to this chapter. 
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one of the major disadvantages caused by the fact the dataset was collected as a self-
reported mail survey. 
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Table 5.3.1: Descriptive overview: dependent and independent variables and their 
distribution. 
independent variables mean (SD); percent 
sex = male 48.67% 
graduate-cohort = 2001 49.89% 
field of study  
 arts, humanities and social sciences 16.73% 
 education and social work 6.91% 
 economics and business 13.07% 
 engineering and agriculture 34.60% 
 science 9.17% 
 life science 9.17% 
 law 5.76% 
abitur grade: centered, lowes=worst to highest=best -0.50 (6.42) 
abitur: not from Gymnasium 10.34% 
age: first enrolment 20.8 (2.22) 
(age: first enrolment)² not meaningful to report 
CASMIN education: father  
 1a no degree 0.65% 
 1c/2a Haupt- or Realschule, with vocational degree 40.32% 
 1b/2b Haupt- or Realschule, no voc. degree 1.51% 
 2c_gen Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, no voc. degree 0.41% 
 2c_voc Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, voc. postsec. degree 4.32% 
 3a Fachhochschule-degree 18.32% 
 3b University-degree 31.98% 
CASMIN education: mother  
 1a no degree 1.20% 
 1c/2a Haupt- or Realschule, with vocational degree 53.31% 
 1b/2b Haupt- or Realschule, no voc. degree 8.25% 
 2c_gen Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, no voc. degree 1.30% 
 2c_voc Abitur/Fachhochschulreife, voc. postsec. degree 6.08% 
 3a Fachhochschule-degree 7.13% 
 3b University-degree 19.65% 
fathers occupational position  
 self employed 21.02% 
 employee 46.08% 
 civil servant 20.91% 
 work contract 11.56% 
 never employed 0.43% 
mothers occupational position  
 self employed 9.89% 
 employee 62.50% 
 civil servant 9.74% 
 work contract 10.36% 
 never employed 7.52% 
no. of semesters studied until graduation 11.57 (2.91) 
federal state of upper secondary degree  
 northern states 15.94% 
 North-Rhine/Westphalia 20.58% 
 Hesse/Rhine/Palatinate 13.88% 
 Baden-Württemberg 12.59% 
 Bavaria 13.61% 
 eastern Germany 15.74% 
 city states 5.48% 
 abroad 1.85% 
studies without interruption of >=1 semester 71.07% 
changed field of study or program 18.07% 
source of finance: 6 factors (PCA) not meaningful to report 
satisfaction with study program: 4 factors (PCA) not meaningful to report, variables 
documented in table 5.3.7 
  
--- continued on next page  
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--- table 5.3.1 continued  
  
work experience during studies (not mut. excl.)  
 worked during studies to make ones living 21.29% 
 worked as student assistant 37.29% 
 worked in field related job: private sector 35.69% 
 self-employed: field related job 14.04% 
 not employed during studies 39.01% 
percentile of GPA within field of study not meaningful to report 
children at time of first wave interview 11.51% 
relationship status at time of first wave interview  
 no partner 33.84% 
 relationship 50.04% 
 married 15.74% 
vocational training before university 19.07% 
vocational training before university: field overlapping 9.48% 
vocational training before university: fields unrelated 9.59% 
job search, voc. training and social ties  
 no voc. training, job not found through network 79.49% 
 voc. training, job not found through network 17.02% 
 no voc. training, job found through network 1.44% 
 voc. training, job found through network 2.05% 
job search, over-qualification, voc. training and social ties  
 no overlapping voc. training, job not found through netw. 88.14% 
 overlapping voc. training, job not found through netw. 8.38% 
 no overlapping voc. training, job found through netw. 2.38% 
 overlapping voc. training, job found through netw. 1.11% 
  
dependent variables  
  
ISEI 66.96 (12.73) 
hourly wage (note: for models log, here not log) 18.78 (8.06) 
search time in months 10.01 (14.90) 
over-qualified: self-report 19.46% 
over-qualified: ESeC 13.57% 
  
N 8105 
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001. 
Own calculations, not weighted, multiple imputation of missing values. 
 
 
 
Since dependent variables were not imputed, the number of observations 
varies to some degree between the models. As no direct comparison of the effects is 
made, this should be acceptable. Harmonizing the sample sizes would mean dropping 
all those cases that never find a job, but for example in the event history analysis on 
the search time they are well handled and the main motivation to estimate a Cox-
model (cf. section 3 and chapters 4.3 to 4.5). 
 
5.3.2 Results 
For each labor market outcome, I report a separate model. Different 
operationalizations for the work experience in vocational education are used. Table 
5.3.2 shows for each treatment/outcome-combination the relevant coefficient 
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representing the impact of educational detours on the respective outcome. The full 
tables including coefficients of all control variables are documented in the Appendix 
(5.3.4) in table 5.3.6 to 5.3.11.  
Interpretation of the coefficients differs between the different models. The 
logged earnings and the ISEI-models are linear (OLS) regression models; higher 
coefficients mean higher values of wage or ISEI respectively, and thus a better job. In 
the over-qualification models, the dependent variables are coded 1 for over-qualified 
graduates and 0 otherwise. Positive values indicate that the respective independent 
variable increases the risk of over-qualification on average (all else equal). 
The first model reports on the differences – all else being equal – between 
graduates with and without a vocational degree. For none of the outcomes, a 
vocational degree does make much of a difference. None of the coefficients is 
statistically significant, and the effects are miniscule. For example, the hourly wage is 
only roughly one percent higher for those with a double qualification. Thus, the 
overall effect of a double qualification is negligible. A somewhat different picture is 
found for those vocational degrees that overlap in content with the higher education 
degree. Here, a small gain in wages is left after controlling for all other variables in 
the model. On all other outcomes, however, there is ceteris paribus no bonus for a 
double qualification. At about the same very small degree, those with a non-fitting 
vocational education are penalized. Even in the search time, there is no difference 
when keeping all else equal. In sum, the empirical analysis fails in separating 
hypotheses 1 and 2. A strong human capital effect appears to be absent, but neither is 
there a penalty. On average, the double qualifiers have similar job characteristics 
including a similar risk of over-qualification and also a similar search time, which 
contradicts hypothesis 3 and 4. 
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Table 5.3.2: Effects of vocational training degrees on the labor market entry among higher 
education graduates. 
 
     
model: central independent variable 
ln(WAGE): 
OLS-
regression 
ISEI: OLS-
regression 
over-
qualification: 
self-defined 
(logit) 
over-
qualification: 
not in ESeC 
1 or 2 (logit) 
search time 
(cox) 
 
     
 
     
vocational degree 0.01 -0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 
 (0.56) (-0.27) (0.67) (0.50) (1.03) 
 
     
      
vocational degree: overlapping field with 
higher education 
0.05* 0.71 0.08 -0.01 0.01 
(2.12) (1.55) (0.71) (-0.10) (0.22) 
 
     
      
vocational degree: non-overlapping field 
with higher education 
-0.03 -0.80 0.01 0.08 0.04 
(-1.52) (-1.79) (0.05) (0.65) (0.97) 
 
     
      
job search, voc. training and social ties      
 no voc. training, job not found 
 through networks 
Reference     
      
 voc. training, job not found 
 through networks 
0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 
(0.38) (-0.04) (0.13) (0.30) (0.82) 
      
 no voc. training, job found 
 through networks 
0.04 -0.06 0.41 -0.10 -0.02 
(0.85) (-0.06) (1.72) (-0.35) (-0.26) 
      
 voc. training, job found through 
 networks 
0.05 -0.89 0.56** 0.21 0.10 
(1.26) (-1.04) (3.00) (0.92) (1.14) 
 
     
      
job search, over-qualification, voc. 
training and social ties 
     
 no overlapping voc. training, 
 job not found through networks 
Reference     
      
 overlapping voc. training, job 
 not found through networks 
0.04* 0.82 0.02 -0.11 0.01 
(2.00) (1.72) (0.21) (-0.82) (0.20) 
      
 no overlapping voc. training, 
 job found through networks 
0.04 -0.37 0.43* -0.24 0.04 
(1.13) (-0.49) (2.39) (-1.05) (0.48) 
      
 overlapping voc. training, job 
 found through networks 
0.07 -0.37 0.66** 0.61* 0.03 
(1.46) (-0.32) (2.70) (2.14) (0.26) 
 
     
      
N 8098 7819 8105 8105 8105 
      
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
 
 
 
The lowest two sets of models report the result of the interaction of training and social 
network search which test hypotheses 6. Here, the effects go into the theoretically 
expected direction: there is a penalty on the ISEI-score, in terms of an occupational 
closure mechanism certainly the first thing to expect, and a higher risk of over-
education for those who found their job via contacts from a previous vocational 
training. This result is consistent for both overlapping and non-overlapping vocational 
degrees.  
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For a closer look on the role of family formation, it is firstly important to 
separate between men and women. There is not much reason to expect particularly 
high penalties for men if family formation is the mechanism behind them. Previous 
studies have shown that married men and women with children were disadvantaged in 
the job search process after graduation (e.g. Meulemann, 1991). In table 5.3.3 the 
results from table 5.3.2 are broken down by sex. Differences are small, in the sense 
that there are not many substantial effects at all. Most notably, men can realize a 
bonus in wages but loose in other aspects. For women, I find the typical pattern that is 
expected for a credentialist hiring regime: a penalty in income, especially for 
vocational programs without skill-overlap with higher education, but a reduced search 
time. 
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Table 5.3.3: Effects of vocational training degrees on the labor market entry among higher 
education graduates – separate analyses by sex. 
 ln(WAGE) ISEI 
over-qual.:  
self-defined 
over-qual.: 
not in ESeC 
search time 
 
 
men 
     
regression model OLS OLS 
logit, 
1 = over-
qualified 
logit, 
1 = over-
qualified 
cox, log 
hazard ration 
      
vocational degree 0.05* (2.20) -0.81 (-1.53) 0.04 (0.26) 0.32 (1.85) 0.01 (0.17) 
      
      
vocational degree: 
overlapping field with higher 
education 
0.05 (1.93) -0.24 (-0.39) 0.18 (1.19) 0.13 (0.67) 0.00 (0.02) 
      
      
vocational degree: non-
overlapping field with higher 
education 
0.02 (0.67) -1.00 (-1.51) -0.18 (-1.00) 0.30 (1.50) 0.01 (0.19) 
      
N 3938 3773 3940 3885 3940 
 
 
     
 
women 
     
      
vocational degree -0.02 (-0.88) 0.49 (0.84) 0.08 (0.62) -0.16 (-1.05) 0.09 (1.60) 
      
      
vocational degree: 
overlapping field with higher 
education 
0.04 (1.16) 1.65* (2.39) -0.07 (-0.47) -0.17 (-0.93) 0.03 (0.49) 
 
     
 
     
vocational degree: non-
overlapping field with higher 
education 
-0.05* (-1.98) -0.75 (-1.23) 0.15 (1.06) -0.05 (-0.32) 0.07 (1.25) 
 
     
 
     
N 4160 4046 4165 4165 4165 
      
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001. 
Own calculations, not weighted, multiple imputation of missing values. 
 
 
 
In order to adjust for this, I estimate another set of models including family 
status and whether the person had any children, both measured at the time of 
graduation (table 5.3.4). First, these models confirm for a larger set of variables the 
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results of Meulemann (1991): for men, relationships and marriages are correlated 
positively with a number of concepts that indicate a favorable labor market entry. 
Children do not make a difference. By comparison, for women being single is not 
correlated with better jobs, only with a shorter search time. Having children is linked 
to a problematic labor market entry: even though these women are faster integrated in 
the labor market, they are employed in substantially worse jobs as can be seen by the 
negative effects on wage and the ISEI-score. Even though the t-value is somewhat 
lower, the effect itself does not change. More importantly, while the effects of family 
formation exist, they do not explain the small effects of the double qualification. 
Therefore, hypothesis 7 – that in particular women with double qualification are 
worse off in the labor market because they are more often in a critical phase of family 
formation at the time of the labor market entry – is not supported. Given that the 
coefficients for the double qualification stay remarkably stable for all models, we 
have to assume that the two mechanisms are largely independent from each other. 
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Table 5.3.4: Effects of vocational training degrees on the labor market entry among higher 
education graduates – including family formation. MEN. 
men: family variables ln(WAGE) ISEI Over-
qualification: 
self-defined 
Over-qual.: 
not in ESeC 1 
or 2 
search time 
regression model OLS OLS 
Logit, 1 = 
over-qualified 
Logit, 1 = 
over-qualified 
cox, log hazard 
ration 
      
vocational degree 0.05* (2.07) -0.78 (-1.46) 0.05 (0.33) 0.31 (1.79) -0.03 (-0.54) 
relationship status      
 no partner Reference     
 partnership 0.05*** (3.38) 0.83* (2.39) -0.34*** (-3.30) -0.38** (-3.07) 0.24*** (6.78) 
 married 0.09*** (3.70) 0.48 (0.87) -0.12 (-0.76) -0.34 (-1.66) 0.86*** (15.07) 
children at time of graduation -0.02 (-0.80) 0.09 (0.14) 0.21 (1.15) -0.11 (-0.43) 2.18*** (29.15) 
      
      
vocational degree: overlapping 
field with higher education 
0.05 (1.91) -0.18 (-0.29) 0.19 (1.22) 0.13 (0.67) -0.08 (-1.29) 
relationship status      
 no partner Reference     
 partnership 0.05*** (3.39) 0.84* (2.41) -0.34** (-3.28) -0.39** (-3.09) 0.24*** (6.77) 
 married 0.09*** (3.72) 0.47 (0.86) -0.12 (-0.76) -0.33 (-1.64) 0.86*** (15.10) 
children at time of graduation -0.02 (-0.78) 0.10 (0.15) 0.22 (1.19) -0.11 (-0.43) 2.18*** (29.19) 
      
      
vocational degree: non-
overlapping field with higher 
education 
0.02 (0.52) -1.02 (-1.52) -0.17 (-0.94) 0.30 (1.44) 0.05 (0.73) 
relationship status      
 no partner Reference     
 partnership 0.05*** (3.35) 0.84* (2.41) -0.34*** (-3.31) -0.39** (-3.11) 0.24*** (6.80) 
 married 0.09*** (3.73) 0.48 (0.87) -0.12 (-0.74) -0.34 (-1.66) 0.85*** (15.02) 
children at time of graduation -0.02 (-0.83) 0.12 (0.18) 0.21 (1.17) -0.11 (-0.46) 2.18*** (29.12) 
      
      
N 3876 3712 3876 3821 3876 
      
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.4: Effects of vocational training degrees on the labor market entry among higher 
education graduates – including family formation. WOMEN. 
women: family variables 
ln(WAGE) ISEI Over-
qualification: 
self-defined 
Over-qual.: 
not in ESeC 1 
or 2 
search time 
regression model OLS OLS 
Logit, 1 = 
over-qualified 
Logit, 1 = over-
qualified 
cox, log hazard 
ration 
      
      
vocational degree -0.02 (-0.81) 0.56 (0.96) 0.07 (0.54) -0.17 (-1.16) 0.05 (0.84) 
  relationship status      
  no partner Reference     
  partnership 0.01 (0.75) 0.26 (0.67) 0.06 (0.61) 0.08 (0.72) 0.20*** (5.61) 
  married -0.02 (-0.92) -0.74 (-1.30) 0.14 (1.07) 0.21 (1.42) 0.74*** (13.79) 
children at time of graduation -0.08** (-2.82) -1.91** (-2.86) 0.15 (1.00) 0.46** (2.90) 3.67*** (40.95) 
      
      
vocational degree: overlapping 
field with higher education 
0.03 (1.10) 1.64* (2.38) -0.09 (-0.59) -0.18 (-0.97) 0.05 (0.77) 
relationship status      
  no partner Reference     
  partnership 0.01 (0.70) 0.21 (0.56) 0.06 (0.65) 0.08 (0.77) 0.20*** (5.57) 
  married -0.03 (-0.98) -0.77 (-1.35) 0.15 (1.10) 0.21 (1.44) 0.74*** (13.78) 
children at time of graduation -0.08** (-2.83) -1.89** (-2.82) 0.15 (1.00) 0.46** (2.86) 3.68*** (40.98) 
      
      
vocational degree: non-
overlapping field with higher 
education 
-0.05 (-1.85) -0.67 (-1.09) 0.15 (1.09) -0.06 (-0.40) 0.01 (0.24) 
relationship status      
  no partner Reference     
  partnership 0.01 (0.68) 0.24 (0.62) 0.06 (0.66) 0.07 (0.70) 0.21*** (5.62) 
  married -0.02 (-0.95) -0.73 (-1.28) 0.15 (1.10) 0.20 (1.39) 0.74*** (13.80) 
children at time of graduation -0.08 **(-2.79) -1.89** (-2.82) 0.15 (0.96) 0.46** (2.88) 3.67*** (40.93) 
      
      
N 4129 4011 4129 4129 4129 
      
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
 
 
 
Finally, hypothesis 7 projected that an additional degree can be used as an 
alternative to higher education if the labor market entry is difficult. If this hypothesis 
– which is derived from credentialist assumptions – is true, the over-qualified 
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individuals should be better off with a vocational degree. Table 5.3.5 summarizes the 
coefficients having a vocational degree for wage and ISEI. Problematic is the low 
number of cases that limits the possibility to draw strong conclusions from this 
analysis. The general direction of the effect, however, points towards a confirmation 
of this hypothesis. On average, the wage level achieved by double qualifiers is higher. 
And even though they are over-qualified, they achieve a higher ISEI-score. 
 
Table 5.3.5: Effects of a vocational degree on the labor market entry among overeducated 
graduates 
   
 ln(WAGE) ISEI 
   
   
vocational degree 0.09 2.95  
 (0.92) (1.38) 
 
  
N 410 400 
   
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001. 
Own calculations, not weighted, multiple imputation of missing values. 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Conclusion  
The main conclusion is in short: effects of educational careers on the labor market 
entry are not very strong. When debating the contribution of the frequent practice of 
German youth to complete a double qualification to social inequality, this finding 
should mute some concerns about additional disadvantages through delayed 
educational careers. Besides the obvious opportunity costs, there seems to be no large 
labor market penalty for the detour on the way to a higher education degree. Findings 
from the literature suggested that those with a vocational degree have lower chances 
of completing higher education. This illustrates that the higher education degree plays 
an important role for success. Once it is achieved, not many differences are left – 
apart from a higher risk of drop-outs from higher education within this group 
(Meulemann, 1991). 
Against the findings of no additional advantage of a vocational degree for 
graduates from higher education, the human capital mechanism of a linear increase of 
productivity with each additional year of education has to be seen skeptical. The only 
exception is the group of men who have completed an apprenticeship within the same 
field of studies as their higher education degree. Among them, there is a positive 
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effect of vocational training on wage. And even within this group, gains are small. 
Given that double-qualifiers are on average older, a small positive wage effect should 
already be expected from the seniority bonuses in the collective wage agreements 
between unions and employers in Germany: until recently, wages were often defined 
by age instead of tenure. Thus, only substantial and larger wage effects could be 
interpreted as the result of an increase in human capital. In defense of the human 
capital mechanism, several arguments could be put forward to reason that the human 
capital theory would never even expect positive effects. Human capital depreciation is 
one such reason: if an increase in human capital goes along with an increase in 
productivity only in the shorter run, i.e. the human capital gained is devaluated rapidly 
over time, a vocational education degree that is already five years old at the time of 
the labor market entry should not be considered relevant human capital. That human 
capital loses its value over time when it is not practiced, is a common explanation e.g. 
for the scarring effect of unemployment (Gangl, 2004). Depreciation cannot explain 
negative effects, but non-effects. Similarly, critics of my interpretation in favor of the 
signaling or credentialism approaches could highlight the specificity of human capital 
to jobs. Skills can be field specific – and if the field of study differs between 
vocational training and higher education, the realized gains in human capital cannot 
pay off in the labor market. This is – however – unlikely. No logically persistent 
hypothesis can be derived from the human capital model on the question whether the 
same field of study should be better to increase returns – or the combination of 
different fields has higher payoffs. Is it simply more education in one field on several 
levels that improves productivity, or the broader knowledge from a combination of 
different fields? Many examples from the real world can be named as illustrations for 
the one or the other. Human capital specificity has been addressed by theorists from 
its beginning as job specific and unspecific human capital. To derive a hypothesis on 
the value of overlapping or complementary contents, it would be necessary to know 
what is more important for the majority of jobs: many skills in one field, or a specific 
combination of skills from different fields. Such softer forms of the human capital 
perspective – with only small changes – are open to a non-effect of a vocational 
degree achieved before a higher education degree, but only with additional 
information about the skill profiles jobs might require. My findings are therefore not 
as strongly in favor of the signaling or credentialism approach as if they would reveal 
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negative coefficients. As most coefficients are very small or zero, softer versions of 
the human capital model offer an easy escape. 
Above, I postulated a number of empirical implications for the safety net 
hypotheses. According to this claim, vocational training serves as a fallback-option in 
case that either the completion of higher education or the search for a job in a higher 
class position fails. If this holds true, we should observe advantages in the labor 
market for those who have a vocational degree, since a second ‘entry ticket’ into the 
labor market can be used if the higher education degree does not grant access. This 
must go along with a higher risk of over-education for the double-qualifiers, since the 
faster entry can only be realized on the cost of accepting a job below the usual status-
level of higher education graduates. This pattern would have been further support for 
the signaling or credentialism perspective, but could not be supported empirically. 
Somewhat more confidence into the occupational closure- or credentialism-
arguments can be gained from the result that the interaction of training and social 
network search exists. The analyses have revealed a penalty on the ISEI-score for 
those finding their job via social networks from vocational education. Furthermore, 
these graduates more often work in positions for which they are over-educated. This 
result is consistent for both overlapping and non-overlapping vocational degrees, what 
is another interesting hint that at least not only the human capital mechanism can 
explain the labor market pay-offs. Since the differentiation by the measured skill-
overlap does not alter the results, I infer that skills and returns to education are at least 
to some degree independent from each other. There are, however, no positive effects 
on the search time. 
When confronted with the non-significant and small coefficients in the first 
models, one may argue that isolating the safety net mechanism must fail. This 
mechanism affects only the small minority with actual labor market entry problems, 
whose contribution to the average outcome could be diluted among the large number 
of labor market entrants. Only a very small minority of students with a longer search 
time is expected to change the overall average difference between double-qualifiers 
and all other graduates. This problem is overcome by the analysis referring to 
hypothesis 5 and showing that among the over-educated graduates, those with a 
double qualification do indeed achieve higher wages. Apart from limitations 
stemming from the limited number of cases, this shows that on the labor market 
below the higher education segment, a very low income can be avoided by a 
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vocational degree. This is exactly the storyline one would expect from credentialism: 
if graduates do not succeed in entering the highly educated labor market segment, 
then a license to enter a job in the form of a degree can grant access to favorable jobs 
within the lower segments.  
Finally breaking down the analyses by sex and controlling for the state of 
family formation does not alter the results much. Men are somewhat more likely to 
receive bonus from a vocational training; women are somewhat more likely to receive 
a penalty. The importance of family formation variables is, however, confirmed by 
the effects of childbearing on a successful labor market entry which occur only for 
women.  
By comparison to men, women are affected in some aspects affected 
differently by double qualifications in their labor market entry. The independence 
from being without a partner does not result in a better job, but leads to a shorter 
search time. Most strongly, women other than men do have a disadvantage from 
parenthood. Surprisingly, this does not mirror in a longer search time, but rather in 
substantially worse jobs. As family formation is not the central concern of this 
chapter, scrutinizing these findings carefully has to be left for future research. 
The expectation that labor market penalties from double qualifications 
among women can be explained by family formation does not find support in the 
empirical results either. Controlling for the factual family formation does not alter the 
negative coefficient of a vocational training. Even though some of the coefficients are 
not statistical significant, this pattern points towards another implication of the 
credentialist perspective: perhaps, women are more often in the situation that they 
have to rely on the safety net of a previous vocational degree due to their stronger 
limitations by family formation.  
More importantly, including the family formation into the model does not 
explain the effects of the double qualification, neither for men nor for women. This 
pattern would be expected if women have penalties for double qualifications due to 
stronger involvement into family formation upon graduation after the long detour via 
an additional educational degree (Hypothesis 7). Even though the general 
disadvantage for women with children are found, the life course perspective does not 
contribute much to explain labor market entry patterns. 
Taken together, the case of the double-qualifier in the German education 
system serves as a good testing ground for various theoretical hypotheses. Overall, 
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there is evidence that the human capital mechanism cannot explain returns to 
education exclusively. Other mechanisms, such as occupational closure by degrees as 
suggest by credentialism. What is more important from a policy perspective and for 
the broader context of inequality research is that the overall effects are small. 
Similarly as in the US, the German labor market does not ask ‘when’ education is 
achieved, it matters ‘what’ (type of) education is achieved. 
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5.3.4 Appendix 
Table 5.3.6: Full model, Effects of vocational training degrees on the search time till the first 
significant job (Cox-model). 
search time vocational 
training before 
university 
voc. training: 
field overlap 
voc. training: no 
field overlap 
job search: voc. 
training and 
netw. 
job search: over-
qualification, 
voc. training and 
netw. 
           
sex = male -0.04 (-1.43) -0.04 (-1.65) -0.04 (-1.52) -0.04 (-1.44) -0.04 (-1.64) 
           
graduate-cohort = 
2001 
-0.12 (-3.05) -0.12 (-3.06) -0.12 (-3.04) -0.12 (-3.04) -0.12 (-3.05) 
           
field of study           
  arts, hum., soc. sc. ref.cat.          
  educ. / soc. work 0.14 (2.71) 0.14 (2.63) 0.14 (2.69) 0.14 (2.72) 0.14 (2.64) 
  econ. / business -0.06 (-1.39) -0.06 (-1.26) -0.05 (-1.11) -0.06 (-1.40) -0.06 (-1.24) 
  engin. / agric. 0.01 (0.45) 0.02 (0.46) 0.02 (0.58) 0.02 (0.47) 0.02 (0.48) 
  science -0.01 (-0.23) -0.01 (-0.23) -0.01 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.22) -0.01 (-0.22) 
  life science 0.13 (2.50) 0.13 (2.51) 0.13 (2.55) 0.13 (2.52) 0.13 (2.51) 
  law -0.05 (-0.86) -0.05 (-0.84) -0.05 (-0.85) -0.05 (-0.85) -0.05 (-0.83) 
           
abitur grade 0.00 (0.50) 0.001 (0.57) 0.001 (0.53) 0.001 (0.51) 0.001 (0.56) 
           
abitur: non-gymn. 0.02 (0.51) 0.02 (0.50) 0.02 (0.52) 0.02 (0.53) 0.02 (0.52) 
           
age first enr. -0.05 (-5.20) -0.05 (-6.50) -0.05 (-6.00) -0.05 (-5.21) -0.05 (-6.45) 
(age first enr.)² -0.001 (-1.16) -0.001 (-1.52) -0.001 (-1.33) -0.001 (-1.16) -0.001 (-1.49) 
           
father ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.05 (-0.33) -0.05 (-0.36) -0.05 (-0.32) -0.05 (-0.34) -0.05 (-0.35) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. -0.07 (-0.76) -0.07 (-0.75) -0.07 (-0.74) -0.07 (-0.76) -0.07 (-0.75) 
  2c_gen 0.07 (0.39) 0.07 (0.37) 0.07 (0.37) 0.07 (0.40) 0.07 (0.38) 
  2c_voc 0.05 (0.84) 0.05 (0.83) 0.05 (0.82) 0.05 (0.85) 0.05 (0.85) 
  3a FH-degree 0.04 (1.19) 0.04 (1.16) 0.04 (1.15) 0.04 (1.19) 0.04 (1.16) 
  3b Uni-degree 0.02 (0.58) 0.02 (0.55) 0.02 (0.55) 0.02 (0.60) 0.02 (0.56) 
           
mother ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.13 (-1.10) -0.13 (-1.11) -0.13 (-1.14) -0.13 (-1.12) -0.13 (-1.11) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. -0.03 (-0.61) -0.03 (-0.59) -0.03 (-0.62) -0.03 (-0.63) -0.03 (-0.61) 
  2c_gen 0.08 (0.80) 0.08 (0.80) 0.08 (0.81) 0.08 (0.81) 0.08 (0.80) 
  2c_voc 0.02 (0.42) 0.02 (0.43) 0.02 (0.42) 0.02 (0.41) 0.02 (0.44) 
  3a FH-degree -0.001 (-0.02) -0.001 (-0.02) -0.001 (-0.03) -0.001 (-0.03) -0.00 (-0.01) 
  3b Uni-degree 0.06 (1.56) 0.06 (1.55) 0.06 (1.55) 0.06 (1.55) 0.06 (1.56) 
           
father occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.03 (-1.13) -0.03 (-1.13) -0.03 (-1.12) -0.04 (-1.14) -0.03 (-1.13) 
  civil servant -0.04 (-1.00) -0.04 (-0.99) -0.04 (-0.97) -0.04 (-1.00) -0.04 (-0.99) 
  work contract -0.02 (-0.44) -0.02 (-0.45) -0.02 (-0.43) -0.02 (-0.42) -0.02 (-0.44) 
  never employed -0.09 (-0.51) -0.09 (-0.51) -0.08 (-0.49) -0.09 (-0.51) -0.09 (-0.52) 
           
mother occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.003 (-0.07) -0.002 (-0.06) -0.002 (-0.06) -0.003 (-0.06) -0.002 (-0.06) 
  civil servant -0.04 (-0.64) -0.03 (-0.63) -0.03 (-0.62) -0.04 (-0.64) -0.03 (-0.62) 
  work contract -0.03 (-0.54) -0.03 (-0.54) -0.03 (-0.53) -0.03 (-0.53) -0.03 (-0.54) 
  never employed 0.08 (1.35) 0.08 (1.37) 0.08 (1.37) 0.08 (1.35) 0.08 (1.38) 
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--- table 5.3.6 continued --- 
 
no. of semesters 0.02 (3.66) 0.02 (3.58) 0.02 (3.62) 0.02 (3.67) 0.02 (3.58) 
           
federal state degree           
  northern states ref.cat.          
  NRW -0.03 (-0.75) -0.03 (-0.73) -0.03 (-0.76) -0.03 (-0.74) -0.03 (-0.72) 
  Hessen/RLP -0.01 (-0.14) -0.01 (-0.13) -0.01 (-0.16) -0.01 (-0.14) -0.01 (-0.14) 
  Baden-Württ. -0.01 (-0.24) -0.01 (-0.26) -0.01 (-0.29) -0.01 (-0.22) -0.01 (-0.25) 
  Bavaria 0.01 (0.14) 0.004 (0.10) 0.004 (0.10) 0.01 (0.15) 0.004 (0.10) 
  east Germany 0.17 (3.74) 0.17 (3.78) 0.17 (3.72) 0.17 (3.76) 0.17 (3.77) 
  city states 0.10 (1.79) 0.10 (1.80) 0.10 (1.78) 0.10 (1.79) 0.10 (1.80) 
  abroad 0.14 (1.53) 0.13 (1.47) 0.13 (1.48) 0.14 (1.54) 0.13 (1.47) 
           
no stud. interrupt. -0.07 (-2.79) -0.07 (-2.78) -0.07 (-2.80) -0.07 (-2.80) -0.07 (-2.78) 
           
changed study field 0.03 (1.03) 0.03 (1.04) 0.03 (1.02) 0.03 (1.05) 0.03 (1.04) 
           
source of finance           
  factor 1 -0.04 (-2.87) -0.04 (-2.90) -0.04 (-2.89) -0.04 (-2.86) -0.04 (-2.87) 
  factor 2 0.003 (0.20) 0.002 (0.17) 0.002 (0.17) 0.003 (0.23) 0.003 (0.19) 
  factor 3 0.02 (1.27) 0.02 (1.27) 0.02 (1.26) 0.02 (1.27) 0.02 (1.28) 
  factor 4 0.001 (0.12) 0.001 (0.12) 0.001 (0.14) 0.001 (0.09) 0.001 (0.12) 
  factor 5 -0.004 (-0.35) -0.004 (-0.34) -0.004 (-0.33) -0.004 (-0.33) -0.004 (-0.35) 
  factor 6 -0.03 (-1.95) -0.03 (-1.94) -0.03 (-1.95) -0.03 (-1.98) -0.03 (-1.95) 
           
satisf. with study           
  factor 1 0.01 (0.49) 0.01 (0.47) 0.01 (0.49) 0.01 (0.48) 0.01 (0.47) 
  factor 2 -0.001 (-0.06) -0.001 (-0.06) -0.001 (-0.06) -0.001 (-0.05) -0.001 (-0.05) 
  factor 3 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.42) 0.01 (0.42) 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.42) 
  factor 4 -0.01 (-0.39) -0.01 (-0.37) -0.01 (-0.39) -0.01 (-0.38) -0.01 (-0.37) 
           
work experience 
during studies 
          
  to make living -0.01 (-0.33) -0.01 (-0.33) -0.01 (-0.32) -0.01 (-0.31) -0.01 (-0.32) 
  student assistant -0.01 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.20) -0.004 (-0.17) -0.01 (-0.18) 
  private sector 0.003 (0.11) 0.004 (0.16) 0.004 (0.14) 0.003 (0.11) 0.004 (0.14) 
  self-employed 0.02 (0.58) 0.02 (0.59) 0.02 (0.58) 0.02 (0.61) 0.02 (0.58) 
  not employed -0.04 (-1.23) -0.04 (-1.24) -0.04 (-1.27) -0.04 (-1.22) -0.04 (-1.24) 
           
percentile of GPA -0.02 (-0.35) -0.01 (-0.32) -0.02 (-0.35) -0.02 (-0.34) -0.01 (-0.32) 
           
voc. before uni. 0.04 (1.03)         
           
voc. overlap   0.01 (0.22)       
           
voc. non-overlap     0.04 (0.97)     
           
job search: voc. and 
netw. 
          
  no voc. + no netw.       ref.cat.    
  voc. + no netw.       0.03 (0.82)   
  no voc. + netw.       -0.02 (-0.26)   
  voc. + netw.       0.10 (1.14)   
           
job search: overlap  
voc. and netw. 
          
  no overlap+no 
  netw. 
        ref.cat.  
  overlap+no netw.         0.01 (0.20) 
  no overlap+netw.         0.04 (0.48) 
  overlap+netw.         0.03 (0.26) 
N 8105  8105  8105  8105  8105  
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.7: Full models, hourly wages Effects of vocational training degrees on the wage 
(OLS-regression). 
hourly wage vocational 
training before 
university 
voc. training: 
field overlap 
voc. training: no 
field overlap 
job search: voc. 
training and 
netw. 
job search: over-
qualification, 
voc. training and 
netw. 
           
sex = male 0.10 (9.05) 0.10 (9.24) 0.10 (8.70) 0.10 (9.05) 0.10 (9.27) 
           
graduate-cohort = 
2001 
-0.05 (-2.96) -0.05 (-2.99) -0.05 (-3.02) -0.05 (-2.92) -0.05 (-2.95) 
           
field of study           
  arts, hum., soc. sc. ref.cat.          
  educ. / soc. work 0.02 (0.99) 0.02 (1.02) 0.02 (0.87) 0.02 (1.00) 0.02 (1.04) 
  econ. / business 0.30 (14.95) 0.29 (14.02) 0.30 (14.65) 0.30 (14.96) 0.29 (14.03) 
  engin. / agric. 0.22 (12.96) 0.22 (12.65) 0.22 (12.83) 0.22 (13.02) 0.22 (12.70) 
  science 0.16 (8.20) 0.16 (8.11) 0.16 (8.17) 0.16 (8.22) 0.16 (8.14) 
  life science 0.17 (7.53) 0.16 (7.40) 0.17 (7.49) 0.17 (7.52) 0.16 (7.39) 
  law 0.02 (0.81) 0.02 (0.78) 0.02 (0.83) 0.02 (0.83) 0.02 (0.81) 
           
abitur grade -0.003 (-3.35) -0.003 (-3.44) -0.003 (-3.25) -0.003 (-3.34) -0.003 (-3.45) 
           
abitur: non-gymn. -0.01 (-0.34) -0.01 (-0.36) -0.01 (-0.38) -0.01 (-0.31) -0.01 (-0.33) 
           
age first enr. 0.004 (1.11) 0.01 (1.66) 0.001 (0.29) 0.01 (1.14) 0.01 (1.75) 
(age first enr.)² 0.001 (1.81) 0.001 (2.11) 0.000 (1.39) 0.001 (1.84) 0.001 (2.17) 
           
father ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.06 (-0.85) -0.06 (-0.86) -0.06 (-0.90) -0.06 (-0.86) -0.06 (-0.86) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. 0.05 (1.12) 0.04 (1.07) 0.05 (1.11) 0.05 (1.12) 0.04 (1.07) 
  2c_gen 0.11 (1.33) 0.11 (1.37) 0.11 (1.34) 0.11 (1.33) 0.11 (1.37) 
  2c_voc 0.006 (0.22) 0.01 (0.25) 0.01 (0.22) 0.01 (0.26) 0.01 (0.28) 
  3a FH-degree -0.01 (-0.62) -0.01 (-0.55) -0.01 (-0.63) -0.01 (-0.61) -0.01 (-0.54) 
  3b Uni-degree 0.02 (0.94) 0.02 (1.00) 0.01 (0.91) 0.02 (0.96) 0.02 (1.01) 
           
mother ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.06 (-1.16) -0.06 (-1.10) -0.06 (-1.13) -0.06 (-1.14) -0.06 (-1.09) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. -0.02 (-1.11) -0.02 (-1.07) -0.02 (-1.05) -0.02 (-1.12) -0.02 (-1.08) 
  2c_gen -0.03 (-0.73) -0.03 (-0.74) -0.03 (-0.78) -0.03 (-0.73) -0.03 (-0.74) 
  2c_voc -0.02 (-1.07) -0.02 (-1.07) -0.02 (-1.07) -0.02 (-1.06) -0.02 (-1.05) 
  3a FH-degree -0.04 (-1.97) -0.04 (-1.95) -0.04 (-1.96) -0.04 (-1.95) -0.04 (-1.93) 
  3b Uni-degree -0.02 (-0.84) -0.02 (-0.85) -0.02 (-0.87) -0.01 (-0.82) -0.01 (-0.82) 
           
father occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee 0.003 (0.24) 0.003 (0.23) 0.003 (0.24) 0.003 (0.22) 0.003 (0.21) 
  civil servant -0.03 (-1.58) -0.03 (-1.64) -0.03 (-1.58) -0.03 (-1.59) -0.03 (-1.65) 
  work contract 0.01 (0.47) 0.01 (0.44) 0.01 (0.46) 0.01 (0.48) 0.01 (0.45) 
  never employed -0.03 (-0.34) -0.03 (-0.36) -0.03 (-0.36) -0.03 (-0.34) -0.03 (-0.36) 
           
mother occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.004 (-0.23) -0.01 (-0.27) -0.004 (-0.23) -0.004 (-0.21) -0.01 (-0.25) 
  civil servant -0.01 (-0.20) -0.01 (-0.24) -0.01 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.23) 
  work contract 0.01 (0.39) 0.01 (0.36) 0.01 (0.37) 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.37) 
  never employed 0.02 (0.86) 0.02 (0.79) 0.02 (0.87) 0.02 (0.88) 0.02 (0.82) 
           
no. of semesters -0.01 (-4.93) -0.01 (-4.88) -0.01 (-5.11) -0.01 (-4.93) -0.01 (-4.87) 
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--- table 5.3.7 continued 
           
federal state degree           
  northern states           
  NRW 0.01 (0.75) 0.01 (0.79) 0.01 (0.80) 0.01 (0.78) 0.01 (0.80) 
  Hessen/RLP 0.01 (0.42) 0.01 (0.46) 0.01 (0.46) 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.46) 
  Baden-Württ. 0.04 (1.86) 0.04 (1.97) 0.04 (1.86) 0.04 (1.88) 0.04 (1.99) 
  Bavaria 0.05 (2.99) 0.06 (3.07) 0.06 (2.96) 0.06 (2.99) 0.06 (3.07) 
  east Germany -0.20 (-9.63) -0.20 (-9.56) -0.20 (-9.49) -0.20 (-9.65) -0.20 (-9.59) 
  city states -0.05 (-2.19) -0.06 (-2.15) -0.06 (-2.17) -0.06 (-2.20) -0.06 (-2.16) 
  abroad 0.02 (0.41) 0.02 (0.47) 0.02 (0.38) 0.02 (0.40) 0.02 (0.46) 
.. unkown -0.18 (-2.10) -0.18 (-2.09) -0.17 (-2.05) -0.18 (-2.09) -0.18 (-2.08) 
           
no stud. interrupt. -0.02 (-2.03) -0.02 (-2.02) -0.02 (-2.05) -0.02 (-2.04) -0.02 (-2.03) 
           
changed study field -0.02 (-1.21) -0.02 (-1.18) -0.02 (-1.19) -0.02 (-1.20) -0.02 (-1.18) 
           
source of finance           
  factor 1 -0.002 (-0.24) -0.002 (-0.23) -0.002 (-0.29) -0.001 (-0.18) -0.001 (-0.17) 
  factor 2 -0.04 (-6.06) -0.04 (-6.04) -0.04 (-6.14) -0.04 (-5.98) -0.04 (-5.96) 
  factor 3 0.004 (0.72) 0.004 (0.73) 0.004 (0.72) 0.004 (0.72) 0.004 (0.73) 
  factor 4 -0.01 (-1.38) -0.01 (-1.41) -0.01 (-1.38) -0.01 (-1.40) -0.01 (-1.42) 
  factor 5 -0.003 (-0.53) -0.003 (-0.55) -0.003 (-0.53) -0.003 (-0.55) -0.003 (-0.57) 
  factor 6 0.01 (0.97) 0.01 (0.98) 0.01 (0.98) 0.01 (0.94) 0.01 (0.95) 
           
satisf. with study           
  factor 1 -0.01 (-1.05) -0.01 (-1.05) -0.01 (-1.08) -0.01 (-1.05) -0.01 (-1.04) 
  factor 2 -0.02 (-4.06) -0.02 (-4.04) -0.02 (-4.05) -0.02 (-4.05) -0.02 (-4.03) 
  factor 3 -0.01 (-1.97) -0.01 (-1.99) -0.01 (-1.96) -0.01 (-1.96) -0.01 (-1.99) 
  factor 4 0.02 (2.96) 0.02 (2.97) 0.02 (2.96) 0.02 (2.97) 0.02 (2.97) 
           
work experience 
during studies 
          
  to make living -0.02 (-1.46) -0.02 (-1.47) -0.02 (-1.44) -0.02 (-1.43) -0.02 (-1.45) 
  student assistant 0.01 (0.97) 0.01 (1.01) 0.01 (0.99) 0.01 (0.99) 0.01 (1.03) 
  private sector 0.02 (1.68) 0.02 (1.60) 0.02 (1.74) 0.02 (1.63) 0.02 (1.56) 
  self-employed 0.004 (0.28) 0.004 (0.28) 0.004 (0.28) 0.004 (0.29) 0.004 (0.28) 
  not employed -0.01 (-0.96) -0.01 (-0.89) -0.01 (-0.95) -0.01 (-0.92) -0.01 (-0.85) 
           
percentile of GPA 0.01 (0.53) 0.01 (0.52) 0.01 (0.60) 0.01 (0.54) 0.01 (0.52) 
           
voc. before uni. 0.01 (0.56)         
           
voc. overlap   0.05 (2.12)       
           
voc. non-overlap     -0.03 (-1.52)     
           
job search: voc. and 
netw. 
          
  no voc. + no netw.       ref.cat.    
  voc. + no netw.       0.01 (0.38)   
  no voc. + netw.       0.04 (0.85)   
  voc. + netw.       0.05 (1.26)   
           
job search: overlap  
voc. and netw. 
          
  no overlap+no 
  netw. 
        ref.cat.  
  overlap+no netw.         0.04 (2.00) 
  no overlap+netw.         0.04 (1.13) 
  overlap+netw.         0.07 (1.46) 
           
constant 2.82 (64.46) 2.82 (65.76) 2.83 (66.38) 2.82 (64.32) 2.81 (65.52) 
N 8098  8098  8098  8098  8098  
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.8: Full models, Effects of vocational training degrees on the ISEI-score (OLS-
regression). 
ISEI vocational 
training before 
university 
voc. training: 
field overlap 
voc. training: no 
field overlap 
job search: voc. 
training and 
netw. 
job search: over-
qualification, 
voc. training and 
netw. 
           
sex = male 0.87 (3.39) 0.93 (3.67) 0.82 (3.22) 0.87 (3.39) 0.93 (3.66) 
           
graduate-cohort = 
2001 
-3.77 (-9.21) -3.77 (-9.22) -3.79 (-9.26) -3.78 (-9.23) -3.79 (-9.25) 
           
field of study           
  arts, hum., soc. sc. ref.cat.          
  educ. / soc. work -5.17 (-9.60) -5.13 (-9.55) -5.21 (-9.69) -5.18 (-9.61) -5.13 (-9.55) 
  econ. / business 2.46 (5.41) 2.24 (4.75) 2.34 (5.15) 2.46 (5.40) 2.23 (4.75) 
  engin. / agric. 6.82 (17.79) 6.74 (17.45) 6.77 (17.62) 6.81 (17.74) 6.73 (17.39) 
  science 7.69 (17.22) 7.66 (17.13) 7.67 (17.17) 7.69 (17.20) 7.66 (17.12) 
  life science 23.21 (44.80) 23.15 (44.62) 23.18 (44.75) 23.20 (44.77) 23.15 (44.61) 
  law 18.57 (30.92) 18.55 (30.90) 18.57 (30.94) 18.56 (30.90) 18.54 (30.88) 
           
abitur grade -0.07 (-3.01) -0.07 (-3.11) -0.06 (-2.97) -0.07 (-3.03) -0.07 (-3.12) 
           
abitur: non-gymn. -0.99 (-2.53) -0.99 (-2.54) -1.00 (-2.57) -1.00 (-2.55) -1.00 (-2.57) 
           
age first enr. 0.19 (2.09) 0.25 (3.07) 0.15 (1.78) 0.19 (2.08) 0.24 (3.02) 
(age first enr.)² 0.01 (1.21) 0.01 (1.61) 0.01 (0.99) 0.01 (1.20) 0.01 (1.59) 
           
father ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.66 (-0.42) -0.64 (-0.41) -0.71 (-0.45) -0.64 (-0.41) -0.61 (-0.39) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. -0.72 (-0.75) -0.77 (-0.79) -0.74 (-0.77) -0.72 (-0.74) -0.78 (-0.80) 
  2c_gen 1.85 (1.03) 1.92 (1.07) 1.89 (1.06) 1.83 (1.02) 1.91 (1.06) 
  2c_voc -0.78 (-1.32) -0.77 (-1.30) -0.78 (-1.32) -0.80 (-1.35) -0.79 (-1.34) 
  3a FH-degree -0.02 (-0.06) -0.002 (-0.01) -0.02 (-0.05) -0.03 (-0.08) -0.01 (-0.02) 
  3b Uni-degree -0.04 (-0.10) -0.02 (-0.05) -0.04 (-0.12) -0.05 (-0.14) -0.03 (-0.07) 
           
mother ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -1.08 (-0.93) -1.03 (-0.88) -1.05 (-0.89) -1.09 (-0.93) -1.05 (-0.90) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. 0.34 (0.75) 0.35 (0.76) 0.37 (0.81) 0.34 (0.75) 0.35 (0.77) 
  2c_gen 0.87 (0.83) 0.88 (0.85) 0.83 (0.80) 0.86 (0.82) 0.87 (0.84) 
  2c_voc -0.55 (-1.10) -0.55 (-1.09) -0.55 (-1.09) -0.55 (-1.09) -0.54 (-1.08) 
  3a FH-degree 0.80 (1.69) 0.81 (1.70) 0.81 (1.70) 0.80 (1.68) 0.80 (1.69) 
  3b Uni-degree 0.80 (2.00) 0.80 (2.00) 0.79 (1.98) 0.80 (2.00) 0.80 (1.99) 
           
father occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee 0.25 (0.81) 0.25 (0.80) 0.25 (0.81) 0.25 (0.82) 0.25 (0.81) 
  civil servant 0.53 (1.40) 0.51 (1.35) 0.52 (1.39) 0.53 (1.41) 0.51 (1.36) 
  work contract 0.92 (1.96) 0.91 (1.93) 0.91 (1.95) 0.91 (1.94) 0.90 (1.92) 
  never employed 3.01 (1.67) 2.99 (1.66) 2.98 (1.66) 3.00 (1.67) 2.98 (1.66) 
           
mother occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee 0.16 (0.38) 0.14 (0.34) 0.15 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) 0.13 (0.32) 
  civil servant 0.24 (0.43) 0.22 (0.39) 0.24 (0.42) 0.24 (0.42) 0.22 (0.38) 
  work contract -0.09 (-0.17) -0.11 (-0.19) -0.11 (-0.20) -0.10 (-0.18) -0.11 (-0.20) 
  never employed 0.366 (0.62) 0.33 (0.55) 0.36 (0.60) 0.36 (0.61) 0.32 (0.55) 
           
no. of semesters -0.12 (-2.42) -0.11 (-2.31) -0.12 (-2.49) -0.12 (-2.43) -0.11 (-2.32) 
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--- table 5.3.8 continued 
           
federal state degree           
  northern states ref.cat.          
  NRW -0.69 (-1.80) -0.68 (-1.78) -0.67 (-1.75) -0.70 (-1.81) -0.70 (-1.80) 
  Hessen/RLP -0.47 (-1.10) -0.46 (-1.08) -0.45 (-1.06) -0.47 (-1.11) -0.46 (-1.09) 
  Baden-Württ. -0.18 (-0.41) -0.13 (-0.30) -0.16 (-0.37) -0.19 (-0.43) -0.14 (-0.33) 
  Bavaria -0.99 (-2.31) -0.96 (-2.23) -0.99 (-2.31) -0.99 (-2.31) -0.96 (-2.24) 
  east Germany -1.56 (-3.34) -1.56 (-3.33) -1.52 (-3.24) -1.57 (-3.34) -1.55 (-3.32) 
  city states -1.64 (-2.90) -1.63 (-2.87) -1.62 (-2.87) -1.64 (-2.89) -1.62 (-2.85) 
  abroad 0.14 (0.15) 0.19 (0.21) 0.14 (0.15) 0.14 (0.15) 0.20 (0.21) 
oa -5.66 (-2.77) -5.65 (-2.76) -5.57 (-2.73) -5.69 (-2.78) -5.68 (-2.78) 
           
no stud. interrupt. -0.09 (-0.34) -0.09 (-0.32) -0.09 (-0.35) -0.09 (-0.33) -0.09 (-0.31) 
           
changed study field -0.45 (-1.44) -0.44 (-1.41) -0.44 (-1.41) -0.45 (-1.44) -0.44 (-1.42) 
           
source of finance           
  factor 1 -0.24 (-1.50) -0.23 (-1.47) -0.24 (-1.53) -0.24 (-1.53) -0.24 (-1.51) 
  factor 2 -0.290 (-2.18) -0.28 (-2.13) -0.30 (-2.21) -0.30 (-2.23) -0.29 (-2.19) 
  factor 3 0.14 (1.17) 0.15 (1.17) 0.15 (1.17) 0.15 (1.17) 0.15 (1.18) 
  factor 4 0.37 (3.34) 0.37 (3.32) 0.37 (3.33) 0.37 (3.36) 0.37 (3.34) 
  factor 5 -0.17 (-1.44) -0.17 (-1.45) -0.17 (-1.44) -0.17 (-1.44) -0.17 (-1.46) 
  factor 6 -0.35 (-2.24) -0.35 (-2.24) -0.35 (-2.23) -0.35 (-2.22) -0.35 (-2.24) 
           
satisf. with study           
  factor 1 -0.05 (-0.34) -0.04 (-0.32) -0.05 (-0.36) -0.05 (-0.33) -0.04 (-0.31) 
  factor 2 -0.18 (-1.42) -0.18 (-1.41) -0.18 (-1.40) -0.18 (-1.42) -0.18 (-1.42) 
  factor 3 0.12 (0.94) 0.12 (0.93) 0.12 (0.94) 0.12 (0.94) 0.13 (0.93) 
  factor 4 0.04 (0.31) 0.04 (0.31) 0.04 (0.32) 0.04 (0.30) 0.04 (0.30) 
           
work experience 
during studies 
          
  to make living -0.84 (-2.68) -0.85 (-2.70) -0.84 (-2.68) -0.85 (-2.71) -0.85 (-2.71) 
  student assistant 1.28 (4.95) 1.29 (4.98) 1.29 (4.98) 1.27 (4.92) 1.28 (4.96) 
  private sector 0.44 (1.65) 0.42 (1.56) 0.45 (1.66) 0.45 (1.67) 0.43 (1.61) 
  self-employed -0.88 (-2.52) -0.89 (-2.53) -0.88 (-2.52) -0.89 (-2.55) -0.89 (-2.55) 
  not employed 0.25 (0.85) 0.27 (0.91) 0.26 (0.89) 0.24 (0.82) 0.26 (0.88) 
           
percentile of GPA 1.30 (2.96) 1.28 (2.92) 1.31 (2.99) 1.29 (2.95) 1.28 (2.91) 
           
voc. before uni. -0.10 (-0.27)         
           
voc. overlap   0.71 (1.55)       
           
voc. non-overlap     -0.80 (-1.79)     
           
job search: voc. and 
netw. 
          
  no voc. + no netw.       ref.cat.    
  voc. + no netw.       -0.02 (-0.04)   
  no voc. + netw.       -0.06 (-0.06)   
  voc. + netw.       -0.89 (-1.04)   
           
job search: overlap  
voc. and netw. 
          
  no overlap+no 
  netw. 
        ref.cat.  
  overlap+no netw.         0.82 (1.72) 
  no overlap+netw.         -0.37 (-0.49) 
  overlap+netw.         -0.37 (-0.32) 
           
constant 62.22 (64.73) 62.06 (65.43) 62.40 (65.43) 62.26 (64.69) 62.11 (65.35) 
N 7819  7819  7819  7819  7819  
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.9: Full models, Effects of a vocational degree on the labor market entry among 
overeducated graduates (over-qualification: self-defined; logit). 
over-qualification: 
self-report 
vocational 
training before 
university 
voc. training: 
field overlap 
voc. training: no 
field overlap 
job search: voc. 
training and 
netw. 
job search: over-
qualification, 
voc. training and 
netw. 
           
sex = male -0.37 (-5.37) -0.37 (-5.55) -0.37 (-5.55) -0.37 (-5.38) -0.37 (-5.49) 
           
graduate-cohort = 
2001 
-0.07 (-0.72) -0.08 (-0.74) -0.07 (-0.73) -0.07 (-0.63) -0.06 (-0.62) 
           
field of study           
  arts, hum., soc. sc. ref.cat.          
  educ. / soc. work -0.02 (-0.13) -0.02 (-0.17) -0.02 (-0.19) -0.01 (-0.10) -0.02 (-0.12) 
  econ. / business 0.10 (0.94) 0.08 (0.78) 0.11 (1.04) 0.11 (1.01) 0.09 (0.87) 
  engin. / agric. -0.44 (-4.73) -0.45 (-4.75) -0.44 (-4.68) -0.43 (-4.57) -0.43 (-4.58) 
  science -0.56 (-4.88) -0.58 (-4.89) -0.58 (-4.87) -0.57 (-4.83) -0.57 (-4.84) 
  life science -3.57 (-9.74) -3.58 (-9.75) -3.57 (-9.73) -3.58 (-9.74) -3.58 (-9.75) 
  law -1.03 (-5.67) -1.03 (-5.67) -1.03 (-5.67) -1.02 (-5.62) -1.02 (-5.63) 
           
abitur grade 0.03 (5.37) 0.03 (5.39) 0.03 (5.42) 0.03 (5.39) 0.03 (5.39) 
           
abitur: non-gymn. -0.10 (-0.97) -0.10 (-0.99) -0.10 (-0.98) -0.09 (-0.89) -0.09 (-0.89) 
           
age first enr. -0.08 (-3.51) -0.08 (-4.22) -0.09 (-4.31) -0.08 (-3.44) -0.08 (-3.97) 
(age first enr.)² -0.001 (-0.95) -0.002 (-1.10) -0.002 (-1.22) -0.001 (-0.87) -0.001 (-0.93) 
           
father ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a 0.71 (2.02) 0.70 (2.00) 0.70 (2.01) 0.70 (1.99) 0.69 (1.97) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. 0.36 (1.61) 0.36 (1.60) 0.37 (1.63) 0.36 (1.59) 0.36 (1.60) 
  2c_gen -0.44 (-0.79) -0.43 (-0.77) -0.44 (-0.79) -0.43 (-0.77) -0.43 (-0.77) 
  2c_voc 0.32 (2.30) 0.32 (2.31) 0.32 (2.30) 0.33 (2.39) 0.34 (2.41) 
  3a FH-degree -0.002 (-0.02) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.004 (-0.05) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.001 (-0.01) 
  3b Uni-degree -0.12 (-1.32) -0.12 (-1.32) -0.13 (-1.35) -0.12 (-1.27) -0.12 (-1.27) 
           
mother ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.36 (-1.25) -0.36 (-1.23) -0.37 (-1.26) -0.36 (-1.23) -0.35 (-1.21) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. 0.10 (0.92) 0.11 (0.95) 0.11 (0.94) 0.11 (0.93) 0.11 (0.93) 
  2c_gen -0.30 (-1.03) -0.08 (-1.04) -0.31 (-1.04) -0.29 (-0.98) -0.29 (-0.98) 
  2c_voc 0.11 (0.84) 0.11 (0.83) 0.11 (0.83) 0.11 (0.85) 0.11 (0.83) 
  3a FH-degree -0.24 (-1.82) -0.24 (-1.82) -0.25 (-1.82) -0.24 (-1.78) -0.24 (-1.77) 
  3b Uni-degree -0.12 (-1.09) -0.13 (-1.11) -0.13 (-1.11) -0.12 (-1.07) -0.12 (-1.07) 
           
father occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.19 (-2.33) -0.19 (-2.32) -0.19 (-2.32) -0.19 (-2.39) -0.19 (-2.39) 
  civil servant -0.22 (-2.13) -0.22 (-2.13) -0.22 (-2.12) -0.22 (-2.17) -0.22 (-2.17) 
  work contract -0.12 (-1.04) -0.12 (-1.05) -0.12 (-1.04) -0.12 (-1.02) -0.12 (-1.03) 
  never employed -0.11 (-0.27) -0.12 (-0.28) -0.12 (-0.27) -0.13 (-0.29) -0.13 (-0.31) 
           
mother occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.01 (-0.09) -0.01 (-0.11) -0.01 (-0.08) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.002 (-0.02) 
  civil servant -0.00 (-0.00) -0.00 (-0.00) 0.003 (0.02) 0.004 (0.02) 0.002 (0.01) 
  work contract 0.08 (0.57) 0.08 (0.55) 0.08 (0.57) 0.09 (0.62) 0.09 (0.61) 
  never employed 0.13 (0.88) 0.13 (0.86) 0.13 (0.90) 0.14 (0.93) 0.14 (0.90) 
           
no. of semesters 0.04 (3.69) 0.04 (3.69) 0.04 (3.64) 0.04 (3.68) 0.04 (3.70) 
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--- table 5.3.9 continued 
 
federal state degree           
  northern states ref.cat.          
  NRW 0.18 (1.77) 0.18 (1.79) 0.18 (1.77) 0.18 (1.83) 0.18 (1.85) 
  Hessen/RLP 0.06 (0.52) 0.06 (0.55) 0.06 (0.52) 0.06 (0.55) 0.06 (0.57) 
  Baden-Württ. 0.10 (0.86) 0.10 (0.88) 0.10 (0.83) 0.11 (0.94) 0.11 (0.97) 
  Bavaria -0.04 (-0.32) -0.04 (-0.31) -0.04 (-0.36) -0.04 (-0.31) -0.03 (-0.29) 
  east Germany 0.43 (3.49) 0.43 (3.53) 0.43 (3.50) 0.43 (3.47) 0.423 (3.49) 
  city states 0.25 (1.72) 0.26 (1.73) 0.25 (1.71) 0.25 (1.69) 0.25 (1.69) 
  abroad -0.04 (-0.16) -0.04 (-0.17) -0.05 (-0.21) -0.04 (-0.17) -0.04 (-0.17) 
oa 0.56 (1.16) 0.57 (1.18) 0.56 (1.17) 0.56 (1.17) 0.56 (1.17) 
           
no stud. interrupt. 0.07 (1.02) 0.07 (1.01) 0.07 (1.01) 0.07 (0.99) 0.07 (0.99) 
           
changed study field 0.10 (1.29) 0.10 (1.30) 0.10 (1.29) 0.10 (1.29) 0.10 (1.31) 
           
source of finance           
  factor 1 0.03 (0.64) 0.03 (0.62) 0.03 (0.61) 0.03 (0.76) 0.03 (0.76) 
  factor 2 -0.03 (-0.88) -0.03 (-0.90) -0.03 (-0.91) -0.02 (-0.67) -0.02 (-0.67) 
  factor 3 -0.003 (-0.10) -0.003 (-0.10) -0.003 (-0.10) -0.003 (-0.10) -0.004 (-0.12) 
  factor 4 -0.10 (-2.45) -0.10 (-2.45) -0.10 (-2.44) -0.11 (-2.52) -0.11 (-2.54) 
  factor 5 -0.01 (-0.18) -0.01 (-0.18) -0.01 (-0.17) -0.01 (-0.21) -0.01 (-0.20) 
  factor 6 -0.003 (-0.07) -0.003 (-0.06) -0.003 (-0.07) -0.01 (-0.16) -0.01 (-0.14) 
           
satisf. with study           
  factor 1 0.001 (0.03) 0.001 (0.02) 0.001 (0.02) 0.002 (0.04) 0.001 (0.03) 
  factor 2 0.06 (1.70) 0.06 (1.71) 0.06 (1.70) 0.06 (1.72) 0.06 (1.72) 
  factor 3 0.04 (1.06) 0.04 (1.06) 0.04 (1.07) 0.04 (1.04) 0.04 (1.04) 
  factor 4 -0.02 (-0.63) -0.02 (-0.62) -0.02 (-0.62) -0.02 (-0.60) -0.02 (-0.60) 
           
work experience 
during studies 
          
  to make living 0.12 (1.50) 0.12 (1.50) 0.12 (1.51) 0.13 (1.62) 0.13 (1.60) 
  student assistant -0.27 (-3.84) -0.27 (-3.83) -0.27 (-3.84) -0.26 (-3.77) -0.26 (-3.77) 
  private sector -0.10 (-1.40) -0.10 (-1.41) -0.10 (-1.37) -0.11 (-1.48) -0.11 (-1.51) 
  self-employed 0.10 (1.16) 0.10 (1.15) 0.10 (1.16) 0.11 (1.22) 0.11 (1.22) 
  not employed 0.02 (0.22) 0.01 (0.23) 0.02 (0.21) 0.03 (0.33) 0.03 (0.34) 
           
percentile of GPA -0.93 (-7.90) -0.93 (-7.89) -0.93 (-7.88) -0.93 (-7.89) -0.93 (-7.90) 
           
voc. before uni. 0.06 (0.67)         
           
voc. overlap   0.08 (0.71)       
           
voc. non-overlap     0.01 (0.05)     
           
job search: voc. and 
netw. 
          
  no voc. + no netw.       ref.cat.    
  voc. + no netw.       0.01 (0.13)   
  no voc. + netw.       0.41 (1.72)   
  voc. + netw.       0.56 (3.00)   
           
job search: overlap  
voc. and netw. 
          
  no overlap+no 
  netw. 
        ref.cat.  
  overlap+no netw.         0.02 (0.21) 
  no overlap+netw.         0.43 (2.39) 
  overlap+netw.         0.66 (2.70) 
           
constant -0.80 (-3.34) -0.79 (-3.32) -0.78 (-3.25) -0.84 (-3.49) -0.84 (-3.52) 
N 8105  8105  8105  8105  8105  
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.10: Full models, effects of a vocational degree on the labor market entry among 
overeducated graduates (over-qualification: not in ESEC 1 or 2; logit). 
over-qualification: 
ESeC 
vocational 
training before 
university 
voc. training: 
field overlap 
voc. training: no 
field overlap 
job search: voc. 
training and 
netw. 
job search: over-
qualification, 
voc. training and 
netw. 
           
sex = male -0.34 (-4.32) -0.35 (-4.49) -0.34 (-4.36) -0.34 (-4.32) -0.35 (-4.51) 
           
graduate-cohort = 
2001 
0.65 (5.28) 0.65 (5.26) 0.65 (5.28) 0.65 (5.29) 0.67 (5.33) 
           
field of study           
  arts, hum., soc. sc. ref.cat.          
  educ. / soc. work 0.29 (2.35) 0.28 (2.31) 0.29 (2.36) 0.29 (2.35) 0.28 (2.27) 
  econ. / business -0.16 (-1.43) -0.15 (-1.27) -0.15 (-1.26) -0.16 (-1.43) -0.16 (-1.31) 
  engin. / agric. -1.12 (-10.3) -1.12 (-10.2) -1.11 (-10.3) -1.12 (-10.3) -1.12 (-10.2) 
  science -1.12 (-7.82) -1.12 (-7.81) -1.12 (-7.81) -1.12 (-7.82) -1.12 (-7.83) 
  life science -3.00 (-9.41) -3.00 (-9.40) -3.00 (-9.39) -3.00 (-9.41) -3.00 (-9.39) 
  law -0.90 (-4.77) -0.90 (-4.77) -0.90 (-4.76) -0.90 (-4.76) -0.90 (-4.77) 
           
abitur grade 0.03 (4.75) 0.03 (4.79) 0.03 (4.76) 0.03 (4.77) 0.03 (4.83) 
           
abitur: non-gymn. 0.32 (3.06) 0.33 (3.05) 0.33 (3.07) 0.33 (3.07) 0.33 (3.09) 
           
age first enr. -0.03 (-1.05) -0.04 (-1.58) -0.03 (-1.22) -0.03 (-1.05) -0.04 (-1.66) 
(age first enr.)² -0.001 (-0.57) -0.001 (-0.80) -0.001 (-0.63) -0.001 (-0.57) -0.001 (-0.87) 
           
father ed.: CASMIN           
  1a -0.08 (-0.17) -0.08 (-0.17) -0.07 (-0.15) -0.09 (-0.18) -0.12 (-0.25) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. 0.03 (0.09) 0.03 (0.11) 0.03 (0.11) 0.03 (0.08) 0.04 (0.12) 
  2c_gen 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02) 
  2c_voc 0.16 (1.00) 0.16 (0.99) 0.16 (0.98) 0.17 (1.00) 0.17 (1.02) 
  3a FH-degree -0.07 (-0.67) -0.07 (-0.69) -0.07 (-0.69) -0.07 (-0.65) -0.07 (-0.69) 
  3b Uni-degree 0.05 (0.48) 0.05 (0.45) 0.05 (0.46) 0.05 (0.50) 0.05 (0.49) 
           
mother ed.: 
CASMIN 
          
  1a -0.19 (-0.53) -0.19 (-0.53) -0.20 (-0.54) -0.19 (-0.53) -0.17 (-0.48) 
  1c/2a with voc. ref.cat.          
  1b/2b no voc. -0.22 (-1.49) -0.22 (-1.48) -0.22 (-1.50) -0.22 (-1.48) -0.22 (-1.48) 
  2c_gen 0.07 (0.23) 0.07 (0.21) 0.07 (0.24) 0.07 (0.24) 0.08 (0.24) 
  2c_voc 0.09 (0.64) 0.09 (0.64) 0.09 (0.64) 0.09 (0.62) 0.08 (0.54) 
  3a FH-degree -0.17 (-1.17) -0.17 (-1.17) -0.17 (-1.17) -0.17 (-1.18) -0.17 (-1.17) 
  3b Uni-degree -0.23 (-1.82) -0.23 (-1.84) -0.23 (-1.81) -0.23 (-1.82) -0.23 (-1.84) 
           
father occ. 
position 
          
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.09 (-0.94) -0.09 (-0.93) -0.09 (-0.94) -0.09 (-0.95) -0.09 (-0.95) 
  civil servant -0.18 (-1.49) -0.17 (-1.48) -0.17 (-1.48) -0.18 (-1.51) -0.18 (-1.51) 
  work contract -0.27 (-1.94) -0.27 (-1.94) -0.27 (-1.94) -0.27 (-1.93) -0.27 (-1.95) 
  never employed -0.24 (-0.43) -0.24 (-0.43) -0.24 (-0.42) -0.24 (-0.42) -0.25 (-0.45) 
           
mother occ. position           
  self-employed ref.cat.          
  employee -0.09 (-0.77) -0.09 (-0.76) -0.09 (-0.75) -0.09 (-0.74) -0.09 (-0.71) 
  civil servant -0.03 (-0.18) -0.03 (-0.17) -0.03 (-0.17) -0.03 (-0.17) -0.03 (-0.15) 
  work contract -0.05 (-0.28) -0.05 (-0.28) -0.04 (-0.27) -0.04 (-0.27) -0.04 (-0.27) 
  never employed -0.23 (-1.28) -0.23 (-1.27) -0.23 (-1.25) -0.23 (-1.28) -0.24 (-1.30) 
           
no. of semesters 0.02 (1.34) 0.02 (1.28) 0.02 (1.32) 0.02 (1.34) 0.02 (1.31) 
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--- table 5.3.10 continued 
           
federal state degree           
  northern states ref.cat.          
  NRW 0.13 (1.10) 0.13 (1.10) 0.13 (1.09) 0.13 (1.10) 0.13 (1.13) 
  Hessen/RLP 0.13 (1.00) 0.13 (1.00) 0.13 (0.99) 0.13 (1.00) 0.13 (1.01) 
  Baden-Württ. 0.17 (1.23) 0.16 (1.20) 0.16 (1.19) 0.17 (1.24) 0.17 (1.24) 
  Bavaria 0.08 (0.62) 0.08 (0.59) 0.08 (0.60) 0.08 (0.61) 0.08 (0.59) 
  east Germany 0.45 (3.27) 0.46 (3.29) 0.45 (3.24) 0.45 (3.27) 0.46 (3.29) 
  city states 0.40 (2.45) 0.40 (2.44) 0.40 (2.43) 0.40 (2.42) 0.39 (2.36) 
  abroad -0.42 (-1.37) -0.43 (-1.40) -0.42 (-1.38) -0.42 (-1.37) -0.44 (-1.44) 
oa 1.00 (1.84) 1.01 (1.85) 1.00 (1.82) 1.00 (1.83) 0.97 (1.77) 
           
no stud. interrupt. 0.05 (0.58) 0.05 (0.57) 0.05 (0.58) 0.05 (0.58) 0.04 (0.54) 
           
changed study field 0.16 (1.80) 0.16 (1.80) 0.16 (1.79) 0.16 (1.80) 0.17 (1.89) 
           
source of finance           
  factor 1 0.03 (0.55) 0.03 (0.53) 0.03 (0.56) 0.03 (0.55) 0.03 (0.54) 
  factor 2 0.02 (0.54) 0.02 (0.52) 0.02 (0.54) 0.02 (0.59) 0.02 (0.57) 
  factor 3 -0.01 (-0.13) -0.01 (-0.13) -0.02 (-0.14) -0.01 (-0.13) -0.01 (-0.17) 
  factor 4 -0.04 (-0.83) -0.04 (-0.83) -0.04 (-0.83) -0.04 (-0.85) -0.04 (-0.90) 
  factor 5 0.002 (0.04) 0.002 (0.05) 0.002 (0.05) 0.002 (0.06) 0.01 (0.13) 
  factor 6 -0.04 (-0.92) -0.04 (-0.92) -0.04 (-0.93) -0.04 (-0.93) -0.04 (-0.87) 
           
satisf. with study           
  factor 1 0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (0.32) 0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (0.26) 
  factor 2 0.06 (1.48) 0.06 (1.48) 0.06 (1.47) 0.06 (1.49) 0.06 (1.51) 
  factor 3 0.03 (0.77) 0.03 (0.78) 0.03 (0.77) 0.03 (0.78) 0.03 (0.79) 
  factor 4 -0.05 (-1.15) -0.05 (-1.15) -0.05 (-1.15) -0.05 (-1.16) -0.05 (-1.15) 
           
work experience 
during studies 
          
  to make living 0.12 (1.35) 0.12 (1.36) 0.12 (1.35) 0.13 (1.39) 0.12 (1.36) 
  student assistant -0.27 (-3.38) -0.27 (-3.38) -0.28 (-3.39) -0.27 (-3.35) -0.27 (-3.36) 
  private sector -0.15 (-1.83) -0.15 (-1.80) -0.15 (-1.81) -0.15 (-1.83) -0.16 (-1.88) 
  self-employed 0.04 (0.40) 0.04 (0.40) 0.04 (0.40) 0.04 (0.44) 0.05 (0.47) 
  not employed 0.02 (0.27) 0.02 (0.25) 0.02 (0.25) 0.02 (0.28) 0.02 (0.28) 
           
percentile of GPA -0.23 (-1.73) -0.23 (-1.71) -0.23 (-1.73) -0.23 (-1.73) -0.23 (-1.74) 
           
voc. before uni. 0.06 (0.50)         
           
voc. overlap   -0.01 (-0.10)       
           
voc. non-overlap     0.08 (0.65)     
           
job search: voc. and 
netw. 
          
  no voc. + no netw.       ref.cat.    
  voc. + no netw.       0.03 (0.30)   
  no voc. + netw.       -0.10 (-0.35)   
  voc. + netw.       0.21 (0.92)   
           
job search: overlap  
voc. and netw. 
          
  no overlap+no 
  netw. 
        ref.cat.  
  overlap+no netw.         -0.11 (-0.82) 
  no overlap+netw.         -0.24 (-1.05) 
  overlap+netw.         0.61 (2.14) 
           
constant -1.46 (-5.25) -1.44 (-5.23) -1.46 (-5.29) -1.47 (-5.27) -1.44 (-5.22) 
N 8105  8105  8105  8105  8105  
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.11: Original questionnaire in German language: satisfaction with study program 
and university. 
Wie beurteilen Sie die folgenden Aspekte Ihres 
abgeschlossenen Studiums? 
(5-Likert-Skala: sehr gut – sehr schlecht) 
How would you evaluate the following aspects of 
your completed studies? 
(5-likert-scale: very good – very poor) 
Strukturiertheit structuredness 
Studierbarkeit (Zeitperspektive) possibility to complete studies from a timing 
perspective 
zeitliche Koordination temporal coordination 
Zugang zu Praktika/Übungen access to internships/exercises 
Aktualität erlernter Methoden up-to-dateness of studied methods 
Aktualität der Praxisanforderungen up-to-dateness of practical requirements 
Verknüpfung von Theorie und Praxis conjunction/link of theory and practice 
Aufbereitung Pflichtpraktika rework of mandatory internship 
fachliche Vertiefungsmöglichkeiten possibility to deepen functional knowledge 
Einübung wiss. Arbeitsweisen practice of scientific methods 
Einübung mündlicher Präsentationen practice of presentations 
Anfertigen wiss. Texte scientific writing 
Einübung beruflich-professionellen Handelns practice of occupational and professional action 
fach-/berufsbezogene Einübung: Fremdsprachen job-related practice of foreign languages 
Kontakt zu Lehrenden contact with teaching personal 
fachliche Beratung und Betreuung functional advice and supervision 
Besprechung Hausarbeiten etc. rework of assignments 
Verfügbarkeit wichtiger Fachliteratur access to important literature 
Zugang zu EDV-Diensten access to computing-services 
Verwendung EDV in Lehre use of computerized teaching 
ggf. Laborausstattung laboratory equipment 
Unterstützung Stellensuche supported job search 
Angebot berufsorientierender Veranstaltungen supply of occupation-oriented subjects 
individuelle Studien- und Berufsberatung individual study- and occupational-support 
Source: HIS higher education graduate panels 1999 and 2001; own calculations, not weighted, multiple 
imputation of missing values. 
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Table 5.3.12: CASMIN educational classification. 
CASMIN code Description 
1a Inadequately completed general education 
1b General elementary education 
1c Basic vocational qualification or general elementary education 
and vocational qualification 
2a Intermediate vocational qualification or intermediate general 
qualification and vocational qualification 
2b Intermediate general qualification 
2c Full maturity certificates 
3a Lower tertiary education 
3b Higher tertiary education 
Source: Brauns and Steinmann (1999): Educational Reform in France, West-Germany and the United 
Kingdom: Updating the CASMIN Educational Classification. In: ZUMA-Nachrichten 44, Jg. 23, S. 7–
44. 
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6 INEQUALITY OF OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES IN 
THE LIFE COURSE – A FEW FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the beginning of this volume, I set out to integrate research on educational 
inequality by social origin with the life course perspective and investigate how 
educational inequality develops during young adulthood in three different contexts. 
Two broad research questions defined the framework for my empirical studies: 
First, I asked about social inequality in postsecondary educational career 
patterns with specific attention to the decision to re-enroll. Second, I investigated 
effects of non-traditional educational careers on a successful labor market entry. 
Both of these questions were selected with the aim of developing our 
understanding of the role of later formal education for the intergenerational 
persistence of social positions via educational attainment. The stimulation of adult 
formal education by recent institutional developments in the European higher 
education area moved the German system towards the setting Nordic and Anglo-
Saxon countries have experienced for decades. Access to higher education is widened 
and to a lower degree restricted by the secondary education system. Further, the 
institutional support and flexibility for adult students is at least announced to be 
extended. These policies have been implemented explicitly with the aim of creating 
life chances. As a consequence, they demand a careful examination of changes in life 
courses. Instead of a historic comparison within one country, I compare the German 
situation before the Bologna reforms to those contexts which could be seen as 
something like the blueprint for many recent developments. The changing framework 
for education in the life course brings up new issues on the patterns of life courses, 
educational attainment and their dependence on the parental social status. How does 
social origin relate to educational re-enrollment back from the labor market into 
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education? And if there are differences, are they context specific, or mainly 
attributable to the education system alone? How do overall patterns of educational 
careers change, and does the timing of education constitute a new dimension of social 
inequality? Do these inequalities have consequences for social status via placement in 
the labor market? All of these questions seem largely unresolved given the praise 
sometimes heard on the improvement of life chances via adult education. Sections 1 
and 2 prepared the ground for giving an answer to these questions by describing the 
country specific situations in Germany, the US and Sweden with regard to the 
institutional setup (section 1) and the individual standardization of education careers 
(section 2). Section 3 then addressed the question how educational inequality 
develops into young adulthood, and discussed some potential explanations for country 
differences. 
Furthermore, studying late educational enrollments has more to offer to 
researchers interested in social inequality than evaluating the macro-structural 
conditions in a way which is close to policy making. There is a number of questions 
which is more theoretical nature which contribute to a more general understanding of 
intergenerational status mobility. By comparison to young children up to secondary 
school, young adults are supposed to be comparatively independent from their 
parents. Does social inequality still reach these late transitions? And what could be 
explanations for such longevity of the effects of parental social positions on 
educational participation of children? The specificity of the situation makes the 
research questions I have explicated above to theoretically significant ones. 
Explanations of social origin differences apply differently than to other thresholds 
throughout the educational career. A set of theoretical questions therefore can further 
motivate studying this subject – also with a more detailed view on the micro-level. In 
section 4 I have addressed several of them: 
- How does the development and persistence of young adults own 
educational expectations relate to social origin (chapter 4.1)? 
- Can we test the claim, that parental status is the benchmark for young 
adults with regard to their own lower limits in terms of status they want to 
achieve? Is additional formal education a reaction on temporary failure 
within this aim? Other than for earlier educational transitions, we can 
directly observe failure in the reproduction of parental status before re-
enrollment gets possible (chapter 4.2 and 4.3). 
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- Do young adults react on life events differently, depending on the costs of 
education in the context they life (chapter 4.3)? 
- Which parent defines the relevant status position? Do mothers become 
important when the material situation of the family becomes a less direct 
limitation for higher education (chapter 4.4)? 
Answering these questions and developing explanations for these thresholds on the 
micro-level can not only help to better understand class inequality in general, but also 
to develop more focused and concrete explanations on the macro-level in the future. 
 
 
At the same is true for the consequences of non-standard educational careers 
upon labor market entry. A large and steadily increasing strand of literature within 
economics and sociology discusses the question why education pays off. Many 
different explanations were developed, but rarely tested against each other. 
Differentiation in the pathway through that education is achieved might help in 
several ways to isolate some of the mechanisms. Section 5 follows the life courses 
one step further and asks how later education contributes to the so-called OED-
triangle (Blau and Duncan, 1967). Two chapters within this section address the issue 
for the German and the US context respectively. Do non-standard patterns of 
educational careers lead to consequences on the labor market in a very flexible 
education system (chapter 5.2 on the US)? And what about the practice of German 
young adults who qualify for higher education and complete a vocational degree 
before entering? Does the achievement of this additional (but lower) degree have 
additional pay-offs to the returns that can be realized from higher education? 
 
 
Most answers to these questions are discussed in the given chapters and I 
will not recapitulate them here in detail. There are a small number of somewhat 
bigger theoretical questions and also some implications for policy that shall be 
discussed briefly on the following pages. 
One such bigger question is how institutional conditions can change life 
course and life chances. From the results, I suggest that two developments will go 
along with a flexibilization of the educational career regimes and de-
institutionalization of educational career patterns by widening access and promoting 
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adult studies. We can expect a contribution of open and flexible education systems to 
a de-standardization of the educational career, but also to a wider de-standardization 
of life courses throughout young adulthood. If education mixes more with other 
phases of the life course, e. g. interrupts work careers, is used more often for avoiding 
unemployment or it interferes with family formation, this has consequences for the 
typical trajectories of young peoples’ biographies. The education system has a direct 
and powerful impact on the patterns of educational careers, and is thus a strong 
example for the importance of institutional settings for individual life courses. 
Previous work on the question which institutional arrangements form patterns of life 
courses, as discussed in chapter 1, have not taken into account how the higher 
education system structures postsecondary educational careers. The set of institutions 
governing the patterns of life courses in youth should be extended by this feature of 
the higher education system, resulting from its openness towards non-traditional 
students. 
The comparison between Sweden, Germany and the US has proven that these 
institutions operate comparatively independent from other institutional differences or 
larger regime types. It therefore supports an approach to comparative research which 
concentrates on the concrete institutions (Mayer, 2005) rather than on broad (and 
sometimes vague) regime types (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990). By any of the broad 
classifications known, Sweden and the US would be expected to produce very 
different outcomes, while a look at the concrete institutional settings correctly 
suggests that the de-standardization of educational careers is on a similar level. From 
changes in these settings, we can expect that life courses will change as well – which 
applies e.g. to the recent reforms put on their way within the German system (see 
chapter 1.5). Therefore, some policy implications seem appropriate at this stage. The 
next paragraphs shortly develop an expectation on the development of educational 
inequality upon flexibilization and de-institutionalization of educational career 
trajectories. 
 
Equalization by a System of Second Chances – Does it Work? 
What consequences can be expected from de-institutionalization of educational 
careers for intergenerational inequality? Answering this question is not 
straightforward and needs some interpretation of my and other researcher results. My 
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conclusion is twofold: on the one side, removing selectivity and improving the 
opportunities of access for non-traditional students to higher education can create new 
chances. And even though inequality in later transitions may increase, it may replace 
the higher inequality that we would have observed if the selection was made earlier. 
This would be in line with the expectation that later decisions are per se less 
dependent on the parents due to a generally increasing independence from parents 
over the life course (Müller and Karle, 1993). When higher education is concerned, 
the direct dependence on the parents can still be assumed to be high due to continuing 
financial dependence and the high costs compared to earlier secondary education. For 
the later enrollment financial independence is often greater than directly after leaving 
secondary school due to own earnings or spouses resources. In best case, the later 
chances serve previously disadvantaged individuals to catch up with those who could 
get more education right after finishing secondary school. Then, lower social origin 
students would likely be over-represented among re-enrollers. That this is in most 
cases not true has been shown by several chapters of this volume, especially chapters 
3.2 and 3.3. For a reducing of removing inequality, this is not even necessary. If a 
system replaces earlier transitions by later transitions, social inequality will already be 
smaller if inequality in later transitions is smaller than in earlier ones. Thus, my 
findings do not contradict the claim that more equality of educational opportunities 
could be achieved by opening access and offering support for non-traditional students 
who did not qualify for higher education via specified tracks in the secondary 
education system. The idea that a general shift into later transitions could reduce 
inequality even supported by several findings, e.g. the very high inequality in earlier 
transitions in Germany by comparison to the somewhat higher inequality in Sweden 
and the US in later transitions. 
However, a number of mechanisms possibly counteract this equalization, at 
least to some degree. First and foremost, it should be mentioned that late chances 
could in most cases not be used by lower class children who were diverted away from 
higher education earlier. More often, upper class children made use of these 
opportunities and thus inequality in educational attainment increased over the life 
course. The only exception throughout all empirical analyses within this book – and 
also throughout all literature that is known to me – are women in the US. Among 
them, re-enrollments after a longer time out of education – at least two years –
working class daughters are more likely to enroll and this might indeed help them to 
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catch up to small degree in their educational attainment. For all other cases, those who 
have better chances of educational achievement are also more likely to participate in 
later postsecondary education. Thus, Merton’s Matthew-effect in science (Merton, 
1968) seems to apply on the process of educational attainment too: higher initial 
chances are linked with a permanent advantage. The finding is refined when 
controlling for different measures of scholastic performance in the earlier educational 
career. For the open and flexible contexts Sweden and the US, these are able to 
account for much of the class differences in re-enrollment activities. This finding has 
interesting implications for the education system: it means that earlier disadvantages 
are the source of later disadvantages, rather than the question of later inequality (in re-
enrollment) itself. Hence, widening access to late transitions might improve the 
chances of lower class children somewhat by the removal of nominal barriers which 
were build up earlier in the educational career. But it will not remove the substantive 
barriers of a lack in schooling and development. This interpretation is in line with a 
conclusion that Cameron and Heckmann draw upon their study about the GED-degree 
in the US: ‘there is no cheap substitute for schooling’ (Cameron and Heckman, 1993, 
p. 1). Non-equivalence of preparedness for higher education explained much, but not 
all of the inequality in late school entry. For the potential of policies promoting late 
second chances, this suggests that these policies might work to some degree and could 
potentially indeed help some of the lower origin students – but only if their chances 
for better achievement in earlier schooling would be improved. Then, however, one 
might wonder if they would even need second chances, since the counterfactual 
situation could be that lower class students enroll directly just as their upper class 
peers when prepared equally well. In sum, these findings can strengthen the 
suggestion to intervene earlier. But then the question remains what we can expect if 
only the postsecondary education system would change, and the secondary education 
system remained as it is. 
What could be shown in section 2 is that in education systems with open 
success, educational career patterns de-standardize over individuals. Chapter 3.4 
showed that lower class individuals are the once who are most affected by this de-
standardization. This new line of inequality must be questioned with regard to two 
different issues before concluding about its problematic nature which might go along 
with flexible systems. 
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First, it is not sure what the counterfactual situation is: will more young 
adults from the lower classes delay postsecondary education when possibilities for 
later re-enrollment are given and attractive? Does this lead to a delay of educational 
careers for some individuals, and a ‘cooling out’ or diversion away from the education 
system for others? Or are the many non-standard educational careers a result of the 
usage of second chances of individuals who would have been unable to study 
otherwise? Chapter 3.4 showed that lower classes delay more often, even though their 
re-enrollment rate is lower, as shown in 3.2. From such a pattern, one can infer that 
the non-standard patterns do at least not stem from later equalization through second 
chances. Thus, at least a part of the non-standard patterns is likely to be attributable to 
intended delays of higher education, instead as to ad hoc chances of preferences 
towards higher education. An open and flexible system, as the US or Sweden, invite 
to delay and it is therefore likely that additional inequalities in timing are provoked 
compared to more rigid systems. In chapter 4.1 I have followed on this question by 
analyzing a dataset which includes information about the sequential order of 
educational decision making in the German context. With regard to the most frequent 
detour for this context, the completion of both a vocational and a higher education 
degree, I showed that a part of the young adults planned this pattern from the 
beginning, while about half of them also re-enroll ad-hoc. There is some cooling out 
among those who delay their entry into higher education, which also causes a small 
increase in the overall inequality of higher education participation. Taking these 
findings together, one should expect that at least a part of the potential students delay 
their higher education enrollment when the education system invites them to do so. 
Second, one may wonder whether there are any negative consequences 
related with non-standardized educational careers – with regard to success within the 
education system as well as upon labor market entry. In this volume, I have not 
investigated the consequences within the education system but in section 5, I 
discussed literature which presents clear-cut answers to this question in places. All 
studies I have found and discussed show higher drop-out rates among those who enter 
late or interrupted before. On this issue, certainly more research is needed about the 
specific circumstances that cause drop-outs among re-entrants into education. Many 
different answers are possible, such as life events in other biographical areas – of 
which family formation is just one example. The consequences upon labor market 
entry are discussed within section 5 at length. Overall, besides obvious opportunity 
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costs for a later realization of returns to education in the labor market, both studies on 
the US and on Germany reveal that there are on average no strong negative 
consequences for later achievement. It is, however, important to note that this is only 
the case if the same amount of education is eventually achieved, and the higher drop-
out rates must be kept in mind. This pattern, with strong consequences within the 
educational system but at most small consequences within the labor market, has a 
clear policy implication. Delays and non-standard educational careers are overall 
unproblematic (in the cases we know) with regard to labor market outcomes, 
including non-monetary returns. However, non-traditional students often lag behind 
the direct entrants in their educational achievement. Thus, flexibilization and 
openness of the education system should be accompanied by an improvement of 
chances to succeed within the education system for adults with labor market 
experience. There is not much research with regard to the reasons for their apparently 
problematic situation. Future research should for example investigate whether it is 
more important to offer childcare since family formation breaks out adult learners, or 
whether preparedness for higher education by the secondary school system is 
insufficient for those who typically delay. 
In sum, there could be some equalization in educational attainment through a 
more open education system to non-traditional learners, but it is unlikely that the great 
expectations of a society of equal opportunities through lifelong learning will come 
true. Benefits are expected to be on a lower level, and go along with new issues of 
inequality that have to be counted in. A new differentiation in educational career 
patterns will develop, which may imply a new dimension of educational inequality in 
particular with regard to persistence in the education system. The re-enrollment 
decision will become a more important educational threshold and reducing inequality 
in re-enrollment will become a new task, which is not done by just offering 
admission. And most importantly, some of the social inequalities developed in earlier 
stages of the educational career will re-appear and manifest themselves in this later 
threshold. 
  
6.   Discuss ion  and  Conclus ions  
 377 
Inequality in Late Educational Transitions and Educational Career 
Patterns 
Beyond the question how systems which shift educational transitions into later stages 
of the life course perform overall with regard to inequality of opportunities, the 
existence of inequality in late educational transitions has policy implications in its 
own right. The existence of class differences way beyond the typical age of moving 
away from parents home first illustrates the strength of parental influence. The 
constant inequality requests a closer look at its reasons. Some of those explanations 
which I have investigated in this volume do have policy relevance in their own right. 
First and most directly, the costs for higher education could be a continuing 
deterrent for lower class young adults to enter the educational system, even after a 
number of years in the labor force. This could easily be tackled by policies reducing 
the costs for higher education and offering studentships targeted at older students. 
Overall, I do not think that this explanation is a very likely one, since the control of 
poverty does not change the continuing effects for the US much. And I also observe 
substantial inequality in Sweden, where costs have already been reduced by such 
policies. Tackling the problem of direct costs might therefore be seen as a helpful 
step, but it is probably not sufficient for equalizing re-enrollment. 
Second, I have paid specific attention to the motive of relative status 
reproduction, since status demolition can be directly observed when studying re-
enrollments. Assuming that families give first priority to reproduction of parental 
status within the next generation leads to the expectation that those who failed in their 
aim would re-enroll to have better chances of overcoming this situation. Then, later 
chances of re-enrollment would first and foremost cater the needs of ‘disappointed’ or 
‘downgraded’ upper class children. The evidence for this explanation is not very 
strong from my findings and neither from previous work done by other others. 
Nevertheless, there is some support for this explanation. Balancing this motive is hard 
to achieve by policies. The fact that it does not explain much is therefore – at least 
from a policy perspective – a finding that should be welcomed. 
Third, the ‘primary effects’, differences in education performance and 
attendance in secondary school, are found to be important explanatory variables. This 
suggests that not even so much the postsecondary education system itself should be 
made more attractive for lower class children, but secondary school has to prepare 
more equally for higher education. As discussed above on the system level, nominally 
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equivalent access will not suffice for achieving this aim. Programs for secondary 
school students who are falling behind are likely to be more effective. 
Fourth, most specific to the late educational participation are life events in 
other biographical areas that may interfere with late educational participation. These 
events are shown to be correlated with origin at least to some degree, as discussed in 
chapters 4.4 and 4.5. Furthermore, they are related with other lines of inequality, in 
particular sex-segregation. For women it is much more likely that family formation 
conflicts with their work career, but also with education. Therefore, fostering entry 
into education throughout adulthood should take into account the specific situation of 
adult learners, in particular with regard to their family situation. In this context it is 
interesting that women re-enroll more often after a divorce. This suggests paying 
attention not only to childbearing, but also to partnership formation. These women 
might have to re-train after staying at home for a long time, which puts policies into 
question that discourage women’s labor force participation. 
 
 
My last conclusion refers to the relevance of the promotion of lifelong 
learning for sociologists. The changing nature of study behavior and timing of 
education, student body and access situation into the education system increases the 
relevance of seeing inequality in postsecondary education from a life course 
perspective. In the US, this circumstance has led to a large body of research, as my 
literature review in several places of the book shows (in particular in sections 2 and 
3). For Germany, education throughout the life course will become of greater 
relevance for social scientists. The developments under recent reforms are likely to 
change the interplay of postsecondary education and other life course domains and 
thus lead to more complex situations for studying inequality in this area of education. 
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